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ABSTRACT 
Tax crimes, money laundering and other financial crimes threaten the strategic, 
political and economic interests of developed and developing countries. The 
problems encountered by the researcher, is the broad and vague meaning of 
financial crime compounded by the confusing and ill-considered use of the term 
by law- and policymakers, politicians, government agencies, agency officials and 
practitioners weakening effective communication about the phenomenon. The 
literature shows that given the complexity and multi-faceted nature of financial 
crime, combating financial crime in all its facets cannot be undertaken by 
investigative agencies acting in isolation. This study was undertaken with the aim 
to describe and systematically categorise financial crime and evaluate the 
prospect of using a Whole-of-Government approach as a framework to harness 
the capacity of the existing government agencies to combat financial crime more 
effectively. The research was underpinned by a pragmatic paradigm allowing the 
researcher to apply a qualitative research methodology using an exploratory and 
evaluation research design. A detailed review of the literature available nationally 
and internationally was conducted to establish a conceptual and practical 
understanding of the issues under investigation. An interview schedule with 
predetermined questions was developed, pre-tested and administered to 
participants who are active practitioners involved in combating financial crime in 
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the primary government agencies responsible for combating financial crime 
based on a purposive sample. The data obtained from the literature and 
participants were analysed, interpreted and thematically listed according to the 
frequency with the aim of identifying and comparing similarities and differences 
between the data. The data was used to develop a system to categorise financial 
crime systematically based on descriptors used to describe the meaning and 
application of the term financial crime and to propose practical methods practises 
and models to combat financial crime more effectively. This research indicates 
that financial crime can be systematically categorised according to descriptors of 
the unlawful conduct and that the whole of government approach is a viable 
approach to combat financial crime more effectively according to the available 
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SUMMARY 
Co-operation is difficult at the international level. It is also equally challenging, 
and sometimes even harder, at the domestic level. There are serious obstacles 
to overcome. Efforts are often carried out in parallel by different agencies and 
organisations focus on their particular piece of the puzzle. Laws and rules 
sometimes prevent sharing. 
(Opening address by Richard Boucher, Deputy General Secretary of the OECD to delegates 
attending the OECD Tax and Crime Conference in Oslo, 2011.) 
 
This study was conducted with the aim of evaluating the prospect of a Whole-of-
Government approach by Government enabling integration of efforts, inter-
agency cooperation, collaboration and sharing of information between key 
investigative agencies responsible for combating financial crime as a model 
institutional and operational arrangement to combat financial crime more 
effectively. 
 
During the preliminary literature study, it emerged that internationally the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank are devoting considerable 
attention to the issue of combating financial crime. More specifically, the OECD 
is at the forefront of promoting intensified inter-agency cooperation and sharing 
of information in combating financial crime through what is referred to as a Whole-
of-Government approach. 
 
This qualitative, exploratory and evaluation research study explores what the 
Whole-of-Government approach is all about examining and determining the 
available options for application by investigative authorities in South Africa to 
empower them to combat financial crime more effectively. In this research, 
combating of financial crime concerns all the efforts undertaken by government 
agencies against the background of the legislative, policy, institutional and 
operational frameworks to achieve its objective implementing a Whole-of-
Government approach. 
vii 
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Financial crime is a unique form of unlawful behaviour receiving attention 
because of its damaging effect on the economies of countries and its symbiotic 
relationship with other forms of crimes such as corruption, money laundering and 
financing of other illegal activities. The meaning of the concept financial crime is 
not always clear. The way financial crime and examples thereof are addressed in 
government publications and statements made by public officials shows a 
potential lack of shared understanding and characteristics of this category of 
crime. A substantial number of international organisations and authors have 
published literature regarding the emergence of financial crime and its meaning. 
In South Africa, there is little or no literature emerging about the phenomenon 
save for a few exceptions focusing on specific offences, for example, money 
laundering. 
 
The meaning and application of the term financial crime generally and in the 
South African context from a South African perspective is explored and 
described. In addition to the conceptual vagueness, a practical explanation of the 
diverse unlawful conduct and behaviours included under the concept from a 
South African crime perspective does not exist. 
 
This research provides a model for a systematic method of categorising financial 
crime providing a detailed reference to the conduct and characteristics used to 
describe that crime. The researcher analysed the relevant literature to determine 
the views of academia and authors and views expressed in government and 
organisational publications on the meaning and characteristics of financial crime. 
This research provides a degree of conceptual clarity of the concept financial 
crime thereby assisting practitioners involved in the combating of financial crime 
and policymakers to efficiently identify and communicate about the topic when 
developing policies and strategies to combat financial crime more effectively. 
 
Internationally organisations and governments are studying, exploring and 
implementing programmes to ensure better inter-agency cooperation and 
collaboration amongst crucial agencies to combat financial crime more 
effectively. In South Africa, there are few examples of official attempts to initiate 
viii 
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efforts for closer collaboration and inter-agency cooperation to combat financial 
crime through official policies and programmes. The researcher conducted an in-
depth analysis and review of the available literature related to the topic to expand 
on his understanding of the research problem under investigation. The 
researcher analysed the domestic legislation providing the legal framework for 
the establishment of the critical investigative agencies, their mandates relevant 
to the combating of crime generally and more explicitly financial crime and the 
extent for which it makes provision for cooperation and sharing of information for 
combating financial crime. 
 
The concept of a Whole-of-Government approach is increasingly encouraged as 
an organisational model to enable inter-agency cooperation and coordination 
during the combating of financial crime. Reference to its application is 
increasingly finding its way into the literature and statements made by lawmakers 
and practitioners in the context of countering of financial crime (and other crime 
issues requiring an integrated and multi-disciplinary response). The concept is 
explained and evaluated in this research using sources of information such as 
the literature and feedback from the interviews. Once the concept is explained, 
the researcher evaluates the features of different models for application of a 
Whole-of-Government approach as an enabler for better co-operation and co-
ordination of efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. Using the 
information obtained during the exploration of the literature and feedback from 
the participants the researcher considered the development of a conceptual 
model or strategy to illustrate its possibilities and viability. In practical terms, it is 
aimed at bridging the gap between the principals of a Whole-of-Government 
approach and practise in the context of combating financial crime. 
 
The researcher is of the view that the results of this research will empower that 
the agencies to understand the meaning and types of financial crime within the 
South African criminal context and enable them to identify different organisational 
models that can be considered to implement a Whole-of-Government approach 
to combat financial crime more effectively. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) asserts 
that financial crime has a detrimental impact on predominantly developing 
countries such as South Africa, as it deprives them of resources which could 
otherwise have been used for its long-term development (OECD, 2012a:5). In an 
article published in the ‘Business Day,’ a columnist (Theobald, 2013) lamented 
over the appalling and weak investigation and prosecution of serious financial 
crimes. He stated, “Without effective investigation and prosecution of serious 
financial crime, our investment markets are doomed”. Theobald (2013), who often 
refers to the appallingly weak investigation and prosecution of serious financial 
crimes, cited as corroboration the disastrous Fidentia prosecution that resulted in 
little more than a slap on the wrist for former Fidentia Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) J Arthur Brown. The judge in that case was scathing about the quality of 
the prosecution’s performance. “The judgment told us we should be very worried 
about how well our prosecutors are doing” (Theobald, 2013). This article is just 
one of many that frequently appear in the printed and electronic media, referring 
to the poor state of South Africa’s law enforcement efforts to curb financial crime. 
 
The lack of cooperation and integration during the investigation and prosecution 
of financial crime was cited as a possible cause for the poor state of South Africa’s 
law enforcement efforts to curb financial crime. Professor Gerhard Kemp of the 
law faculty of the University of Stellenbosch was quoted in an article published in 
the ‘Mail & Guardian’ newspaper, stating: 
 
As a general point in all these economic crime cases, as 
soon as you are between the police and the NPA there are 
different approaches and one might get lost with 
methodology…it doesn’t make sense from an investigative 
point of view” (Steyn, 2013). 
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During March 2011, the OECD hosted a Tax and Crime Conference in Oslo, 
Norway. The theme of the conference was (Tax and Crime Conference ..., 2011): 
 
A Whole-of-Government Approach in Fighting Financial 
Crime. 
 
In his opening address to the delegates attending the conference, Richard 
Boucher, Deputy General Secretary of the OECD, acknowledged that to combat 
financial crime effectively there must be cooperation between agencies (Boucher, 
2011). Boucher further stated that separate agencies could not operate in 
“isolation” and further acknowledged that officials attached to various 
investigative agencies with the skills to investigate financial crimes are spread 
across these agencies.  
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The background section is provided because it outlines the context within which 
the research will take place, and it gives insight into the developments that have 
preceded the research project “to understand what it is all about”, as averred by 
Denscombe (2012:51 & 52). 
 
The “hard question” with regard to inter-agency cooperation and information 
sharing between investigative agencies during the combating (prevention, 
detection and investigation) of financial crime, Boucher (2011) suggested, was, 
“how to do so effectively” (my emphasis). In highlighting the problems associated 
with cooperation and information sharing between agencies involved in 
combating financial crime, Boucher (2011) stated the following:  
 
Co-operation is difficult at the international level. It is also 
equally challenging, and sometimes even harder, at the 
domestic level. There are serious obstacles to overcome. 
Efforts are often carried out in parallel by different agencies 
and organisations focus on their particular piece of the 
puzzle. Laws and rules sometimes prevent sharing. 
3 
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In the closing statement by Norway, as the host country, and the OECD as the 
organisers, it was noted that: 
 
Tax crime, money laundering and other financial crimes 
thrive in a climate of secrecy, inadequate legal frameworks, 
lax regulation, poor enforcement and weak inter-agency 
cooperation. (The launch of the Oslo Dialogue…, 2011). 
  
Among others, the Conference reached the following conclusions about “inter-
agency cooperation (The launch of the Oslo Dialogue…, 2011): 
 
There is a clear benefit to inter-agency cooperation 
covering tax, law enforcement, anti-money laundering 
authorities and where appropriate other agencies; 
 
There is a need to identify and fill the legislative, policy and 
operational gaps that prevent effective domestic and 
international cooperation; and 
 
Developing countries can also benefit from the Whole-of-
Government approach and in particular significant 
improvements could be achieved through early detection, 
effective investigation, prosecution and recovery of assets 
by use of appropriate tools (my emphasis). 
 
Implementing a Whole-of-Government approach starts with the development of a 
shared understanding of what it means to work in a Whole-of-Government manner 
(Melchor, 2008:5). According to Melchor (2008:5), this may involve some changes 
in structures and legislation, but most importantly it requires a change in 
organisational culture and individual expectation. Through a Whole-of-
Government approach, horizontal coordination and integration are implanted in 
the process of policy design and implementation (Melchor, 2008:6). 
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From the stated excerpts and statements, it is clear that financial crime poses a 
serious threat and that there are now calls on governments to make the most of 
the capacity of various government agencies to work together. This includes 
working across agency boundaries, aiming to prevent, detect and prosecute 
financial crime through inter-agency cooperation, using a Whole-of-Government 
approach. 
1.3 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY (PROBLEM STATEMENT) 
Creswell (2013:130) asserts that the intent of the problem statement in qualitative 
research is to provide a reason for studying a particular problem or issue. 
Creswell (2013:130) warns that the term problem may be a misnomer and 
suggests that instead of referring to a ‘problem’ it might be clearer if it is called a 
“need for the study” or to consider “creating a rationale for the study”. Various 
authors Marshall & Rossman, 2011:59, & Flick, 2011:89) state that qualitative 
research can be conducted because of the experience of the researcher.  
 
The researcher first dealt with “creating a rationale for the study” as a precursor 
to identifying “issues” dealt within the problem statement. In following this 
approach, the researcher decided that this section could be more appropriately 
described as “The rationale for research”, as suggested by Creswell (2013:130). 
 
The researcher is a former detective in the South African Police Service (SAPS), 
with 14 years’ experience in the Commercial Crime Unit, investigating commercial 
and financial crime. He is currently a South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
official with 20 years’ experience in the investigation of tax offences, and was 
previously seconded to other investigation agencies to investigate financial crime. 
In the researcher's experience and from the stated literature, the researcher is 
aware and concerned that the system to combat financial crime, which is 
institutionalised in sector-based silos (i.e. separate, single-purpose investigative 
agencies), has become fragmented and suffers from poor coordination and 
cooperation. In turn, this leads to an ineffective approach to combating financial 
crime. The researcher noticed with concern that the current system is not capable 
of effectively harnessing and integrating resources within and across the key 
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investigative agencies to meet the need for the effective combating of financial 
crime. 
 
The apparent inability of government agencies to combat financial crime in an 
integrated fashion creates a need to explore an alternative approach such as the 
prospect of a Whole-of-Government approach, where there are horizontal 
cooperation and integration, sharing of information and harmonising of initiatives 
to combat financial crime. This should be entrenched in the process of a model 
policy framework or white paper and implementation by Government. 
 
For reasons stated above, the researcher has identified “a need” to conduct a 
further scientific enquiry and in-depth analysis of the current situation with regard 
to the government policies, legal arrangements, practices, steering approaches 
to combating financial crime and the viability of implementing the Whole-of-
Government approach as a model steering framework to combat financial crime 
in South Africa. 
 
It is against the backdrop provided above that the researcher formulated the 
research problem statement as follows: 
 
The system to combat financial crime in South Africa in the 
context of how financial crime is understood, the lack of a 
policy framework or strategic plan, and how separate key 
investigative agencies cooperate to combat financial crime 
is fragmented and not effective. 
1.3.1 Ill-considered and confusing application of the term financial crime 
When lawmakers, heads of agencies and practitioners use the term financial 
crime, they often do so quoting various examples of crimes and ignoring others. 
The term financial crime is often used in conjunction with other categories of 
crime such as commercial crime and economic crime, creating confusion and 
miscommunication when using the term financial crime. The same concern 
applies to communication in official government documents.  
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1.3.2 Sector-based single purpose agencies 
The system to combat financial crime in South Africa is spread across a multitude 
of institutionalised, sector-based, ‘single-purpose’ investigative agencies with 
vertical responsibilities legally mandated for combating financial crime at various 
stages. Financial crime is a cross-agency problem and not only that of a single 
agency. The various agencies operate in isolation. Their efforts are fragmented 
and suffer from poor coordination and cooperation that render the combating of 
financial crime ineffective. Efforts to share information between agencies are 
dependent on the various authorising legislation relevant to separate 
investigation agencies. 
1.3.3 No policy framework 
There is no or an ineffective policy framework to provide guidance and direction 
regarding the approach to accomplish a multidisciplinary and integrated synergy 
across agency boundaries dedicated to the combating of financial crime. There 
is no clear government policy that spells out what Government’s approach is in 
respect of combating financial crime by integrating various agencies, and of what 
policies are in place to ensure inter-agency cooperation. There is no ‘centre of 
government’ operating in a guiding role to create a structure to set expectations, 
set a common agenda, ensure overall accountability or to coordinate the efforts 
of investigative agencies during the combating of financial crime.  
 
Investigative authorities’ function is based on a multitude of strategic plans that 
do not demonstrate harmonisation of a single approach to effectively combat 
financial crime. Many of these schemes never become operational. Apart from 
documented intentions and possible plans, there appears to be no clear, 
implemented, decisive strategic and operational policy stating the official 
approach or architecture to prevent, detect and investigate financial crime. 
1.3.4 Obstructive elements 
There are several legislative provisions in a vast and complex array of statutes 
providing for procedures for cooperation and information sharing among the 
various agencies and authorities that may prove to be obstructive to interagency 
7 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
cooperation. Disclosure of information does not necessarily mean reciprocating, 
and different procedures to share information apply to the various agencies. The 
use of information may be restricted to specific purposes.  
 
There are also operational and political factors to consider. Operationally, 
obtaining information from another may include drawn-out procedures and in 
some cases even applying for court orders. Politically, there may be resistance 
to adopting arrangements or amendments to legislation to enable Whole-of-
Government approaches.  
1.4 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
Denscombe (2012:49) states that the aims of the research indicate the direction 
the researcher is embarking on and points to the objectives the researcher wants 
to accomplish. In doing so, it should guide the reader of the research report as to 
the nature of the research (Denscombe, 2012:50).  
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the prospect of a Whole-of-Government 
approach by Government to enable integration of efforts, inter-agency 
cooperation, collaboration and sharing of information among the key 
investigative agencies responsible for combating financial crime that can be 
implemented as a model to combat financial crime more effectively. 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Fouché and De Vos (2011:94), the researcher must make a 
conscious decision about what the goal or purpose and objectives of the 
research are going to be. Fouché and De Vos (2011:94) caution that there is 
confusion in the terminology about the meaning of the terms purpose and 
objective and therefore its use. Fouché and De Vos (2011:94) assert that the 
purpose of research refers to the broader, more abstract commencement of 
“something which you [the researcher] plan[s] to achieve”, and also refers to the 
“central thrust of the study” (Fouché & De Vos, 2011:108).   
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According to Fouché and De Vos (2011:94), objective symbolises the more 
concrete, measurable and speedier commencement of accomplishing what the 
researcher plans to do, or sets out to achieve. It identifies the specific issues the 
researcher wants to examine (Fouché & De Vos, 2011:108). Fouché and De Vos 
(2011:94) suggest that the term objective refers to the steps the researcher 
should take one by one to accomplish the purpose, therefore indicating the 
intended result of the study. Fouché and De Vos (2011:95) believe that studies 
may propose a multitude of objectives but that there is usually one objective that 
is prominent. 
 
Kumar (2011:50) asserts that stated objectives transform the research questions 
into “behavioural aims by using action-oriented words such as ‘to find out’, ‘to 
determine’, ‘to ascertain’ and ‘to examine’.” Fouché and De Vos (2011:95) agree, 
stating that it is useful to refine the study by expressing the actions by using a 
verb that translates to “explore, describe, explain, correlate, etc.” In doing so, 
different objectives will emerge (Fouché & de Vos, 2011:95). Fouché and De 
Vos (2011:109) propose a list of research objectives with which most 










Strydom and Delport (2011b:288) suggest that it is accepted that a specific 
objective must be formulated for every research question. The detailed 
objectives of this research about achieving the research aim and developing 
knowledge in dealing with it are as follows: 
a. To explore and describe the concept, nature and characteristics of financial 
crime. 
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b. To explain how financial crime can be systematically categorised (codified) 
practically, using as a reference a descriptor of the type of unlawful 
conduct. 
c. To explore and describe the application of ‘combating’ or to combat crime 
within the South African, legislative, policy and strategic framework. 
d. To determine the key investigative agencies and institutional arrangements 
for combating financial crime. 
e. To explore what the legal, institutional or organisational models are for 
ensuring inter-agency cooperation and integration of efforts to combat 
financial crime, considering what the legal framework provides in respect 
of legislative mandates and sharing of information. 
f. Determine what the concept Whole-of-Government entails and how it can 
be applied or adapted for implementation by the Government to serve as a 
model framework to ensure effective multi-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts to combat financial crime. 
g. To identify and explain models for implementation of a Whole-of-
Government approach that can support the Government in implementing a 
strategy or policy framework, using all its key agencies to combat financial 
crime more effectively. 
 
Given the stated objectives, the researcher believes that this study presents an 
original contribution to the clarification of the emergence of this category of 
crime, explicitly about the need to combat it more effectively, using a Whole-of-
Government approach, in the context of South Africa having a multitude of 
agencies, each with its separate legal mandate, objectives and disciplines at its 
disposal. 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions provide the specification of exactly what is to be investigated 
during the research (Denscombe, 2010a:15). According to Maxwell (2013:77), 
research questions identify the things that researchers want to understand and 
learn. Research questions should provide a snapshot of exactly what it is that is 
going to be investigated, and those are the things that must be observed, 
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measured and interrogated to illuminate the broader topic (Denscombe, 
2010a:15-16). In providing detail and direction to the research, research 
questions in a sense operationalise the research by providing a basis for “tangible 
focused points of investigation” (Denscombe, 2002:31). This means that the 
ideas and the concepts that provided the background to the research is put into 
practice during the research (Denscombe, 2010a:15). 
 
The research questions formulated by the researcher in this study are as follows: 
a. What do the concept, nature, characteristics and examples of financial 
crime entail?  
b. How can financial crime be categorised systematically (codified) in practical 
terms, using as a reference a description of unlawful conduct?  
c.  What does ‘combating’ or to combat’ crime entail within the South African 
legislative, policy and strategic framework? 
d. Which are the key investigative agencies responsible for combatting 
financial crime? 
e. What institutional models are available for ensuring inter-agency 
cooperation and integration of efforts for combating financial crime, 
considering the legal framework that provide for legislative mandates and 
sharing of information?  
f. What does the concept Whole-of-Government entail and how can it be 
applied or adapted for implementation by the Government to serve as a 
model framework to ensure effective multi-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts to combat financial crime? 
g. Are models for implementing a Whole-of-Government approach available 
to support Government in implementing an organisational system, using all 
its key agencies and integrate efforts to combat financial crime more 
effectively? 
1.7 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Strydom (2013:149), different authors have different opinions about 
what the purpose of research should be called. Various authors use the terms 
research, design, strategies, purpose, objectives, goals or aims interchangeably 
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(Strydom, 2013:150). Strydom posits that before the design of a study can be 
formulated, the purpose of the study should be developed. Creswell (2013:134) 
states that the purpose statement is the most important statement in a qualitative 
study. Strydom (2013:160) suggests that for the sake of clarity the purpose of the 
study should be described separately. 
 
Denscombe (2002:25) states that the purpose of the research relates to the 
reason for doing the research. According to Creswell (2013:134), the purpose 
statement is a declaration of intent providing the major objective of the study. 
Terrell (2016:21) expands by stating that the purpose statement in research 
informs the reader of what the overarching focus or goal of the study is. 
 
Singleton and Straits (1999; as quoted by Dantzker & Hunter, 2006:37) identify 
three expectations of possible accomplishments for conducting research, 
namely exploring, describing and explaining. According to Denscombe 
(2010a:10), these represent different notions about what research should 
attempt to achieve. Engel and Schutte (2013; as quoted by Strydom, 2013:149) 
postulate that to explore, describe and explain can be regarded as the purpose 
of research more than any of the other terms but also includes an evaluative 
purpose. Strydom (2013:151) concludes that for purposes of social research the 
term research is distinguished as follows namely exploration, description, 
explanation, evaluation, intervention and participatory action research. Creswell 
and Plano Clark (2011:152) refer to the words describe, understand, explore and 
develop as action verbs to indicate an “exploration of the central phenomenon”. 
Alston and Bowles (2002; as quoted by Strydom, 2013:151) postulate that most 
studies may contain elements of all the purposes, and that the elements depend 
on the nature of the research problem and state of knowledge in the field. 
 
Exploratory research provides the researcher with the opportunity to obtain 
additional insight about something of which there is already awareness but 
limited knowledge, and the why or how remains to be discovered (Dantzker & 
Hunter, 2006:37). Denscombe (2010a:10) states that explanatory research is 
aimed at explaining “why” things happen. Research is undertaken for 
explanatory endeavours to analyse and fully understand “why” as applied to 
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policies, frameworks, attitudes and opinions, to name but a few (Dantzker & 
Hunter, 2006:38). The alternatives as stated are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and a research project may contain elements of more than one 
category (Denscombe, 2010a:10). 
 
Terrell (2016:23) states that purpose statements for qualitative studies include 
the participants and location of the study, focusing on what is called the “central 
phenomenon” that is to be investigated. The central phenomenon contains 
words denoting the concept being explored in qualitative research (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011:152). Creswell (2013:135) suggests that in formulating a 
statement of purpose, the researcher identifies the specific qualitative approach 
used in the study, using words that indicate the action of the research, and 
identifies the central phenomenon of the study related to the concept being 
explored or examined in the study and suggests referring to the participants and 
place of study. 
 
Using the guidance provided by Creswell (2013:135-136) as noted above, the 
researcher proposes that the statement of purpose for the study be formulated 
as follows: 
 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory and evaluation research study is to 
explore what the Whole-of-Government approach is all about, and to define best 
practices for its application by the investigative authorities in South Africa to 
empower them to combat financial crime more effectively. In this research, it is 
submitted, combating of financial crime concerns all the efforts undertaken by 
government agencies within their legislative, policy, institutional and operational 
frameworks to achieve their objectives and the Whole-of-Government approach 
through an integrated governmental response. 
 
Denscombe (2010a:11-12) provides additional guidance on how the researcher 
should arrive at specifying the purpose of the research. According to Denscombe 
(2002:26), the following notions of the kind of things social research endeavours 
to find out provide direction to the researcher in formulating the purpose of the 
study: 
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• Evaluating something (how well does something work?) 
• Describing something (what is it like?) 
• Developing good practice (how can it be improved?) 
• Empowerment (how can it help those who are being researched?). 
 
Regarding evaluating something as a purpose for doing research, Denscombe 
(2002:27) states that such research is driven by a desire to arrive at conclusions 
about the value of one thing when compared with alternatives. This is done by 
researchers investigating particular programmes or policies with the intention of 
weighing up their strengths and weaknesses and, of importance to this study, 
how things might be improved. 
 
With regard to describing something, the purpose of the research may be to 
discover information that did not exist previously by doing exploratory research, 
thereby breaking into new territory and reporting back on what is found 
(Denscombe, 2002:27). This study endeavours to explore how financial crime is 
understood and how mechanisms and structures function to combat financial 
crime.  
 
With regard to developing good practice, Denscombe (2002:27) explains that 
the driving force behind such a purpose for doing research is to solve practical 
problems or to improve procedures by setting best practices. According to this 
purpose, the aim is to arrive at recommendations for good practice that will 
address problems and enhance the performance of individuals and institutions 
by means of changes to processes and procedures.  
 
Where the purpose of the study is empowerment, Denscombe (2002:27) asserts 
that in social research, the people or subject matter that are investigated are 
treated as the objects of the research, where such research is conducted on and 
about them. Denscombe (2002:28) proposes that the research should be viewed 
as being conducted for them with the aim of empowering them. Denscombe 
(2002:35) postulates that this approach stems from the questions regarding “who 
stands to gain from the knowledge produced by the research?” 
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Using the guidance provided by Denscombe as described above, the researcher 
submits that the purpose statement of the study can be further explained as 
follows: 
 
In this study, the purpose is to describe the meaning and application of the term 
financial crime in general, and in the South African context from a South African 
perspective. This research explores methods of systematically categorising 
financial crime in accordance with the description of the type of conduct falling 
within a category of financial crime, as opposed to a clinical legal classification 
in accordance with the conventions of the South African legal system, i.e. the 
distinction between common law crimes and statutory crime. This exploration 
describes a reference to the type of unlawful and criminal conduct and 
characteristics that are used to describe financial crime. The exploration aims to 
empower practitioners involved in the combating of financial crime and 
policymakers to effectively identify and communicate about the topic when 
developing policies and strategies to combat financial crime more effectively. 
 
The purpose of this research is also to evaluate the current situation regarding 
the efforts by the authorities to combat financial crime against the background 
of the legal, policy and strategic framework and how well agencies cooperate, 
coordinate and share efforts across agency boundaries during these efforts to 
determine how well it works. The researcher explored the literature for a model 
for classification that could be used or adapted for application in the South 
African context to do this. The information was obtained from the literature 
reviewed and feedback received from the participants. 
  
The researcher explored the concept of a Whole-of-Government approach, 
which is increasingly encouraged as an organisational model to enable inter-
agency cooperation and coordination in the combating of financial crime.  Once 
the concept has been explained, the researcher evaluates the features of 
different models for the best practice of applying a Whole-of-Government 
approach to empower the authorities to cooperate better and coordinate their 
efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. Using the information obtained 
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during the exploration of the literature and feedback from the participants, the 
researcher considered the development of a conceptual model or strategy to 
illustrate its possibilities and viability. In practical terms, it is aimed at bridging 
the gap between the principles of a Whole-of-Government approach and 
practice in the context of combating financial crime. 
 
The researcher is of the view that the results of this research, according to the 
statement of purpose, will enable the investigative agencies to understand the 
meaning and types of financial crime within the South African criminal context 
and to identify various organisational models that can be considered in order to 
implement a Whole-of-Government approach to combat financial crime more 
effectively. The researcher will report on the findings of the different aspects of 
this research in one or more journal articles in scientific journal(s), and in addition 
present lectures to audiences concerned with combating financial crime, such 
as the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, the Institute of Commercial 
Forensic Practitioners, and the authorities, to share new knowledge and best 
practice obtained during this research project. 
1.8 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research is limited to the exploration of the current efforts of the Government 
within the, legislative, strategic, policies and legal framework to combat financial 
crime. Available options for improving efforts to combat financial crimes more 
effectively are limited to the prospect of implementing a Whole-of-Government 
approach and associated paradigms, such as inter-agency cooperation and an 
integrated and multidisciplinary approach as an organisational model to improve 
coordination across organisational boundaries. 
 
The law is dynamic and develops continuously. Certain statutes referred to in this 
research at the time of writing may have been amended or repealed, or certain 
Bills may have been enacted. The same may apply to draft policies, discussion 
documents or White Papers published by Government. For obvious reasons, 
these changes could not have been considered and included in this study at the 
time of finalisation of the research report. 
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In this research, a reference to combating or to combat financial crime is used as 
a common description to include the concepts of prevention, detection and 
investigation of financial crime. This research is not intended to explore a 
rationalisation of existing agencies involved in combating financial crime or 
evaluating the prospect of dissolving or replacing any of the existing single-
purpose agencies. This research is limited to the key investigative government 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime, their knowledgeable and 
experienced staff members, as well as other experts in the field with proven 
knowledge and experience in the various disciplines associated with the 
combating of financial crime. This research recognises the importance of 
partnerships between government agencies, the private sector, and non-
governmental agencies in combating financial crime but avoids the theoretical 
discussion and practical application, due to the limited scope of this research, 
which is restricted to cooperation between statutory investigative agencies. 
1.9 KEY CONCEPTS 
Definitions of concepts are provided to enable readers to have a clear 
understanding of the meaning of the concepts (Le Roy, 2013:27). According to 
Strydom and Delport (2011b:288), the definitions provided should be 
complemented by any specific meaning attached to them by the researcher and 
using the terms in the context of the study. The following are the definitions that 
represent the important concepts that form part of the research and discussion: 
1.9.1 Agency 
An agency, according to the rather narrow description of Pollitt and Talbot, as 
referred to by Lægreid and Verhoest (2010:4), is a: 
 
Structurally disaggregated body, formally separated from 
the ministry, which carries out public tasks, at a national 
level on a permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is 
financed mainly by the state budget, and is subject to public 
legal procedures. 
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In this research, the term agency refers to an organ of state, a statutory body, 
authority, or department funded by the State, staffed by officials in the service of 
the State, with a legal mandate and powers to perform a function or duty in relation 
to the combating of financial crime.  
1.9.2 Crime 
Joubert (2010a:44) concisely defines crime as: “Unlawful and blameworthy 
conduct that is defined by law as a crime.” A similar but more functional definition 
is presented by Gooch and Williams (2007:94) who define crime as, “[a]n act (or 
sometimes failure to act) that is deemed by statute or by the common law to be 
a public wrong and is therefore punishable by the State in criminal proceedings”. 
In South Africa, criminal conduct is sometimes referred to as a crime and 
sometimes as an offence. However, there is no technical difference between a 
crime and an offence (Snyman, 2008:5). 
1.9.3 Crime detection 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, “crime detection” is the process of uncovering 
criminal activity (or verifying reported crime) and acquiring evidence in order to 
identify and prosecute its perpetrators (Oxford Dictionary, 2018). 
 
For purposes of this research report, crime detection, detection of crime and 
detection are interpreted as similar terms. In the context of this study, crime 
detection refers to those activities undertaken by the SAPS and other agencies 
affiliated with the State by virtue of their respective statutory mandates. 
1.9.4 Criminal investigation 
Benson, Jones and Horne (2015:19) present the following working definition to 
explain the concept criminal investigation: 
 
Criminal investigation can be defined as a systematic, 
organised, thinking, reasoning, examination and analysis 
process designed to search for the truth, during which an 
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inquiry and thorough analysis is conducted of all types of 
crimes or unlawful acts. 
 
For purposes of this research report, criminal investigation, investigation of crime 
and crime investigation are interpreted as similar terms. In the context of this 
research, criminal investigation refers to those undertaken by the SAPS and other 
agencies affiliated with the State by virtue of their respective statutory mandates 
and authority to conduct criminal investigations. 
1.9.5 Crime prevention 
Lab (2014:27) defines crime prevention as, “any action designed to reduce the 
actual level of crime and perceived fear of crime”. In this research, the focus is 
on financial crime. In respect of financial crime prevention, Croall (2003:45) 
includes measures such as regulatory and control strategies. In the context of 
this research, crime prevention is limited to the actions of the SAPS and other 
agencies affiliated with the State by virtue of the SAPS’ statutory mandate. 
1.9.6 Financial crime 
In explaining the meaning of financial crime, Gottschalk (2010b:2), while stating 
that the term financial crime expresses different concepts, depending on the 
jurisdiction and context, quotes Henning (2009:295), who states that: 
 
Financial crime generally describes a variety of crimes 
against property, involving the unlawful conversion of 
property belonging to another person to one’s own personal 
use and benefit, more often than not involving fraud but also 
bribery, corruption, money laundering, embezzlement, 
insider trading, tax violations, cyber-attacks and the like. 
1.9.7 Whole-of-Government 
In this research, Whole-of-Government denotes public service agencies working 
across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated 
government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and 
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informal. They can focus on policy development, programme management and 
service delivery (Connecting Government …, 2004:1). In the context of this 
research, the term does not necessarily refer to the literal interpretation of all of 
Government but to the departments with political oversight and agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime at some stage or another. 
1.10 PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD-VIEW OFFERED IN THE STUDY 
According to Yin (2016:341), world-views represent “[a] broad and profound 
system of thinking about the methods to be used in social research, based on 
having a particular ontological perspective.” Creswell (2014:5) suggests that the 
broad research approach represents “the plan or proposal” to conduct research. 
Creswell (2014:3) offers three approaches to research, namely: 
• Qualitative 
• Quantitative, and 
• Mixed methods 
 
Creswell (2014:5) postulates that each of the above approaches to research 
involves philosophical assumptions and distinct approaches and procedures that 
intersect. Creswell (2013:15) posits that researchers will always bring certain 
philosophical assumptions to their research, whether they are aware of it or not. 
Creswell (2014:5) reminds us that during the planning of a research study, the 
researcher has to think through the philosophical world-view assumptions that he 
will bring to the study. The research design that the researcher applies to the 
study should be informed by the relevant philosophical world-view that he 
adopted (Creswell, 2014:5). Creswell (2014:6) suggests that researchers 
unambiguously state the larger philosophical views adopted because this will 
assist in explaining why a particular research approach was chosen for the 
research. Morehouse (2012:4) underscores the importance of the researcher, 
knowing which philosophical viewpoint underpins the study, as it is helpful to the 
“development within the inquirer of several important qualities” such as: 
• enhancing the ability to detect research problems as they arise; 
• the capacity to defend the work undertaken to supporters and critics; 
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• confidence to ask good research questions and then to match the 
issues to appropriate data collection methods and data analysis 
procedures. 
 
Creswell (2014:6) sees ‘world-view’ as “[a] general philosophical orientation 
about the world and the nature of the research that a researcher brings to a 
study”, meaning that it is a “basic set of beliefs that guide action”. Other authors 
have, according to Creswell (2014:6), decided to refer to ‘world-view’ as 
‘paradigms’ (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011, in Creswell, 2014:6). According to 
Grbich (Grbich, 2007 in Yin 2016:15), “[a] worldview establishes the position or 
epistemological location” for qualitative research. Yin (2016:15) explains that this 
philosophy refers to the belief one holds “about the ways of knowing what you 
know and how your research is intended to arrive at its findings and conclusions”. 
The position or location referred to relates to the influence over the choice of 
study design and how the research intends to arrive at its findings and conclusion 
Yin, 2016:15). According to Morehouse (2012:4), an understanding of the 
philosophical underpinnings of a research project provides the foundation upon 
which: 
• to select data-gathering strategies; 
• to formulate research questions; 
• to include or exclude methods of data analysis; 
• to make a case for research choices as the research moves from one 
phase to the next. 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1994:107-108) postulate that paradigms as basic belief 
systems are based on ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions, defining what it is that they are about, and that fall within or outside 
the ambit of legitimate inquiry. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994:108), the 
core beliefs that define the paradigms of enquiry can be summarised by using 
the responses that proponents of any of the paradigms give when answering 
three fundamental questions. Guba and Lincoln (1994:108) suggest that the 
answers provided to any of the three key questions that are intersected in such a 
way, taken in any order, constrain how the others may be answered. The 
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following philosophical questions, according to Lincoln and Guba (1994:108), 
serve as the major focus around which the philosophical paradigms (world-views) 
can be considered: 
• The ontological question (question of ontology) 
• The epistemological question (question of epistemology) 
• The methodological question (question of methodology) 
 
Morehouse (2012:11) identifies the same philosophical questions as Lincoln and 
Guba above, except for issues of methodology, and identifies an additional three 
beliefs or assumptions, based on the following philosophical questions: 
• The logical question (question of logic) 
• The teleology question (question of teleology) 
• The ethical question (question of ethics) 
 
Morehouse (2012:11) suggests that in answering the philosophical questions, the 
researcher will be influenced in respect of the choice of methods of data collection 
and analysis. According to Morehouse (2012:11), with the benefit of knowing the 
background to the philosophical underpinnings of the research, the researcher 
will be better able to understand the extent to which the philosophy guides 
him/her in addressing the issues in a practical manner.  
 
Yin (2016:3) posits that world-views range from positivism to constructivism, and 
those choices of world-view also include a comfortable middle ground consisting 
of postpositivist, critical theory, transformative and pragmatist world-views.  
According to Creswell (2014:6), the post-positivist world-view, the constructivist 
world-view, transformative world-view and the pragmatic world-view are widely 
discussed in the literature. Yin (2016:3) suggests that the pragmatist world-view 
probably takes the best advantage of the full spectrum of research methods and 
procedures that qualitative research has to offer.  
 
The decision by a researcher to embrace a qualitative, quantitative or mixed-
methods research approach will often be determined by the ‘world-view’ or set of 
beliefs the researcher brings to the inquiry (Creswell, 2014:6). The following 
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world-views will be presented in this research as the world-views adopted by the 





According to Salvador (2016:6), researchers may adjust and adapt their 
paradigms to conform to their focuses and methodology. Salvador (2016:6) 
concludes by stating that world-views are not communally restrictive, rather 
leaving it up to the researcher's desire to reflect on which specific research to 
commence with. The research design that relates to the philosophical world-
views and the specific methods of research that were applied in the research will 
then be offered. 
1.10.1  The constructivist world-view 
Kuper, Reeves and Levinson (2008:404) maintain that most qualitative 
researchers today share a different belief about knowledge, called 
“constructivism”. Yin (2016:334) ascribes the following meaning to 
constructivism:  
 
The world-view that social reality is a joint product created 
by the nature of the external conditions but also by the 
person observing and reporting on these conditions. 
Following this view, all social reality, because it is 
constructed in this manner, therefore assumes a relativist 
rather than absolute nature (cf. positivism and post 
positivism) 
  
According to De Vos, Strydom, Schulze and Patel (2011:7), the participants in a 
research study are often viewed as passive role-players in the researcher’s quest 
to gather data mostly for his or her own purposes. Salvador (2016:5) postulates 
that in constructivism, the researcher transacts with the participants. Hence they 
become actively involved in all the phases of the process, thereby creating 
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findings as the engagement progresses. De Vos et al. (2011:7) concur, stating 
that the participants are partners in the entire research undertaking, as they seek 
understanding of the world in which they live and work.  
 
Crotty (in Creswell, 2014:9) with regard to constructivism maintains that 
individuals seek an understanding of the world they live and work in. In this world-
view, Salvador (2016:5) suggests that the objective is to create 
“unanimity/commonality” in constructions of scholarly and emerging themes that 
would mirror the lived experiences of the participants. To this extent, Constantino 
(2008:118) postulates that because constructivist research is naturalistic, inquiry 
happens in the settings where a phenomenon naturally occurs. 
 
Among the methodology leading to the discovery and understanding of the social 
phenomena widely used by constructivists are semi-structured interviews and 
open-ended questionnaires (Salvador, 2016:6). According to Patton (2002:21), 
responses to open-ended questions allow one to understand the world as seen 
by the participant. Responses to open-ended questions are used by qualitative 
researchers to understand the perceptions, feelings and knowledge of people, 
thereby allowing them to construct the meaning of a situation. Creswell (2013:25) 
suggests that the more open-ended the questions are, the better, as the 
researcher listens carefully to what people say in their life settings, in the process 
generating meaning from the data collected in the field and also addressing the 
process of interaction among individuals. In this research, the intention of the 
researcher includes understanding the world that participants live and work in, 
and sharing their lived experiences; this world-view is appropriate and applicable 
to this study. 
1.10.2 The postpositivist world-view 
According to Ponterotto (2005:129), postpositivism arose out of discontent with 
some aspects of the positivist standpoint. Positivists accept an objective, 
“apprehendable” reality. In contrast, postpositivists acknowledge an objective 
reality that is only imperfectly “apprehendable” (Guba and Lincoln in Ponterotto, 
2005:129). Ponteretto (2005:129) asserts that this view holds that social, 
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intellectual mechanisms are flawed, and that life’s phenomena are basically 
intractable, therefore one can never fully capture a “true” reality. In the words of 
Creswell (2014:7), this means that “we cannot be positive about our claims of 
knowledge when studying the behaviour and actions of humans”.  
 
According to Creswell (2014:7), the knowledge that develops through a 
postpositivist lens is based on careful observation and measurement of objective 
reality that exists “out there” in the world. Guba and Lincoln (1994:110) contend 
that the methodology requires making inquiries in more natural settings through 
increased use of qualitative techniques. Creswell (2014:7) posits that developing 
numeric measures of observation and studying the behaviour of individuals 
become paramount to the postpositivist. In this research, the researcher does not 
intend to collect information on a measuring instrument completed by participants 
Observations may, however, be recorded by the researcher, implying that the 
postpositivist approach may to a lesser extent be appropriate during this study. 
1.10.3 The pragmatic world-view 
Yin (2016:22) suggests that between the original positivist and constructivist 
world-view extremes there exists a middle ground for adopting different world-
views. The middle ground offers world-views that have features such as more 
adaptability for conducting qualitative study than either the positivist or 
constructivist extremes. This, according to Yin (2016:23), means that unless the 
researcher must adhere to one of the two extremes as a critical ideological 
commitment, he/she may assume a world-view in the middle ground for 
conducting qualitative research. Yin (2016:23) favours a world-view in the middle 
ground and to this extent posits that the rise of the pragmatist world-view has 
been more prominent in the middle ground.  
 
According to Creswell (2014:10), pragmatism as a world-view is opposed to 
antecedent conditions such as in postpositivism, which emphasises methods 
rather than focusing on the research problem and the use of all available 
approaches to understanding the problem. According to McCaslin (2008:2), “The 
central notion of pragmatism focuses on the nature of truth. In its simplest 
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explanation, pragmatism holds that truth is found in ‘what works,’ and that truth 
is relative to the current situation.” Reality, according to the pragmatist, “is to be 
revealed and experienced.” (McCaslin, 2008:2). Creswell (2014:11) believes that 
pragmatism provides a philosophical basis for research where individual 
researchers have the freedom of choice. The author explains that in having this 
freedom, researchers are free to choose the methods, techniques and 
procedures of research that best meet their needs and purposes. This world-view 
opens the door to multiple methods, different world-views, different assumptions, 
and various forms of data collection and different methods of data analysis 
(Creswell, 2014:11). Various forms of qualitative and quantitative data are 
blended to create a representative model (Christ, 2013:112). 
 
In giving expression to a pragmatic philosophical basis for research, the 
researcher in this study is not bound by a critical ideological commitment. Thus, 
for conducting this qualitative research, the researcher assumed a world-view in 
the middle ground as viewed by Yin, (2016:22). Having been afforded this 
freedom of choice, the researcher could choose the most suitable data collection 
methods and techniques for analysing the data so as to address the issues being 
examined, leading to the discovery of data and finding the truth in what works, as 
viewed by McCaslin (2008:2). 
1.11 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Schensul (2008a:2) postulates that the term methodology is often used 
interchangeably with research methods. The author refers to the integral 
components of research methodology as being the guiding paradigms, aspects 
of research design methods of data collection, and analysis and dissemination.   
Research methods refer to the way the research will be undertaken. Methods 
refer to the way qualitative researchers collect data to build their argument 
(Schensul, 2008b:2). 
 
Schensul (2008b:2) posits that, irrespective of the preferred guiding paradigms, 
all qualitative research methods have common characteristics. Research 
methods are conducted in an exchange between real people focusing on the 
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meaning as conveyed by participants in the research setting in addition to 
behaviour (Schensul, 2008b:2). The methods take into consideration the social, 
cultural and physical contexts within which individuals live, work and interact 
(Schensul, 2008b:2). 
1.12 RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN 
Creswell (2014:3) explains that research approaches are the plans and 
procedures for conducting research, spanning the steps from the conception of 
broad assumptions to specific methods for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation. The overall decision entails which approach should be used to 
study the topic. The decision is informed by the philosophical assumptions the 
researcher brings to the study, namely the research design and research 
methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation of data. Creswell (2014:3) 
further elucidates that the selection of the research approach is also based on 
the nature of the research problem, issues under investigation, the researcher’s 
personal experiences, and the audiences at which the study is aimed.  According 
to Creswell (2014:5), the specific research methods and procedures of research 
translate the research approach into practice. 
 
The research approach involves the juncture between the philosophy, research 
designs and specific methods (Creswell, 2014:5). Creswell (2014:17) concludes 
by stating that the world-views, the designs, and the methods all contribute to a 
research approach that tends to be quantitative, qualitative or mixed. Faced by 
the choice of research approaches, the researcher does not only select a 
qualitative, quantitative or mixed-methods approach to the study, but he/she must 
also decide on the type of qualitative research design in the choice of study 
approach (Creswell, 2014:11-12). The informed research approach pursued in 
this research as identified by the researcher is that of a qualitative research 
approach.  
 
Yin (2016:301) asserts that qualitative research is positioned to accommodate 
the broad variety of world-views, “extending from constructivist to pragmatic to 
postpositivist approaches”. He also suggests that qualitative research is more 
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adaptive to accommodate pragmatist, constructivist worldviews, thus being more 
receptive than other methods, considering the reflective nature of research. 
 
Maxwell (2013:3) states that in the design of a qualitative study it is unlikely that 
a researcher can just develop a sound strategy in advance and implement it 
faithfully. This researcher determined that the topic explored in this study is best 
suited to a qualitative research design, which is where the researcher will make 
knowledge claims, based on the various meanings of individual experiences, with 
the intention of developing theory or patterns (Creswell, 2003:18). According to 
Creswell (2003:18), in following a qualitative approach, the researcher collects 
open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from 
the data. The research process engages emerging questions, procedures and 
data that are typically collected at the participant’s setting. The data analysis 
builds on the information obtained to reach a conclusion as to what the general 
themes are. The researcher then makes interpretations of the meaning of the 
data (Creswell, 2014:4). 
 
According to Creswell (2014:4), qualitative research as an approach is used for 
exploring and understanding the meaning that individuals and groups attribute to 
a social or human problem. Qualitative research is used when the researcher 
wants to study an issue or problem to get a complex and detailed understanding 
of the subject under investigation (Creswell, 2013:48). According to the author 
(2013:48), this detailed understanding can be established only by talking directly 
to the people at their homes or places of work because, according to Creswell 
(2003:181), “this enables the researcher to develop a level of detail about the 
individual or place and to be highly involved in the actual experiences of the 
participants’’. The researcher engages with the participants at their place of work 
or in a natural setting, and it involves active participation by the participants during 
collection of data, in order to build rapport with them and to gain credibility in their 
eyes, as suggested by Creswell (2003:181). 
 
According to Denscombe (2010a:109), qualitative studies tend to have an 
inherent flexibility. This view is supported by Creswell (2014:4) asserting that the 
final report in a qualitative study has a flexible structure. Flexibility allows the 
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researcher to make modifications to the original design as the research evolves, 
until the researcher is satisfied that the direction taken affords the greatest 
potential for discovery, meaningful answers to questions posed, or the generation 
of new questions (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011:343). This allows the 
researcher, as Denscombe (2010a:110) rightly put it, to embark on a “voyage of 
discovery” and choose a qualitative design as the appropriate approach to pursue 
this study.  
1.13 TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
According to Welman and Kruger (2001:46), data is collected from the “objects 
of our enquiry”. The data is used to solve the “problem concerned” (Welman & 
Kruger, 2001:46). The research problem usually has a bearing on a part of a 
population that Kruger and Welman (2001:46) also refer to as “participants or 
subjects”, which may be individuals, groups, organisations, personal products 
and events, or the conditions to which they are exposed. In this research, the 
objects of analysis are the government agency officials and practitioners with past 
or current experience, expertise and knowledge of investigating or studying 
financial crime, and approaches to combating financial crime.  
 
In qualitative research, the purpose of sampling may be to gain in-depth 
knowledge about a situation / event / episode (Kumar, 2011:192). In qualitative 
research, Kumar (2011:192) states that the researcher does not have a pre-
determined sample size but rather waits to reach a point of data saturation during 
the data collection phase. Kumar (2011:192) asserts that in qualitative research, 
“information-rich” participants are purposely selected to provide the data 
required. Welman and Kruger (2001:46) distinguish between two types of 
samples, namely probability samples and non-probability samples. According to 
Kumar (2011:206), non-probability sampling designs are used when the number 
of elements in a population is either unknown or cannot be individually identified. 
In a non-probability sample, the probability that any of the units of analysis will be 
included in the sample cannot be specified. In some instances, certain members 
may not have a chance at all of being included (Welman & Kruger, 2001:61). In 
these situations, Kumar (2011:206) argues, the selection of elements is 
29 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
dependent on other considerations. Kumar (2011:206) asserts that there are five 
commonly-used non-random designs that are each based on different 
considerations commonly used in qualitative and quantitative research. 
Examples of non-probability samples provided by Kumar (2011:206) include 
quota sampling; accidental sampling; purposive sampling; expert sampling and 
snowball sampling.  
 
What differentiates the designs referred to above as quantitative or qualitative is 
the predetermined sample size (Kumar, 2011:206). Kumar (2011:206) states that 
in qualitative research, the researcher does not determine the number of 
participants in advance but continues to select additional cases until he/she 
realises that a saturation point has been reached. Kumar (2011:206) also states 
that in qualitative research, researchers will predominantly use purposive 
sampling and accidental sampling strategies to select the participants to the 
research.  
 
According to Kumar (2011:207), the primary consideration in a purposive sample 
is the researcher’s judgement regarding who can provide the best information to 
achieve the objectives of the study. The researcher approaches those persons 
who, in his opinion, are likely to be in possession of the required information and 
will be willing to share it (Kumar, 2011:207). In a purposive sample, researchers 
rely on experience, ingenuity and previous research findings to deliberately 
obtain units of analysis in such a manner that the sample obtained may be 
regarded as being representative of the relevant population (Welman & Kruger, 
2001:63). Denscombe (2010b:34) states that purposive sampling works on the 
principle that the researcher is likely to get the best information by focusing on a 
relatively small number of people. They are deliberately chosen, based on their 
known attributes, which means that they are hand-picked for the research, based 
on the issue being investigated and their privileged knowledge or experience in 
respect of the topic. In this instance, as is proposed by Denscombe (2010b:35), 
purposive sampling works where the researcher already knows something about 
the specific people or events and selects particular ones because they are 
regarded as the ones to most likely produce the most valuable data.  
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For example, in this study, the researcher interviewed government agency 
officials and practitioners with past or current experience, expertise and 
knowledge of investigating or studying financial crime and approaches to 
combating financial crime. It is therefore crucial that the sample include persons 
nominated by the investigative agencies responsible for the combating and 
prosecution of financial crime, who are seasoned, experienced agency officials 
working for these agencies or who have previously worked at such an agency. 
 
Welman and Kruger (2001:63) state that this type of sampling poses a problem 
in that various researchers may proceed in different ways to obtain a purposive 
sample, and therefore it is not possible to evaluate whether such a sample is 
representative of the relevant population. However, Denscombe (2010b:35) 
argues that when a wide cross-section of people is included in the sample and 
used in this way, purposive sampling is to a degree “emulating a representative 
sample”. For this reason, the researcher included officials from across all the key 
investigative agencies responsible for the investigation of financial crime. 
 
In this study, issues under investigation include the confusion when it comes to 
communicating about financial crime and the failure of the government to 
implement a policy framework to combat financial crime effectively. This appears 
to be due mainly to a lack of horizontal cooperation between the separate 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime against the background of the 
widely–touted multidisciplinary and integrated approach. The researcher 
therefore conducted enquiries into the experiences and knowledge of 
practitioners and investigators employed by the respective investigative agencies 
identified as being responsible for combating financial crime. From the shared 
experiences of the participants, the researcher gained operational insight into the 
practical challenges experienced by the participants, developing “a level of detail” 
and being “highly involved in the actual experiences” of the participants, as 
suggested by Creswell (2003:181), regarding current efforts in combating 
financial crime and the structures that are in place. With this understanding of the 
experiences of the participants, the researcher evaluated the viability of the 
Whole-of-Government approach and sought to discover new ideas for 
approaches to more effectively combat financial crime. 
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Based on the above discussion of a purposive sample of non-probability sampling 
designs obtained during qualitative research and with consideration as to who 
could provide the best information to achieve the objectives of this study, the 
researcher made use of a purposive sampling design. In this regard, the 
researcher used key informant(s) to guide him and map out the agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime and to purposively draw from those 
agencies a group of participants based on their expertise, acquired knowledge 
and experience to achieve the objectives of the study.  
 
Making use of the purposive sample, the researcher was guided towards ten 
officials who could partake as participants by the relevant agencies from which 
permission was sought to conduct interviews. The participants in the study 
represented the investigative authorities from the key agencies responsible for 
combating financial crime, which were identified as the South African Police 
Service (Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation), The South African Revenue 
Service (Enforcement: Criminal Investigations), The Financial Intelligence Centre 
and the National Prosecuting Authority (Commercial Crime Court Unit). Due to 
the clandestine nature of their occupations and to protect the identities of the 
participants, their titles, location and designations cannot be disclosed for fear of 
exposing their identities. Permission to conduct interviews with participants was 
obtained from the following agencies, and communications confirming the 
permission are attached as follows: 
• Annexure B - Permission to do research in the South African Police 
Service: Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) 
• Annexure C - Permission to do research in the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) 
• Annexure D - Permission to do research in the Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) 
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1.14 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
According to Denscombe (2010b:4 & 153), research methods are the tools for 
data collection, and they help the researcher to gain a clearer picture of things, 
an accurate measurement of things, and facts and evidence about the subject 
matter. Denscombe (2010a:153) gives the following advice about choosing an 
appropriate research method to collect data: 
• Although certain research strategies are associated with the use of 
certain research methods, this does not mean it rules out the possibility 
of choice. It is important that the researcher recognises that there is 
the likelihood of some scope to choose among different methods for 
use within any specific strategy. 
• Each of the methods has its inherent strengths and weakness. Each 
data collection method has its assumptions and produces a type of 
data of which the usefulness depends on what the researcher is trying 
to achieve. It therefore follows that none of the possible methods can 
be regarded as perfect. 
• When choosing a method, the researcher should base his/her decision 
on the condition of 'usefulness', instead of looking for a method that is 
superior to the others in a complete sense. The researcher should look 
for the most suitable procedure in practice. The researcher should ask 
him-/herself which method is most beneficial to the inquiry.  
• A research method need not be seen as mutually exclusive. If a 
method is not inherently better than others, and if methods are to be 
chosen realistically, it opens up the possibility of combining methods. 
More than one method can be used for the research, with the clear 
understanding that weaknesses in one method can be compensated 
for by the strengths of another method. 
• The use of more than one method allows the researcher to use 
triangulation. Combining the different methods can be used by the 
researcher to look at the research topic from a variety of viewpoints, 
as a means of evaluation and contrast, with each method approaching 
the topic from a different point of view. 
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Schensul (2008b:3) lists observation and interviews, among other things, as the 
major approaches to methods of data collection during qualitative research. In 
addition, Yin (2016:155) refers to the collection of objects in the field as a “data 
collection method”, which may include documents, artefacts, records and videos 
because these represent another form of primary evidence that can be invaluable 
in a qualitative study. For example, newspaper articles can provide important 
contextual information to complement fieldwork (Yin, 2016:155). Strydom and 
Delport (2011a:376) refer to document study and analysis as an information 
collection method. In this study, taking cognisance of the assertion by 
Denscombe (2010b:4 & 153) that research methods are the tools for data 
collection, the researcher made use of the methods of data collection that are 
stated and discussed in the sections that follow. 
1.14.1 Document study 
Ritchie and Lewis (as quoted by Strydom & Delport, 2011a:377) state that 
documentary analysis involves the study of existing documents, either to 
understand its useful content or to indicate a deeper meaning that may be 
exposed by its style and coverage. Strydom and Delport (2011a:377) identify 
three categories of documents, namely personal documents, non-personal 
documents and documents aimed at the mass media. When these documents 
are studied and analysed for the purpose of scientific research, their use is 
operationalised to that of a data collection method. Strydom and Delport 
(2011a:376-377) suggest that when a combination of methods such as 
interviewing, document study and secondary analysis is used for data collection, 
it provides a source for validation and cross-checking of findings. 
 
Strydom and Delport (2011a:377) assert that a broad range of documents is 
available to the social researcher as a source of information, and they 
differentiate between documents, based on the source or class of document. Yin 
(2016:157) suggests that for most topics covered by qualitative research, the 
researcher should spend time checking for relevant web-based information that 
is possibly pertinent to the research. Denscombe (2012:58) recommends that the 
works referred to should be those that come from “published sources that are 
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authoritative and credible”. Regarding the recommendation above, Denscombe 
(2012:58) advises that the researcher should look for resources of material that 
emanate from: 
1.14.1.1 Books, for example, textbooks 
With regard to textbooks, works by academic authors and practitioners, the 
researcher made use of library catalogue searches to identify relevant titles and 
authors. The researcher also requested a UNISA librarian to conduct literary 
searches, using keywords related to the topic under investigation. The researcher 
evaluated the literature identified and consulted those that presented the most 
likely best sources of information. 
1.14.1.2 Other literature sources for example journals articles 
Over and above the same practical application as referred to above, the 
researcher also made use of Google Scholar, which is a web-based search 
engine that includes an index of most peer-reviewed academic journals and 
books, conference papers, theses and dissertations, pre-prints, abstracts, 
technical reports, and other scholarly literature to identify literature relevant to the 
research topic. The researcher made extensive use of journal articles to obtain 
information related to the topic under investigation during the research. 
1.14.1.3 Conference proceedings 
The researcher made use of the Google Scholar search and alert function on the 
Internet to alert him to conference proceedings that have dealt with the topic 
under investigation and where relevant information was readily available for use 
in the research. 
1.14.1.4 Official publications 
The researcher made use of the Internet to search official Government Web sites 
to find Government publications such as policy documents, White Papers, 
statutes and information related to the topic under investigation. The researcher 
also subscribed to the SA Government News Agency electronic notification 
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service to notify him whenever there was a publication or an article relevant to 
the topics under investigation. 
1.14.1.5 Reference material  
The researcher identified several references works, for example, subject 
dictionaries and encyclopaedias as possible sources of information and 
subsequently used them as such. In following the advice provided above 
(Denscombe, 2012:58), the researcher made extensive use of ‘mass media’, as 
referred to and listed by Strydom and Delport (2011a:379) as a source of 
information for a document study. According to Strydom and Delport (2011a:379), 
‘mass media’ “includes all information that is freely available to the public and 
thus to any individual”. Strydom and Delport (2011a:379) quote several different 
examples of ‘mass media’ or ‘virtual documentation’, referring to documents 
available in electronic format on the Web. Mass media serves various social 
functions, including dissemination of information, leisure and social control. Web 
sites can represent commercial, governmental, educational and other institutional 
interests, along with personal web sites and so-called ‘blogs’, which are 
frequently updated with the latest information (Strydom & Delport, 2011a:379). 
To stay up to date on information published on web sites as indicated above, the 
researcher subscribed to Google Alerts via the web to alert him to any new 
material matching the keywords specified by him. When receiving an alert, the 
researcher examined the relevant document, and if it related to the topic under 
investigation, the researcher printed a hard-copy version to be analysed at a later 
stage and included in the research when relevant and contributing to the 
information. In some instances, the alerts made the researcher aware of other 
leads to follow for relevant literature. 
 
The examination of documents as a source of data may include newspapers, 
speeches, transcripts of meetings, and just about anything that appears in written 
form, including interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2012:27). Cohen et al. (2011:350) refer 
to this information as “text as data”, meaning that qualitative data exists in the 
form of text scripts that are commonly gathered from interviews, survey 
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questions, journals, recorded observations or existing documents, among other 
sources, and presumably also books.  
 
Denscombe (2010b:220) suggests that the greatest attraction of documents as a 
source of data is their accessibility. Denscombe (2010b:220) further states that 
the Internet provides the researcher with access to Government Web sites, 
confirming what has already been noted above, that can provide a vast amount 
of information on social and economic factors, including policy issues. 
Denscombe (2010b:221) warns that documentary sources should never be 
accepted at face value and recommends that documents must be evaluated for 
authenticity, credibility and meaning. Yin (2016:157) offers the advice that, when 
using Web-based information, the researcher should note, understand and fully 
reference the source of the information, which this researcher adhered to. In this 
regard, the researcher verified that the document had been produced by the 
author or institution ascribed to it, as suggested by Strydom and Delport 
(2011a:380), or that the author or institution was taking responsibility for the Web 
site if it was a Web-based document. The researcher also checked the reliability 
of materials by establishing whether similar information had been published by 
another author or institution, quoting the same source or event, and whether they 
were factually in agreement. 
 
Rubin and Rubin (2012:27) point out that some transcripts of official 
governmental meetings record every word spoken. In such instances, the 
researcher believes that transcripts of the sessions of the security and justice 
portfolios of Parliament may prove to be a useful source for document analysis. 
The researcher made use of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), which 
is the official Web-based notification service for the functions of Parliament to 
alert him and provide access to content related to the topic under research. In 
addition, Rubin and Rubin (2012:27) point out that the web sites of government 
agencies provide the official views, reporting goals and accomplishments of the 
organisation. Rubin and Rubin (2012:28) further believe that if a participant is 
aware that the researcher knows about the downside of an organisation, such as 
a government agency that forms part of the study, it makes it easier for both 
conversational partners to talk about these problematic issues during the 
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interviews. Also, Rubin and Rubin (2012:28) argue that if the researcher masters 
the terminology found in the documents and shows familiarity with the 
organisation's activities, participants are more likely to recognise the interviewer 
as an informed person to whom it is worth talking about their experiences. 
 
Denscombe (2010b:232) offers some advantages of documents as a source of 
data: 
• Ease of access to data. 
• It is cost-effective.  
• The data is permanently available in a form that can be checked by 
others and is open to public scrutiny.  
 
Strydom and Delport (2011a:382) list the following additional advantages of a 
document study: 
• Non-reactivity: This refers to the producers of documents not 
necessarily being aware that the contents of their documents are being 
studied or analysed at a later stage. The content of what they produce 
is therefore not influenced by the researcher. 
 
• Inaccessible subjects: This relates to the fact that document study is 
the only method where the researcher does not have to make personal 
contact with the participant, allowing access to persons who the 
researcher may not otherwise have been able to study. 
 
Denscombe (2010b:232) cautions against the following disadvantages of 
documents as a source of data: 
• The researcher must evaluate the credibility of the source and 
establish the authority, the origin and the procedures used to produce 
the original data. 
• The data contained in documents is originally produced for other 
purposes and not for the research. It therefore constitutes secondary 
data unless, of course, it is the original transcript of the research 
interview. 
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• Documents could owe more to the interpretation of those who drafted 
them than to an objective picture of reality. 
1.14.2 Interviews 
According to Brinkmann (2008:2), interviewing concerns a conversational 
practice where knowledge is produced through the interaction between an 
interviewer (cast in the role of the researcher) and the person being interviewed 
(cast in the role of a participant). An interview is most often conducted to serve 
the researcher’s interests, external to the conversation itself to obtain knowledge 
about an issue under investigation. Greef (2011:342) states that “[t]he interview 
is a social relationship designed to exchange information between the participant 
and the researcher”. Denscombe (2010b:174) states that interviews are used 
when the researcher wants to gain insight into things such as people’s opinions, 
feelings, emotions and experiences. Interviewing is a method that is aligned to 
the complexity of the subject matter, specifically in-depth interviews which, 
according to Denscombe (2010b:  174), lend themselves to the collection of data 
based on: 
• opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences. This has to be explored 
in depth and detail, as opposed to just a word or two;  
• sensitive issues that require a careful and considerate approach 
during which the participants can be encouraged to discuss personal 
and sensitive matters in an open and honest manner; 
• privileged information. In this case, the justification for interviews can 
be found in the premise that contact with the principal officials in the 
field who can provide privileged information, can provide in-depth 
information if the participants are willing to provide information that 
others could not. What they must be able to offer is insight into people 
in a particular position who are familiar with the issues being 
investigated in the study. 
 
Denscombe (2010b:174) asserts that there are various types of research 
interviews that can be undertaken as one-to-one interviews, and he lists them as 
follows: 
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• Structured interview: Is a method that resembles a questionnaire 
method. 
• Semi-structured interviews: In this type of interview, the researcher 
has a clear, predetermined list of questions to be answered. However, 
the interviewer is flexible and allows for the order of the topics to 
change, and, more importantly, allows the interviewee to develop 
ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised by the researcher. 
The questions are open-ended, and there is a great emphasis on 
allowing the interviewee to elaborate on points of interest. 
• Unstructured interviews: This type of interview takes the emphasis of 
the interviewee's thoughts further in that the role of the researcher is 
to initiate the discussion by introducing a theme or topic and then 
letting the interviewee develop his/her ideas and follow his/her own 
train of thought. 
 
Brinkmann (2008:2) asserts that most qualitative research interviews are semi-
structured as a consequence of the agenda being set in accordance with the 
researcher’s interest. A semi-structured interview is a qualitative data collection 
strategy during which the researcher asks the participants a series of 
predetermined but open-ended questions (Ayres, 2008:2). According to Greef 
(2011:351), researchers use semi-structured interviews in order to gain a detailed 
picture of a participant’s beliefs about, or perceptions or accounts of, a particular 
topic. Semi-structured interviews are especially suitable if the researcher is 
particularly interested in a complex situation or process (Greef, 2011:352). The 
method gives the researcher and participant much more flexibility (Greef, 
2011:351). Greef (2011:348) is of the opinion that the guided interview is ideal for 
obtaining comprehensive and comparable data. Responses can be coded, and 
tabulated, and descriptive statistics can be used to examine the data for 
relationships, because all respondents have been asked the same questions 
(Greef, 2011:348). Greef (2011:352) posits that during semi-structured 
interviews, questions are nearly always open-ended. 
 
40 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
Roulston (2008:2) states that an open-ended question is a type of question posed 
by researchers to participants that enables them to choose how they orient 
themselves to the research topic. It allows participants the opportunity to select 
the terms with which to formulate their descriptions and strengthen the topics that 
are meaningful to them. 
 
Denscombe (2010b:192) cites the following significant advantages of interviews 
considered by the researcher when deciding to conduct interviews: 
• Interviews are particularly useful for producing data that deals with 
topics in-depth and in detail. Subjects can be probed, issues pursued, 
and lines of investigation followed over a relatively extended period. 
• The researcher is likely to gain valuable insight based on the depth of 
the information gathered and the wisdom of key participants. 
• Interviews require only simple equipment and build on conversational 
skills, which researchers already have. 
• Interviews are an excellent method for producing data based on 
informants' priorities, opinions and ideas. Participants can expand on 
their thoughts, explain their views and identify what they regard as the 
crucial factors. 
• Interviews as a method of data collection are probably the most 
flexible. The lines of inquiry can be adjusted during the interview. 
Interviewing allows for developing a line of inquiry. 
• Interviews generate a high response rate because they are 
prearranged and scheduled for a convenient time and location.  
• Direct contact at the point of the interview means that data can be 
checked for accuracy and relevancy as it is collected. 
 
In this research, the researcher followed the advice provided by Denscombe 
(2010b:192), as listed above. The questions posed during the interviews were 
probing, seeking valuable insight based on the depth of the information gathered 
and the wisdom of key participants. The questions were open-ended, allowing for 
participants to expand on their ideas, explain their views and identify what they 
regard as crucial factors. During the interviews, scope was allowed for 
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adjustment, thereby allowing the development of a line of inquiry. Interviews were 
scheduled according to the availability of the participants, who were briefed on 
the nature of the study, areas of inquiry, the format of the interviews, and what 
they could expect during the interviews. when answers from participants would 
be checked and clarified, and could be elaborated on where required. 
 
The researcher decided to use the semi-structured, one-on-one interviews with 
participants, as this method allowed him to check whether all points of interest 
had been covered. Another reason why the researcher used one-on-one 
interviews was because Denscombe (2010b:176) reasons that it presents 
advantages, such as: 
• Relatively easy to arrange. 
• The opinions and views expressed are those of one person, and that 
makes it easy for the researcher to link specific ideas to specific people 
• It is relatively easy to control in that the researcher must grasp and 
interrogate one person’s ideas, and guide only one person through the 
interview agenda. 
• It makes the transcription of the recording of the interview easier 
because there are only two voices to identify and only one person 
talking at a time. 
 
Other advantages of semi-structured one-on-one interviews are presented by 
Brinkmann (2008:2), who postulates that the one-on-one interview can be 
conducted informally and in a less structured manner, allowing for the participant 
to respond with spontaneous descriptions and narratives. Cook (2008:2) states 
that the researcher retains some control over the direction and content to be 
discussed, although it still allows the participants freedom to elaborate or take the 
interview in new but relevant directions. Cook (2008:2) also adds as an 
advantage the relative ease and cost-efficiency with which it can be conducted, 
endorsing what Denscombe (2012:176) referred to above. 
 
During the semi-structured, one-on-one interview with participants, as noted 
above, the researcher made use of an interview schedule, as suggested 
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(interview schedule attached as Attachment A – page 509). One and the same 
interview schedule included as Attachment A (page 509), was used in relation to 
each of the participants during the interviews. During the semi-structured type of 
interview, the researcher made use of open-ended questions because, as 
suggested by Robson (2002:275), this type of interview is flexible; allows for in-
depth exploration to clear up misunderstandings; enables testing of the limits of 
a participant’s knowledge; encourages cooperation and support; provides a 
realistic assessment of what the participant believes; and can produce 
unexpected and/or unanticipated answers. According to Robson (2002:278), the 
interview schedule is likely to include introductory comments, a list of topical 
headings and possible key questions to ask under these headings, a set of 
associated prompts, and closing statements in compiling the interview schedule, 
the researcher heeded the advice given by Robson (2002:278) by including 
introductory comments, topical headings, key questions under the headings, and 
an opportunity for closing remarks by the participant. 
 
What is stated above are all attributes of a data collection method that the 
researcher aspired to in the study and that he believes enabled him to obtain 
answers and knowledge about the subject matter under investigation. The 
researcher gained access to the prospective interviewees following facilitation by 
means of the correct official channels and agreement obtained from all parties to 
the research. However, from previous experience the researcher was aware that 
obtaining official authority to gain access to government agencies would prove to 
be an exhausting and frustrating process, burdened by bureaucracy and red-
tape. In this research, it again turned out to be the case. The researcher used the 
proverbial “gatekeeper” to each specific agency to facilitate access to the 
agencies and interviewees. The interview method was viable regarding cost, time 
and travel because the agencies were not distributed across a large geographical 
area, and in conducting the interviews the researcher did not incur excessive 
costs. 
 
Denscombe (2010b:172) cautions researchers that if a participant agrees to take 
part in an interview, the researcher must be alert to the following aspects: 
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• The participant consents to participate, as this confirms the ethical 
conduct of the researcher. This implies that the data should not be 
obtained by using underhanded methods. The participant should 
understand that the meeting is held to produce data for research 
purposes and should indicate that he/she understands this and agrees 
to it. 
• The words of the participant are treated as ‘on the record’ and ‘for the 
record’, and the interviewee is made to understand that fact. However, 
an interviewee may request that the words not be attributed to him/her 
or made publicly available. 
• The agenda for the interview is set by the researcher. However, the 
degree of control exercised by the researcher may vary in accordance 
with the style of interviewing. 
 
In observing the caution presented by Denscombe (2010b:172) and elucidated 
above, the researcher administered to each participant, both vocally and by 
means of printed documents they were required to sign (namely an ‘Informed 
Consent form, included as Annexure F and an undertaking by the participant on 
an ‘Undertaking and Personal Details of Participant’ form, included as Annexure 
G) to participate in the study, informing them of the various aspects referred to. 
All those involved in this study signed the relevant forms, providing their consent 
and acknowledging that they have been apprised of the ethical undertakings and 
other arrangements. 
 
Brinkman (2008:2) posits that before conducting the interview, the researcher 
prepares an interview schedule in which the research questions are posed in a 
format that renders them suitable to be asked directly as interview questions. In 
the literature, an interview schedule is also referred to as an ‘interview guide’, or 
‘interview protocol’ (Brinkmann, 2013:59). According to Greef (2011:352), the 
interview schedule is a questionnaire developed by the researcher to guide 
interviews. According to King and Horrocks (2010:35), qualitative interviews 
make use of an interview guide (schedule) that outlines the main topics the 
researcher wants to cover but is flexible regarding the way the questions are 
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phrased or the order in which they are asked. This allows for the participant to 
lead the interaction in an unexpected direction. In this regard, Marshall and 
Rossman (2011:144) state that this method is in fact based on an assumption 
fundamental to qualitative research, which is that, “[t]he participant’s perspective 
on the phenomenon of interest should unfold as the participant views it, not as 
the researcher views it.” 
 
Kumar (2011:158) advises that after having constructed a research instrument 
such as an interview schedule, the researcher tests it before using it for actual 
data collection. Keats (2000:76) advises that the researcher always carries out a 
pilot before the major data collection begins. Kumar (2011:158) refers to this 
process as ‘pre-testing’. Keats (2000:76) proposes that this could include a 
qualitative examination of the questions, and interviewing a small sample of the 
participants, using the intended interview schedule to ensure that all the 
requirements for an interview schedule have been complied with. Kumar 
(2011:158) asserts that pre-testing involves a critical verification of the 
understanding of each question and its meaning by the participant. Kumar 
(2011:158) counsels that the pre-test should be conducted under actual field 
conditions on a group of people like the study population, to identify problems 
that future participants may experience in understanding or interpreting the 
questions. The purpose is not to collect data but to determine whether it is difficult 
to understand a question as a result of how it was framed, the appropriateness 
of the meaning it communicates, whether different participants interpret a 
question differently, and to establish whether their interpretation is different to 
what the researcher wants to convey. Strydom (2011:241) suggests that the pilot 
study must be executed in the same manner as planned for the main 
investigation. In following the counselling provided in the literature, the researcher 
conducted five pre-test interviews with participants who volunteered to participate 
in the pre-test interviews. The pre-test participants represented a group of 
practising investigators working for investigation agencies concerned with 
combating financial crime. Interviews were conducted under actual field 
conditions. These participants were subjected to the same rigour regarding 
informed consent and anonymity as if they formed part of the sample. As the 
process unfolded, the open-ended questions and answers were critically 
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reviewed to remove any ambiguities and uncertainties. Corrections were made 
to the interview schedule as the process evolved until the researcher was 
satisfied that the schedule produced the required data. 
 
In conducting the interviews, the researcher considered the guidelines provided 
by Leedy and Ormrod (2015:282-286) for conducting productive interviews. The 
guidelines provided by Leedy and Ormrod (2015:282-286) and their application 
in this research project are listed and discussed below: 
1.14.2.1 Identify general interview questions in advance 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:282) postulate that researchers often have greater 
success when they prepare general interview questions in advance, making sure 
that all questions are addressed at some point during the interview, and that the 
issues are related to the research questions and overall research problem. In this 
research project, the researcher made use of an interview schedule. Leedy and 
Ormrod (2015:282) suggest that the researcher should avoid asking leading 
questions, and that it is not necessary to ask each and every question explicitly, 
as the answers to some may emerge while the participant responds to others. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:282) suggest that questions can be asked in several 
interviews. The researcher gave the participants an opportunity to be interviewed 
during several sessions where it appeared appropriate under the circumstances 
or when requested. 
1.14.2.2 Consider how participants’ cultural backgrounds might influence 
their responses 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:282) alerted the researcher to the possibility that culture 
may play a significant role in how participants respond to questions. The 
researcher did not anticipate that cultural differences could play a part in this 
research because culture was not relevant to the research questions, but he was 
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1.14.2.3 Make sure your participants are representative of the group 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:284) recommend that the researcher should choose 
people who are expected to give the researcher common perceptions and 
perspectives. In this research, the researcher intentionally conducted interviews 
with practitioners attached to the investigative authorities involved at some stage 
or another during the combating of financial crime.  
1.14.2.4 Find a suitable location 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:284) postulate that in theory, interviews can be 
conducted at any place where the participant is willing to be interviewed. Leedy 
and Ormrod (2015:284) suggest that the researcher would probably be more 
successful if the interview was conducted where it is quiet and there was no risk 
of being distracted. In this research, the researcher endeavoured to engage the 
participants at their places of work or a facility such as a boardroom or an office 
where they could feel comfortable in the surroundings familiar to them. Prior to 
the research, the researcher confirmed with the participants whether they were 
comfortable with the venue. In those instances where it was found that the 
surroundings were not conducive to a productive interview, the location was 
changed to a venue agreed upon by the researcher and participant, and with 
which the participant was familiar and comfortable. 
1.14.2.5 Get written permission 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) recommend that the researcher explains the 
nature of the study and what the purpose of the research is. During the initial 
engagement with the participant, the researcher provided the participant with a 
synopsis of the research topic, research questions and aims of the research. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) recommend that the researcher obtain written 
permission from the participant and that the participant is requested to sign an 
informed consent form. The researcher obtained written permission and informed 
consent from all the participants in this study. The participants were required by 
the researcher to sign an “Informed Consent” form, included as Annexure F, and 
an undertaking by the participant on the form “Undertaking and Personal Details 
47 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
of Participant”, included as Annexure G, to participate in the study. They were 
also informed of various aspects of the research.  
 
Prior to approaching the participants and being referred to them for the purpose 
of a purposive sample, the researcher obtained written authorisation to conduct 
the research from the following relevant investigative agencies: 
• The SAPS (DPCI) – Annexure B 
• The SARS – Annexure C 
• The FIC – Annexure D 
• The NPA (SCCCU) – Annexure E 
1.14.2.6 Establish and maintain rapport 
To develop and maintain rapport between the researcher and participant, Leedy 
and Ormrod (2015:285) suggest that the researcher breaks the ice with small 
talk. The researcher is himself attached to an investigative agency and in this 
regard commenced discussions by referring to some topical issues of mutual 
interest to get a discussion going. Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) advise that the 
researcher should be mindful during the interview that the purpose of the 
interview is to obtain information, therefore he/she should guard against 
disclosing his/her own thoughts, beliefs and opinions. To prevent the discussion 
from becoming lopsided and to maintain rapport, the researcher must show 
interest and understanding in other ways. During the interviews, the researcher 
demonstrated interest by making relevant comments and adapting his body 
language and facial expressions. 
1.14.2.7 Focus on the actual rather than on the abstract and hypothetical 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) assert that the researcher would most likely obtain 
more revealing information if he asked the participant how he or she perceived a 
specific situation, or thought a situation should be dealt with, as opposed to 
asking about a person’s philosophy regarding the topic. In this research, the 
questions formulated by the researcher and the follow-up questions did not 
inquire about the abstract and hypothetical but rather focused on the participants’ 
interpretation, thoughts and experience of specific issues. 
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1.14.2.8 Do not put words in people’s mouths 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) advise that participants should be allowed to 
choose their own way of expressing their thoughts and to let them say it in a way 
they want to say it. The researcher followed this advice and allowed participants 
to express their ideas in their own words in an open-ended fashion, enabling them 
to elaborate if they were so inclined. 
1.14.2.9 Record responses verbatim 
According to the advice given by Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285), everything that 
the participants say must be recorded, whether by way of handwritten notes, 
voice recording or otherwise, especially if the interview is unstructured. The 
researcher heeded the advice provided and made written notes as the interviews 
progressed, as well as verbatim recordings of the interviews. In some cases, 
concepts were better demonstrated by means of a drawing or a graph, which the 
researcher encouraged, as it provided graphic detail.  
1.14.2.10 Keep one’s reactions to oneself 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) suggest that the researcher is likely to acquire 
more accurate information if he/she does not show surprise, agreement or 
disapproval of what he/she is being told.  The researcher followed the advice by 
not expressing or showing surprise, choosing to maintain a neutral stance on the 
position being presented during the interviews. 
1.14.2.11 The researcher is not necessarily getting the facts 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:285) recommend that the researcher should be aware 
that the response by the participant may only represent a perception and not 
necessarily a fact. The researcher heeded this advice and so interpreted the 
participants’ responses accordingly. 
1.14.3 Participants 
The participants in the study with whom interviews were conducted represented 
the investigative authorities from the key agencies responsible for combating 
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financial crime. They were identified as the South African Police Service 
(Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation), The South African Revenue Service 
(Enforcement: Criminal Investigations), The Financial Intelligence Centre, and 
the National Prosecuting Authority (Commercial Crime Court Unit). Due to the 
requirement that the identities of the participants had to be protected, their titles, 
location and designations cannot be disclosed for fear of exposing their identities. 
The participants were chosen in view of their privileged knowledge, experience 
and expertise in respect of the topic, based on the purposive sample, and most 
likely to provide valuable information. 
1.15 DATA ANALYSIS 
Denscombe (2010b:273) points out that qualitative data takes the form of the 
spoken word or text and visual images observed or creatively produced. Ruben 
and Ruben (2012:27) suggest that some documents, even though they do not 
originate from interviews, are treated in the same vein by researchers as 
transcripts from interviews. Document analysis is associated primarily with 
research methods such as interviewing, documenting and observing. Qualitative 
data, however, can be produced by other means, for example, the use of open-
ended questions as the product of an interview can produce answers in the form 
of text that, once transcribed, can be treated as qualitative data. Brinkmann 
(2008:3) points out that it is the transcription of an interview rather than an original 
oral interview conversation that serves as the researcher’s primary source of data 
when he/she is interpreting and analysing the interview. It therefore follows that 
the kind of research method used does not provide the defining characteristics of 
qualitative data. It is the nature of the data produced that is the crucial issue 
(Denscombe, 2010b:273). Henning (as quoted by Strydom and Delport, 
2011a:380) asserts that the real test for a credible qualitative research lies in the 
analysis of the data. This assertion, Strydom and Delport (2011a:380) posit, holds 
especially true for document analysis.  
 
Interviews have the propensity to produce hundreds of pages of transcripts that 
need to be critically examined and carefully interpreted (Cohen et al., 2011:352). 
Greef (2011:360) suggests that by employing qualitative analysis, an attempt is 
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made to capture the richness of themes emerging from participants’ verbal 
communication. Cohen et al. (2011:344), referring to Patton (2002), assert that 
the goal of qualitative data analysis is to uncover emerging themes, patterns, 
concepts, insights and understandings. According to De Vos (2002:339), data 
analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of 
data collected during the research and adds that it should lead the reader to an 
understanding of the sense of the experience or the phenomenon being studied. 
Denscombe (2010b:274) has a similar view on the analysis of qualitative data, 
stating that data must be prepared and organised before it can be analysed. 
Denscombe (2010b:274) advises that in a raw state, qualitative data will be 
difficult to interrogate in a systematic and meaningful way. Denscombe 
(2010b:274) continues that it would probably be difficult for the researcher to 
compare aspects of the data or find recurrent themes. To solve this problem, 
Holliday (2013:3) advises that organising the raw data under thematic headings 
is an effective way of making sense. 
 
Words combine to form meanings. The meanings must be sorted, interpretations 
considered, and conclusions reached (Cohen et al., 2011:350).  According to 
Cohen et al. (2011:352), an excellent qualitative analysis should discover 
patterns, consistent themes, meaningful categories, and new ideas. Schurink, 
Fouché and De Vos (2011:397) postulate that qualitative research covers a 
variety of techniques, the core of which is covered by observation, interviewing 
and document study. Strydom and Delport (2011a:380) posit that there are 
different techniques available to the researcher to analyse documents obtained 
in a document study. According to Greef (2011:360) there are several 
approaches to analyse the content of a document study and available interviews. 
According to Welman and Kruger (2001:194), a content analysis may be used to 
analyse data from qualitative research.  
 
Jupp (quoted by Strydom & Delport, 2011a:380) states that there are different 
techniques that the researcher can apply when it comes to the analysis of 
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• Content analysis 
According to Schreier (20013:2), qualitative content analysis helps to 
reduce the amount of material, therefore requiring the researcher to 
focus on selected aspects of meaning, namely that which relates to 
the overall research question. A content analysis tends towards a 
systematic and enumerative approach in a step to quantify the 
frequency of elements in a document, such as words. It relates to the 
transformation of the wording from a qualitative, unsystematic form 
into a systematic, quantitative form (Monette, Sullivan & De Jong, 
2002:207 in Strydom & Delport, 2011a:381).  
 
• Linguistic analysis 
During linguistic analysis, the meaning of words and phrases in a 
document or of text is explored (Strydom & Delport, 2011a:380). 
 
According to Strydom and Delport (2011a:381), a combination of techniques can 
be used to analyse a document or documents. In this research, the researcher 
used content analysis and linguistic analysis as proposed above. The content 
analysis in combination with a language analysis was used to analyse the 
transcripts of interviews. The language analysis was used in respect of other 
forms of documents or the body of material obtained during the document study. 
 
According to Roulston (2013:11), researchers analyse historical data, including 
interviews, to produce themes that represent patterns that can be observed 
across a data set (or data sets). Delport and Fouché (2011:428) posit that themes 
are probably the most frequently used model to transform data into knowledge. 
Aurini, Heath and Howells (2016:198) refer to a process called “Frequency 
Coding”, stating that qualitative researchers tend not to think of themselves as 
counters. The authors do, however, point out that when a theme or a pattern is 
identified by the researcher, it isolates something that happens many times or in 
a specific manner (Aurini et al., 2016:198). According to Aurini et al. (2016:198), 
many things can be counted, such as words, phrases and events. Counting 
assists the researcher in identifying a category and a theme, and it can verify 
fundamental propositions “[a]bout what is going on in your data [in the data 
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collected]” and how the participants understand the social phenomenon being 
studied.  
 
Yin (2016:185) asserts that the analysis in qualitative research does not follow an 
unyielding step-by-step procedure, but it is not entirely unstructured either. Yin 
(2016:185) explains that in most qualitative analyses, irrespective of the type or 
variant that is emulated, it does follow a generic “five-phased cycle” of analysis, 
and further explains that the analysis is likely to occur in a “non-linear” fashion. 
To better explain the sequence of the phases and the non-linear fashion of the 
analysis process, the researcher presents a graph, Figure 1.1, below depicting 
the complete cycle and the five phases as depicted by Yin (2016:186). The 
arrows in the graph depict the back and forth movement between the phases 
(Yin, 2016:185). The graphic depiction below was adapted from the illustration by 
Yin (2016:186), and is captioned “Five Phases of Analysis and Their Interactions”, 
namely compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpretation and conclusion:  
 
Figure 1.1: Phases of analysis and their interactions 
 
(Source: Adapted from Yin, 2016:186) 
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Yin (2016:186) sets out the five phases and discusses them as follows: 
 
The first phase: Compiling 
Yin (2016:186) posits that the first phase of the formal analysis of the data begins 
with the compilation and sorting of the information collected during the data 
collection. During the “compiling phase”, the information is formally arranged in 
some useful order and may be considered to resemble a database.  
 
During this phase, the researcher first started to compile data when information 
was collected during the preliminary review of the literature. During this phase, 
the researcher commenced with interviewing participants, transcribing audio 
recordings of the interviews, and making back-up copies of recordings and 
transcripts. The researcher continuously collected literature on the issues under 
investigation and arranged it according to relevance. 
 
The second phase: Disassembling 
Yin (2016:186) postulates that this involves breaking down the data into smaller 
pieces such as substantive themes based on a combination of disassembled 
items. Yin (2016:186) posits that although the second phase may involve 
breaking down the compiled data into fragments or pieces and assigning labels 
or codes in a formal coding procedure, it is not mandatory. During this phase, the 
researcher commenced by breaking down the text of the interviews into themes 
and tabulating the topics into tables related to the replies to the research 
questions. 
 
The third phase: Reassembly 
During the third phase of the analysis process, namely the reassembly procedure, 
the arrangement of the data can be facilitated by depicting data graphically or by 
arranging it in lists and tables (Yin, 2016:187). During this phase, the researcher 
tabulated the themes in frequency tables and produced graphs to depict the data.  
 
The fourth phase: Interpretation 
This cycle concerns the interpretation of the “reassembled” data to create new 
narratives, with accompanying tables and graphics where relevant. This phase 
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constitutes the key analytical part of the research report (Yin, 2016:187). In this 
phase, the researcher analysed and interpreted the reassembled data, 
integrating the interpretation with the text collected during the document study 
and presenting the data from the documents in a narrative format. 
 
The fifth phase: Conclusion 
This phase of the analysis cycle is referred to as the “concluding” phase and calls 
for the drawing of findings from the entire study (Yin, 2016:187). 
 
In this research, the researcher approached the analysis of the data in 
accordance with the guidance provided in the literature, as suggested by Yin 
(2016:185–187) In addition to approaching the analysis of the data in the manner 
suggested by Yin (2016:185-187) (referred to above), the researcher also 
consulted the literature for further guidance on how to prepare, organise and 
reduce the data into themes and interpret the results. Welman and Kruger 
(2001:195) assert that a content analysis can be conducted of the responses to 
open-ended questions and unstructured aspects of the interviews, to report the 
substance of the interviews in a quantitative way, in addition to making a 
qualitative analysis of the essence of the content of such an interview.  According 
to Denscombe (2010b:281), a content analysis can be used with any text and is 
used as a way of “quantifying” the text that follows a logical and relatively 
straightforward procedure, which he describes in the following steps:  
 
a. The researcher should choose an appropriate sample of texts. The texts 
used are the transcripts of the responses to the open-ended questions used 
in the interviews with the participants. Welman and Kruger (2001:195) also 
state that a content analysis can be conducted of the responses to open-
ended questions and unstructured aspects of the interviews to report the 
substance of the interviews in a quantitative way, in addition to making a 
qualitative analysis of the essence of the content of such an interview.  
b. The researcher broke the text down into smaller component units. Each 
individual word can be a unit for analysis. 
c. The researcher developed relevant themes for analysing the data. This took 
on the form of ‘keywords’ associated with the topic.  
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d. According to Welman and Kruger (2001:195), content analysis involves the 
contents of the participants’ responses to the open-ended questions being 
examined systematically to record the relative frequencies of themes and 
the ways in which these themes are portrayed. 
e. As part of the analysis, the researcher must then count the frequency at 
which the various themes occur. 
f. The researcher then analysed the text in respect of the frequency of the 
units and their relationship to other units that occur in the text. Leedy and 
Ormrod (2015:317) describe this step as one of the crucial stages of a 
content analysis in which it is required to tabulate the frequency of each 
characteristic found in the material being studied. Appropriate analyses 
were performed in respect of the frequencies or percentages obtained to 
determine whether significant differences exist between the sources of text 
in the literature and the answers of the participants relevant to the research 
question. 
 
In preparing the data for analysis, Denscombe (2010b:275) advises that the 
researcher must make back-up copies of the data, whether it is in the form of 
recordings, computer files, visual documents or documents, such as the 
transcripts. Heeding the advice, the researcher continually made back-up 
versions of electronic data as well as copies of documents. Denscombe 
(2010b:275) suggests that if audio recordings are made during the interviews, 
they should be transcribed and annotated. He further envisages that 
transcriptions will help with detailed searches and comparisons of the data. 
Transcriptions are also necessary if the researcher intends to use data software 
during the analysis. In this research, the researcher transcribed the audio 
recordings made during the interviews and analysed the data from the text.  
 
The analysis of documents as a source of data provided answers and shed light 
on the following issues: 
• Government’s approach and policy or lack thereof regarding the 
combating of financial crime. 
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• Official mandate of governmental investigative authorities about 
combating financial crime. 
• Perceptions from experts and policymakers regarding Government's 
approach to combating financial crime. 
• Understanding of the meaning of the concept Whole-of-Government 
and how this concept is applied elsewhere, especially regarding the 
combating of financial crime. 
• Understanding of the meaning of the concept financial crime and how 
this is being categorised, using a structured approach and a 
description of the type of unlawful conduct. 
1.15.1 Bracketing 
Starks and Trinidad (as quoted by Tufford & Newman, 2010:81) state that in 
qualitative studies, the researcher is the instrument for analysis across all stages 
of the research project. Because of the subjective nature of the research 
endeavour, it will result in the inevitable transmission of assumptions, values, 
interests, emotions and theories within and across the research. These are 
referred to collectively as “preconceptions” or “presuppositions”, which have the 
potential to influence how data are gathered, interpreted and presented (Tufford 
& Newman, 2010:81). Tufford and Newman (2010:81) describe “bracketing” as a 
method used by researchers to mitigate the potentially adverse effect of 
unrecognised preconceptions related to the research, thereby increasing the 
accuracy of the research. Gearing (2008:2) defines bracketing as “a rigorous 
process that suspends internal and external suppositions [preconceptions] 
thereby allowing the focusing in on a specific phenomenon to understand or see 
it as it is.” 
 
Concerning the application of bracketing, Parse (2001:80) states that the 
researcher explicitly declares his/her beliefs about the phenomenon and “sets 
these aside” when approaching the participant’s descriptions. Spiegelberg (as 
quoted by Parse, 2001:80) states that it is important to “consider all of the data, 
real or unreal or doubtful and having equal rights, and investigate them without 
fear or favour.” Parse (2001:80) then concludes by stating that “Bracketing, then, 
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is an attempt to ensure that the various perspectives of the participants are 
considered in uncovering the essences of the phenomenon under study.” 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2011:97), in quoting Moustakas (1994:34), 
bracketing of the researcher’s personal experiences is important because it 
allows the researcher to perceive the phenomenon “freshly as if for the first time”. 
 
In applying the practice of bracketing, Leedy and Ormrod (2015:274) recommend 
that during the interview, the researcher suspends any preconceived notions or 
personal experiences that may influence what the researcher “hears” the 
participant saying. Leedy and Ormrod (2015:274) acknowledge that such a 
suspension can be complicated if the researcher has personally experienced the 
phenomenon under study, but it is essential if the researcher is to gain an 
understanding of the typical experiences that people have had.  
 
During the research, the researcher followed the advice provided by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2015:274) by suspending any preconceived notions or personal 
experiences that might have influenced what the researcher “heard” the 
participants saying in order to gain an understanding of the typical experiences 
that people have had. This process involved ‘bracketing’ by the researcher, 
setting aside his personal viewpoint to, live the experience “freshly as if for the 
first time”, as proposed by Maykut and Morehouse (1994:123) and Marshall and 
Rossman (2011:97). Bracketing enables the researcher “to remain open to what 
is in the data”, as suggested by Roulston (2013:9). 
1.16 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY 
Validity is defined as “the extent to which the research produces an accurate 
version of the world” (Bloor & Wood, 2006:147). Validity is based on whether the 
findings are accurate from the viewpoint of the researcher, the participants or the 
readers of a version (Creswell & Miller, 2000:125). Kumar (2011:84) postulates 
that one of the areas of difference between quantitative studies and qualitative 
studies is the use of and importance given to the concepts of validity and 
reliability. Kumar also indicates that the debate concerns whether, given the 
framework of qualitative research, these concepts can or should even be applied 
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to qualitative research. White (2011:233-234) explains that validity is a term that 
applies equally to empirical, exegetic and qualitative approaches. However, 
validity distinguishes between internal and external validity that is applied and 
understood differently in empirical and qualitative studies. 
 
Denscombe (2010b:298) believes the validity of research is something that 
“needs to be demonstrated” as part and parcel of the research process itself. 
Creswell and Miller (2000:124) agree, and state that there is a consensus that 
qualitative researchers must validate their studies as credible. Leedy and Ormrod 
(2015:103) are of the same view, stating that irrespective of which research 
methodology is chosen, the researcher must think about the general validity of 
the approach, taking cognizance of the likelihood that it will yield accurate, 
meaningful and credible results that can potentially assist in addressing the 
research problem. 
 
Koonin (2014:252) states that the concepts validity and reliability are most 
commonly associated with quantitative studies, during which researchers tend to 
use research methods that produce measurable numerical and statistical results.  
They would often also seek for causal effects. They therefore want to repeat tests 
to determine whether the same cause, under the same circumstances, returns 
the same results. However, in qualitative research, the aim of research is to 
attempt to provide an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon. To this end, 
qualitative researchers prefer to use the concept trustworthiness to measure 
validity and reliability in qualitative studies (Koonin, 2014:253). If qualitative 
researchers still use the terms validity and reliability, the way in which they 
determine validity and reliability will differ from the way it is determined in 
quantitative studies (Koonin, 2014:254 with reference to Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Shenton, 2004).  
 
In qualitative research, the term used to encapsulate the concept of validity and 
reliability is trustworthiness (Koonin, 2014:258). According to Lincoln and Guba 
(as quoted by Kumar, 2011:184), trustworthiness in qualitative research is 
determined by four indicators, namely credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability. Kumar (2011:185), referring to Trochim and Donelly (2007), 
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presents a table to illustrate how the four indicators proposed by Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) equate to validity and ‘reliability’ in quantitative research. The table, 
Table 1.1 is provided below to aid in the exposition that follows on the methods 
used in this research to ensure validity and reliability. 
 
Table 1.1: A comparison of the terms used to equate validity and 
reliability in qualitative research 
Traditional evaluation criteria for 
quantitative research 
Alternative evaluation criteria for 
qualitative research 
Internal Validity Credibility (Par. 1.16.1) 
External Validity Transferability (Par. 1.16.2) 
Reliability Dependability (Par. 1.16.3) 
Objectivity Confirmability (Par. 1.16.4) 
(Source: Adapted from Kumar, 2011:185)  
  
A procedural perspective recommended by Creswell (2013:249-250) to check the 
accuracy of findings in research is to identify and discuss one or more available 
strategies. Creswell (2013:250) recommends the use of multiple approaches to 
enhance the researcher’s ability to assess the accuracy of findings as well as 
convince readers of that precision. Creswell (2013:250) presents eight primary 
strategies, presented here in no specific order of importance: 
• Triangulation 
• Member checking 
• Rich, thick description 
• Clarifying bias  
• Present negative or discrepant information 
• Prolonged time in the field 
• Peer debriefing 
• Auditing 
 
The researcher chose, and actively incorporated validation strategies 
recommended by Creswell (2013:250-253) as part of this research. The 
researcher identifies, discusses and reflects on the application of the applied 
strategies in the sections that follow below. 
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1.16.1 Credibility 
According to White (2011:236), credibility is broadly analogous to ‘internal 
validity’. Schurink et al. (2011:397) assert that credibility (in qualitative research) 
is an alternative to internal validity. Rossouw (as quoted by Delport & Fouché, 
2011:428) agrees, postulating that credibility, as encountered in qualitative 
research, is a concept equivalent to validity in quantitative studies (Bloor & Wood, 
2006:147). Validity is based on whether the findings are accurate from the 
viewpoint of the researcher, the participants, or the readers of a version (Creswell 
& Miller, 2000:125). Kumar (2011:185), with reference to Trochim and Donnelly 
(2007:149), declares that credibility involves establishing that the results of the 
research are credible or believable from the perspective of the participants. 
Creswell (2014:201) points out that credibility is one of the strengths of qualitative 
research and is founded on determining whether findings are accurate from the 
viewpoint of the researcher, the participants or the person who reads the version 
of an account  
1.16.1.1 Triangulation of different methods 
Denscombe (2010b:346) explains that ‘triangulation’ involves the practice of 
viewing things from more than one perspective. This can mean the use of 
different methods, various sources of data or even different researchers within a 
study. The principle behind this is that the researcher gains a better 
understanding of the phenomenon that is being investigated if he/she views it 
from different positions. Viewing something from more than one viewpoint allows 
the researcher to get a better “fix” on it, which implies “to get [a] better knowledge 
of it”. If the researcher succeeds in establishing the themes from a convergence 
of several sources of data, the process is adding validity to the data (Creswell, 
2014:201). 
 
Creswell (2014:201) recommends the use of multiple data collection strategies, 
thereby enhancing the researcher’s ability to assess the accuracy of the findings 
as well as convincing the reader of the accuracy. The researcher used multiple 
data-collection strategies, namely interviews, a study of the literature, and 
document study. The researcher ensured credibility in that the data collected 
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addressed the research problem, aim and research during data collection. During 
the data analysis, the researcher compared different sets of data to identify 
similarities that provide evidence for making judgements about similarities 
between the various sets of information, thereby ensuring credibility. The 
researcher compared the data received from the various participants and other 
sources of evidence. The purpose of using triangulation in this research is to 
improve accuracy and to get a fuller picture by producing corresponding data to 
give the researcher added confidence in his research data and findings. 
1.16.1.2 Member checking 
According to Yin (2016:337), member checking refers to the procedure whereby 
the findings of a study or draft material are shared with the participants in the 
study. The ‘checking’ allows the participants to correct or otherwise improve the 
accuracy of the study, simultaneously reinforcing collaborative and ethical 
relationships. Creswell (2013:252) states that according to Lincoln and Guba 
(1985:314), member checks are "the most critical technique for establishing 
credibility." This approach carries a lot of weight in most qualitative studies and 
involves taking data, analyses, interpretations and conclusions back to the 
participants so that they can judge the accuracy and credibility of the account.  
 
According to Creswell (2013:252), member checking may involve determining the 
accuracy of the qualitative findings by taking the final report or specific 
descriptions or themes back to the participants and determining whether the 
participants feel that the findings are accurate. This does not necessarily mean 
taking back the raw transcripts to check for accuracy. Instead, the researcher 
takes back parts of the polished or semi-polished product, such as the main 
conclusions, the themes, and so forth. This procedure could involve conducting 
a follow-up interview with participants in the study and provide an opportunity for 
them to comment on the findings. 
 
In this research, the researcher re-engaged with some of the participants to 
confirm whether he had correctly interpreted an answer, or to clarify certain 
aspects of their responses. The researcher took the final report, specific 
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descriptions and conclusions back to the participants and enquired from them 
whether they agreed with the findings of the researcher and whether the 
conclusions made sense, based on their own experiences. In applying this 
procedure, the researcher contextualised the sites or people in the study, 
providing as much detail as possible, which may include describing a small part 
of the interaction that took place or providing a detailed version of how people 
feel. The researcher constantly scrutinised the data and the interpretation of the 
data to ensure that assumptions made were acceptable and applied to the scope 
of the research. 
1.16.1.3 Thick description 
According to Yin (2016:340), ‘thick description’ refers to the effort to collect data 
that has the attribute of describing real-world events in great detail. Increased 
detail not only provides a richer version of the facts but it can also assist in 
reducing any influences caused by selectivity and reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher when reporting about the event. Tracy (2010:843) posits that thick 
description is one of the most important means of achieving credibility.   
 
Creswell and Miller (2000:129) assert that the process of writing, using a thick 
description, is intended to provide as much detail as possible. By using a rich, 
thick description when conveying the findings in a report, the description may 
transport readers to the setting and provide the discussion with an element of 
shared experiences. Offering several perspectives about the theme renders the 
result closer to reality and richer, adding validity to the findings (Creswell, 
2014:202). Creswell and Miller (2000:129) argue that the purpose of a thick 
description is that it creates “verisimilitude” or a sense of credibility. That is, it 
creates the feeling that the reader has experienced, or could have experienced, 
or could experience the events described in a study. Creswell (2013:252), 
referring to Erlandson et al. (1993:32), states that with such detailed description, 
the researcher enables readers to transfer information to other settings and to 
determine whether the findings are transferable "because of shared 
characteristics". This is because the writer describes in detail the participants or 
setting being studied.  
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Creswell and Miller (2000:129) suggest that there is a measure of overlap 
between thick description as a strategy to ensure credibility, and such thick 
description as a strategy to ensure transferability. By providing vivid detail, the 
researcher assists readers to understand that the account given is credible, 
helping them to decide whether the findings are valid in relation to other settings 
or similar contexts (Creswell & Miller, 2000:129).  
 
To enhance the credibility of the study, the researcher identified a target 
population from which rich, thick and ‘real life’ information was obtained. The rich, 
thick information gathered is an attempt to transport readers to the setting and 
give the discussion an element of shared characteristics (Creswell, 2013:252). In 
this research, the researcher provided a detailed description of the setting, and 
offered many perspectives on a theme. This resulted in the results becoming 
more realistic and richer. The researcher provided sufficient information about the 
context being studied and ensured that the research questions were 
appropriately addressed (Jensen, 2008:2). 
1.16.1.4 Prolonged engagement and persistent observation 
Creswell (2013:250) refers to “prolonged engagement and persistent observation 
in the field”. This includes building trust with the participants, learning the culture, 
and checking for misinformation that stems from distortions introduced by the 
researcher or informants. In this way, the researcher develops an in-depth 
understanding of the issues under investigation (Creswell, 2014:202). Creswell 
(2014:201) asserts that the more involvement the researcher has with the 
participants in their setting, the more validity and accuracy can be added to the 
version presented by the participant. Leedy and Ormrod (2015:106) refer to 
“extensive time in the field,” stating that it includes extended periods in the field 
studying a particular phenomenon, forming a tentative hypothesis and continually 
looking for evidence that continually confirms or rebuts that assumption. Botes 
(2003:180) refers to “sufficient prolonged involvement”, stating that this means 
the researcher should be entrenched in the field of study, having a prolonged 
interaction with the participants or study material. 
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To increase credibility, the researcher spent extended periods with the 
respondents to understand them better, gain their trust and to obtain insight into 
their lives regarding the problem under investigation, as proposed by Creswell 
(2013:251). The researcher developed an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon under study and conveys to the reader the detail about the site and 
the people, lending credibility to the narrative account as suggested by Creswell 
(2013:251). The researcher developed an in-depth understanding of the issues 
under investigation by visiting and interviewing the participants at their places of 
work. The researcher built trust and rapport with the participants to ensure that 
they were comfortable with disclosing certain information. Later on, the 
researcher reciprocated by providing feedback to the participants. This increased 
the credibility because the findings originated from participants’ lived experience. 
Throughout the data collection phase of this study, the researcher immersed 
himself in the study material, documents and literature to ensure sufficient 
involvement, “thoroughly examining and studying all relevant sources”, as 
suggested by Botes (2003:180).  
1.16.1.5 Clarifying bias 
Ogden (2008:2) asserts that “bias” refers to a predisposition or partiality. Ogden 
(2008:2) elucidates that in qualitative research, bias involves influences that 
compromise accurate sampling, data collection, data interpretation and the 
reporting of findings. Leedy and Ormrod (2015:106) refer to the 
“acknowledgement of personal biases”, suggesting that rather than claiming to 
be an objective, impartial observer, the researcher describes personal beliefs and 
attitudes that may potentially be slanting the observations and interpretations. 
Ogden (2008:2) asserts that the real imperative is for researchers to be aware of 
their values and predispositions, and to acknowledge that these factors are 
inseparable from the research process. At the outset of this research report, the 
researcher stated his background and experience in the field and his concerns 
about the phenomenon under investigation. Where the researcher became aware 
that his personal beliefs and attitudes could possibly introduce bias into the 
findings, he alerted the reader to that fact. Ogden (2008:2) suggests that in 
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qualitative research, researchers word their interview questions so that they are 
not predisposed to elicit biased responses. In this regard, the researcher 
conducted a pilot or pre-test to identify questions with the potential to solicit 
preordained and biased responses from participants.  
1.16.2 Transferability 
According to White (2011:234), external validity is also referred to as 
‘generalisability’. Generalisability is a measure of the extent to which research 
results can be extrapolated to another setting (White, 2011:234). White 
(2011:237) asserts that qualitative researchers apply the term transferability 
instead of generalisability. Denscombe (1010b:301) claims that most qualitative 
researchers accept that generalisability is relevant but argue that it has to be 
approached in a different way when being used in relation to qualitative research.    
 
According to Creswell (2014:203-204), the value of qualitative research lies in the 
description and themes in the context of a specific site, and not to generalise the 
findings to individuals, sites or places outside of those under study. According to 
Denscombe (2010b:300), qualitative research tends to be based on the intensive 
study of a relatively small number of cases. This raises the question of how typical 
those cases are and how likely it is that what was found in those few cases will 
also be found elsewhere in cases addressing a similar issue.  In research based 
on small numbers and qualitative data, this issue can be dealt with through what 
Lincoln and Guba (as quoted by Denscombe, 2010b:300) refer to as 
‘transferability’. This involves an inventive process whereby the reader of the 
research uses information about the instance that has been studied to arrive at a 
judgement as to what extent the findings of a study can be applied to other 
situations (Denscombe, 2010b:301). The question then becomes one of “to what 
extent could the findings [of one study] be transferred [applied] to other instances 
[situations]?” (Denscombe, 2010b:301). The following suggestions in the 
literature guided the researcher to address the issue of transferability: 
 
According to White (2011:237), qualitative researchers facilitate transferability by 
providing detailed descriptions of all aspects of their research by means of the 
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application of thick description together with a reflexive account of themselves. 
With regard to thick description, Halaweh (2015:354) agrees, stating that thick 
description is also a strategy to ensure transferability. To this end, the researcher 
applied ‘thick description’ of this research, as discussed in the previous section. 
With regard to a reflexive account on the part of the researcher, Leedy and 
Ormrod (2015:278) state that good qualitative researchers actively try to identify 
personal, social, political or philosophical biases that can potentially affect their 
ability to collect and interpret data. This procedure is referred to as ‘reflexivity’. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015:278 & 353) suggest that the researcher takes whatever 
steps necessary to circumvent such influences, including alerting readers to any 
such biases that may have limited the researcher’s ability to study the research 
problem with complete objectivity. This includes being upfront about any 
assumptions that may have influenced methods, analyses and interpretations. In 
this research, the researcher consciously thought about what his biases might 
be, speculating on the effects these biases may have had on his actions, the data 
collected and the interpretation of the results, and, where necessary, bringing it 
to the attention of the reader (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015:353). 
 
According to Polit and Beck (2010:1453) transferability is considered to be a 
collaborative endeavour during which the researcher provides detailed 
descriptions that will allow readers to make inferences about extrapolating the 
findings to other settings. The function of transferability, however, is performed 
by readers and consumers of research. It is their function to evaluate the extent 
to which the findings of the research apply to new situations. It can thus be said 
that it is the readers and users of research who ‘‘transfer’’ the results.  
 
White (2011:238) agrees, stating that transferability is a process carried out by 
other qualitative researchers after it had been facilitated by the original 
researcher. According to Kumar (2011:185), the researcher must extensively and 
thoroughly supply information that will enable others to gauge the process the 
researcher adopted so that they can follow and replicate it. To put it differently, to 
gauge to what extent the findings are transferable, the reader must be presented 
with relevant details on which to base a comparison. Armed with the appropriate 
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information, the reader can consider the transferability of the findings. It is, 
therefore, the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that there is sufficient 
contextual information about the fieldwork sites to enable the reader to make such 
a transfer (Lincoln & Guba; Firestone, as quoted by Shenton, 2004:69). 
 
Jensen (2008:2) suggests that qualitative researchers use two strategies that 
could increase the transferability of a study, namely thick description (already 
discussed in the section above) and through purposive sampling. In this research, 
the researcher made use of purposive sampling. To this end, the researcher 
made sure that in this study the participants are important members of the 
community related to the study, i.e. practitioners and investigators being 
members of the key agencies involved in the combating of financial crime 
(Jensen, 2008:2). 
1.16.3 Dependability 
According to White (2011:235), qualitative researchers usually adopt the notion 
of dependability rather than reliability. It is therefore very similar to the concept of 
reliability in quantitative research (Kumar, 2011:383). Reliability is concerned with 
whether the results will be the same if the same thing is observed twice - the 
greater the similarity between the results the greater the dependability (Kumar, 
2011:383). White (2011:235) posits that dependability is a measure of the extent 
to which a reader of the account concurs with the findings of the research, based 
on the evidence presented. 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985; as quoted by Golafshani, 2003:601), argue that “since 
there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former is 
sufficient to establish the latter”. Patton (as quoted by Golafshani, 2003:602) 
holds the same view, citing that reliability is a consequence of the validity of a 
study. Golafshani (2003:601) asserts that this is an endorsement of the similarity 
of reliability and validity in qualitative research. Koonin (2014:259) argues that 
dependability refers to the quality of the process of integration that took place 
between the data collection methods, data analysis and theory generated from 
the data. Denscombe (2010b:300) posits that the issues around validity in 
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qualitative research can be resolved by demonstrating that the research reflects 
procedures and decisions that others can see and evaluate in terms of how far it 
constitutes “reputable procedures and reasonable decisions”, acting as a “proxy” 
for being able to replicate the research. Denscombe (2010b:300) argues that it is 
only when such information is supplied that it is possible to reach conclusions as 
to how feasible it is that another researcher would have been able to arrive at the 
same comparable findings.  
 
White (2011:235) recommends that the primary mechanism enabling qualitative 
researchers to achieve dependability is a thick description. White (2011:235) 
pronounces that the richness of the description is indicative of the “density of the 
layers of meaning with which the interpretation has to deal” and a reflection of the 
authenticity of the research. White (2011:236) states that providing a thick 
description leaves an audit trail that enables readers to follow the interpretative 
process from the outset of the study and understand the findings derived from it. 
The concept of dependability as regards this study is relevant because the 
conclusions of the study are reliable and objectively real (White, 2011:235), can 
be trusted, and will be such that another researcher will make the same findings. 
By following the advice from the literature to ensure reliability and dependability, 
the researcher provides a thick description. 
1.16.4 Confirmability 
According to Morse, Barret, Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002:13), confirmability is 
one of the elements of “trustworthiness”, which is a concept that runs parallel with 
validity and reliability in qualitative inquiry. White (2011:235) posits that in 
qualitative research, ‘confirmability’ complements ‘dependability’ as regards the 
extent to which a researcher’s interpretation of the research material can be 
corroborated. Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be 
confirmed or corroborated by others (Trochim & Donnelley, as quoted by Kumar, 
2011:185). Confirmability is also like reliability in quantitative research. It is only 
possible if both researchers follow the process in an identical manner for the 
results to be compared (Kumar, 2011:185). Seale (1999:468) asserts that 
confirmability is a measure replacing the conventional measure of neutrality or 
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objectivity as a means to establish trustworthiness in research. With regard to 
confirmability, Shenton (2004:63) asserts that it equates to the qualitative 
researcher's concern with objectivity. Seale (1999:468) states that auditing is a 
useful strategy to establish confirmability. In this regard, Seale (1999:468) posits 
that auditing is “an exercise in reflexivity, which involves the provision of a 
methodologically self-critical account of how the research was done”. In 
observing confirmability, the researcher must take steps to ensure that the 
findings are derived from the participant’s experiences and ideas, and not those 
of the researcher’s own characteristics and preferences (Shenton, 2004:72). 
Shenton (2004:72) proposes triangulation as a step to ensure confirmability and 
reduce the effect of a researcher’s bias. This researcher, in following this advice, 
used triangulation in this research to address confirmability. 
 
Shenton (2004:2) contends that a detailed methodological description enables 
the reader to determine the extent to which the data and the constructs that 
emerge from the data may be accepted. In this regard, the role of an audit trail is 
to allow the observer to trace the steps of the research “step-by-step” according 
to the decisions made and procedures described. This allows for tracking the way 
the concepts inherent to the research question gave rise to the work that followed 
(Shenton, 2004:72). According to Creswell and Miller (2000:128), the audit trail 
can be viewed by external observers such as the readers who examine the 
narrative account and can attest to its credibility (internal validity). Creswell and 
Miller (2000:128) propose that for researchers to establish an audit trail they must 
provide clear documentation of all research decisions and activities. To ensure 
confirmability, the researcher kept a detailed record of all the literature consulted. 
This provides proof that the findings did not originate in the imagination of the 
researcher but that they are clearly linked to the data, resulting in the findings of 
the study, determined by a review of the literature, as suggested by Liamputtong 
(2013:26). 
1.17 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Mcauley (2003:95) cautions that social research often involves an intrusion into 
people’s lives and therefore suggests that such research largely depends on a 
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successful relationship between the researcher and the participants. Central to 
this relationship is ethical responsibility, which is integral to the research topic 
and to research design and planning. The motivation for researchers to act 
ethically is partly a matter of professional integrity (Denscombe, 2002:175).  
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2015:120), whenever human beings are the 
focus of research, the researcher should look at the implications of what he/she 
is proposing to do. UNISA provides guidelines about ethical considerations 
involving human participants in which the concerns outlined by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2015:120-123) are addressed (UNISA, 2007:9). UNISA (2007:9) 
prescribes, among other things that the following general ethics principles should 
be adhered to by researchers:  
1.17.1 Competence, ability and commitment to research 
The researcher is academically schooled and proficient in conducting research 
and the application of research methodology, having undertaken a research 
project and publishing a dissertation of limited scope at a master’s level. Prior to 
undertaking this research project, the researcher had to comply with the 
requirement of having completed a research proposal module, in lieu of which he 
had to complete and submit a research proposal on which this study is based. 
The researcher is professional in his career and academically committed to the 
research topic.  
1.17.2 Respect for and protection of participants’ rights 
The researcher took steps to ensure that the identity of all participants in this 
study is protected, thereby ensuring that they cannot be identified, victimised or 
intimidated because of their participation in this study. The participants are 
allocated a unique code during the interviews and to their responses, that is kept 
separate from their personal identity and known only to the researcher. This step 
ensures that their names are not visible to anyone but the researcher who was 
responsible for collecting the information and conducting the interviews. Where a 
quote, account, description, or answer is attributed to a participant in the research 
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study, the participant’s code is provided with the in-text reference and the list of 
references.  
1.17.3 Informed and non-coerced consent 
In this research, all the participants were informed of the purpose of the research 
and given a choice to participate in this research voluntarily. At all times during 
the research, the researcher was acutely aware that the participants participated 
on a voluntary basis. Before the interviews were conducted, participants were 
provided with a form entitled “Informed consent form”. A copy of the said form is 
attached as Annexure C. The contents of the form were discussed with and 
explained to the participant. The following aspects are covered in the form:  
• Purpose of the research 
• Duration of the study 
• Participant’s role 
• Selection of participants 
• Risk and discomfort 
• Protection of privacy 
• Benefits to participants 
• Benefit to others 
• Maintaining confidentiality 
• Statement regarding gifts and compensation/reimbursements 
• Research-related inquiries 
• Voluntary participation, without prejudice for non-participation or 
withdrawal from research 
• Autonomy 
• Security of data feedback regarding findings of research 
• Access to developed products and sharing of benefits derived from 
products 
• Benefit to local community and society at large 
• Possible adverse impact on the community 
• Dissemination of results 
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The participant could then voluntarily and freely elect to sign a declaration of 
informed consent, witnessed by the researcher at the place, on the date and at 
the time of affixing his or her signature. In addition to the declaration of informed 
consent, the participant was again informed of his/her right to confidentiality and 
anonymity, and given an opportunity to sign an undertaking to voluntarily agree 
to participate in the study on the understanding that he/she would be allocated a 
unique participant number and that his/her identity would be kept strictly 
confidential. The form is entitled “Undertaking and personal details of participant” 
attached hereto as Annexure G. The researcher kept this form separate from the 
interview schedule and participants’ responses. Before the research study could 
commence, the researcher had to obtain ethical clearance from the College of 
Law Ethical Clearance Committee, to confirm that the researcher had complied 
with all the conditions and had provided all the undertakings for ethical research. 
A copy of the said ethical clearance certificate is attached as Annexure A. 
1.18 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
Financial crime is multifaceted and is conceptualised in many different guises. 
The combating of financial crime consists of many elements, is conducted in 
terms of several legislative provisions, and carried out by various investigative 
agencies at different stages, making use of their own legal mandates and powers. 
Whole-of-Government is a foreign concept to most, and its application as a 
steering concept in public management to address fragmented efforts to solve 
social issues requires further exploration. 
 
The result of this research is set out in a research report in which the research 
design and research questions are presented and discussed. The following 
chapter layout is the result of using the guidelines provided by Denscombe 
(2010b:311) and the General Information Guide - Master’s and Doctor’s Degrees, 
published by UNISA (2009:8-9): 
 
CHAPTER 2: FINANCIAL CRIME 
This chapter discusses the use and conceptualisation of the meaning of the term 
financial crime and its characteristics in the international sphere as presented in 
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the literature and document study, and in the South African context as is found in 
the literature, document study and feedback from participants. A system of 
categorising financial crimes consistent with the common descriptors, as 
identified in the literature and comments from the participants for practical 
application, is explored in this chapter. The crimes are then categorised 
systematically and codified according to the type and description of the unlawful 
conduct.  
 
CHAPTER 3: COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME 
This chapter determines the conceptual meaning of combating or to combat crime 
generally, and its subordinate elements within the South African legislative, policy 
and strategic framework. The focus then shifts more explicitly to financial crime. 
The legal, policy and strategic framework for combating financial crime in South 
Africa is determined. This chapter explores and discusses the current situation of 
cooperation between responsible government agencies and the integration of 
their efforts to combat financial crime, as experienced by the participants and 
according to the analysis of documents. 
 
CHAPTER 4: INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
In this chapter, it is determined which key investigative agencies have, been 
assigned the legal mandates to combat financial crime. The availability of legal 
gateways and provisions enabling agencies to cooperate is identified and 
discussed. The availability of institutional or organisational arrangements to foster 
interagency cooperation and sharing of information to combat financial crime 
more effectively is determined and discussed. 
 
CHAPTER 5: WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
In this chapter, the public management concept Whole-of-Government is 
demystified. The Whole-of-Government approach is evaluated as a prospective 
application to enable key investigative agencies to cooperate more effectively to 
combat financial crime. This chapter also identifies and explains models or 
strategies for implementing a Whole-of-Government approach that can support 
Government’s efforts to combat financial crime effectively, making optimal use 
of available agencies, their respective mandates and resources. Based on the 
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models identified and studied, a concept model is demonstrated to illustrate the 
prospective viability of a ’Whole-of Government’ approach. 
 
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, the results of the research and conclusions based on the findings 
are presented. Recommendations are made, taking the research questions and 
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CHAPTER 2: FINANCIAL CRIME 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter essentially addresses two integral aspects related to the concept 
financial crime. The first aspect being addressed is to determine the practical 
meaning of financial crime. For practical use, the second aspect being addressed 
is directed at categorising or classifying financial crime systematically and 
methodically in accordance with descriptors of the types of acts or conduct 
identifiable or associated with crimes/offences in terms of South Africa’s laws. It 
is intended that the conceptual model for classifying financial crime should be 
applied by the South African crime-fighting authorities, agencies, departments, 
policy-makers and practitioners, as a system to correctly identify and facilitate 
communication about the types of financial crime. 
 
Financial crime affects every South African, directly or indirectly, by robbing them 
of individual resources or draining the funds available for the country’s 
development (Combating Financial Crime ..., 2012). The OECD agrees with this 
view, asserting that financial crime has a particularly damaging impact on 
developing countries such as South Africa, as it deprives them of resources which 
could otherwise have been used for its long-term development (OECD, 2012a:5). 
 
One of the preliminary steps for Government, government agencies, agency 
officials and practitioners to combat financial crime is to understand the meaning 
and scope of financial crime and to know what type of unlawful acts and conduct 
constitutes crime that falls in the category of financial crime. Financial crime is 
not listed as a separate category of crime in the National Crime Statistics 
maintained by the SAPS, which is the primary law enforcement agency in South 
Africa. Financial crime as a separate category of offences is not addressed in the 
South African Police Service Strategic Plan for 2014-2019 (Strategic Plan…, 
2014b). The absence of a reference to financial crime in these two critical SAPS 
publications does not help to shed light on the meaning or classification of 
financial crime from a South African primary law enforcement perspective. A 
study of the publications and literature produced by government departments 
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does not reveal Government’s absolute definition of what financial crime is. There 
are, however, government publications, literature and statements made by 
politicians and government officials in which they refer to financial crime. These 
comments and references to financial crime are often accompanied by a 
reference to one or more examples of crimes which in their view is a financial 
crime. 
  
The term financial crime is often loosely used by Government, politicians, 
government agencies, agency officials and practitioners when communicating 
about crime. A study of Government’s literature, statements and publications 
reveals that there is a measure of terminological confusion when it comes to using 
the term financial crime. An example of the ill-considered use of the phrase 
financial crime by a politician when referring to crime, in general, is found in a 
media briefing by Minister David Mahlobo, on State security during the 2015/16 
budget vote (Media Briefing …, 2015). When referring to threats the agency took 
note of, Minister Mahlobo (Media Briefing, 2015) stated that, “[i]ncluded in these 
are other threats of ascendary [sic.] of non-state actors in drug trafficking, 
proliferation of arms and ammunition, money laundering, financial crime and [the] 
illicit economy”. Minister Mahlobo further stated “[a]s we continue with our work, 
we shall focus on these threats, ensuring that we can advise Government 
accordingly.” (Media Briefing, 2015). 
 
In the above example, the terms money laundering and financial crime are used 
as if they relate to two unrelated concepts. Most, if not all, academic writers and 
practitioners would have assumed that money laundering is included in the scope 
of the concept financial crime. One can only assume that the minister, considering 
the lack of a conceptual explanation of the term financial crime, adopts a view that 
financial crime is a generally understood term and that people generally know 
what it entails, and that money laundering was quoted as an example. 
 
A further example of the confusing use of terminology where it concerns public 
policy and strategies to combat financial crime is found in a speech by the Minister 
of Police, Mr Fikile Mbalula, MP, outlining the Ministry’s Strategic Plan for the 
period 2017 – 2019.  During the press conference hosted by the Minister of Police 
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on 25 April 2017, Mr Fikile Mbalula, MP, made the following statement (Minister 
of Police’s Press Conference …, 2017): 
 
Crime is a major burden to society in terms of death, injury 
and the impact on families, and has incalculable value 
[harm]. Factors such as illicit financial outflows, cross-
border traffic-related crimes, white-collar crime, cost to 
SAPS to fight crime, cost to secure property, and material 
losses for all victims through medical and life insurance, has 
[sic.] impacted on the individual and State.  
 
The reference to ‘white-collar crime’ in the above quotation from the speech made 
by Minister Mbalula is a deviation from the apparently preferred term in official 
South African Police Service documents and South African Police Service Act, 
No. 68 of 1995, which generally refers to ‘commercial crime’ (Minister of Police’s 
Press Conference …, 2017). This may be an indication that in Government circles 
the terms economic crime, commercial crime and white-collar crime are used 
interchangeably or analogously. This underscores the lack of a common language 
that Government and policymakers can use when specifically addressing financial 
crime and/or its manifestations. 
 
According to the literature, there is not an internationally accepted definition of 
financial crime. A plausible explanation can probably be offered for the 
differences in opinion held by ordinary citizens and laymen, depending on their 
experience and knowledge regarding the meaning of financial crime and what 
unlawful behaviour constitutes a financial crime. However, such a difference in 
understanding and conceptualisation can prove to be problematic from a strategic 
and crime combating point of view when the Government, policy-makers, the 
various investigative agencies and their officials hold divergent views of the 
meaning of the term financial crime and what it entails. Gottschalk (2010a:441) 
refers to this problem and states that there is confusion among researchers and 
practitioners when communicating about examples of financial crime. When 
different agencies communicate about financial crime, at an operational level and 
at a strategic level, they should have a clear view and common understanding 
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across the various agencies of the meaning of financial crime. This holds true in 
view of their respective mandates and those of others, especially when having to 
formulate strategies for actions to combat financial crime more effectively 
(Gottschalk, 2010a:441).  
 
Naylor, Taylor and Bahramitah (2002:1) argue that having a common 
understanding of the meaning of financial crime goes further than a mere “simple 
lack of terminological neatness”. In the context of developing strategies, actions 
or policies to deal with financial crime, policy-makers and heads of investigative 
agencies should have a common understanding of what it is they must combat 
(Naylor et al., 2002:1).  
 
Gottschalk (2010a:441) elaborates, stating that there is a need for classification 
of financial crime into categories to enable a structure within which policing, and 
law enforcement can work. Gottschalk (2010a:441) believes that this is important, 
especially in the context where there are various agencies responsible for the 
combating of financial crime in accordance with their respective mandates. 
 
To solve the problem, Gottschalk (2010a:441) conducted exploratory research 
based on a literature review, to develop a systematic approach to classifying 
financial crime into main categories as well as subcategories. In the research 
report authored by Gottschalk (2010a:441) he proposes that future research be 
undertaken to refine further and improve the categories of financial crime (as this 
research is intent on). Gottschalk (2010b:5) illustrated his classification of financial 
crime in a schedule (Figure 2.7 – paragraph 2.9), captioned the main categories, 
and listed subcategories of financial crime. 
 
The IMF states that countries have different legal classifications of specific acts, 
such as money laundering, corruption, and tax evasion (Boorman & Ingves, 
2001:5). In this regard it should be noted that South African law does not, as in 
some other jurisdictions where other legal systems apply, classify (codify) crimes 
into categories or degrees. Traditionally, South African law recognises the 
distinction between conventions of the common law and statutory provisions, 
which are classified in accordance with the source of the provision (Joubert, 
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2010b: Vol. 6. par. 20). According to Joubert (2010b: Vol. 6. par. 20), jurists have 
developed their own classifications of common-law and statutory offences in 
accordance with the interests the provisions protect.  Joubert (2010b: Vol. 6. par. 
20) furthermore suggests that a novel approach is to systematise crimes, more 
particularly those of statutory origin, in accordance with the type of conduct 
(behavioural descriptors) that the particular statutory provision prohibits.  
 
This assertion by Joubert is echoed in the statement by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in their publication, International Classification of 
Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), that for purposes of legal harmonisation, 
across different jurisdictions, “criminal acts” (or conduct) can be based on 
behavioural descriptions rather than strictly legal specifications derived from 
criminal laws (criminal offences as defined by each country’s substantive law or 
criminal system) (UNODC, 2015:8). The same may be equally applicable to the 
various agencies that are responsible for the combating of financial crime at some 
stage or another, or for practical use by practitioners in the criminal justice 
system. 
 
When government agencies, non-governmental organisations and people have 
to communicate about financial crime in the South African context (and even at 
an international level), it is important that there should be a clear and common 
understanding of the type of conduct or behavioural descriptors they are 
communicating about. The type of prohibited conduct should constitute a crime 
in accordance with the conventions of the criminal law and statutory provisions 
that South African law recognises. The terminology and descriptors of the type of 
conduct used to describe the offences should be used frequently in the South 
African Criminal Justice System (CJS) and habitually by investigators, officials, 
policymakers and politicians, rather than just a strict legal specification.  
 
If different views exist between the various agencies tasked to combat financial 
crime, as regards what conduct constitutes financial crimes, it raises the question 
of how they can assist each other in their common objective to combat financial 
crime, for example during inter-agency cooperation. To initialise actions to 
combat financial crime and allocate resources effectively it is incumbent on those 
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involved to know exactly what is meant when financial crime is referred to so that 
they have a shared understanding of what it is they are fighting against, and direct 
their efforts and resources accordingly. Where different agencies have different 
mandates, they would then at least be able to specify which type of criminal 
conduct it is that is being referred to that falls within the ambit of their respective 
mandates. They can then specify what type of conduct should be excluded from 
their investigative efforts. 
 
This chapter explores and provides a descriptive analysis of the complex 
phenomenon of the concept of financial crime and endeavours to achieve the 
research objective (paragraphs 1.5(a) and (b) of Chapter 1), namely to: 
• Explain the functional meaning and multifaceted characteristics of 
financial crime in general and in the South African context specifically. 
• Divide financial crime into categories, using a systematic approach, 
enabling practitioners to identify the confusing variety of the types of 
conduct that fall in the category of financial crime. 
 
In this chapter, aspects are addressed that relate to definitions of financial crime, 
its nature, classification, behavioural descriptors, characteristics and types of 
conduct according to the interpretations as presented by international regulators, 
international bodies, authors, scholars, researchers and commentators in the 
media and the literature. Conceptualisations for financial crime, as well as 
definitions, characteristics and classification of financial crime, based on an 
analysis of the feedback from participants, are presented by the researcher and 
subsequently integrated to present a conceptual system model for categorising 
or classifying financial crime for domestic application. 
2.2 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL CRIME:  ACADEMIC AND 
PRACTITIONER LITERATURE 
In determining the nature and scope of financial crime, a practical point of 
departure is to consider the meaning of financial.  According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (2017), “financial” relates or pertains to finance or money matters. 
According to the Oxford Dictionaries (2017), “finance” refers to the management 
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of large amounts of money, especially by governments or large companies, and 
“finances” refers to the monetary resources and affairs of a state, organisation or 
person. 
 
“Financial Crime covers a broad range of offences, including tax evasion and tax 
fraud, money laundering, corruption, insider trading, bankruptcy fraud and 
terrorist financing.” (OECD, 2012b:9). The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
in its electronic publication titled “Financial Crimes” asserts that financial crimes 
cover a broad range of activities, often combining licit and illicit financial 
transactions, including activities ranging from fraud through to the active 
manipulation of the stock market, or laundering the proceeds of crime (Financial 
Crimes ..., 2013). 
 
In a background paper prepared for the IMF by Boorman and Ingves (2001:20), 
the term, financial crime, according to the IMF, expresses different concepts, 
depending on the jurisdiction and the context. According to Boorman and Ingves 
(2001:5-20), the term financial crime has been used to describe several different 
concepts of varying levels of specificity. According to these levels of specificity: 
 
At its absolute broadest, the term has occasionally been 
used to refer to any type of illegal activity that result [results] 
in a pecuniary loss. This would include violent crimes 
against the person or property such as armed robbery or 
vandalism.  
 
At its next broadest, the term has often been used to refer 
only to non-violent crimes that result in a pecuniary loss. 
This would include crimes where a financial loss was an 
unintended consequence of the perpetrator’s actions, or 
where there was no intent by the perpetrator to realize a 
financial gain for himself or a related party (e.g. when a 
perpetrator hacks into a bank’s computer and either 
accidentally or intentionally deletes an unrelated depositor’s 
account records). Also, the term has occasionally been 
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used slightly more narrowly to refer only to instances where 
the perpetrator intends to benefit from the crime. Either way, 
criminal fraud (i.e. the act of illegally deceiving or 
misrepresenting information so as to gain something of 
value) for personal benefit is undoubtedly the most 
common. 
 
The term has been used in a more narrow sense to refer 
only to those instances where a nonviolent crime resulting 
in a financial loss crime also involves a financial institution.  
 
Even though financial crime is often thought of to be victimless, probably 
because it is thought of as being non-violent, Harrison and Ryder (2013:5) assert 
that this is far from the truth. In support of this assertion, Harrison and Ryder 
(2013:5) refer to an explanation provided by FATF (Report on Money Laundering 
…, 2004:2), which states that “criminal proceeds have the power to corrupt and 
ultimately destabilise communities or whole national economies”, leading 
Harrison and Ryder (2013:5) to conclude that “financial crime will almost 
certainly also have an adverse impact on the economies of countries.” (my 
emphasis). 
 
According to Harrison and Ryder (2013:6), financial crime can also be seen to 
impact on an individual level, which may include a reduced flow of wealth 
between generations. These authors furthermore maintain that the impact of 
financial crime should not be underestimated and may be just as significant as 
physical abuse. 
 
According to Gottschalk (2010a:443), “financial crime comes in all kinds of 
shapes and colors”. Gottschalk (2014:1) further states that there “exists a variety 
of financial crime types”. The variety of criminal activity that is classified as 
financial crime is, according to Gottschalk (2010a:441), confusing. The term 
financial crime, Gottschalk (2010b:2) states, is expressed in different concepts, 
depending on the jurisdiction and the context. This statement is consistent with 
the statement made by the IMF, as already noted by Boorman and Ingves 
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(2001:5). To add to the differences in opinion on the meaning of financial crime, 
Pickett and Pickett (2002:3) use the terms financial crime, white-collar crime and 
fraud interchangeably, as observed by Gottschalk (2010c:13). The author 
(2014:xix) argues that white-collar crime is financial crime committed by white-
collar criminals, and further argues that “white-collar crime is financial crime 
committed by higher class members of society for personal or organisational 
gain”. 
 
In view of the above, it should be noted that Aslett (2010:2) states that economic 
crime and white-collar crime are not legal terms and that they refer to a wide 
range of offences. Aslett (2010:2) offers the following definition for white collar 
crime: 
 
Non-violent crimes committed through acts of 
misrepresentation for the purpose of financial gain by 
persons in an entrepreneurial, professional or semi-
professional position who use their occupational skills and 
opportunities to advance the commissioning of the crimes. 
 
Bintliff (1993:6) takes a historical look at the terminology used to break with the 
tradition of referring to crimes perpetrated against companies as “white-collar 
crime”. Bintliff (1993:6) asserts that criminologists, sociologists, business 
executives, security professionals and law enforcement officials did not keep 
pace with the changes in the corporate world, and became confused about what 
to call the new onslaught of crimes against business, and therefore clung to the 
“white collar” explanation first offered by Sutherland. Few have tried to break 
with tradition by “testing the waters with a series of new titles and labels” (Bintliff, 
1993:9). According to Bintliff (1993:6), new terms include occupational crimes, 
corporate crimes, economic crimes, blue-collar crimes, financial crimes and 
business crimes. Bintliff (1993:6) continues by adding that “although these labels 
vaguely or partly, describe forms of white-collar crime, they also add to the 
confusion factor”. Budhram and Geldenhuys (2017:8) posit that the 
understanding and scope of the concept white-collar crime have transformed, 
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and it now includes a variety of crimes that did not form part of the original 
arrangement. 
 
Overarching terms that include words such as financial crime, economic crime, 
commercial crime and corporate crime are now used interchangeably with white-
collar crime (Budhram & Geldenhuys, 2017:8). Referring to the term financial 
crime as a general and vague label that can mean any offence that involves 
money or its equivalent, Bintliff (1993:7) asserts that it is regularly used to 
describe specific situations related to financial frauds such as insider trading, 
stock swindles, major embezzlements and other high-finance crimes. Bintliff 
(1993:7) then argues that the term white-collar crime describes the same type 
of offence, and to avoid confusion, one term should be used. 
 
Mwenda (2006:i) observes that there is a lack of a precise definition of the term 
financial crime in many jurisdictions, and also states that in different countries, 
words such as white-collar crime and fraud crime are used interchangeably with 
financial crime. Mwenda (2006:i) asserts that overall, fraud crimes are a larger 
category within the field of financial crime and includes criminal conduct such as 
identity theft, elder financial abuse, counterfeiting, bribery and various corporate 
wrongdoing and embezzlement crimes. Mwenda (2006:i) concludes by saying 
that by contrast, financial crime is wider in scope “and includes all aspects of 
financial victimization”. 
 
Naylor, Taylor and Bahramitah (2002:1), while observing the lack of a precise 
definition and a subsequent overlap, states that umbrella terms such as 
economic crime, commercial crime and white-collar crime are frequently used 
interchangeably, even by so-called experts in the field. For example, when 
describing the typologies of white-collar crime, Gottschalk (2014:1) uses the 
terms white-collar crime and financial crime interchangeably.  
 
In turn, Naylor (2003:82) states that the term economic crime is one of the worst 
examples of terminological vagueness, and asserts that the frequency with 
which the term is used contrasts starkly with the infrequency with which it is 
defined. Naylor et al. (2002:1) assert that the confusion extends further than a 
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mere “simple lack of terminological neatness”. According to Naylor (2003:82), 
the terms economic crime and commercial crime refer to acts conduct or 
activities), while white-collar crime refers to the category of actors (perpetrators) 
committing those acts. Levi (2009:223) asserts that financial crime is an 
imprecise term and that it is not self-evident what it includes and excludes. 
According to Levi (2009:224), fraud and financial crime are terms favoured in 
the American context, whereas the term economic crime is the modern 
European equivalent.  
 
Regarding the references to economic crime in the above discussions, it is 
important to note that Betts (2017:2) elucidates that economic crime tends to 
relate to offences involving direct or indirect financial gain or loss, and can 
include the offences of money laundering, bribery, counterfeiting, computer 
misuses and other miscellaneous fraudulent offences. 
 
The interchangeable use of financial crime, white-collar crime, economic crime, 
and commercial crime, as separate concepts, will not be critically compared for 
the purpose of this research, as it will not advantage or disadvantage the stated 
objective of this investigation, except to say that such interchangeable use 
between the various terms adds to the confusion regarding the meaning of 
financial crime. To this end, the researcher will argue that through this research, 
clarity will be provided regarding the type of unlawful conduct to include or 
exclude from the category of offences termed financial crime for application in 
the jurisdiction of South Africa. 
 
According to the SAPS, crime statistics they generated are an important link in 
the statistical system that guides policy development and planning in the criminal 
justice system (Crime Situation …, 2015). The national crime statistics for South 
Africa are provided by the SAPS in line with the broad objectives of the National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (Brodie: 2013). Its aim in this regard is stated as the 
“gathering [of] reliable crime information”, together with the parallel development 
of an “effective communications strategy”, based on such information that would 
“properly [inform] public opinion in the fight against crime” (Brodie, 2013). 
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An analysis of the SAPS’ National Crime Statistics for 2014/15 (Crime Statistics 
…, 2015) reveals that under the heading “Crime Category” no provision is made 
for Financial Crime. From a statistical perspective it would, therefore, appear 
that the SAPS do not recognise financial crime as a separate category of crime. 
It does, however, acknowledge “Commercial Crime” under the heading “Other 
Serious Crimes”. It is, therefore, possible that some of the crimes stated in the 
literature and feedback from participants as financial crime may resort under the 
heading “commercial crime” for the purpose of SAPS’ National Crime Statistics. 
The lack of recognising Financial Crime in the official crime statistics as a 
separate category of offences may explain the absence of clear “policy 
development and planning” with regard to financial crime. According to Brodie 
(2013), “other serious crimes” include commercial and financial crimes, which 
range from large-scale fraud and corruption to small-scale incidents such as 
shoplifting. Brodie (2013) asserts that the broad categories of crime mentioned 
in the National Crime Statistics are not arbitrary; they are, however, important 
when it comes to understanding, or attempting to understand, both motive and 
modus of the crimes, both of which are necessary to understand whether 
effective crime-prevention strategies are being deployed. Brodie (2013) also 
states that within these general categories there is often further confusion about 
or between specific crimes that could lead to misinformation or misinterpretation 
of data. 
 
De Koker (2007:38) provides an authoritative outlook, stating that financial crime 
is not generally used in South Africa. De Koker (2007:38) further explains that 
South African law enforcement agencies normally use the terms commercial 
crime and economic crime to refer to instances such as theft, fraud, insider 
trading, money laundering and terrorist financing. Budhram and Geldenhuys 
(2017:7) assert that the concept of commercial crime is “closely related to white-
collar crime, financial crime and economic crime”. According to De Koker 
(2007:38), the term financial crime can be used to refer to offences such as 
serious fraud, insider trading, money laundering and terrorist financing. 
 
An example of the explanation offered by De Koker above, regarding the use of 
the terms commercial crime and economic crime, is evident in a report on a global 
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economic crime survey conducted by financial services company PwC, titled 
Global Economic Crime Survey 2016, 5th South African edition, March 2016 
(Global Economic Crime …, 2016). On page 9 of the report, under the heading 
“Breakdown of economic crime types”, the report lists a range of types of offences 
categorised as “economic crime types”, in relation to their prevalence in South 
Africa.  These crimes include:  
• Asset misappropriation (theft) 
• Procurement fraud 
• Bribery and corruption 
• Cybercrime 
• Human resources fraud 
• Accounting fraud 
• Money laundering 
• Intellectual property infringement 
• Tax fraud 
• Mortgage fraud 
• Insider trading 
• Espionage (industrial and trade secrets) 
• Competition law/antitrust infringements 
 
Comparing the economic crime types listed above with examples of financial 
crime’ provided elsewhere in this research report, a lot of overlap is evident, 
proving that not much attention is given to the meaning and interchangeable use 
of the terms commercial crime, economic crime and financial crime as used in 
the South African context.  
 
In a news report covering the conviction of a fraudster in one of the largest fraud 
cases heard by the Western Cape High Court, on charges relating to VAT fraud, 
racketeering, money laundering and reckless trading, the prosecutor, Senior 
State Advocate Freek Geyser, was quoted as saying, “The conviction is a victory 
in our struggle to ensure that financial crime does not pay” (Vilette, 2016). The 
reference to “financial crime” in the comments made by the prosecutor after 
sentencing, when referring to the range of offences for which the accused was 
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convicted of, is representative of the examples of financial crimes described in 
this section. It confirms that the term financial crime does find practical application 
in the South African CJS and is used by officers of the court. 
 
Michel (2008:384) states that financial crimes remain part of the commercial 
crime family, as they share the same general characteristics; however, Michel 
(2008:387) asserts that when referring to financial crimes it should be narrowed 
down to the scope of activities that pertain to the financial market or the 
investment business. In the same vein, Michel (2008:348) contends that in the 
fight against financial crimes, the end–mission consists of “protecting the 
backbone of the economy, which essentially involves the trust of investors, the 
integrity of the markets and the safety of savings.” For all practical purposes, the 
previous assertions by Michel imply that financial crime is the category of 
economic crimes that adversely impact on or prejudice the financial systems of 
a country. Boorman and Ingves, (2001:3) state that financial crime is a subset of 
financial abuse which, according to them (2001:4), includes “illegal financial 
activities, many of which have the potential to harm financial systems…”. 
 
Michel (2008:389) asserts that financial crime involves a combination of experts 
that work together for the same purpose, that is, to make a profit, and that 
opportunity is their motivator. According to Michel (2008:391), a feature of 
contemporary financial crime is the emergence of professionals from the expert 
community who are not related to criminal organisations but who act with 
wrongful intentions in business environments. Michel (2008:391) states that the 
strategies used by corporate executives to commit financial crime show a high 
degree of refinement and sophistication. The National Treasury Policy 
document, A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better also observes 
that financial crimes have become more sophisticated (A Safer Financial Sector 
..., 2011:73). Michel (2008:392) further asserts that an analysis of current 
financial crimes indicates that knowledge of procedures, roles and functions 
related to a specific environment provides the means to accomplish 
blameworthy conduct and that the perpetrators proceed with scant regard to 
governance or moral issues. 
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According to Gottschalk (2010b:2), financial crime is driven by profit, hence the 
reference to a ‘profit-driven crime’. Naylor et al. (2002:2) state that a typical 
profit-driven crime is not an isolated act but “a complex series of interrelated 
actions” and that it applies to all offences where profit is at least partially the 
motive. In view of what has been stated by Joubert (2010b: Vol. 6. par. 20) as 
referred to above, it may be wise to consider the possibility that financial crime 
may be referring to types of offences categorised under umbrella terms such as 
commercial crime, economic crime, white-collar crime and the like that are 
prejudicial or harmful to the financial system of a country.  
 
The information obtained from the text provided by the authors as cited will be 
analysed in more detail in the following paragraphs, starting with the definitions 
provided, followed by the characteristics and the examples given of the types and 
sub-types of financial crime, followed by the (systematic) classification of financial 
crime. The nature and scope of financial crime, according to the interpretation 
presented in the literature, as cited by a variety of academic authors and 
practitioners, were analysed, and the main themes emerging from the literature 
tabulated in Table 2.1 (paragraph 2.9) The frequency of the themes presented in 
Table 2.1 (paragraph 2.9), expressed as a percentage, is graphically depicted in 
Figure 2.1 (paragraph 2.9). 
 
An analysis of the themes captured in Table 2.1 (paragraph 2.9) confirms the 
view expressed in the literature that there is confusion when determining what 
conduct is covered under the term financial crime, and demonstrates just how 
many differences of opinion there are about the nature and scope of the concept 
of financial crime. An analysis of the available definitions for financial crime, 
presented in the literature by academics and practitioners, shows that these 
persons almost invariably follow a similar approach when a definition of financial 
crime (refer to Table 2.3 – page 93) is formulated. They first provide a definition 
in accordance with their understanding of the meaning of the concept financial 
crime, its nature and unique characteristics, followed by examples of the offences 
or typologies of offences that fit within the definition.  
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The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 2.1 in the 
interview schedule, “Do you think there is a common understanding of the 
meaning of financial crime? Please substantiate your answer”. These topics are 
presented in Table 2.2 (paragraph 2.9), and it can be seen that, more than one 
participant could have provided the same answer. This was an open-ended 
question where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, 
and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the 
participants could therefore simply have answered “yes” or “no” and elected to 
substantiate their answer and/or provided more than one response to justify their 
choice. 
In response to question 2.1 in the interview schedule, “Do you think there is a 
common understanding of the meaning of financial crime?”, the participants 
answered “yes” with a frequency of 50%, which is representative of the view that 
there is a common understanding of the meaning of financial crime. In response 
to the same question, the participants responded “no”, with a frequency of 50%, 
which is representative of the view that there is not a common understanding of 
the meaning of financial crime. In addition, responding to the same question, the 
participants responded with a frequency of 20% that they were of the view that 
most people have a general idea of the meaning of financial crime.  
 
The participants demonstrated that they were divided on whether there was a 
common understanding of the concept financial crime. This is an indication that 
there is no common understanding of the meaning of financial crime, a result that 
is consistent with the narrative that emerges from the literature. There is a 30% 
frequency of the theme presented that in South Africa the term financial crime is 
generally associated with the term commercial crime. There is a 10% frequency 
presented by the participants of the theme that financial crime and commercial 
crime can be used interchangeably. The emerging themes are consistent with the 
narrative that emerged from the literature with regard to the use of financial crime 
and commercial crime in South Africa, namely that local practitioners regard 
financial crime as: 
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• representative of that category of commercial crime from which a 
financial benefit is derived; 
• representative of that category of commercial crime aimed at the financial 
sector or systems; 
• being part of the commercial crime family. 
2.3 DEFINING FINANCIAL CRIME  
According to the IMF, “No internationally accepted definition of financial crime 
exists”, and they further reiterate that “there is no single, broadly accepted 
understanding of the meaning of the term financial crime (Boorman & Ingves, 
2001:5-20). Despite this fact, Harrison and Ryder (2013:1) state that the term 
“financial crime is often used in common parlance [phrasing] and thus is one of 
which we assume we know its meaning”, and that where definitions are found 
they are less precise than for instance the definitions of fraud, money laundering 
and terrorist financing, Pickett and Pickett (2002:1) agree with the assertion by 
the IMF, stating that there is no precise legal definition of financial crime and 
furthermore, that in practice there are numerous definitions of financial crime. 
Ryder (2011:3) suggests that a useful departure point for defining financial crime 
in the United Kingdom (UK) may be the definition of financial crime found in UK 
legislation, namely the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 (United 
kingdom, 2000), which states that financial crime includes any offence involving 
fraud or dishonesty; misconduct in, or misuse of, information relating to a financial 
market, or handling the proceeds of crime. However, Fleming (2009:2) observes 
that financial crime, as defined by the Financial Services and Markets Act (UK 
legislation), relates to a broad and potentially indistinct range of offences.  
 
Pickett and Pickett (2002:1) assert that the definitions of financial crime tend to 
be similar. According to the authors, the definitions also tend to cover many “key 
aspects of human behaviour”. This observation is consistent with the definitions 
observed in the literature where not only examples of crimes are given but also 
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Harrison and Ryder (2013:3) do not formulate their own definition of financial 
crime; instead, they follow an approach of defining what a financial criminal is. 
According to Harrison and Ryder (2013:3), a financial criminal is “someone who 
has committed a financial crime and who has some degree of standing (i.e. that 
of management) within a business or corporation.” 
 
The following definitions for financial crime, formulated by practitioners and 
academic authors as listed below, have been provided in the literature as cited 
as follows: 
 
a. Boorman and Ingves for the IMF  
The IMF interprets financial crime in a broad sense, stating that “it can refer to 
any non-violent crime that generally results in a financial loss, including financial 
fraud. It also includes a range of other illegal activities, such as money laundering 
and tax evasion” (Boorman & Ingves, 2001:3). 
 
b. Henning 
Henning (2009:295) states that: 
Financial crime generally describes a variety of offences against 
property, involving the unlawful conversion of goods belonging 
to another person to one’s own personal use and benefit, more 
often than not involving fraud but also bribery, corruption, money 
laundering, embezzlement, insider trading, tax violations, cyber-
attacks and the like. 
c. Gottschalk 
According to Gottschalk (2010b:2), financial crime is “profit-driven crime to gain 
access to and control over property that belonged to someone else”.  
 
d. Pickett and Pickett 
Pickett and Pickett (2002:3) define financial crime as a crime that: 
… involves the use of deception for illegal gain, normally involving 
breach of trust, and some concealment of the true nature of 
activities. We now have a working definition, but it covers a whole 
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array of activities that fall under the general banner of financial 
crime. 
e. De Koker 
De Koker (2006), as cited in Botha (2009:28), states that financial crime is a 
vague term but that it can be defined as: 
[T]hose economic crimes which target and abuse financial 
systems and institutions which include offences such as insider 
trading, money laundering, tax evasion and investor fraud. 
The information obtained from the literature regarding the definitions of financial 
crime by the respective authors was analysed and its focus, as emphasised by 
the researcher, tabulated in Table 2.3 below. 
Table 2.3: Literature - definitions of financial crime  
DEFINITIONS OF FINANCIAL CRIME 
Definition Source 
“[Financial crime] … can refer to any non-violent crime that generally 
results in a financial loss, including financial fraud. It also includes a 
range of illegal activities such as money laundering and tax evasion.” 
(Boorman & Ingves, 
2001:3) 
“Financial crime generally describes a variety of offences against 
property, involving the unlawful conversion of property belonging to 
another person to one’s own personal use and benefit, more often than 
not involving fraud but also bribery, corruption, money laundering, 
embezzlement, insider trading, tax violations, cyber-attacks and the 
like.” 
(Henning, 2009:295) 
Financial crime is profit-driven crime to gain access to and control over 
property that belonged to someone else”. 
(Gottschalk, 
2010b:2) 
“Financial crime involves the use of deception for illegal gain, normally 
involving breach of trust, and some concealment of the true nature of 
activities. We now have a working definition, but it covers a whole array 
of activities that fall under the general banner of financial crime.”  
(Pickett & Pickett, 
2002:3). 
“[Financial crime refers to] those economic crimes which target and 
abuse financial systems and institutions which include offences such as 
insider trading, money laundering, tax evasion and investor fraud.” 
(De Koker, 2006; as 
quoted by Botha, 
2009:28) 
(Source: Analysis of the literature as indicated) 
What is evident from an analysis of the themes and focus areas presented in the 
literature regarding definitions for financial crime is the lack of clarity it provides, 
and the divergent views presented when defining financial crime. It confirms the 
notion that “[no] internationally accepted definition of financial crime exists”, and 
that “[t]here is no single, broadly accepted understanding of the meaning of the 
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term financial crime (Boorman & Ingves, 2001:5-20). It also confirms the assertion 
by Pickett and Pickett (2002:2) that definitions also tend to cover many “key 
aspects of human behavior”. This observation is consistent with the definitions 
observed in the literature, where not only examples of crimes are given but also 
the types of human conduct associated with financial crime. 
When integrated, the various focuses described by the authors of the definitions, 
presented in Table 2.3 (page 93), offer the following practical definition for 
financial crime: 
 
Financial crime refers to a variety of non-violent, profit-
driven, unlawful conduct that targets financial systems, 
financial institutions, or property belonging to another, 
gaining access or control thereof or converting property for 
one’s own personal use or benefit, that generally results in 
a financial loss. It may involve the use of deception, 
breaches of trust, concealment of the truth, often including 
criminal offences such as fraud, theft, corruption, money 
laundering and tax evasion.  
In addition to the above practical definition, De Koker (2007:38), from a South 
African perspective, argues that financial crime is a subset of the categories of 
crime generally referred to in South Africa as “economic crime” or “commercial 
crime” that specifically “target and abuse financial systems and institutions” (De 
Koker, 2006), as cited in Botha (2009:28). 
Inclusive of the insight provided above, an operational definition for 
understanding the meaning of financial crime applicable to the South African 
context, according to the literature as referred to above, can be formulated as 
follows: 
Financial crime is understood as a subspecies of the 
category of offences generally referred to as ‘economic 
crime’ or ‘commercial crime’ that specifically targets and 
abuses the financial sector, systems and institutions, or 
property belonging to another, gaining access or control 
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thereof or converting it for one’s own personal use or 
benefit, that generally results in a financial loss and is non-
violent and profit-driven.  It may involve the use of fraud, 
deception, breaches of trust, concealment of the truth, often 
including crimes such as fraud, theft, corruption, money-
laundering and tax evasion. 
2.3.1 Official SA Government documents 
A literature search for publications by the Government of the RSA and its national 
departments yielded only a few official publications or documents referring to or 
about financial crime, but these publications do not define financial crime. They 
merely refer to financial crime and then cite a few examples of crimes or conduct 
that fall into the category of financial crime. 
It would, therefore, appear from the available literature that the Government of the 
RSA has not formulated a formal or official definition for financial crime. It might 
be that the SA Government either assumes that there is a common understanding 
of the term financial crime when the term is communicated, or that it is unaware 
that the term financial crime does not necessarily have a common understanding 
among its audience when communicated. This confirms the need for a 
domestically accepted, functional definition of financial crime that can be used by 
government departments, agencies and officials to identify financial crime, and 
that is supported by a systematic classification according to the nature and type 
of criminal conduct, or type of fraud or deceit.  
2.3.2 Printed and electronic national news media 
After extensive research and monitoring of the printed and electronic news media, 
the researcher could not find or come across a definition for financial crime 
provided in the news media, although reference may have been made to financial 
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2.3.3 Statutory meaning 
The Government recently published the Financial Sector Regulation Bill (Bill No. 
B 34B of 2015) (hereafter referred to as the Financial Sector Regulation Bill). At 
the time of the finalisation of this chapter, the Financial Sector Regulation Bill had 
not yet been implemented. In the Memorandum on the Objects of the Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill that was published together with the Bill it is stated that:  
 
The object of the Bill is to achieve a financial system that 
works in the interests of financial customers, and 
supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in 
the Republic, by establishing, in conjunction with the 
other financial sector laws, a regulatory and supervisory 
framework that promotes— 
• financial stability; 
• the safety and soundness of financial institutions; 
• the fair treatment and protection of financial 
customers; 
• the efficiency and integrity of the financial system; 
• the prevention of financial crime; 
• financial inclusion; and 
• confidence in the financial system. 
 
Of significance to this research is the reference to “the prevention of financial 
crime” as is evident in the above quote. In that regard, the legislator has provided 
a definition of “financial crime” to assist with its interpretation of clause 1 of the 
Financial Sector Regulation Bill. Although the Bill did not come into operation at 
the time of writing, it provides insight into what a statutory definition for “financial 
crime” may look like in future. It is submitted that the Bill presents an indication 
that where it concerns financial crime, the legislator, at least in this instance, is 
inclined to associate financial crime with those criminal acts that target the 
financial system. The recurring reference to the term “financial” in the object of 
the Financial Sector Regulation Bill is an indication of the focus of the Bill. In 
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clause 1 of the Bill the legal drafters have provided the following statutory 
definition of “financial crime”: 
 
‘‘financial crime’’ includes an offence in terms of— 
(a) a financial sector law; 
(b) sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, 1998 (Act No. 121 of 1998); 
(c) the Financial Intelligence Centre Act; or 
(d) section 4 of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (33 of 
2004) (hereafter referred to as the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act). 
 
To interpret the above definition, clause 1 of the Financial Sector Regulation Bill 
provides the following definition for “financial sector”: 
 
‘‘financial sector law’’ means— 
(a) this Act [The Financial Sector Regulation Act, once 
promulgated]; 
(b) a law listed in Schedule 1; 
(c) a Regulation made in terms of this Act or made in terms 
of a law referred to in Schedule 1; or 
(d) a regulatory instrument made in terms of this Act or 
made in terms of a law referred to in Schedule 1; 
 
Schedule 1 to the Financial Sector Regulation Bill provides the following list of the 
laws referred to above under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d): 
• Pension Funds Act (24 of 1956) 
• Friendly Societies Act (25 of 1956) 
• Banks Act (94 of 1990) 
• Financial Services Board Act (97 of 1990) 
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• Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act (8 of 
1993) 
• Mutual Banks Act (124 of 1993) 
• Long-term Insurance Act (52 of 1998) 
• Short-term Insurance Act (53 of 1998) 
• Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act (28 of 2001) 
• Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (37 of 
2002) 
• Collective Investment Schemes Control Act (45 of 2002) 
• Co-operative Banks Act (40 of 2007) 
• Financial Markets Act (19 of 2012) 
• Credit Rating Services Act (24 of 2012) 
 
According to the definitions in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill as set out 
above, financial crime per its statutory definition will constitute an offence: 
• created for in the to be promulgated Financial Sector Regulation Act; 
• any offence provided for in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 
1998 (121 of 1998); 
• an offence provided for in section 4 of the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (33 of 
2004); 
• any offence provided for in the current legislation listed in Schedule 
1. 
2.3.4 Participants 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 2.2 in the 
interview schedule, “How would you define the term financial crime in your own 
words?”, the main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were 
identified. These topics are presented in the frequency table, Table 2.4 
(paragraph 2.9). This was an open-ended question where the participants could 
provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were provided from 
which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided 
more than one theme in their response to the question. 
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Evident from the answers given by the participants regarding definitions for 
financial crime (question 2.2 in the interview schedule) is the lack of providing 
clarity, similar to the lack in the literature. The divergent views held by the 
participants when defining financial crime confirm the view that from a domestic 
perspective, just as from an international perspective, no accepted, shared 
definition of financial crime exists. It confirms that there is no single, broadly 
accepted understanding of the meaning of the term financial crime, as asserted 
by Boorman and Ingves (2001:5-20). 
Using an integration of the main themes emerging from the answers provided by 
the participants during the interviews as tabulated in Table 2.4 (paragraph 2.9), 
the following definition for financial crime from a participant perspective can be 
offered as formulated by the researcher:  
Financial crime is any unlawful, non-violent conduct that is 
financially prejudicial to another [person] or society at large, 
often making use of fraud and dishonesty aimed at financial 
systems, business and individuals, with the intent to obtain 
a financial benefit, or for self-enrichment to which the 
perpetrator is not legally entitled, or for the purpose of use 
by a criminal business enterprises system. 
The conceptual definition derived at above is in broad terms vaguely similar to the 
definition formulated from the themes presented in the literature. The reference to 
intent and unlawful in the definition above could possibly be a conscious reference 
to the definitional elements of intent and unlawfulness in common-law crimes and 
more specifically fraud, as there is also a reference to the causal element of 
prejudice to others.  
2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL CRIME 
From a study of the literature it is evident that scholars and practitioners include 
characteristics of the type of conduct and perpetrators of financial crime in their 
writings. In the sections below, these characteristics are identified and analysed 
as part of the literature study.  
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2.4.1 Academic and practitioner literature 
When defining or discussing financial crime in the literature, the authors referred 
to below provide their own unique characteristics associated with financial crime. 
A summary of the characteristics is given below: 
a. Boorman and Ingves (IMF) 
According to the definition of financial crime provided by Boorman and Ingves 
(2001:3), the following characteristics related to financial crime are evident: 
• It is non-violent  
• It results in financial loss 
 
b. Henning 
An analysis of the definition of financial crime provided by Henning (2009:295) 
identifies the following characteristics associated with financial crime: 
• It concerns crime against property belonging to another person 
• It involves the unlawful conversion of property 
• The crimes are perpetrated for one’s own personal benefit and the use 
of the proceeds. 
 
c. Gottschalk 
In the definition of financial crime provided by Gottschalk (2010b:2), the author 
describes the nature of financial crime according to its associated conduct, 
characteristics and components, which are the following: 
• It is profit-driven 
• It concerns property belonging to someone else 
 
Gottschalk (2014:xix) also asserts that financial crime often makes use of fraud. 
 
d. Pickett and Pickett 
The characteristics of financial crime according to the definition of Pickett and 
Pickett (2002:3) are that: 
• It makes use of deception; 
• It breaches trust; 
• It conceals the true nature of activities; 
• It is perpetrated for illegal gain. 
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According to Pickett and Pickett (2002:2), white-collar crime or financial crime, as 
it is interchangeably referred to by Pickett and Pickett (2002:3), contains several 
clear additional components to the ones stated above: 
• It is deceitful 
• It is intentional 
• It involves losses 
• It may be concealed or hidden 
 
e. Michel 
Michel (2008:384) states that financial crimes share the following general 
characteristics with commercial crime but states that even as obvious as these 
characteristics may seem, some of it may not be as well understood as one would 
expect: 
• It is opportunity-driven 
• It requires rapid conversion of profits into cash 
• It is a mechanical process 
 
f. Harrison and Ryder 
As already stated, financial crime, according to Harrison and Ryder (2013:3), is 
perpetrated by a person or persons who have a certain level of standing within a 
business or corporation. 
 
g. Levi 
Levi (2009:225) states that financial crime makes use of a variety of deceptions 
used against a spectrum of victims.The unique characteristics of financial crime, 
according to a content analysis of the literature, as cited by a variety of academic 
authors and practitioners, were analysed and the main emerging themes 
tabulated as illustrated in Table 2.5 (paragraph 2.9). In the literature, one author 
may have provided more than one characteristic, and more than one author may 
have provided the same characteristic. The frequency of the themes as presented 
in the literature and reflected in Table 2.5 (paragraph 2.9), expressed as a 
percentage, is graphically depicted in Figure 2.2 (paragraph 2.9). 
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An analysis of the themes captured in Table 2.5 (paragraph 2.9) confirms the view 
expressed in the literature that there is confusion when categorising the term 
financial crime. It demonstrates just how many unique characteristics are 
attributed to financial crime and how many different views and opinions there are. 
All this adds to the difficulty of determining what the distinguishing characteristics 
of financial crime are according to the literature. One characteristic of financial 
crime that is noticeable in the frequency Table 2.5 (paragraph 2.9) and the graph 
in Figure 2.2 (paragraph 2.9) is that financial crime makes use of fraud and 
deception. 
2.4.2 Government documents  
An extensive search of the available literature for publications by the Government 
of the RSA or its national departments referring to the characteristics of financial 
crime yielded one document that referred to the characteristics of financial crime. 
In a National Treasury Policy document: A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South 
Africa Better, it is stated that financial crimes have become “more sophisticated” 
(A Safer Financial Sector..., 2011:73). 
2.4.3 Printed and electronic national news media 
After extensive research and monitoring of the national printed and electronic 
news media, the researcher could not find or come across news articles or reports 
that could provide information regarding the characteristics of financial crime. 
2.4.4 Interviews 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 2.3 in the 
interview schedule, “What do you think are the identifiable characteristics of 
financial crime?”. These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 2.6 
(paragraph 2.9), from which can be seen that, one participant may have provided 
more than one theme, while more than one participant may have provided the 
same theme. 
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As is evident in Table 2.6 (paragraph 2.9), the participants provided a more 
extensive range of characteristics associated with financial crime than those 
found in the literature (Table 2.5 – paragraph 2.9). Some of the themes identified 
in the feedback from the participants in Table 2.6 (paragraph 2.9) match some of 
the themes identified from their responses to question 2.2 in the interview 
schedule, namely “How would you define financial crime in your own words?”, 
tabulated in Table 2.4 (paragraph 2.9). The themes presented by the participants 
in Table 2.6 (paragraph 2.9) and that broadly match those characteristics 
presented in the participants’ definition in Table 2.4 (paragraph 2.9), are 
summarised as follows, where the first frequency as a percentage represents the 
themes in the definition, Table 2.4 (paragraph 2.9) and the latter the 
characteristics presented by the participants in Table 2.6 (paragraph 2.9): 
• Non-violent (10% - 10%) 
• Gaining a direct or indirect financial/monetary advantage/benefit (60% 
- 60%) 
• Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim (50% - 50%) 
• It is crime aimed at the financial systems of a country (10% - 10%) 
• The focus of financial crime is on the criminal economic and business 
systems (10% - 10%) 
• Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation (10% - 30%) 
• The proceeds are invariably laundered (10% - 10%). 
 
The feedback from participants is broadly consistent with the characteristics 
found in the literature as listed above in Table 2.5 (paragraph 2.9), which 
shows/displays a comprehensive version of the characteristics of financial crime. 
The themes presented by the participants in Table 2.6 (paragraph 2.9) that are 
broadly consistent with those presented in the literature (Table 2.5 – paragraph 
2.9) are summarised as follows, where the first frequency as a percentage 
represents the participants’ and the second the literature: 
• Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation (30% - 42%) 
• Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim (50% - 29%) 
• Gaining a direct or indirect financial/monetary advantage/benefit 
(60% - 14%) 
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• It is directed at illegally obtaining property (10% - 14%) 
• Focus on money (10% - 14%) 
2.5 EXAMPLES OF FINANCIAL CRIME 
Academic authors and practitioners referred to in the literature almost invariably 
follow up on their definitions of financial crime with examples of the crimes or 
conduct that they associate with financial crime.  When reference is made to 
financial crime in Government documents, it is often followed by an example of a 
crime or criminal conduct that according to the source falls under the category of 
financial crime. Persons representing Government also tend to provide examples 
of crimes and conduct when referring to financial crime. In the following sections, 
an analysis is provided, where this pattern has been observed in the literature 
and analysed by the researcher. 
2.5.1 Academic and practitioner literature 
The following authors provide examples of crimes or descriptions of unlawful 
conduct in their discussions or definitions of financial crime, and accordingly fitting 
the label of financial crime in terms of their interpretation: 
a. Boorman and Ingves for the IMF 
Boorman and Ingves (2001:4) quote the following financial crimes:  
• Money laundering 
• Financial fraud 
• Cheque fraud 
• Credit card fraud 
• Mortgage fraud 
• Insurance fraud 
• Tax evasion 
• Circumvention of exchange restrictions  
• Sale of fictitious financial instruments 
• Sale of fictitious insurance policies 
• Embezzlement of non-financial institutions 
• Stock manipulation 
105 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
 
b. Henning 




• Money laundering 
• Embezzlement 
• Insider trading 




Gottschalk (2010b:2) asserts that financial crime often involves fraudulent 
conduct, thus he provides a substantial list of fraud typologies such as cheque 
and credit card fraud, mortgage fraud, medical fraud, corporate fraud, bank 
account fraud, point-of-sale fraud, currency fraud and healthcare fraud. In 
addition to the illegal act of fraud as noted, Gottschalk (2010b:2) also lists the 
following illegal acts: insider trading, tax violations, kickbacks, identity theft, 
embezzlement, identity theft, cyber-attacks and money laundering. 
 
Gottschalk (2010b:2) then provides examples of the types of fraud and “illegal 
acts” that comply with those components and characteristics according to the 
definition provided by Gottschalk 2010b:2), as: 
• Cheque and credit card fraud 
• Mortgage fraud 
• Medical fraud 
• Corporate fraud 
• Bank account fraud 
• Point-of-sale fraud 
• Currency fraud 
• Insider trading  
• Tax violations 
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• Kickbacks 
• Embezzlement 
• Identity theft 
• Cyber-attacks 
• Money laundering 
 
d. Pickett and Pickett 
Pickett and Pickett (2002:3) elaborate on their definition by stating that a lot of 
the illegal activity that constitutes financial crime can occur in both the commercial 
and public sectors. Pickett and Pickett (2002:3) list some of the illegal activities 
as:  
• Consumer fraud  
• Credit card fraud 
• Kickbacks 
• Bid rigging 
• Inflated invoices 
• External fraud  
• Inventory theft 
• Theft of cash  
• Basic company fraud 
• Subsistence claims  
• Cheque fraud  
• Identity fraud  
• Misappropriation schemes  
• Computer-related crimes  
• Identity theft 
• Financial statement fraud  
• Fraud in general 
 
e. Michel 
According to Michel (2008:388) the following constitute a summary of common 
financial crime schemes identified by him during his “empirical observations”: 
• Misleading information 
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• ‘Pump and dump’ (stock price manipulation) 
• Insider trading 
• Accounting fraud 
• Embezzlement 
• Money laundering 
• False documentation 
• Extortion 
 
f. Harrison and Ryder 
When referring to individual financial crimes, Harrison and Ryder (2013:7) refer 
to the following examples in their discussion: 
• Money laundering 
• Terrorist financing 
• Fraud 
• Insider dealing  
• Market abuse 
• Bribery and corruption 
 
g. Levi 
Levi (2009:223) states that conventional usage among American, British and 
international regulators and policing bodies suggests that financial crimes 
include: 
• fraud; 
• market abuse (e.g. insider trading); 
• money laundering; 
• other forms of illicit corporate conduct for profit. 
 
h. Australian Crime Commission 
The ACC provides the following examples of crimes which, according to them, 
constitute a financial crime (Financial Crimes ..., 2013). 
• Fraud 
o securities fraud 
o bank fraud 
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o identity fraud 
• Manipulation of the stock market 
• Money laundering 
• Pyramid investment schemes 
• Tax evasion 
• Embezzlement 
• Insider trading 
 
i. Bintliff 
Bintliff (1993:7) asserts that the term financial crime is regularly used to describe 
conduct related to financial frauds such as: 
• insider trading; 
• stock swindles; 
• major embezzlement. 
 
j. De Koker 
According to De Koker (2007:38,) the term financial crime can be used to refer to 
crimes such as: 
• serious fraud; 
• insider trading;  
• money laundering; 
• terrorist financing. 
2.5.2 Government documents 
Literature searches concerning official publications by national departments of 
the RSA yielded only a few official publications or documents featuring a 
reference to or a view on financial crime. The National Treasury Policy document, 
‘A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better’, quotes the following 
examples of crimes that, according to the document, constitute financial crimes 
(National Treasury Policy document: A Safer Financial Sector ..., 2011:73): 
• Corruption 
• Blackmail  
• Money laundering 
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• Advance fee fraud 
• Banking fraud 
• Identity theft  
• Organised crime 
 
According to an information booklet published by the FIC entitled “Combating 
Financial Crime in South Africa: Typologies Report”, 2012, it aims to raise 
awareness of financial crimes committed in South Africa by focussing on a 
selection of prevalent crimes (presumably financial crimes) defining each scheme 
(Combating Financial Crime ..., 2012.) The following unlawful behaviour is 
described in the booklet as examples of types of conduct that constitute a 
financial crime: 
• 419 Scams 
• Pyramid scheme 
• Account hijacking 
• Trade-based money laundering 
• Ponzi scheme 
• Use of front companies  
• Drug mules 
 
Examples of financial crime emerging from the literature published by 
Government and non-governmental organisations, academics and scholars were 
tabulated in Table 2.7 (paragraph 2.9). As can be seen from the examples 
presented in Table 2.7 (paragraph 2.9), one author could have provided more 
than one example of a financial crime, and more than one author could have 
provided the same example. The frequency of examples of financial crimes from 
the literature, as reflected in Table 2.7 (paragraph 2.9) and expressed as a 
percentage, is graphically depicted in Figure 2.3 (paragraph 2.9). 
  
An analysis of the examples of financial crime captured in Table 2.7 (paragraph 
2.9) confirms the view expressed in the literature that financial crime covers a 
broad range of offences and that the term has been used to describe many 
different concepts at varying levels of specificity (Boorman & Ingves, 2001:5-20). 
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2.5.3 Printed and electronic national news media 
After researching and monitoring publications in the national printed and 
electronic news media, the researcher could not find or come across new 
information that provided contemporary insight into the types of conduct that 
constitute financial crime.  
2.5.4 Interviews 
During the interviews the participants were asked to differentiate between 
examples of financial crimes falling within the category of common law offences 
and those which fall in the category of statutory offences. This was done because 
of the way South African law distinguishes between the two categories of 
offences. 
2.5.4.1 Common-law offences 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 2.4 in the 
interview schedule, “According to your understanding of financial crime, what 
common-law offences according to South African law fall within the category of 
offences referred to as financial crime?”, the main themes emerging from the 
participants’ answers were identified. These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 2.8 (paragraph 2.9). As can be seen from the themes 
presented in Table 2.8 (paragraph 2.9), a participant could have provided more 
than one example of a common-law crime that falls under the category of financial 
crime, and more than one participant could have provided the same example. 
The frequency of the themes, as presented (in Table 2.8 – paragraph 2.9)) by the 
participants, on what common law offences according to South African law can 
be categorised as financial crime (question 2.4 in the interview schedule) is 
graphically depicted as a percentage in Figure 2.4 (paragraph 2.9). 
According to the frequency of themes presented by the participants in response 
to question 2.4 in the interview schedule, i.e. “… what common-law offences 
according to South African law fall within the category of offences referred to as 
financial crime?”, the common-law offences of fraud (90% frequency), theft (50% 
frequency) and forgery (40% frequency) occupy the high end of responses.  
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Bearing in mind that the examples of financial crime in the literature do not draw 
a distinction between statutory and financial crime, it is important to note that fraud 
(general), tax fraud (evasion) and theft (embezzlement) feature at the high end of 
the frequency of examples provided in the literature and by the participants. 
Some of the examples of the offences offered by the participants as common-law 
offences are not classified as such in terms of the strict conventions of South 
African law, for example ‘kite flying’, which is a metaphor used to describe the 
manifestation of a type of fraud. This may be an indication that when practitioners 
refer to examples of common-law crime classified as financial crime according to 
their own classification, they tend to think of it in descriptive terms (describing the 
nature of the conduct), or of a typology rather than the strict classification under 
the legal convention. The feedback from participants in how they refer to 
examples of types or manifestations of fraud, for example “advance fee fraud”, is 
consistent with how financial crime is categorised in the literature, which is mostly 
in accordance with the type of conduct or manifestation of the type of conduct, or 
descriptive of a typology. 
2.5.4.2 Statutory crimes 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 2.5 of the 
interview schedule, i.e. “According to your understanding of financial crime, what 
statutory offences according to South African law fall within the category of 
offences referred to as financial crime?”, the main themes emerging from the 
participants’ answers were identified. These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 2.9 (paragraph 2.9), from which can be seen that, a 
participant could have more than one answer, and more than one participant 
could have provided a similar answer. 
The frequency of the themes, as illustrated in Table 2.9 (paragraph 2.9) by the 
participants regarding which statutory offences according to South African law can 
be categorised as financial crime (question 2.5 in the interview schedule), is 
graphically depicted as a percentage in Figure 2.5 (paragraph 2.9). 
The participants provided examples of types of unlawful conduct to describe the 
statutory offences, rather than the specific contravention of a specific statute that 
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criminalises that type of conduct. This is interpreted as an indication that 
practitioners have developed a practical and descriptive way in which to identify 
the types of conduct that constitute financial crimes, as opposed to identifying the 
types in accordance with the strict legal conventions. This ostensibly supports the 
conception that a proposed practical classification of financial crime for use by 
lawmakers and practitioners could follow a similar approach. 
According to the frequency of themes presented by the participants in response 
to question 2.5 in the interview schedule, i.e. “… what statutory offences 
according to South African law fall within the category of offences referred to as 
financial crime?”, the statutory offences commonly referred to as tax evasion 
(90% frequency), money laundering (70% frequency) and corruption (60% 
frequency) occupy the high end of financial crime according to the frequency of 
themes presented by the participants. Bearing in mind that the examples of 
financial crime in the literature do not draw a distinction between statutory and 
financial crime, it is important to note that fraud (general), tax fraud (evasion) and 
theft (embezzlement) feature at the high end of the frequency of examples 
provided in the literature and by the participants. 
Various characterisations of financial crime presented in the literature and by 
participants are consistent with the views expressed by Boorman and Ingves 
2001:5), namely that countries have different legal characterisations of specific 
(unlawful) acts or conduct. The themes provided by the participants regarding 
statutory financial crime support the suggestion by Joubert (2010b: Vol 6. par. 
20), who states that a novel approach is to systematise crimes, more particularly 
those of a statutory origin, according to the type of conduct that the particular 
statutory provision prohibits. 
The researcher presents the graph in Figure 2.6 to illustrate the departure from 
the approaches to identify financial crime in accordance with descriptors, and 
classification in accordance with the differentiation between common-law 
offences and statutory offences in terms of the conventions of South African law.  
In compiling the graph, the researcher used the data from Table 2.7 (examples of 
financial crime found in the literature – paragraph 2.9), Table 2.8 (examples of 
financial crimes, according to common law – paragraph 2.9) and Table 2.9 
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(examples of financial crimes according to statutory law – paragraph 2.9). The 
examples of financial crimes presented in the literature are presented as 
examples of unlawful conduct, irrespective of whether it is classified as common 
law or statutory law. On the other hand, the examples of financial crime presented 
by the participants in Tables 2.8 (paragraph 2.9) and 2.9 (paragraph 2.9) 
distinguish between common law and statutory-law offences. 
The data represented in the graph as Figure 2.6 (paragraph 2.9) indicates a 
convergence of the following themes at various levels of frequency between the 
unlawful conduct identified in the literature and the financial crimes identified by 
the participants: 
• Money laundering 
• Insider trading 
• Embezzlement 
• Identity fraud/theft 
• Stock manipulation 
• Bribery/corruption  
• Fraud in general 
• Cheque fraud 
• Terror financing 
2.6 CLASSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL CRIME 
As noted in paragraph 2.1 above, South African law does not, as in some other 
jurisdictions where other legal systems apply, classify or codify crimes into 
categories or degrees of crimes. Traditionally, South African law recognises the 
distinction between conventions of the common-law and statutory provisions, 
which are a classification in accordance with the source of the provision. This 
means that the crime originates from the common law, or it is a creature of statute, 
i.e. a contravention of a statute created by Parliament (Joubert, 2010b: Vol. 6. 
par. 20). This implies that the highest level of categorisation of crime, according 
to the conventions of South African law, is that it can be categorised as either a 
common-law crime or statutory offence, depending on its source, as explained by 
Joubert (2010b: Vol. 6. par. 20). However, according to Joubert (2010b: Vol. 6. 
par. 20), jurists have developed their own classifications of common-law and 
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statutory offences in accordance with the interests it protects. This is probably a 
practical arrangement, as can be seen in most South African criminal-law 
textbooks where crimes are categorised in accordance with the interest it protects. 
However, this practical arrangement does not provide for a category of offences 
referred to as financial crime. However, some of the crimes listed under the 
common-law crimes in criminal-law textbooks do fall under the category of 
financial crime, such as fraud and theft, according to the findings of this research. 
This confirms the need for some form of classification for the category of crimes 
referred to as financial crime that will enable practitioners to readily identify which 
crimes fall in the category of financial crime in accordance with the nature and 
type of the conduct, irrespective of whether it is sourced from the common law or 
the statutes. 
As can be seen from the use of the term financial crime and other umbrella terms 
such as economic crime, commercial crime and white-collar crime, as indicated 
in the literature by Naylor, Taylor and Bahramitah (2002:1), it appears that jurists 
are not the only group who have developed their own classification of crimes in 
accordance with the interests they protect. Scholars, practitioners and authorities 
have also developed their own classification of financial crimes according to their 
characteristics, manifestations and type of conduct. One such author is 
Gottschalk (2010b:5), whose classification will be discussed in more detail below. 
According to the UNODC, crimes or offences as defined in law are typically 
associated with actions or behavioural and contextual characteristics that are 
universally considered to be an offence (UNODC, 2015:8). Referring to theirs as 
an “event-based” approach to crime classification, the UNODC (UNODC, 2015:8) 
argues that it avoids issues created by legal complexities, resulting in a simplified 
applicable classification. The event-based approach of crime classification 
proposed by the UNODC is discussed in more detail in paragraph 2.6.2. 
2.6.1 Previous research 
Based on exploratory research, Gottschalk (2010b:5) developed a model in which 
he suggests that there are four main categories of financial crime, namely: 
• Fraud 
• Theft  
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Under the main categories framed by Gottschalk, he then listed subcategories or 
sub-types of crimes, which he asserts are financial crimes that fall under the main 
category, namely fraud, theft, manipulation and corruption. Gottschalk (2010b:5) 
illustrated his model referred to above in a schematic format as can be seen from 
Figure 2.7 (paragraph 2.9).   
 
When analysing Gottschalk’s model as depicted in Figure 2.5 (paragraph 2.9), it 
will be observed under the main category, for example Corruption, that there are 
four sub-categories. These categories, namely bribery, kickbacks, organisation 
and public, represent sub-categories of corruption based on the nature or type of 
criminal conduct, and the type of deception or fraud used to facilitate the crime of 
corruption. For example, it can be stated that X committed corruption by means 
of the criminal conduct of bribery. 
 
Gottschalk (2010b:5) suggests that the categories as proposed in the model can 
be refined and improved through research.  The main categories of crime listed 
by Gottschalk (2010b:5), namely fraud, theft and corruption, are familiar South 
African crimes. The category of crime referred to by Gottschalk as “manipulation” 
is not known along those terms as a crime according to the South African legal 
conventions. It would, however, seem that according to the model proposed by 
Gottschalk, he is referring to financial crime, which, for example, concerns 
manipulation of the bankruptcy system. A discussion of the main categories of 
financial crime as presented by Gottschalk (2010b:5) in the literature follows 
below:  
2.6.1.1 Fraud 
The first main category of financial crime developed by Gottschalk (2010b: 5) is 
labelled “Fraud”. Gottschalk (2010b:5) provides a substantial list of sub-
categories according to the nature or type of criminal conduct and the type of 
deception or fraud to commit the crime of fraud. Gottschalk, with apparent 
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approval, quotes the definition of fraud as referred to by Henning (2009:299) after 
the definition in South African law of fraud by Snyman (2008:531), who defines 
fraud as “the unlawful and intentional making of a misrepresentation which 
causes actual prejudice, or which is potentially prejudicial to another.” For the 
purpose of the classification of financial crime in this research, the definition of 
fraud provided by Snyman (2008:531) can be applied for domestic application to 
describe this category However, the criminal conduct and type of deception or 
fraud described as embezzlement, as stated under the main category of fraud, 
will constitute an act of theft according to the unlawful act the South African 
common law recognises as theft. 
2.6.1.2 Theft 
The second main category of financial crime developed by Gottschalk (2010b:5) 
is labelled “Theft” and refers to those financial crimes where the act of theft is 
used to facilitate the commissioning of the crime. The author provides a 
substantial list of the nature or type of criminal conduct, which he lists as sub-
types. Gottschalk (2010b:5) illustrated his model, referred to above, in a 
schematic format, as can be seen in Figure 2.7 (paragraph 2.9). In explaining the 
category of theft, Gottschalk (2010b:13) refers to the following definition of theft, 
“The illegal taking of another person’s, group’s or organisation’s property without 
the victim’s consent”. Although theft is a crime in terms of South African law, its 
definition in terms of South African common law is: 
 
A person commits theft if he unlawfully and 
intentionally appropriates movable, corporeal property 
which 
(a) belongs to, and is in the possession of, another;  
(b) belongs to another but is in the perpetrator’s own 
possession: or 
(c) belongs to the perpetrator but is in the another’s 
possession and such other person has a right to possess 
it which legally prevails against the perpetrator’s own 
right of possession provided that the intention to 
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appropriate the property includes an intention 
permanently to deprive the person entitled to the 
possession of the property, of such property (Snyman, 
2008:483). 
 
A brief examination of the definitional elements of the crime of theft as provided 
above shows that all the essential elements of the crime of theft according to the 
definition in South African common law are not included in the definition of theft 
as conceptualised by Gottschalk (2010b:13). For the purpose of the classification 
of financial crime in this research, the definition of theft provided by Snyman 
(2008:483) as quoted above should be applied to describe this category. The 
listing of the nature or type of criminal conduct under the category of theft is 
consistent with the nature and type of conduct that would constitute theft in the 
South African common-law definition of theft. 
2.6.1.3 Manipulative crime 
The third main category of financial crime developed by Gottschalk (2010b:5) is 
labelled “Manipulation”. It refers to those financial crimes where manipulation is 
used to facilitate the commissioning of financial crime, and the author provides a 
substantial list of the nature or type of criminal conduct and type of deception or 
fraud used to commit manipulation. According to Gottschalk (2010b:16), crimes 
by “manipulation” can be defined as “a means of gaining illegal control or 
influence over others’ activities, means and results”. The main category 
manipulation is difficult to conceptualise in the South African legal context, as it 
is not an accepted crime or descriptive term for a range of offences under South 
African law. However, the criminal conduct and type of deception described in the 
subcategories listed under manipulation are recognisable under South African 
criminal statutory law. For example, the criminal conduct and type referred to as 
bankruptcy is likely to be catered for under the Insolvency Act (24 of 1936) and 
tax under the Tax Administration Act (28 of 2011) (hereafter referred to as the 
Tax Administration Act), as the source of the statutory offence/s (being bankrupt 
or entering insolvency does not constitute an offence per se). 
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2.6.1.4 Corruption crime 
The fourth main category of financial crime suggested by Gottschalk (2010b:5) is 
labelled “Corruption”, and refers to those financial crimes where corruption is 
used to facilitate the commissioning of the crime. Gottschalk provides a 
substantial list of the nature or type of criminal conduct, which he lists as sub-
types of corruption. For categorising corruption, Gottschalk (2010b:23) describes 
corruption as conduct that aims “to destroy or pervert the integrity or fidelity of a 
person in his discharge of duty, it is to induce to act dishonestly or unfaithfully, it 
is to make venal, and it is to bribe.”  
 
Under South African law, corruption is criminalised under the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004) (hereafter referred to as the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act). The nature or type of 
criminal conduct and type of deception or fraud associated with corruption listed 
as subcategories are not identifiable as criminal conduct, according to the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. For example, “ghost” and 
“bid” probably relate to ‘ghost’ bidders or ‘bid rigging’, for instance, but that type 
of conduct will resort under the main category of Fraud.  
 
In the South African context, Gottschalk’s classification of financial crime into 
main categories and subtypes (refer to Figure 2.7 – paragraph 2.9) could serve 
as an example of what a classification system could look like by following a 
systematic approach (Gottschalk, 2010b:5). The main categories according to the 
type of conduct, i.e. financial crime using fraud, theft, manipulation or corruption, 
will be determined by the outcome of the findings of the research.  Although some 
of the categories and sub-categories listed by Gottschalk in Figure 2.7 (paragraph 
2.9) are recognisable according to the description of the unlawful conduct, they 
must be refined and improved for domestic application. Against the backdrop of 
the discussion about the conceptualisation, meaning, descriptions and 
characterisation of financial crime, the categorization, based on behavioural 
descriptors rather than strict legal conventions derived from criminal law, as 
suggested by the UNODC, will be examined for application in the section below 
(UNODC, 2015) 
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2.6.2 Events-based approach 
“The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) is a 
classification of criminal offences which is based on internationally agreed 
concepts, definitions and principles to enhance the consistency and international 
comparability of crime statistics, and improve analytical capabilities at both the 
national and international levels” (UNODC, 2015:7). The ICCS has been 
developed by the UNODC to overcome the problem of various data sources, 
often within the same jurisdiction, using different definitions and concepts to 
organise crime data, which are often based on legal rather than statistical 
principles (UNODC, 2015:8), for purposes of statistical analysis.  
 
The ICCS addresses the issues highlighted by the UNODC by providing a 
methodological and statistical standard and a common definitional framework to 
improve data quality and comparability. Offences are grouped in a meaningful 
and systematic way, resulting in an improvement in the capability to produce, 
disseminate and analyse crime data accurately in order to inform the public, and 
tailor policies and programmes in the areas of crime prevention, the rule of law 
and criminal justice reform (UNODC, 2015:8). In terms of the Events-based 
approach as used in the ICCS the purpose is to (UNODC, 2015:8): 
 
… consider “criminal” acts in national and international laws 
as the universe of acts that are subject to classification 
within the ICCS. However, the specific classification of such 
acts (i.e. their allocation to analytical categories) is based 
on behavioural descriptions [the type of conduct or 
behaviour exhibited during the commissioning of the crime] 
rather than strictly legal specifications derived from criminal 
laws [such as the common- or statutory law]. Crimes as 
defined in criminal law are typically associated with actions 
or behavioural and contextual attributes that are universally 
considered to be an offence (for example, wounding or 
injuring, or taking property without consent). This event-
based approach avoids issues created by legal 
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complexities, resulting in a simplified and globally applicable 
classification. It is important to note that the ICCS uses 
specific terms, such as “rape”, “harassment” or “burglary”, 
which is widely recognised and defined in criminal 
legislation. These terms are given a specific description in 
the ICCS [Unlike the model provided by Gottschalk in Figure 
2.7], which is intended to be used for statistical purposes. 
The adoption of the ICCS at the national level will require 
the attentive translation of offences as defined by national 
legislation into ICCS categories, with careful consideration 
of the full act/event descriptions and explanatory notes. 
 
An advantage of the ICCS suggested by the researcher is that besides classifying 
criminal offences, the ICCS could also be used in relation to other events or 
conditions related to the criminal justice process, such as arrests, prosecutions, 
convictions and prison sentences. It might, as argued by the researcher below, 
be used to classify or categorise financial crime by means of a systematic process 
of classification in accordance with a description of the conduct for domestic use. 
 
After studying the concept described as an Events-based approach, the 
researcher realised that the approach followed by the UNODC in the ICCS could 
be used as a basis to classify financial crime for use at a domestic level, according 
to which offences are grouped in a meaningful and systematic way to 
communicate more effectively about financial crime in general, and when tailoring 
policies and programmes for combating financial crime. The ICCS was developed 
by the UNODC as “a classification of criminal offences which is based on 
internationally agreed concepts, definitions and principles in order to enhance the 
consistency and international comparability of crime statistics, and improve 
analytical capabilities at both the national and international levels” (UNODC, 
2015:1). It is proposed that an Events-based approach could solve some of the 
problems experienced when categorising financial crime in accordance with its 
strict legal definition (according to the conventions of South African law), as 
opposed to using the behavioural conduct shown by the perpetrators of crime. 
For this study it is, therefore, important to explain how the ICCS is applied and 
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then later developed by means of this research to serve the purpose of 
categorising financial crime that will enhance understanding of the concept at a 
general level.  
 
It was determined that the categories provided by Gottschalk (2010b:5) through 
his research and presented in Figure 2.7 (paragraph 2.9) in paragraph 2.6.1 
above were too broad, and the nature and type of conduct too vague to use as a 
classification of financial crime in the domestic context, mainly because in South 
Africa, crime has its origin in either the common law or statutory law, and 
sometimes the types overlap. For example, tax fraud in South Africa can either 
be prosecuted as fraud or as a contravention of section 235 of the Tax 
Administration Act, No. 28 of 2011. The researcher decided to respond to the 
suggestion by Gottschalk (2010b:5) to refine and improve the categories provided 
by Gottschalk (2010b:5) by means of research, as presented and discussed in 
paragraph 2.7 below. 
2.6.2.1 Principles used during the application of the UNODC ICCS 
According to the UNODC (UNODC, 2015:18), to implement the ICCS approach 
it is necessary to properly allocate any given offence to one of the ICCS 
categories. Knowledge of the ICCS structure is required before attempting to 
classify offences. As previously mentioned, the ICCS is a hierarchical 
classification, and the first step is to identify which Level 1 category is the most 
relevant to the particular offence in question. To allow easy reference to the 
appropriate category, each Level 1 category is defined by the broad actions, 
attributes or events that it encompasses. For example, all acts leading to death 
or intending to cause death are classified under Level 1, category 01. Similarly, 
all acts involving fraud, deception or corruption are classified under Level 1, 
category 07. It is then necessary to classify an offence into a Level 2, 3 or 4 
categories. There are residual categories represented by the word “other” in the 
category name (i.e. other acts of fraud) for cases in which an offence cannot be 
classified in an established category. Offences should be classified into these 
residual categories as sparingly as possible and only upon a thorough review of 
the full classification to ensure that a category is not overlooked. 
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2.6.2.2 The unit of classification of the UNODC ICCS 
The unit of classification of the ICCS is the conduct or unlawful behaviour that 
constitutes a criminal offence (UNODC, 2015:10). This is a very important 
consideration, as it is easy for most persons to understand the nature or type of 
conduct or description of the type of fraud or deceit, as opposed to a strict legal 
definition that is the source of the provision. The description of the criminal 
offence is provided in accordance with the criminal or unlawful behaviour (the 
conduct) shown by the perpetrator(s) of a crime. The behaviour observed is in 
most cases sufficient to define an offence for the purposes of the ICCS, while in 
some cases, additional elements have to be taken into account, such as the 
intention (state of mind) of the perpetrator or the condition/status of the victim (for 
example, whether he/she is a minor). In other cases, a crime is defined by a 
sequence of behaviours, as in the case of trafficking in persons, for example 
(UNODC, 2015:10). 
2.6.2.3 Criteria used to build the UNODC ICCS 
According to the UNODC (UNODC, 2015:12), criminal offences can be 
recognised and classified from a multitude of angles: their impact on victims, the 
way they have been perpetrated, the offender’s motive, and the seriousness of 
the offence, among other things. In building the classification, the UNODC 
(UNODC, 2015:12) states that it had given priority to criteria that are particularly 
relevant from a policy perspective: the categories should provide information that 
can be easily understood and used when developing crime prevention and 
criminal justice policies. This is an important aspect, considering that one of the 
outcomes of this research is to put in place a classification system for financial 
crime that can be used by policy-makers when they develop policy or crime-
combating strategies. A number of criteria have been used to build the 
hierarchical structure of the ICCS in particular; the following criteria have been 
used to form categories of the ICCS (UNODC, 2015:12): 
• policy area of the act/event [conduct] (protection of property rights, 
protection of health, etc.) 
• the target [victim] of the act/event (e.g. person, business premises, 
State, etc.) 
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• the seriousness of the act/event (e.g. acts leading to death, acts 
causing harm, etc.) 
• means by which the act/event is perpetrated (e.g. by fraud, deception 
or corruption, etc.). 
 
Based on these criteria, criminal offences can be grouped into homogeneous 
categories (refer to Figure 2.8 – paragraph 2.6.2.3), which are aggregated at four 
different hierarchical levels: Levels 1, 2, 3 and 4. There are 11 Level 1 categories 
designed to cover all acts or events that constitute a crime within the scope of the 
ICCS (UNODC, 2015:13). Criminal offences at Levels 2, 3 and 4 can be summed 
to provide observations at more aggregated levels, while observations at higher 
levels can be subdivided into lower-level categories. Criminal offences can be 
identified at the level of detail that is of interest, which in the case of this research 
is financial crime and its categories. 
 
The numerical coding of the categories is in accordance with their level of 
classification: Level 1 categories are the broadest categories and have a two-digit 
code (e.g. 01); Level 2 categories have a four-digit code (e.g. 0101); Level 3 
categories have a five-digit code (e.g. 01011); and Level 4 categories, the most 
detailed level, have a six-digit code (e.g. 010111) (UNODC, 2015:13). The ICCS 
(UNODC, 2015:13) lists 11 Level 1 categories, as depicted in Figure 2.8 below, 
for illustrative purposes, of which Categories “5” and “7” under Level 1 should be 
of particular interest in this research study, as an example of how the principles 
are applied by using the Events-based approach in relation to crimes which in 
this research have been identified as examples of categories of financial crime 
and specific crimes. 
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Figure 2.8: Level 1 Categories according to the coding of categories used 
in the ICCS classification approach 
 
(Source: UNODC, 2015:13) 
 
According to this approach, all categories at each level of the classification are 
described in detailed terms. Each offence has an event-based actor description 
(conduct), which is the core set of actions, behavioural and contextual attributes 
that define the offence. The categories of the ICCS capture and describe the 
nature of criminal offences. Descriptions are accompanied by legal inclusions and 
exclusions to identify the most common or important criminal offences included 
in, or excluded from, the category (UNODC, 2015:14). 
 
For this research and classification of financial crime in accordance with a 
systematic approach, the inclusion and exclusions are not included but rather 
replaced with the legal provisions in accordance with the substantive SA legal 
provisions, which criminalise the described criminal conduct. What will, however, 
determine whether a particular act of criminal conduct or descriptive behaviour is 
included in or excluded from the category of offences referred to as financial 
crimes, is whether it fits the description in accordance with the criteria determined 
by this research. 
2.6.2.4 Broad and detailed structure of the UNODC ICCS 
Figure 2.9 (paragraph 2.9) serves to illustrate in tabular format the broad and 
detailed structure of the ICCS approach, which for the purpose of this example 
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will refer to the Level 1 category according to the ICCS, which is “acts involving 
fraud, deception or corruption” (UNODC, 2015:27) and the detail of the structure, 
as is evident from Figure 2.9 (paragraph 2.9). 
2.6.2.5 Acts involving fraud, deception or corruption 
Figure 2.10 (paragraph 2.9) serves to illustrate in tabular format the complete 
classification of the category of acts involving fraud, deception or corruption 
according to the ICCS, and showing all the levels in detail according to the ICCS 
classification (UNODC, 2015:68). For the purpose of this illustration, only the 
Level 1 of fraud (Category 0701) and of forgery/counterfeiting (Category 0702) is 
shown in Figure 2.10 (paragraph 2.9).  
2.7 CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR CATEGORISING FINANCIAL CRIME  
For this research, the researcher applied an adapted version of the Events-based 
approach to categorising financial crime, based on the data received from the 
participants and a review of the literature. A system of numbering (or codification 
of) the various categories, starting with category 01, denotes the first of the Level 
1 category of financial crime. It progresses to the next category, namely Level 1 
crime, which is denoted 02, and so on. In addition to the types of financial crime 
commonly referred to by investigators, practitioners and policymakers, the crimes 
as referred to according to the common law and statutory law, for which the 
perpetrator can be criminally charged in a court of law, have been added, which 
makes it a useful reference from a practical and criminal justice perspective.  
 
The researcher decided on this approach because it is systematic and expresses 
financial crime in terminology in accordance with the type of conduct or behaviour 
that constitutes financial crime, as opposed to the strict legal definition in terms of 
the conventions of substantive law commonly used by investigators, practitioners 
and policymakers when communicating about financial crime (feedback from 
participants and analysis of the literature). It is, therefore, a more practical means 
of categorising financial crime. The categories are not necessarily extensive, 
which implies that they can be extended as and when perceptions change, or 
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criminal conduct evolves, or new forms of criminal conduct appear, especially 
where the use of technology is involved.  
In providing the behavioural descriptors of the type of conduct that perpetuates 
the financial crime at Level 1 and Level 2 sub-types, the researcher opted to use 
more functional descriptions or definitions obtained from the literature or feedback 
from participants, rather than legal definitions used in the legal text, such as 
statutes that criminalise the unlawful conduct. 
The researcher developed a classification for financial crime in accordance with 
the general Level 1 categories and Level 2 sub-types of financial crime, following 
an Events-based approach as described above. In following this approach, the 
researcher used feedback from participants and examples of financial crime and 
types of unlawful conduct described in the literature, feedback from participants, 
South African Common Law and statutes. In consolidating this information, the 
researcher developed a conceptual classification for financial crime, as illustrated 
in Figure 2.10 (paragraph 2.9). The conceptual model represents a classification 
of financial crime according to the description of the conduct and following a 
systematic approach. It is not intended to be representative of a comprehensive 
classification of the full spectrum of unlawful conduct that falls within the 
classification of financial crime. It is suggested that this is an endeavour that can 
be undertaken as part of a future research project. 
The concept described above is not intended to provide a comprehensive and 
final description of all the types of criminal acts (events) that constitute the 
category of offences termed financial crime. It is also not intended to provide a 
full list of all the common-law offences and offences under the statutory law for 
which criminal liability can be incurred as a result of perpetrating the type of 
unlawful conduct described in the conceptual model. 
 
The conceptual model is intended to illustrate a system for categorising various 
types of unlawful acts that may constitute financial crime according to the general 
description of the type of conduct deemed to be unlawful. The general 
descriptions are extrapolated to possible applicable offences under South African 
law. It is suggested that an endeavour to compile a comprehensive list could be 
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the subject of further research, or the research could be undertaken by a research 
institution and the result used as a source of reference to indicate conduct that 
can be classified as financial crime. 
2.8 SUMMARY 
Academics, practitioners, governments and non-governmental agencies have a 
shared view that financial crime has a significant detrimental impact on the 
economies of countries and even more so on those of developing countries where 
it diminishes individual resource and drains funds that would otherwise be 
available for countries to develop. There is agreement at an international and 
national level that more concerted efforts should be made, and policies put in 
place to combat financial crime. This research, however, shows that academics, 
practitioners, governments and non-governmental agencies do not share a 
common view of what financial crime entails and exactly what type of criminal 
behaviour or conduct falls within that category of offences labelled as financial 
crime.  
In this chapter, the use and conceptualisation of the term financial crime were 
considered from the perspective of the literature and from the participants’ 
domestic viewpoint. From the literature reported on in this chapter, it is apparent 
that the concept financial crime is a vague term that is broadly used to describe a 
variety of criminal acts, and even differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and the 
context within which it is used. The research shows that the term financial crime 
is used to describe many concepts at varying levels of specificity and sometimes 
used interchangeably with other terms such as economic crime, white-collar crime 
and commercial crime, mainly because of a lack of systematic definition. There is 
even confusion in the same jurisdiction as to the scope of the concept financial 
crime. This confusion and lack of understanding of the conceptual meaning of 
financial crime, its behavioural descriptors and specific crimes according to the 
conventions of common law and statutory law could create problems when there 
is a need to communicate about financial crime. The literature indicates that there 
is at least some agreement among academics, governments and practitioners 
that money laundering, fraud, corruption and bribery, and insider trading resort 
under the category of financial crime. 
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The defining characteristic of financial crime is that it is crime that relates to a 
variety of non-violent, profit-driven, unlawful conduct aimed at financial systems, 
financial institutions, or property belonging to another, gaining access or control 
thereof or converting property for one’s own personal use or benefit, that generally 
results in a financial loss. The characteristics attributed to the crimes that form 
part of the category of offences categorised as financial crime have been 
individualised. From a South African perspective, the concept financial crime is 
used to refer to a subset of commercial or economic crimes associated with 
criminal conduct aimed at prejudicing financial systems or institutions financially. 
The general discussion regarding the concept financial crime and how it is 
understood by academics, governmental and non-governmental agencies is 
followed by an analysis of the various definitions for financial crime presented by 
academics, governmental and non-governmental agencies in the literature. The 
definition of financial crime as a category of offences is examined and explained 
in accordance with the literature and feedback from participants during interviews.  
From a South African perspective it is possible to offer a definition of financial 
crime in accordance with the main themes presented by the participants that are 
broadly compatible with those that emerged from the literature. 
Examples of individual crimes and descriptions of criminal conduct cited by 
academics, governmental and non-governmental agencies as falling within the 
category of financial crime are systematically listed according to similar typologies 
and behavioural descriptors. Various types of available models for classifying 
financial crime systematically were considered. An adaptation of the classification 
system used by the UNODC, based on an Events-based approach, provides a 
viable, flexible and practical system of classification for financial crime. This has 
been tailored for domestic application, using the behavioural descriptors (types of 
unlawful conduct) as the units for classification rather than their strict descriptions 
or definitions of the crime in accordance with the applicable legal conventions.  
The units or descriptors were obtained from the systematic list of similar 
typologies and behavioural descriptors as presented in the literature and feedback 
from participants. 
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The need for a systematic system of classification of crimes that resort under the 
category of financial crime is examined and explained. In this chapter it is 
suggested that a systematic classification of financial crime, based on a common 
understanding of the behavioural descriptors of the type of unlawful conduct 
associated with specific crimes and contraventions, according to the conventions 
of the common law and statutory law, could assist government departments and 
agencies, their officials, policymakers and practitioners when they have to 
communicate about financial crime, especially when developing policies or 
integrating efforts and resources to combat financial crime. 
In Chapter 3, consideration is given to the application of combating or to combat 
crime generally, and then in more specific terms of financial crime within the 
current structural, operational and legal mandatory framework. A determination 
is made whether the arrangement is effective and what government policies and 
strategies are in place to guide Government’s response to financial crime in a 
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2.9 TABLES AND FIGURES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 2 
Table 2.1: Terms in the literature used to describe the nature and scope 
of financial crime 
 






























































































Terminologically wide, imprecise and vague label or 
term lacking systematic definition
X X X X 36
Covers a broad range of activities, deceptions, frauds 
and financial frauds
X X X X 36
Financial crime can be narrowed down to such 
offences affecting/harming/abusing/victimising  
financial markets, financial systems, investment and 
the economy
X X X X 36
Terms ‘financial crime’, ‘white-collar crime’, and ‘fraud’ 
are used interchangeably
X X X 27
Expresses different concepts depending on jurisdiction X X 18
Any type of illegal conduct resulting in a pecuniary loss X 9
Only non-violent crime resulting in a pecuniary loss X 9
Wrong to conclude it is victimless X 9
Impact just as significant as physical abuse X 9
White-collar crime is financial crime committed by 
white-collar criminals
X 9
Economic crime and commercial crime refers to acts 
(the conduct)
X 9
White-collar crime refers to actors X 9
The term ‘financial crime’ favoured in the American 
context
X 9
Economic crime favoured in the European context X 9
Financial crime is part of the economic crime family X 9
Involves combination of experts working together X 9
Involves experts acting in business environments X 9
Makes use of a variety of deceptions X 9
Adversely impacts economies X 9
Also impacts on an individual level X 9
Variety of financial crime types X 9
Variety is confusing X 9






















Themes or focus emerging from the literature
Scholars and practitioner’s literature
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Figure 2.1: Frequency of themes emerging from the literature describing 
the nature and scope of financial crime 
 
(Source: Data from Table 2.1)  
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Table 2.2: Frequency table with participants indicating whether there is a 
common understanding of the term financial crime  
Question 2.1: Do you think there is a common understanding of the meaning of financial 
crime? Please substantiate your answer 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Yes 5 50 
No 5 50 
In the South African context, it is generally referred to as 
commercial crime  
3 30 
Depending on the agency they work for, some individuals may 
include offences and others may exclude offences 
3 30 
People will have a general idea 2 20 
It should be viewed from the perspective of the offences that the 
FATF aims to combat 
2 20 
Financial crime refers to the classification of offences according 
to what is being targeted, as opposed to how it is identified 
according to the legal convention 
2 20 
Financial crime includes making use of fraud 1 10 
The terms financial crime and commercial crime are used 
interchangeably 
1 10 
This category of crime is not codified, therefore there is no 
common understanding of the unlawful conduct that categorises 
financial crime. 
1 10 
Confuse the nature of unlawful conduct with actual common law 
and statutory law offences according to the conventions of SA law 
1 10 
It is a subspecies of commercial crime  1 10 
The category of commercial crime where financial benefit is 
derived 
1 10 
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Table 2.4:  Frequency of participants’ themes presented in their 
definitions of financial crime 
Question 2.2: How would you define the term financial crime in your own words? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




For financial gain/benefit/enrichment 6 60 
Financially prejudicial to another or society at large 5 50 
Intentional unlawful conduct 3 30 
It is the same as commercial crime 2 20 
Any offence prejudicing the financial position of a business enterprise or 
government. 
1 10 
Not entitled to 1 10 
Forms part of the criminal business enterprise system 1 10 
Aimed at financial systems 1 10 
Aimed at individuals and companies 1 10 
Non-violent criminal conduct 1 10 
Makes use of fraud and dishonesty 1 10 
An offence derived at from a predicate offence 1 10 
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Table 2.5: Authors and their focus on characteristics of financial crime 






























































































































































Makes use of deception/fraud   ✓ ✓  ✓  42 
Results in financial loss ✓   ✓    29 
Crime against property  ✓ ✓     29 
Involves unlawful conversion of property  ✓      14 
Personal use and benefit  ✓      14 
Profit-driven   ✓     14 
Breaches trust    ✓    14 
Conceals/hides true nature of activities    ✓    14 
For illegal gain    ✓    14 
Intentional    ✓    14 
Opportunity-driven     ✓   14 
Conversion of profits into cash     ✓   14 
Mechanical process     ✓   14 
Committed by persons with a certain level 
of standing in business 
      ✓ 14 
Economic crime perpetrated by “white-
collar criminals.” 
  ✓     14 
(Source: Content analysis of the literature) 
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of themes emerging from the literature to describe 
unique characteristics of financial crime 
 

























Themes describing characteristics of financial crime 
emerging from the literature
(Data from the literature - Table 2.5)
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Table 2.6: Frequency table showing participants’ themes for the 
characteristics of financial crime 
Question 2.3: What do you think are the identifiable characteristics of financial crime? 
Participants’ themes 
Quantification 




Gains a direct or indirect financial/monetary advantage/ benefit  6 60 
Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim 5 50 
Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation 3 30 
Involves various methods 2 20 
Involves sophisticated methods 2 20 
Non-violent 1 10 
Proceeds are invariably laundered 1 10 
Motivated by greed 1 10 
Usually involves documents 1 10 
Usually involves technology (cyber technology) 1 10 
Can be either organised or transactional crime 1 10 
When organised, same characteristics as organised crime. 1 10 
Bridges conventional borders and jurisdictions 1 10 
State responses battle to keep up with technology in financial 
systems. 
1 10 
Focus of financial crime is on criminal economy and business 
systems. 
1 10 
Represents crimes related to illicit economy. 1 10 
Directed at illegally obtaining property 1 10 
Focuses on money 1 10 
Crime aimed at the financial systems of a country 1 10 
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Money Laundering X X X X X X X X X X X X 12 92
Fraud X X X X X X 6 46
Identity fraud X X X X X 5 38
corporate fraud X X 2 15
advance fee Fraud X X 2 15
medical fraud X 1 8
point of sale fraud X 1 8
health care fraud X 1 8
currency fraud X 1 8
basic company fraud X 1 8
subsistence claims X 1 8
false documentation X 1 8
Bankruptcy Fraud X 1 8
Securities Fraud X 1 8
Serious Fraud X 1 8
Financial Fraud X X 2 15
cheque fraud X X X 3 23
credit card fraud X X X 3 13
mortgage fraud X X 2 15
insurance fraud X 1 8
consumer fraud X 1 8
bid rigging X 1 8
inflated invoices X 1 8
external fraud X 1 8
financial statement fraud X 1 8
accounting fraud X 1 8
bank account fraud X X X 3 3
Theft
theft of Cash X 1 8
inventory Theft X 1 8
misappropriation schemes X 1 8
embezzlement X X X X X X 6 46
Other
Insider trading X X X X X X X X X X 10 77
Tax Evasion/Fraud X X X X X 5 38
Stock manipulation X X X X X 5 38
Bribery & Corruption X X X X X 5 38
Terrorist financing X X X 3 23
Cyber attacks X X 2 15
Pyramid Scheme X X 2 15
Circumvention of exchange restrictionsX 1 8
Sale of fictitious financial instrumentX 1 8
Sale of fictitious insurance policiesX 1 8
Computer related crimes X 1 8
Extortion X 1 8
Blackmail X 1 8
Organized Crime X 1 8
Ponzi Scheme X 1 8
Drug mules X 1 8
(Source: Analysis of the literature)
EXAMPLES OF FINANCIAL CRIME IN THE LITERATURE
ACADEMIC AUTHORS, PRACTITIONERS AND GOVERNMENT LITERATURE
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Figure 2.3: Frequency of the examples of financial crimes emerging from 
the literature 
 
(Source: Frequency Table 2.7) 
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Table 2.8: Frequency table indicating participants’ answers about 
common-law crimes in the category of financial crime   
Question 2.4: According to your understanding of financial crime, what common-law offences according 
to South African law fall within the category of offences referred to as financial crime? 
Participants’ answers 
Quantification 




Fraud; 9 90 
• Tax fraud (evasion) 4 40 
• Cheque fraud 2 20 
• Plastic fraud 1 10 
• Investor/investment fraud 1 10 
• Ponzi schemes 1 10 
• Customs fraud 1 10 
• Banking fraud 1 10 
• Advance-fee fraud 1 10 
• Fraud relating to transactions between corporate entities. 1 10 
• Double discounting of instalment sales agreements 1 10 
• Manipulation of a computer to commit fraud 1 10 
• Fraud related to Internet transactions 1 10 
• Kite-flying 1 10 
• Mortgage 1 10 
Theft; 5 50 
• Theft by trustees or liquidators of assets belonging to an estate 1 10 
• Embezzlement 1 10 
Other;     
• Forgery 4 40 
• Extortion 1 10 
• Forgery 4 40 
• Cybercrime 1 10 
• Uttering 1 10 
• Corruption 1 10 
• Counterfeiting 1 10 
• Drug trafficking 1 10 
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Figure 2.4: Participants’ frequency of themes for common-law crimes  
 

















  Banking fraud
 Advance fee fraud
 Fraud relating to transactions between corporate…
 Double discounting of instalment sales agreements
 Manipulation of a computer to commit fraud
Fraud related to internet transactions
Kite flying
 Mortgage





















Participants' frequency of examples of common law offences as financial 
crime
(Participants' data - Table 2.8)
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Table 2.9: Frequency table indicating participants’ answers related to 
statutory crimes falling within the category of financial crime  
Question 2.5: According to your understanding of financial crime, what statutory offences 
according to South African law fall within the category of offences referred to as financial crime? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Tax evasion  9 90 
Money laundering 7 70 
Corruption 6 60 
Terror financing 3 30 
Racketeering 3 30 
Counterfeiting 2 20 
Transfer pricing 1 10 
Offences involving fraud 1 10 
Cybercrime 1 10 
Reckless and fraudulent trading 1 10 
Share offer without prospectus 1 10 
False prospectus 1 10 
Deposit-taking without being registered 1 10 
Exchange Control Regulations 1 10 
Under-declaration of customs value 1 10 
Operating an unlicensed medical scheme 1 10 
Failure to report money-laundering activity 1 10 
Identity theft 1 10 
Securities fraud 1 10 
Contraventions of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act  1 10 
Contraventions of the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 
1 10 
Contraventions under the Customs and Excise Act  1 10 
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Figure 2.5: Participants’ frequency of themes presented on statutory 
offences in the category financial crime 
 






























Examples of statutory offences
Participants' frequency of examples of statutory offences as financial 
crime
(Participant's data - Table 2.9)
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Figure 2.6: Graph depicting the disparity between classification of 
financial crime according to descriptors of the type of crime and the legal 
classification according to common-law and statutory law 
 








































Themes representing financial crime
Table 2.7 Literature
Table 2.8 Common law
Table 2.9 Statutory law
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Figure 2.7:  Main categories and subcategories of financial crime as 
categorised by Gottschalk 
 
(Source: Gottschalk, 2010b:5) 
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Figure 2.9:  Broad and detailed structure of the classification of acts 
involving fraud, deception or corruption 
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Figure 2.9:  Broad and detailed structure of the classification of acts 
involving fraud, deception or corruption 
 
 
(Source: ICCS, 2015:69) 
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Figure 2.10: Concept for classification of the category of acts involving 
fraud, deception or corruption according to the ICCS system 
FINANCIAL CRIME CATEGORIES 
SECTION 
01 
ACTS INVOLVING FRAUD, DECEPTION AND FORGERY 
CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY 
0101 Fraud: making of a misrepresentation that causes actual 
prejudice or is potentially prejudicial to another (Snyman, 
2008:531) 
The crime of 
“fraud", as 
defined in 
common law  
 
01011 Financial Fraud: Fraud involving deceptive 
financial transactions for the purpose of personal 
or organisational gain. This includes using 
consumer products such as bank accounts, credit 
cards, cheques, store cards or online banking 
systems (ICCS, 2015:68). 
The common-
















010111 Cheque Fraud: Fraud involving 
the use of a cheque or forged 
document purporting to be a 
legitimate cheque, or a stolen 
cheque purporting to have been 
signed by the legitimate account 
holder.  
The common-
law crime of 















070112 Credit Card Fraud: Fraud 
involving the use of a credit card 
or cloned credit card purporting to 
be a legitimate credit card, or a 
stolen credit card being used 
illegitimately.  
The common-
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070113 Bank fraud: Making use of a 
fraudulent scheme to defraud a 
financial institution (Gottschalk, 
2010b: 5) 
 The common-
















01012 Financial Investment Fraud: These are fraud 
scams that often look and sound like plausible 
investments. Using professional-looking websites, 
accompanied by corporate brochures and 
deceptive sales tactics that make the company 
appear legitimate, they usually promise high 
returns and low risk, and utilise convincing and 
pressured selling techniques (Betts, 2017: 85) 
The common-
















010121 Pyramid Scheme: In the classic 
"pyramid" scheme, participants 
attempt to make money solely by 
recruiting new participants into 
the programme. The hallmark of 
these schemes is the promise of 
sky-high returns in a short period 
of time for doing nothing other 
than handing over your money 
and getting others to do the 
same. (Pyramid Schemes …, 
2015). 
The common-
















010122 Advance-fee fraud: Involves the 
use of attempts to secure a 
prepaid commission for an 
arrangement that is never 
actually fulfilled, or work that is 
never done (Gottschalk, 
2010b: 5). 
The common-










and uttering a 
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010123 Insider trading: Involves the use 
of as yet undisclosed price-
sensitive information obtained in 
one's privileged professional 
capacity to make personal profit 
or avoid loss (Levi, 2009: 232) 
The common-
















01013 Corporate Fraud: Occurs within an organisation.  
Involves deliberate dishonesty to deceive the 
public, investors or lending companies, usually 
resulting in financial gain. (Corporate Fraud …, 
2015 
The common-
















010131 Asset-stripping: Taking 
company funds or assets of value 
while leaving behind the debts. 
Transfer only the assets of one 
company to another and not the 
liabilities. (Asset Stripping …, 
2015) Targeting of company or 
companies to take ownership, 
move the assets and then put the 
stripped entity into liquidation; 
Moving assets from one limited 
company to another to ‘secure’ 
benefits of one business and 
avoid liabilities. (Asset Stripping 
..., 2015) 
The common-













section 22 r.w. 
section 214 of 
the Companies 
Act (71 of 
2008) 
hereafter 
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010132 Fraudulent Trading: Carries on 
business with the intention of 
defrauding creditors or for any 
fraudulent purposes (Fraudulent 
Trading …, 2015). Applies 
whether the company is trading, 
has ceased trading or is in the 
process of being wound up 
(Fraudulent Trading …, 2015) 
The common- 













section 22 r.w. 




010133 Publishing false information: 
Creates, destroys, conceals, or 
falsifies an account, record or 
report that is deliberately 
misleading regarding the 
company's financial position, 
thus misleading investors and 
creditors and keeping a failing 
company trading (Publishing 
false information ..., 2015). 
The common-














common law.  
 
01014 Other Acts of Fraud: The common-
















010141 Identity Fraud: Can be 
described as the intentional 
acquisition of identifiers of one 
individual without his or her 
authority, to successfully 
impersonate that individual and 
commit unlawful activities such 
as fraud (Miri-Lavassani, Kumar, 
Moayed & Kumar, 2009: 367). 
The common-
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theft, forgery 






010142 Procurement fraud: Making use 
of fraud or corrupt activities within 
the procurement life cycle of 
goods, products, services or 
maintenance contracts between 
a customer and a supplier (Ross 
& Chacko, 2016:105) 
The common-
































010143 Tender fraud: Making use of 
fraud or corrupt activities within 
the tendering life-cycle of goods, 
products, services or 
maintenance contracts between 
a customer and a supplier 
The common-



















provided for in  
PRECCA. 
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SECTION 
02 
ACTS INVOLVING THEFT   
0201  Theft:  The unlawful appropriation of movable, corporeal 
property that belongs to, and is in the possession of, another; 
belongs to another but is in the perpetrator’s own possession; or 
belongs to the perpetrator but is in another’s possession, and 
such other person has a right to possess it, provided that the 
intention to appropriate the property includes an intention to 
permanently deprive the person entitled to the possession of the 
property, of such property (Snyman, 2008:483). 
The common-





02011  Theft of property or funds by persons in a 
position of control or trust: 
The common-





020111  Theft of trust monies: 
committed by a person who is 
legally obliged to keep a separate 
trust account. 
The common-




020112  Theft or dissipation of assets 
of insolvent estates or estates 
under curatorship: Committed 
by trustees or liquidators 
responsible for the winding-up of 
such estates 
The common-




020113  Theft from deceased estates: 
committed by executors of 
deceased estates. 
The common-




020114  Theft by persons in a fiduciary 
capacity, committed over a 
period, by means of the 
manipulation of accounting 
records of businesses and 
financial institutions 
The common-




02012 Identity Theft: Identity theft is the crime of 
acquiring another person’s personal information 
without their knowledge. It is an enabler of identity 
fraud (Gottschalk, 2010b:15).  
  
The common-










law offence of 
theft, forgery 
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SECTION 
03 
ACTS INVOLVING CORRUPT ACTIVITIES 
  
0301 Bribery and Corruption: These terms relate to the improper 
influencing of people in positions of trust (Gooch & Williams, 
2007: 38). The criminal conduct grouped under this expression 
is now dealt with under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 













criminal law.  
 
03011  Corruption 
Contravention 





Corrupt activities relating to 
public officers 
Contravention 




Corrupt activities relating to 
foreign public officials 
Contravention 




Corrupt activities relating to 
agents 
Contravention 





Corrupt activities relating to 
members of legislative authority 
Contravention 
of section 7 of 
PRECCA, 
2004 
130115 Corrupt activities relating to 
judicial officers 
Contravention 
of section 8 of 
PRECCA, 
2004 
130116 Corrupt activities relating to 
members of the prosecuting 
authority 
Contravention 
of section 9 of 
PRECCA, 
2004 
130117 Offences of receiving or offering 
of unauthorised gratification by or 
party to an employment 
relationship  
Contravention 
of section 10 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130118 Offences in respect of corrupt 
activities relating to witnesses 
and evidential material during 
certain proceedings 
Contravention 
of section 11 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130119 Offences in respect of corrupt 
activities in relation to contracts  
Contravention 
of section 12 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130120 Offences in respect of corrupt 
activities relating to procuring and 
withdrawal of tenders 
Contravention 
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130121 Offences in respect of corrupt 
activities relating to auctions 
Contravention 
of section 14 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130122 Offences in respect of corrupt 
activities in relation to sporting 
events 
Contravention 
of section 15 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130123 Offences in respect of corrupt 
activities in relation to gambling 
games or games of chance 
Contravention 
of section 16 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130124 Other offences relating to corrupt 
activities – accessory to or after 
offence, as contemplated above 
or section 21 hereunder 
Contravention 
of section 20 
of PRECCA, 
2004 
130125 Other offences relating to corrupt 
activities – attempt, conspiracy 
and inducement of another 
person to commit offence in 
terms of the PRECCA 
Contravention 





ACTS INVOLVING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND THE 
INSTRUMENTALITY OF AN OFFENCE   
0401 Money Laundering: Is the process by which proceeds of 
criminal conduct are sanitised to disguise their illicit origins, and 
generally involves the processes of placement, layering and 





Crime Act (121 
of 1998) 
(hereafter 
referred to as 
POCA in this 
table)  
 
04011 Money laundering is committed when any person 
who knows or ought reasonably to have known 
that property is or forms part of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities and who then enters into any 
agreement or engages in any arrangement or 
transaction with anyone in connection with that 
property, whether such agreement, arrangement 
or transaction is legally enforceable or not; or who 
then performs any other act in connection with 
such property, whether it is performed 
independently or in concert with any other person, 
that has or is likely to have the effect of concealing 
or disguising the nature, source, location, 
disposition or movement of the said property or the 
ownership thereof or any interest that anyone may 
have in respect thereof; or who enables or assists 
any person who has committed or commits an 
offence, whether in the Republic or elsewhere—to 
avoid prosecution; or to remove or diminish any 
property acquired directly, or indirectly, as a result 
of the commission of an offence. 
Contravention 
of section 4 of 
POCA 
040111 Assisting another to benefit from 
proceeds of unlawful activities by 
any person who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known that 
another person has obtained the 
proceeds of unlawful activities, 
Contravention 
of section 5 of 
POCA 
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and who enters into any 
agreement with anyone or 
engages in any arrangement or 
transaction whereby the retention 
or the control by or on behalf of 
the said other person of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities is 
facilitated; or the said proceeds of 
unlawful activities are used to 
make funds available to the said 
other person or to acquire 
property on his or her behalf or to 
benefit him or her in any other 
way. 
040112 Acquisition, possession or use of 
proceeds of unlawful activities by 
any person who acquires, uses, 
or has possession of property 
and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known that it 
is or forms part of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities of another 
person. 
Contravention 




ACTS INVOLVING THE EVASION OF TAXES 
  
0501 Tax evasion:     
 
05011 
Evasion of tax and obtaining undue refunds by 
means of fraud or theft, which is perpetrated by 
persons with intent to evade or assist another 
person to evade tax or obtain an undue refund 
under a tax Act: 
The common-




offence of a 
contravention 
of section 235 




050111 Makes or causes or allows to be 
made, any false statement or 
entry in a return or other 
document, or signs a statement, 
return or other document so 
submitted without reasonable 
grounds for believing the same to 
be true. 
The common-




offence of a 
contravention 
of section 235 
(a) of the Tax 
Administration 
Act. 
050112 Gives a false answer, whether 
orally or in writing, to a request for 
information made under the Tax 
Administration Act, 2011. 
The common-




offence of a 
contravention 
of section 235 
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050113 Prepares, maintains or 
authorises the preparation or 
maintenance of false books of 
account or other records, or 
falsifies or authorises the 
falsification of books of account 
or other records. 
The common-




offence of a 
contravention 
of section 235 




050114 Makes use of, or authorises the 
use of, fraud or contrivance 
The common-




offence of a 
contravention 
of section 235 




050115 Makes any false statement for 
the purpose of obtaining any 
refund of or exemption from tax 
The common-




offence of a 
contravention 
of section 235 




05012 Evasion of duties on goods or to qualify for a 





Duty Act (30 of 
2014) 
(hereafter 
referred to as 
the Customs 
Duty Act) 
0502   Smuggling: Importing or exporting prohibited goods, or without 
paying the duties on dutiable goods; which practice is a fraud on 
the revenue, and is accordingly restrained by the statutes 
relating to Customs Control and Custom Duties 
  
 
05021 Offences in relation to failing to clear goods 
and not being assessed for liability of duties or 
taxes on dutiable goods. 
The common-





118(1) or (2) of 
the Customs 
Control Act, 
(31 of 2014) 
(hereafter 
referred to as 
the Customs 
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Control Act) 
r.w. section 19 
of the Customs 
Duty Act. 
05022 
Offences in relation to importing or exporting 
prohibited or restricted goods 
 
 




(1)(a) of the 
Customs 
Control Act 






Control Act.  
050223 Collusion or arrangement of 
whatever nature with any other 
person inside or outside the 
Republic to defeat or evade a 
provision of Chapter 35 of the 
Customs Control Act, 2014, in 
relation to any prohibited, 
restricted or sectorally controlled 
goods imported or to be imported 
into, or exported or to be 






(Source: Concept developed and compiled by the researcher) 
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CHAPTER 3: COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In March 2011, the OECD concluded that tax crimes, money laundering and other 
financial crimes could threaten the strategic, political and economic interests of 
both developed and developing countries (The launch of the Oslo Dialogue…, 
2011). The OECD warned that these unlawful activities prosper in an environment 
of secrecy, careless regulation, poor enforcement and, of critical importance to 
this study, weak inter-agency cooperation (The launch of the Oslo Dialogue…, 
2011). The OECD opined that to combat such activities requires greater 
transparency, more strategic intelligence gathering, and improved efforts to 
harness the capacity of different key investigative agencies to work together to 
“detect, deter and prosecute these crimes (a Whole-of-Government approach).” 
(The launch of the Oslo Dialogue…, 2011). 
 
There is confusion about what the term combating or to combat crime generally 
entails. In general, the terms prevention and combating crime are sometimes 
used interchangeably or analogously. Considering that this research deals with 
the combating of crime and more explicitly the combating of financial crime, as 
the topic of the research report suggests, it is of the utmost importance to 
understand what the concept entails. In this chapter, the meanings of combating 
crime or to combat crime as well as their components are clarified. The focus 
then shifts to more explicitly clarifying the concept of combating financial crime. 
 
Despite the clear dangers presented by financial crime, there is no official 
government policy or strategic plan to harness the capacity of different key 
investigative agencies to work together by implementing an integrated 
methodology and multidisciplinary approach to effectively combat financial crime 
specifically. While agency heads and lawmakers proclaim that investigation 
activities follow an integrated and multidisciplinary approach, the way that 
Government operates constrains the implementation of integrated approaches.   
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A further research objective to address in this chapter is to determine the current 
situation regarding Government's efforts to combat financial crime. In considering 
the current state of Government's efforts it is essential to review the policy and 
legal frameworks providing Government and the investigative agencies with their 
strategic direction, legal mandate, duties and obligations to combat crime 
generally, and more specifically regarding financial crime. In making the stated 
determinations, the researcher intends answering the questions regarding, firstly 
the current state of inter-agency cooperation, secondly the integration of efforts 
between the responsible government agencies in combating financial crime, and 
thirdly what the current situation is, as experienced by investigating officials and 
practitioners.  
 
This chapter thus considers four aspects related to combating of crime. The first 
aspect addressed covers conceptualising and defining combating of crime and 
its components, as it provides the general background and conceptual clarity for 
the discussion and arguments about the various components of combating 
financial crime. 
 
The second aspect addressed focuses on conceptualising the combating of 
financial crime more explicitly. The various facets or components encountered 
during the combating of financial crime are identified and discussed. The third 
aspect addressed concerns the legal, policy and strategic framework to combat 
financial crime. The fourth aspect addressed concerns the current situation 
regarding cooperation between, the investigative authorities and government 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa, as well as the 
integration of their efforts. 
3.2 COMBATING CRIME 
The concept combating of crime includes the concepts prevention, investigation, 
detection and intelligence, and forms an essential part of this research project. It 
therefore makes sense to conceptualise the meanings of combating of crime and 
each of its components before advancing to a discussion of the combating of 
financial crime and its components. According to Burger (2007:9), the term 
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combating of crime is frequently used. As evident from the discussions in Chapter 
2, the term combating is just as often used regarding financial crime. 
3.2.1  Conceptualising the combating of crime 
According to Hough and Du Plessis (2003:8), combating of crime used in a 
generic sense can be used to “denote the totality of efforts at different levels to 
reduce, contain and manage crime in South African society, inclusive of crime 
prevention in the broader and the combating of crime in the narrower sense”. 
Hough and Du Plessis (2003:8) therefore suggest that cognisance should be 
taken of the context within which the relevant concepts are used. 
 
Burger (2007:147) suggests that the term crime combating is an overarching term 
or concept that encompasses the terms crime prevention and policing. Burger 
(2007:10) through his research adopted the following definition for the concept 
crime combating: 
 
Crime combating entails any lawful activity aimed at 
reducing crime, whether it refers to measures aimed at the 
prevention of crime, or whether it is an activity associated 
with proactive or reactive policing. 
3.2.2 Nature and scope of combating crime 
Burger (2007:9) states that the term combating of crime is often applied 
inconsistently, and users are frequently confused about its correct meaning. 
Burger (2007:9) asserts that the term combating is sometimes used when the 
term prevention of crime is intended and vice versa. Hough and Du Plessis 
(2003:8) assert that the terminology creates confusion, especially the use of and 
distinction between combating of crime and crime prevention. Hough and Du 
Plessis (2003:8) suggest that combating of crime is often used in the narrower, 
short-term, departmental and operational context whereas crime prevention 
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Burger (2007:10) maintains that it is “... obvious that combating is much more 
than prevention alone.” and that it should be construed to include activities such 
as crime prevention and policing. According to Burger (2007:10), this means that 
crime combating could be regarded as an umbrella term for all kinds of legal 
activities “aimed at fighting crime, whether it is to prevent, reduce control deter or 
to solve crime, and may also include policing activities such as law enforcement, 
the maintenance of public order and visible policing.” Burger (2007:10) 
convincingly argues that the terms crime combating, and crime fighting can be 
used interchangeably and phrases such as tackling crime has an analogous 
meaning. 
 
According to section 205(3) of the Constitution of the RSA, the object of the police 
is “to prevent, combat and investigate crime”. It appears that the intention of the 
legislator is that prevention and combating must be treated as separate concepts 
and that SAPS has a duty in respect of each of those functions separately. Burger 
(2007:10), however, warns that in a study of official SAPS documents, he 
encountered what he refers to as “terminological confusion” with regard to the 
use of the terms crime combating and crime prevention. Burger (2007:15) further 
states that the use of the word combat in addition to the use of the word prevent, 
as encountered in section 205(3) of the Constitution of the RSA, implies a 
different meaning of the two concepts, but unfortunately neither of them is 
explained. 
 
Burger (2007:10) further suggests that crime prevention is always part of the 
broader concept of crime combating, while crime combating, on the other hand, 
can never be part of crime prevention. Against the background of the above 
discussion and to eliminate the “terminological confusion” inherent in the wording 
of section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (108 of 1996) 
(hereafter referred to as the 1996 Constitution), Burger (2007:15) proposes that 
it makes more sense “to clearly separate functions and objects in the tasking of 
the police”.  
 
A study of the South African Police Service Act (68 of 1995) (hereafter referred 
to as the South African Police Service Act) indicates that where a reference is 
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made to either prevention or combating of crime, it does so in the context of 
referring to two different concepts. For example, in the preamble to the South 
African Police Service Act, the following is stated: 
 
AND WHEREAS there is a need to provide for a Directorate 
[referring to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation] in 
the Service [the SAPS] that is dedicated to the prevention, 
investigation and combating of national priority offences, ......  
 
In respect of the provisions of the South African Police Service Act, it is then also 
implied, as in the 1996 Constitution that the legislator intended that prevention 
and combating of crime be treated as two separate concepts and that they are 
therefore apparently conceptually different. Where the interchangeable use by 
the SAPS of the concepts combating of crime and crime prevention is 
encountered in official literature referred to in this study, the reader will be alerted 
to that. This “terminological confusion”, where it exists, may cause some 
overlapping in the discussion that follows, when referring to SAPS’ duty to combat 
and prevent crime. Not unlike the 1996 Constitution, the South African Police 
Service Act does not provide a definition or interpretation regarding the meaning 
of the terms combating or prevention of crime.  
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis to interpret the response to question 3.1 in the interview 
schedule, namely to “Define the concept combating of crime or to combat crime 
in your own words”. These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 
3.1 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question where the participants 
could provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were provided 
from which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore have 
provided more than one theme in response to the question. Others provided a 
single-construct definition according to their understanding of the concept. 
 
The frequency of the themes, as presented in Table 3.1 (paragraph 3.11) by the 
participants defining the meanings of combating of crime or to combat crime in 
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their own words, expressed as a percentage, is graphically depicted in Figure 3.1 
(paragraph 3.11). 
 
The low frequency of themes recurring in the answers provided by participants is 
not adequately consistent to enable the researcher to develop a definitive 
functional definition of the concepts combating of or to combat crime according 
to the participants’ understanding. The relatively large number of themes (20) 
identified from the answers provided by the participants is the result of the term 
combating of crime often being applied inconsistently, and because users are 
often confused about its correct meaning, as stated by Burger (2007:9) in the 
discussion of the literature. 
 
The above-mentioned statement does, however, not imply that the themes 
presented by the participants do not correspond to the themes emerging from the 
literature. In fact, the following themes identified in the answers provided by the 
participants are broadly consistent, albeit low in frequency, with the narrative 
about the nature and scope of crime combating that emerged from the literature 
referenced in the discussion in paragraph 3.2: 
• It includes measures to prevent crime (30% frequency of themes) 
• Combating of crime includes a whole package (10% frequency of 
themes) of activities 
• Concept includes various actions (20% frequency of themes) 
• Synonymous with the concept of fighting crime (20% frequency of 
themes) 
• Includes proactive and reactive measures (10% frequency of themes) 
• It includes investigation measures (40% frequency of themes) 
• It includes detection of crime (20% frequency of terms) 
 
This is an indication that the participants are aware that the term combating of 
crime should be construed to include a host of activities “aimed at fighting crime, 
whether it is to prevent, reduce, control, deter or to solve crime”, as suggested by 
Burger (2007:10). The above-mentioned themes provide an insight into how the 
participants understand the concept combating crime. 
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3.3 COMPONENTS OF COMBATING CRIME 
In this research, the concepts of crime combating (or to combat crime) and 
prevention of crime will be treated as two separate concepts. Crime combating 
(or to combat crime) is therefore viewed as an overarching term or concept, 
inclusive of the terms prevention, detection, intelligence and the investigation of 
crime in accordance with the guidance provided in the literature. In this chapter, 
the focus is therefore on the following components of combating crime and later 
in more specific terms on the components of crime combating in relation to 
financial crime: 
• Crime prevention 
• Investigation of crime 
• Crime detection 
• Crime intelligence  
3.3.1 Crime prevention 
In paragraph 3.2.2, the ill-considered use of the terms combating and prevention 
of crime, as alerted to by Burger (2007:9), was established. It is, therefore, 
essential to provide additional information devoted to clarifying the meaning of 
the concept prevention of crime as a separate component of the broader concept, 
namely combating of crime.  
  
According to Nel (2000:4), the term crime prevention means different things to 
different people. Burger (2007:12) asserts that defining crime prevention will 
always be problematic. The following definition of crime prevention, offered by 
Nel (2000:5,) aids with understanding the concept: 
 
Crime prevention involves responding to a few priority 
problems, using targeted multi-agency programmes. These 
programmes aim to address the causes of and opportunities 
for crime problems. They should also enforce laws, ensure that 
order is maintained in the day to day activities of the 
community and reduce public fear of crime. 
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The following definitions for crime prevention found in the literature are also 
presented to assist with understanding the concept of crime prevention: 
  
a. Lab (2014:27) defines crime prevention as, “[a]ny action designed to 
reduce the actual level of crime and/or perceived fear of crime”. Lab 
(2014:28) further explains that crime prevention noticeably denotes an 
attempt to eliminate crime either prior to the initial occurrence or before 
further activity can take place. Lab (2014:27) affirms that crime prevention 
actions are not confined to the efforts of those involved in the criminal 
justice system and that they could include activities by individuals and 
groups in both the public and the private sector.  
 
b. According to Gooch and Williams (2007:94), Crime prevention is: “The act 
of preventing the commission of a criminal offence by both reducing 
opportunity for offending and deterrence.” 
 
c. The UNODC Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (ECOSOC Resolution 
2002/13 ..., 2002) defines prevention of crime as comprising “strategies 
and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their 
potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, 
by intervening to influence their multiple causes”.  
 
The UNODC Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (ECOSOC Resolution 
2002/13 ..., 2002) asserts that crime prevention encompasses a wide range of 
approaches, including, inter alia, those that “[p]revent the occurrence of crimes 
by reducing opportunities, increasing risks of being apprehended and minimising 
benefits, including through environmental design, and by providing assistance 
and information to potential and actual victims referred to as situational crime 
prevention. Gottschalk (2010d:214) maintains that some theorists believe that 
crime can be reduced by using deterrents such as crime prevention, arguing that 
the goal of crime prevention assumes that criminals or potential criminals will 
think carefully before committing a crime if the likelihood of getting caught and/or 
the fear of swift and severe punishment is present. 
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According to the UNODC, Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (ECOSOC 
Resolution 2002/13 ..., 2002), “there is clear evidence that well-planned crime 
prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimisation but also promote 
community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries.” 
The contribution of crime prevention to the sustainable development of countries 
is an important factor in the context of this research, where it is stated in 
paragraph 2.1 that financial crime has a particularly damaging impact on 
developing countries such as South Africa, as it deprives them of resources that 
could otherwise have been used for its long-term development (OECD, 2012a:5). 
 
Welsh and Farrington (2012:11) assert that situational prevention is separated 
from other crime prevention strategies by specifically focusing on the setting or 
place in which criminal acts take place, as well as its crime-specific focus. Welsh 
and Farrington (2012:11) refer to the notion by Clarke (2009), stating that 
situational prevention is concerned with, among other things, large-scale 
systems, such as improvements in the banking system to reduce money 
laundering. In the context of this research, situational prevention is an important 
concept, as it relates to the type of approach, which is probably the most suitable 
approach to the prevention of financial crime. 
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 3.2 in the 
interview schedule, “Define the concept crime prevention in your own words”. 
These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 3.2 (paragraph 3.11). 
This was an open-ended question to which participants could provide their own 
answers, and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of 
the participants could therefore have provided more than one theme in response 
to the question. Others provided a single-construct definition according to their 
understanding of the concept. The frequency of the themes, as presented in 
Table 3.2 (paragraph 3.11) by the participants in their own words, with regard to 
defining the meaning of crime prevention, and expressed as a percentage, is 
graphically depicted in Figure 3.2 (paragraph 3.11).  
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The low frequency of themes recurring in the answers provided by participants is 
not adequately consistent to enable the researcher to develop a definitive 
functional definition of the concept crime prevention according to the participants’ 
understanding. The relatively large number of themes (16 themes) identified from 
the answers provided by the participants coupled with the low frequency that 
accompanies 15 of the themes presented indicates that there is no common 
definitive understanding of the concept of crime prevention among the 
participants.  
 
The feedback from the participants is broadly consistent with the features 
emerging from the literature in that the term crime prevention means different 
things to different people (Nel, 2000:4) and that defining crime prevention will 
always be problematic (Burger, 2007:12).  
 
This does not, however, imply that the themes presented by the participants do 
not correspond to the focus regarding crime prevention in the literature, namely 
that crime prevention includes proactive measures to reduce the opportunity for 
crime or of crime occurring. As can be seen from Figure 3.2 (paragraph 3.11), 
there was a 60% frequency of the theme “Proactive measures to reduce the 
opportunity for crime (e.g., fraud awareness, due diligence, governance 
measures)” presented by the participants. The high frequency of this theme 
occurring is an indication that by and large there is a common understanding by 
the participants of the broad objectives of crime prevention consistent with the 
literature. 
3.3.2 Investigation of crime 
Investigation of crime is a very important function of the police (Olivier, 1997:227) 
and one of the activities associated with combating of crime (Burger, 2007:10). 
Olivier (1997:228) affirms that effective investigation of crime is a useful 
technique to prevent crime and deter criminals from committing crime. 
 
Benson et al. (2015:19) state that Criminal Investigation can be defined as: 
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[A] systematic, organised, thinking, reasoning, examination 
and analysis process designed to search for the truth, during 
which an inquiry and thorough analysis is conducted of all 
types of crimes or unlawful acts, to legally gather information 
and evidence using investigation methods and techniques 
guided by the applicable legislative framework for bringing 
a criminal case before a court of law and ensuring a 
successful prosecution. 
 
According to Meyer, Stumptner, Casanovas, and De Koker (2017:1), 
investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies generally follow a logical, 
recurring process of information collection, assessment, investigation planning, 
execution, and preparation of brief of evidence, where each step either produces 
new information or relies on information that was collected earlier in the 
investigation process. Innes (2003:176) states that the investigation process can 
be viewed as follows: “Crime investigations are composed of a number of discrete 
yet linked investigative actions, which are directed towards the production of 
knowledge about how and why a crime or transgression was committed.” 
 
Stelfox (2009:2) asserts that the objectives of crime investigation have changed. 
He argues that previously its sole purpose was to bring offenders to justice. 
Investigative practices were formulated as a result of the requirement to identify 
suspects and gather evidence to support prosecutions. Stelfox (2009:2) states 
that the criminal landscape has since changed. Now, asset forfeiture, intelligence 
gathering, disruption of criminal networks, and taxing the proceeds of crime also 
must be considered, and are fundamental objectives of the criminal investigation 
process (Stelfox, 2009:2). The investigation of crime becomes a necessity when 
laws and police patrols fail as deterrents, and the police do not apprehend 
offenders soon after a crime has been committed (Folley in Olivier, 1997:227). 
Depending on the legal mandate and powers to investigate, the investigation 
approach followed by other statutory investigative agencies may differ from the 
approach followed by the SAPS. 
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Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.3 in the interview schedule) “Define the concept investigation of crime in your 
own words”, the main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were 
identified. These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 3.3 
(paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question to which the participants 
could provide their own answers, and no choices were provided from which they 
could choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than 
one theme in response to the question. Others provided a single-construct 
definition according to their understanding of the concept. The frequency of the 
themes, as presented in Table 3.3 (paragraph 3.11) by the participants, as 
regards defining the meaning of investigation of crime in their own words, 
expressed as a percentage, is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.3 (paragraph 
3.11). 
 
The responses obtained from the participants offer a large variety of themes (23) 
at levels of frequency ranging from 10% to 70%.  The three themes at the peak 
of frequency descending from high to low are the following: 
• Obtaining/collecting/gathering of evidence (60% frequency of themes) 
• For purposes of criminal prosecution (40% frequency of themes) 
• For court purposes (30% frequency of themes) 
 
Using the three themes at the highest level of recurrence enabled the researcher 
to offer the following high-level definition to express the participants’ 
understanding of criminal investigation: 
 
Criminal investigation concerns the obtaining, collecting 
and gathering of evidence for court purposes, including 
for use in criminal proceedings. 
 
The researcher discovered no meaningful categories or ideas that had emerged 
from the themes presented by the participants in response to the question 
(question 3.3 in the interview schedule). The formulated high-level definition of 
investigation of crime offered is commensurate with some of the focus areas 
found in the definitions of criminal investigation presented in the literature but not 
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nearly as pronounced, which indicates that the participants have a broad 
understanding of the meaning of investigation of crime and its derivatives.   
3.3.3 Crime detection  
Crime detection can be regarded as one of the activities associated with the 
combating of crime (Burger 2007:10). Newburn (2007:1) asserts that the police 
have many functions and responsibilities, and he also states that understanding 
the balance between these has led to considerable academic debate. Newburn 
(2007:1), however, points out that in the mind of the public, over and above the 
fact that the police provide reassurance, there is no doubt that prevention, 
investigation and detection of crime are the central part of the police mandate. 
This assertion by Newburn confirms what was stated by Hough and Du Plessis 
(2003:8) when they refer to a “totality of efforts”, where such efforts are likely to 
include the detection of crime.  
 
The SAPS’ strategic plan in paragraph 4.3 regarding crime detection, states as 
follows under the heading “National Crime Detection Strategic Framework” 
(Strategic Plan..., 2014b:7): 
 
The detection of crime is a crucial element of both the CJS 
and the SAPS as a main stakeholder. While mainly driven 
by the investigative process, crime detection is not a 
singular activity performed solely by the investigation 
capability. It involves the [immense] operational capabilities 
vastly [sic.] within the SAPS. This process starts from the 
moment the SAPS becomes aware of a crime, whether the 
latter is reported to the police or otherwise discovered by the 
police. 
 
The Crime Detection Strategy will, therefore, involve all 
relevant internal police capabilities, both operational and 
operational [sic.] support but also the establishment of 
partnerships with other stakeholders who contribute directly 
to crime detection as an integral part of criminal justice. 
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These inter alia include the Department of Justice and 
Correctional Services, the National Prosecuting Authority, 
the business sector and other private entities, with a specific 
emphasis on individuals who are the victims of crime. These 
external partnerships will contribute towards an integrated 
approach to safety from a crime detection perspective. 
 
In the above-stated intent communicated in the SAPS strategic plan (Strategic 
Plan ..., 2014b) regarding detection of crime, the role and contribution of the other 
stakeholders “who contribute directly to crime detection as an integral part of 
criminal justice”, i.e. “the Department of Justice and Correctional Services, the 
National Prosecuting Authority....”, are unclear. For obvious reasons, the 
Department of Correctional Services sits at the very end of the criminal justice 
value chain. The role of the Department of Correctional Services regarding 
detection of crime is a rather improbable reference in the absence of any 
clarification. The role and responsibility of the Department of Justice and the NPA 
in the detection of crime, as suggested by SAPS in its strategic plan, are also just 
as inconceivable, without any explanation offered of how they are in practice 
supposed to contribute to detection of crime towards “… an integrated approach 
to safety from a crime detection perspective” (Strategic Plan ..., 2014b). The 
preceding analysis agrees with that of Burger (2007:10), who states that in a 
study of official SAPS documents he encountered “terminological confusion”. 
 
The following definitions provided in the sources below aid in conceptualising 
crime detection or detection of crime: 
a. Travis and Edwards (2015:65) define detection “[a]s the discovery of crime 
or probable crime by the police”.  
b. According to the Oxford Dictionary, “Crime detection” is the process of 
uncovering criminal activity (or verifying reported crime) and acquiring 
evidence in order to identify and prosecute its perpetrators (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2018).   
c. According to Britannica Academic, in most countries the detection of crime 
is the responsibility of the police, though special law enforcement agencies 
may be responsible for the discovery of particular types of crime, e.g. 
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customs agencies may be assigned to deal with combating smuggling and 
related customs offences (Britannica Academic, 2018).   
 
According to Britannica Academic, “detection of crime falls into three 
distinguishable phases: the discovery that a crime has been committed, the 
identification of a suspect, and the collection of sufficient evidence to indict the 
suspect before a court (Britannica Academic ..., 2018). According to Travis and 
Edwards (2015:165), detection of crime is one of the principal decision points in 
the CJS that occurs during the law enforcement process. The other two are 
investigation and arrest (Travis & Edwards, 2015:165).  
 
Travis and Edwards (2015:165) maintain that the detection of crime occurs in two 
ways, either proactively or reactively. Reactive crime detection occurs when the 
police become aware of a crime through receipt of a complaint. Others come to 
the attention of the police through the actions of related agencies and the like. 
These occurrences can be referred to as “reactive detection” because in these 
instances the police learn about the commissioning of the offence from a 
complaint. Some crimes are detected by the police proactively as a result of 
undercover operations or observations by officers on patrol (Travis & Edwards, 
2015:165). 
 
Using the definitions for crime detection provided in the literature, it was possible 
for the researcher to arrive at the following practical definition of detection of 
crime: 
 
Crime detection is a pro- or reactive process, during which 
a crime or a possible crime is detected or uncovered by the 
police or law enforcement via the receipt of a complaint, or 
by an indication of the commissioning of an offence or 
possible offence requiring verification, investigation and 
identification of the perpetrator for prosecution. 
 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the request (question 
3.4 in the interview schedule) to “Define the concept crime detection in your own 
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words”, the main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified. 
These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 3.4 (paragraph 3.11). 
This was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were provided from which they could 
choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
theme in response to the question. Others provided a single-construct definition 
in accordance with their understanding of the concept. The frequency of the 
themes, as presented in Table 3.4 (paragraph 3.11) as a result of the participants 
defining the meaning of crime detection in their own words, expressed as a 
percentage, is graphically portrayed in Figure 3.4 (paragraph 3.11). 
 
The frequency of recurrent themes presented in the answers provided by the 
participants (question 3.4 in the interview schedule) is not sufficiently conclusive 
to enable the researcher to develop a definitive functional definition of the concept 
crime detection in accordance with the participants’ understanding. The 
researcher discovered no new expressive categories or ideas that had emerged 
from the themes presented by the participants in response to the question. 
 
The following recurrent themes presented by the participants intersect with the 
focus emerging from the definitions and discussions of detection of crime in the 
literature:  
• Processes in place to detect crime (40% frequency of themes) 
• Uncovering or discovering crime (10% frequency of themes) 
• Identification of a suspect (10% frequency of themes) 
• Proactive process (20% frequency of themes) 
• Reactive response to crime (10% frequency of themes) 
3.3.4 Crime intelligence 
Mashiloane (2014:2) maintains that as a police officer attached to the Crime 
Intelligence Unit of the SAPS, he believes that crime intelligence plays a pivotal 
role in the prevention of crime, subject to its proper management and use. 
Mashiloane (2014:2) states that if crime intelligence is correctly applied in 
policing, huge successes in crime prevention and combating can be achieved. 
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According to these affirmations, crime intelligence is viewed as an activity 
associated with combating of crime.  
 
Gottschalk (2009:176), quoting Brown et al. (2004), explains that intelligence was 
traditionally understood to mean “information from criminals about criminal 
activity by a covert source”. Gottschalk asserts that in present times, intelligence 
is viewed as a “systematic approach to collecting information with the purpose of 
tracking and predicting crime to improve law enforcement”. Mashiloane (2014:53) 
cites Zinn (2010:120), who defines crime intelligence as “information about crime 
that has been systematically processed into a form that can be readily accessed 
and used to track down criminals and combat crime.” In his inaugural lecture, 
Zinn (2011:13) stated, “[t]he essence of effectively combating crime is, inter alia, 
the availability of reliable and accurate information on crime in the form of crime 
intelligence.” It is therefore evident that crime intelligence is a component 
essential to combating crime. Zinn (2011:13) further explained that “[c]rime 
intelligence is based on crime information that has been properly collected, 
recorded, analysed, interpreted, verified and processed.”  
 
According to Lowe (2017:475), the police or law enforcement in general, from a 
preventive and proactive investigations perspective, seeks to identify, prevent or 
gather evidence of future crime (Lowe, 2017:476). In this regard, police mostly 
rely on predictive and actionable intelligence. Lowe (2017:476) posits that 
information is gathered from human sources, making use of intelligence-
gathering techniques such as: 
• intrusive collection techniques; 
• physical surveillance; 
• undercover deployment of officers. 
 
Analysing and matching information with information from other sources, such as 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), available from the financial sector or 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), provides verification to identify the who, what 
and where of future crime (Lowe, 2017:476). Lowe (2017:476) asserts that 
processed and assessed intelligence supports the deployment of resources. It 
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supports making use of powers under judicial supervision to pursue investigation 
objectives, with the ultimate objective to discover and present evidence to make 
arrests. Lowe (2017:476) suggests that police are increasingly seeking to rely 
more on huge amounts of data and the use of data analytics to process and match 
information in order to build a richer, more accurate picture, and to predict 
suspicious activity, with the ultimate objective of making arrests. To accomplish 
this, police and law enforcement generally require accurate intelligence that 
predicts suspicious activity. 
  
Mashiloane (2014:53), referring to the definitions by Zinn and the National 
Strategic Intelligence Act (39 of 1994) (hereafter referred to as the National 
Strategic Intelligence Act), asserts that it should be clear that crime intelligence 
is intelligence about criminal activities. Mashiloane (2014:53) also states that 
crime intelligence is generated to prevent, combat, or investigate criminal 
activities, and concludes his conceptualisation of crime intelligence by stating that 
intelligence products that are used to prevent, combat or investigate crime are 
the end-results of items of information that are collected from various sources. In 
terms of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, “crime intelligence” means 
intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations 
and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution 
of offenders”. 
 
In explaining the treatment of the information gathered, Gottschalk (2009:176) 
states that analysts investigate who the crimes are being perpetrated by and 
“how, when, where, and why” they are perpetrated. Analysts, using information 
obtained, and then provide recommendations for how to stop and combat the 
offences, producing profiles of crime problems and individual targets, and 
providing both strategic and tactical assessments within the parameters set by a 
police force (Gottschalk, 2009:177). This statement is broadly in line with 
Bacarese and Critchell (2012:321) who, when referring to the flow of information 
and how it is evaluated, analysed and disseminated to law enforcement agencies, 
conclude that the challenge is to package the product in such a manner that it 
“provides meaningful and value-added direction to law enforcement agencies 
about complex criminal activity...”. 
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Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 3.5 in the 
interview schedule, “Define the concept crime intelligence in your own words”; 
the main themes emerging from the participant’s answers were identified. These 
themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 3.5 (paragraph 3.11). This 
was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were provided from which they could 
choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
theme in response to the question. Others provided a single-construct definition 
according to their understanding of the concept. Table 3.5 (paragraph 3.11) 
shows the themes regarding the meaning of crime intelligence, as defined by the 
participants in their own words. The frequency of the themes is graphically 
depicted in Figure 3.5 (paragraph 3.11) and expressed as a percentage.  
 
A wide variety of themes (28) emerged from the feedback from the participants 
in their response to defining the term crime intelligence (question 3.5 in the 
interview schedule). The low frequency of recurring themes presented in the 
answers provided by participants is insufficient to enable the researcher to 
develop a definitive, functional definition of the concept crime intelligence in 
accordance with the participants’ understanding. The researcher did not discover 
any new or significant categories or ideas that had emerged from the themes 
presented by the participants in response to the question. 
 
The following themes presented by the participants broadly correspond to the 
themes emerging from the definitions and discussion regarding crime intelligence 
in the literature:  
• Collecting information about criminal activity (70% frequency of 
themes) 
• Analysing information (20% frequency of themes) 
• Information to avert crime (20% frequency of themes) 
• Information to advance criminal investigation (20% frequency of 
themes) 
177 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
• Identification, analysis, processing and dissemination of information 
(30% frequency) 
• Ensuring that effective policing can take place (10% frequency of 
themes) 
• Assisting with the gathering of information to investigate crime (10% 
frequency of themes) 
 
There is also some overlapping between the themes shown above. The 
researcher’s analysis shows that the participants do not have a common, 
definitive understanding of the meaning of the concept crime intelligence in 
accordance with the literature but only a broad or generic understanding. 
3.4 THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING CRIME 
For reasons of constitutional oversight, legal compliance and lawfulness, it is 
important that activities aimed at prevention, combating and investigation of crime 
generally comply with the authority, requirements and legislation. This ensures 
that any procedural aspect that may render any activities in this regard 
unconstitutional or inconstant with the law is circumvented. 
3.4.1 The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
The 1996 Constitution is superior to Parliament and is the yardstick by which all 
other laws are judged. It applies to all organs of Government - including 
parliament, the presidency, the police force, the army and the public service 
(What is Constitutional Supremacy? …, 2016). The supreme status of the 1996 
Constitution is set out early in the text. Section 2 of Chapter 1 of the 1996 
Constitution - which deals with founding provisions - is a crucial one. It is entitled 
"Supremacy of Constitution" and states: "This Constitution is the supreme law of 
the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations 
imposed by it must be fulfilled."  
 
Section 199(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides for the establishment of the 
security services. The 1996 Constitution makes provision for prevention, 
combating or investigation of all crime generally. A study of the 1996 Constitution 
178 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
reveals that no specific provision is made for the treatment of or combating of 
financial crime, neither does it entrust this duty to any specific entity. The 1996 
Constitution does not make any provision that excludes the SAPS from 
preventing, combating or investigating financial crime.  
 
Section 199(1) of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 (the Constitution of the RSA) 
makes provision for the establishment of the security services of the RSA, 
including a single police service. It provides as follows:  
 
199. Establishment, structuring and conduct of security 
services: (1) The security services of the Republic consist of 
a single defence force, a single police service and any 
intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution. 
 
Section 205(3) of the Constitution of the RSA makes provision for the objects of 
the police service and states as follows: 
 
(3) The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat 
and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and 
secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to 
uphold and enforce the law. (Emphasis added by researcher.) 
 
The South African Police Service (Constitutional Framework ..., 2014a) 
summarises the responsibility of the SAPS in terms of the provisions of section 
205(3) of the Constitution of the RSA as follows:  
• Prevent, combat and investigate crime. 
• Maintain public order. 
• Protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, 
and uphold and enforce the law. 
• Create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa 
• Prevent anything that may threaten the safety or security of any 
community. 
• Investigate any crimes that threaten the safety or security of any 
community. 
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• Ensure that criminals are brought to justice. 
• Participate in efforts to address the causes of crime. 
3.4.2 The South African Police Service Act 
Effect was given to the requirement in section 199 of the Constitution for the 
establishment of a police service through the enactment of the South African 
Police Service Act. As already stated above, the SAPS is governed by, among 
other things, section 205(3) of the 1996 Constitution of the RSA that stipulates 
that the SAPS (Constitutional Framework ..., 2014a) has, inter alia, a 
responsibility to prevent, combat and investigate crime. Chapter 6A of the South 
African Police Service Act provides for the establishment of the DPCI. Section 
17B of the South African Police Service Act provides that in the establishment of 
the DPCI, recognition should be given to the need to establish a directorate in the 
police service to, inter alia, “[p]revent, combat and investigate national priority 
offences, in particular, serious organised crime, serious commercial crime and 
serious corruption.” This requirement is given effect in section 17D (1) of the South 
African Police Service Act, which refers to the functions of the DPCI, as follows: 
 
17D. Functions of Directorate — (1) The functions of the 
Directorate are to prevent, combat and investigate— 
(a) national priority offences, which in the opinion of the 
National Head of the Directorate need to be addressed by the 
Directorate, subject to any policy guidelines issued by the 
Minister and approved by Parliament; 
(aA) selected offences not limited to offences referred to in 
Chapter 2 and section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 12 of 2004); and 
(b) any other offence or category of offences referred to it 
from time to time by the National Commissioner, subject to any 
policy guidelines issued by the Minister and approved by 
Parliament. 
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Section 16 of the South African Police Service Act provides for “National 
prevention and investigation of crime”. In instances of crime that require “national 
prevention”, or crimes that require “specialised skills in the prevention thereof”, 
Chapter 6 of the South African Police Service Act provides for the establishment 
of the Organised Crime Unit to fulfil this role. From a constitutional perspective, 
the SAPS is the primary government agency charged with a constitutional duty 
and the powers to combat all crimes, encompassing the prevention and 
investigation of all types of crime, including financial crime. 
3.5 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING CRIME 
Crime prevention has become an increasingly important component of many 
national strategies for public safety and security (UNODC, 2010:9). One of the 
most important aspects of investing in crime prevention policies is that they could 
result in significant reductions in the costs of criminal justice and other public 
services, and bring considerable benefits to society (UNODC, 2010:3). With 
regard to crime prevention, the UNODC highlights the importance of Government 
leadership in developing strategic policies and facilitating their implementation 
(UNODC, 2010:3). It has been observed that the SAPS have a primary statutory 
duty to prevent crime, i.e. prevent, combat and investigate crime (Constitutional 
Framework ..., 2014a). It is not uncommon for the Government or the police or 
one of the non-statutory bodies somehow involved in policing, crime prevention 
or the criminal justice system to publish strategies, policies or plans to combat 
crime. In Section 3.5.1 below, Government strategies, plans or policies are 
identified and discussed in detail. 
3.5.1 National Crime Combating Strategy 
Burger (2007:116) states that the SAPS developed a Crime Combating Strategy, 
resulting from a “strategic focus”, which was first expressed in an article in the 
SAPS Bulletin, entitled “The new strategic focus of the SA Police Service for 
2000-2003”. The strategy that was developed was named the National Crime 
Combating Strategy (NCCS), designed to focus on four operational and two 
organisational priorities (Burger, 2007:116). The National Crime Combating 
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Strategy, as its name suggests, was intended to be functional from 2000 to 2003 
only. 
3.5.2 National Crime Prevention Strategy 
After the transition to democracy, it was realised that South Africa needed a new 
paradigm for enhancing safety and security that would, inter alia, change the 
emphasis from an exclusive focus on crime control to include crime prevention 
(Omar, 2012:4). An approach to change the emphasis from an exclusive focus 
on crime control to one that includes crime prevention was first articulated in the 
National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in 1996 (Omar, 2012:3). According 
to a South African Government publication entitled National Crime Prevention 
Strategy: Summary (NCPS: Summary ..., 2016), the NCPS is a strategy 
document prepared by an interdepartmental strategy team comprising the 
Departments of Correctional Services, Defence, Intelligence, Justice, Safety and 
Security, and Welfare. The NCPS was initiated by Cabinet in March 1995. The 
strategy is the result of an extensive process of research and analysis, and has 
drawn on international experiences (NCPS: Summary ..., 2016). This strategy is 
based on a fundamentally new approach by Government. In particular, it requires 
the development of wider responsibility for crime prevention and a shift in 
emphasis from reactive "crime control"; which deploys most resources towards 
responding after crimes have already been committed, towards proactive "crime 
prevention", aimed at preventing crime from occurring at all (NCPS: Summary ..., 
2016). According to Hough and Du Plessis (2003:6-7, 181), the NCPS refers to 
a long-term, interdepartmental strategy at a national level, involving various 
government departments and civil society, and containing a mixture of both policy 
and strategy. The strategy seeks to establish a comprehensive, integrated policy 
framework to address South Africa’s crime problems and to develop national 
crime prevention programmes (Hough & Du Plessis, 2003:182). Hough and Du 
Plessis (2003:7) further state that the NCPS is not a comprehensive national 
strategy but a national crime prevention strategy. The NCPS, according to Hough 




© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
3.5.3 White Paper on Safety and Security 
A White Paper on Safety and Security was published by the Civilian Secretariat 
for the SAPS in 2016 (White Paper on Safety and Security, 2016b). The Paper 
supports the approaches adopted in the National Development Plan and 
Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy.  The objectives of the Paper are, 
among other things, to provide an overarching policy for safety and prevention of 
crime and violence (White Paper on Safety and Security, 2016b:7). The Paper 
confirms the need for an integrated approach involving multiple stakeholders from 
communities, civil society and all spheres of Government to, among other things, 
achieve a crime-free South Africa (White Paper on Safety and Security, 
2016b:31). The national Government is tasked with establishing a functional 
mechanism that would oversee the implementation of the White Paper (Kruger, 
Lancaster, Landman, Liebermann, Louw & Robertshaw, 2016:12). 
3.5.4 White Paper on Policing 
A White Paper on Policing was published by the Civilian Secretariat for Police 
Service in 2016 (South Africa, 2016a). The Paper provides insight into the 
principles and approaches that will probably form the foundation and guide 
Government and, more explicitly, the role, approaches and responsibilities of the 
SAPS as the leading agency regarding the combating of crime generally (South 
Africa, 2016a).  
 
In a speech by the Minister of Police, Mr Fikile Mbalula, MP, to mark the event of 
outlining the Ministry of Police’s Strategic Plan for the period 2017 – 2019, Mr 
Mbalula stated that for the SAPS to succeed in the fight against crime, and to 
ensure effective crime prevention, the SAPS needs a comprehensive partnership 
strategy to mobilise all role-players and stakeholders, to strengthen service 
delivery by the police service, and to ensure the safety and security of 
communities. Mr Mbalula explained that such a partnership strategy must be 
underpinned by the following themes, derived from the White Paper on Safety 
and Security (Minister of Police’s Press Conference …, 2017): 
• Effective CJS 
• Early intervention to prevent crime and violence, and promote safety 
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• Victim support 
• Effective and integrated service delivery for safety, security, and 
violence and crime prevention 
• Safety through environmental design 
• Active public and community participation. 
 
The minister referred to the following additional actions in crime prevention 
(Minister of Police’s Press Conference …, 2017): 
• Identifying and concluding Memoranda of Agreement (MoAs) with 
strategic stakeholders in the fight against crime  
• Enhancing stakeholders and community participation in safety and 
crime prevention programmes through izimbizo, work groups, 
Community Safety Forums (CSFs) and Community Policing Forums 
(CPFs) 
• Organising and facilitating provincial and national dialogue 
conferences to deliberate on combating crime and making our 
community safer 
• Strengthening school safety committees and forums to prevent crime 
and violence at schools and higher learning institutions. 
3.5.5 South African Police Service Strategic Plan 
The SAPS annually publishes a strategic plan, which Burger (2007:125) asserts 
is nothing but a continuation of the written police plans in another form and that 
cover longer periods. For this research, reference will be made only to the current 
published SAPS Strategic Plan, covering the period 2014 – 2019 (Strategic Plan 
2014 – 2019 ..., 2014b). The current SAPS strategic plan, in respect of combating 
of crime states as follows in paragraph 6.1 on page 14 (Strategic Plan 2014 – 
2019 ..., 2014b under the heading “Operational Strategic Priorities”): 
 
Crime Prevention 
Building safety using an integrated approach.  
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The reduction of contact crime such as murders and 
aggravated robberies remains a challenge, specifically where 
vulnerable groups such as women, children, people with 
disabilities and the elderly are involved. Given the prevailing 
socio-economic conditions, the Department has identified the 
need to develop an integrated approach in the combating of 
crime. This has to manifest in the implementation of various 
crime combating strategies to address specific elements of 
contact crime. 
 
The above quotation, published under the heading “Crime Prevention”, followed 
by a statement of strategic intent, based on combating of crime, underscores the 
statement by Burger (2007:128), when he asserts that “It is not surprising that the 
police, despite their apparent understanding of their role in crime prevention, 
continue to make confusing reference to the concept, both in terms of terminology 
and in practice”. Although the above excerpt refers to contact crimes, the 
reference to “various crime combating strategies” is noticeable. Without any 
reference to what the elements are and what the strategies entail, it is unclear 
why a multitude of crime-combating strategies are required to combat one form 
of crime. 
3.6 LEGISLATIVE MANDATES FOR COMBATING CRIME  
With regard to the provisions of the Constitution and the South African Police 
Service Act, as referred to above, the SAPS is mandated to combat all crime 
generally in South Africa, irrespective of whether the concepts of crime 
combating, and crime prevention are understood to be separate concepts or used 
interchangeably. In paragraph 4.2 of the SAPS Strategic Plan 2014 – 2019, under 
the heading “Legislative Mandate” it is stated in no uncertain terms that “the 
SAPS is responsible for preventing, combating and investigating any crime” 
(Strategic Plan 2014 – 2019 ..., 2014b). 
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According to the UNODC Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (ECOSOC 
Resolution 2002/13 ..., 2002), one of the basic principles of crime prevention is 
that: 
 
Cooperation/partnerships should be an integral part of 
effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the 
causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to 
address them. This includes partnerships working across 
ministries and between authorities, community organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, the business sector and 
private citizens. 
 
The UNODC Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (ECOSOC Resolution 
2002/13 ..., 2002) recommends that “governments should include prevention as 
a permanent part of their structures and programmes for controlling crime, 
ensuring that clear responsibilities and goals exist within government for the 
organisation of crime prevention, …”. The statutory and legal framework 
providing for the establishment and functions of several government 
departments, agencies and institutions with the responsibility or at least some 
responsibility regarding the prevention of crime, in general, is discussed below. 
3.6.1  The South African Police Service 
In describing SAPS’ legislative mandate in its strategic plan for 2014 - 2019 
(Strategic Plan 2014 – 2019 ..., 2014b), the SAPS pronounce that “[t]he SAPS is 
responsible for preventing, combating and investigating any crime.” 
 
As already stated above, the SAPS is governed by Chapter 11 of the Constitution, 
which stipulates that the SAPS (Constitutional Framework ..., 2016) has, inter alia, 
a responsibility to prevent, combat and investigate crime. In the discussion about 
the statutory duties of the police regarding the combating of crime, the legislation 
quoted refers to the separate function of the prevention of crime, therefore it is not 
necessary to repeat it here. 
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The SAPS hosted the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) 
Biannual Colloquium in February 2012. The 10th Colloquium entitled “Filling the 
gaps: integrated approaches to crime prevention and safety’’ took place in Cape 
Town. During this event, Pienaar (2012:1-15), referring to the role of SAPS during 
crime prevention, stated that “crime prevention is not the sole responsibility of the 
SAPS”. Pienaar (2012:1-15), referring to SAPS’ approach to crime prevention, 
added that the SAPS pursue an “integrated approach”, with the focus on 
proactive policing and an “integrated and multidisciplinary approach to support 
early intervention...”. In respect of an “integrated approach”, Pienaar (2012:1-15) 
referred to the roles of the following: 
• The Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) 
• Joint Operational and Intelligence Structures (NATJOINTS) 
• Identification and involvement of all internal and external role-players, 
for example: 
o Government 
o Other law enforcement agencies 
o Non-governmental organisations 
o Civil society 
o Business 
3.6.2 Non-statutory institutional framework 
The institutions discussed in this section are not established by statute. They 
represent efforts by the Government to ensure the alignment of Government-wide 
priorities, and to facilitate and monitor the implementation of priority programmes. 
Clusters are aimed at improving Government planning by means of proper 
coordination of all Government programmes at national and provincial levels. 
When the Government sets its priorities, policy coordination and implementation 
of the respective departments, it views them in terms of the “clusters” that have 
been formed by means of the Inter-Ministerial Committees (IMCs) (Department 
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3.6.2.1 National Crime Prevention Centre 
The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) was established to achieve the 
objectives of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). Omar (2012:7) 
states that the NCPS was located in the Secretariat for Safety and Security but 
was later relocated to function as a component of visible policing within the SAPS, 
and became the lead agency for the implementation of the NCPS. The NCPS is, 
however, based on an ongoing programme of action that is being implemented 
by a range of departments. In addition, Omar (2012:7) commented that the NCPS 
was never fully implemented, due to inherent limitations. 
3.6.2.2 Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster 
According to the UNODC (Handbook on the Crime Prevention Guidelines..., 
2010:32), the JCPS acts as advisor in respect of crime prevention efforts in South 
Africa and is composed of national and provincial departments responsible for 
security, law enforcement and crime prevention. During a briefing of parliament 
in 2014, Minister Jeff Radebe stated that the JCPS had intensified the fight 
against crime, thereby confirming that the JCPS plays a role in the combating of 
crime (Manyathi-Jele, 2014:13). The cluster deals with crime prevention and the 
transformation of the judicial system of South Africa. The JCPS is chaired by the 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, and the deputy is the Minister of Police. 
Ministries in this cluster include (Department of Communications, 2014:1-3): 
• Justice and Correctional Services 
• Defence 
• Home Affairs 
• Police 
• State Security 
3.7 COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME 
In the previous chapter it was established that there is agreement at an 
international and national level that more concerted efforts should be made, and 
policies put in place to combat financial crime. This research indicates that there 
is not a single official policy, plan or strategy explicitly dedicated to the combating 
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and prevention of financial, commercial or economic crime. In the absence of 
such mechanisms explicitly dedicated to the combating of financial crime, it 
appears that such approaches must be inferred from the official policies, plans or 
strategies dealing with all crime generally, as discussed in paragraph 3.5 above. 
The research thus far has shown that academics, practitioners, governments and 
non-governmental agencies do not share a common view of what financial crime 
entails and exactly what type of criminal behaviour or conduct falls within that 
category of offences labelled as financial crime. The research shows that the term 
financial crime is used to describe several concepts at varying levels of specificity 
and sometimes used interchangeably with other terms such as economic crime, 
white collar crime and commercial crime, mainly because of a lack of systematic 
definition. 
 
In the official documents, policies and strategies thus far studied in this chapter, 
the treatment of financial crime is not singled out as a separate category of crime 
where it concerns combating and prevention of specific crimes such as, for 
example, “serious and violent crimes”. Based on the summary of Chapter 2 and 
the official documents, policies and strategies studied thus far in this chapter, 
relating to the combating and prevention of crime, the term commercial crime 
appears to be a preferred superordinate term when referring to the crimes and 
types of conduct found in this research to fall into the category of financial crime. 
However, this does not imply that the terms commercial crime and financial crime 
should be seen as analogous. 
 
It can be argued that, for this chapter, the interchangeable use of the terms 
financial crime, white-collar crime, economic crime and commercial crime when 
used in the context of combating and prevention of crime, is irrelevant. The 
reason that is put forward to advance this argument is that where reference is 
made in the literature and official documents to the combating and prevention of 
crimes, using terms such as financial crime, white collar crime, economic crime 
and commercial crime, it will inadvertently include crimes and types of conduct 
that fall within the category of crimes categorised as financial crimes. In some 
instances, however, reference might be made to the combating and prevention 
of specific crimes, for instance money laundering, terrorist financing and 
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corruption, which clearly fall within the category of crimes and conduct 
categorised as financial crime. In such instances, it can be readily inferred, unless 
indicated otherwise, that the measures to combat specific crimes are unique and 
distinctive of the type or category of conduct or offence.  
 
In the previous sections of this chapter, discussions and explanations of the 
concepts related to combating of crime generally and its elements were 
undertaken to provide conceptual clarity for the discussion and arguments on the 
combating of crime and its components. In the following sections, the focus of 
combating crime will be narrowed to the combating of financial crime against the 
background of the literature, legislation, mandates, policies, strategies and 
feedback from the participants. 
 
Gottschalk (2010b:231) asserts that financial crime is a growing threat 
internationally, thereby compelling many public authorities to give high priority to 
detecting, investigating and confronting this problem and bringing offenders to 
justice. Ideas and procedures to combat financial crime are exchanged and 
developed during these efforts (Gottschalk, 2010b:232). 
 3.7.1 Prevention of financial crime 
Bowron and Shaw (2007:6) assert that financial crime has a devastating impact 
on individuals, companies and governments, adding that traditional methods of 
control, consisting predominantly of investigation and prosecution, have failed to 
stem the rise of both fraud and money-laundering crimes. According to Bowron 
and Shaw (2007:7), tackling financial crime often involves preventive measures 
instituted by private-sector institutions. 
 
Bowron and Shaw (2007:9) assert that a solution to the serious challenges posed 
by financial crime to the efficient functioning of global economies should be seen 
from a holistic perspective, arguing that while law enforcement clearly has a role 
to play in the suppression of financial crime, prevention is always a more effective 
proposition. In this regard, Bowron and Shaw (2007:9) further argue that there 
must be recognition of the fact that reactive resources will never match the sheer 
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volume or frequency of financial crime occurring. Bowron and Shaw (2007:9) 
recommend that to create a hostile environment to perpetrators of financial crime, 
Government, business and individuals must combine their resources to eliminate 
financial crime at its source. 
 
Concomitant with the recommendation stated above, the UNODC guidelines for 
the prevention of crime (ECOSOC Resolution 2002/13 ..., 2002) state that “there 
is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent 
crime and victimisation but also promote community safety and contribute to the 
sustainable development of countries.” The reference to crime prevention in 
relation to the sustainable development of countries is an important consideration 
in the context of this research. In paragraph 2.1 above it is stated that financial 
crime has a particularly damaging impact on developing countries, such as South 
Africa, as it deprives them of resources that could otherwise have been used for 
its long-term development (OECD, 2012a:5). Crime or the perception of crime 
discourages foreign investment, and clearly this has an adverse effect on 
development (Handbook on Planning and Action ..., 2008:110). According to the 
UNODC (Handbook on Planning and Action ..., 2008:111), one particular form of 
crime, namely corruption, is often seen as an even bigger obstacle to investment 
than violent crime. The World Bank believes that corruption is the single greatest 
obstacle to social and economic development (Handbook on Planning and Action 
..., 2008:111). 
 
According to the UNODC (Handbook on the crime prevention guidelines ..., 
2010:12), there are various crime-prevention approaches and programmes that 
have been developed over the past twenty years, including a wide range of 
responses, of which “situational crime prevention” deserves to be highlighted. 
The UNODC (Handbook on the Crime Prevention Guidelines..., 2010:13) states 
that situational crime prevention covers approaches that aim to reduce the 
opportunities for people to commit crimes, to increase the risks and costs of being 
caught, and to minimise its benefits. Situational techniques are designed to be 
directed at highly specific forms of crime and assume that would-be offenders 
make rational decisions about the potential risks and rewards of breaking the law. 
They involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate 
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environment in a systematic and permanent way (Handbook on the Crime 
Prevention Guidelines..., 2010:14). Considering the nature and characteristics of 
financial crime, as discussed in Chapter 2, it would, therefore, appear that 
situational crime-prevention approaches are particularly suited as an approach to 
prevent financial crimes. 
 
The White Paper on Policing (South Africa, 2016a) does not refer to financial 
crime or the combating thereof in explicit terms. The White Paper on Policing 
(South Africa, 2016a:23) does, however, refer to commercial crime, which is a 
term that is apparently inclusive of the term financial crime in the South African 
context. The White Paper on Policing (South Africa, 2016a:23) acknowledges 
that investigation of commercial crime is a specialised police function, and that in 
dealing with incidences of dire risk “[d]emands targeted and continuous training, 
specialised skills, appropriate resourcing, unambiguous and transparent 
management and control, and considered leadership and planning”. (South 
Africa, 2016a:23). Strangely, it does not recommend the development of any 
policy, strategies or strategic plans to combat commercial crime but refers only 
to operational issues. 
 
The White Paper on Policing (South Africa, 2016a:32), referring to “essential 
policing services”, states among other things: 
 
Over the past 20 years, crimes such as cybercrime have 
become more prevalent. The impact of globalisation and 
rapid advances in the development of information 
communication technology (ICT) together have created the 
space for the establishment of intricate networks of criminal 
activity. The costs of these crimes to business and 
economic growth and stability are far-reaching, and the 
SAPS must remain current in its policing approach to 
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The above excerpt confirms that the Government is cognisant of the prevalence 
and increase in sophistication of financial crimes such as cybercrime, and the 
economic impact that these crimes have on the economy of the country. The 
intention of Government is therefore to align its policing response to the shifting 
criminal landscape (White Paper on Policing, 2016a:23). 
 
The White Paper on Policing (2016a:32), regarding the function of the DPCI, 
states as follows: 
 
A dedicated capacity to identify, counter and deal with 
selected organised and transnational crime, corruption and 
serious national priority crimes based on sound analysis of 
crime threats, patterns and trends, intelligence forecasting 
and information sharing, and integrated transversal 
planning is required. The Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation (DPCI), the Hawks, provides the duly 
institutionalised capacity and needs to enjoy a protected 
and adequate budget, a dedicated competent staff 
component across all divisions of the Directorate, structured 
and institutionalised relationships both within and across 
jurisdictional and state boundaries, and adequate 
operational independence (but with sufficient accountability 
mechanisms) that allows for it to fulfil its mandate without 
fear or favour. 
 
The above excerpt confirms that it is the function of the DPCI “to identify, counter 
and deal with selected organised and transnational crime, corruption and serious 
national priority crimes based on sound analysis of crime threats, patterns and 
trends, intelligence forecasting and information sharing”. It is submitted that “to 
identify, counter and deal with” can be interpreted as analogous to combat, which 
implies that the White Paper on Policing recognises the combating of organised 
and transnational crime, corruption and serious national priority crimes as a 
responsibility of the DPCI. What is apparent from the above excerpt from the 
White Paper on Policing (2016a:32), dealing with the functioning of the DPCI, is 
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the absence of a specific reference to Serious Commercial Crime, although 
section 17B of the South African Police Service Act makes a specific reference 
thereto. 
3.7.2 Investigation of financial crime 
Gottschalk (2010b:231) asserts that during the investigation of financial crime 
concerning financial affairs, a multidisciplinary approach is required that may 
include accounting, auditing, legal, fiscal and banking expertise. Gottschalk 
(2010b:232) further states that effective cross-border cooperation, judicial and 
policing authorities play a significant role in facilitating access to the relevant 
expertise to reduce the incidence of financial crime. Chaikin and Sharman 
(2009:1) draw attention to the symbiotic relationship between corruption and 
money laundering. Chaikin and Sharman (2009:1) state that corruption and 
money laundering not only tend to co-occur but that the presence of one “tends 
to create and reciprocally reinforce the incidence of the other”, meaning that they 
are closely interrelated. According to Chaikin and Sharmin (2009:2), current 
strategies to deal with financial crimes such as money laundering and corruption 
have not had the desired effect because the problem has been considered in 
isolation. Chaikin and Sharmin (2009:2) contend that money laundering and 
corruption should be investigated in a systematic and, more importantly, 
integrated fashion. The current National Anti-Corruption Strategy Discussion 
Document (National Anti-Corruption Strategy ..., 2016:2) serves as a case in 
point, dealing with only one aspect of financial crime, namely corruption in 
isolation, as opposed to dealing with it holistically, considering the symbiotic 
relationship with other financial crimes.  
3.7.3 Detection of financial crime 
Financial crimes are becoming increasingly more sophisticated. Significant sums 
of money are accumulated by criminals by means of offences such as drug 
trafficking, investment fraud, extortion, corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion 
and tax fraud (OECD, 2013:7). According to Pickett and Pickett (2002:75), 
financial crime is detected by means of controls, by accident, whistle-blowing, 
auditors and well-constructed programmes of detection (Pickett & Pickett, 
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2002:5). Gottschalk (2009:113) asserts that the detection of financial crime is 
difficult because it is not as visible as conventional crime.  It could be argued that 
the increase in sophistication must play a role in preventing its detection by 
investigative agencies. The sharing of information between key investigative 
agencies can be an important tool for the detection and investigation of financial 
crimes (OECD, 2013:10). It is conceivable that when financial crime is detected 
in the manners referred to, it will be reported to the authorities. Crimes can be 
detected by the police or authorities upon the receipt of a crime report (Benson 
et al., 2015:22). 
3.7.4 Financial crime intelligence 
According to Bacarese and Critchell (2012:321), the utilisation of intelligence-
based techniques to investigate fraud and economic crime is increasingly 
becoming the norm. Intelligence provides a basis for many different aspects of 
an investigation. It does, however, have a predominantly prominent role during 
tracing of the proceeds of economic crime and corruption (Bacarese & Critchell, 
2012:321). 
 
According to Bacarese and Critchell (2012:325), trailing a criminal’s finances is 
an accepted method according to which law enforcement agencies can obtain 
intelligence and establish evidence to prove the existence of criminal activity. 
During the investigation of offences, of which the objective is the acquisition of 
financial gain, such as corruption, or those that involve the movement of money, 
one of the most important sources available to investigators is financial 
intelligence (Bacarese & Critchell, 2012:325). 
3.8 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME 
According to De Koker (2007:34), South Africa has been adopting new laws and 
launching initiatives to combat financial crime since the 1990s. The researcher 
agrees with De Koker’s assertion (2007:380) that South Africa has a 
comprehensive legal framework to combat financial crime. For reasons of 
constitutional oversight, legal compliance and lawfulness it is important that 
activities aimed at prevention, combating and investigation of financial crime 
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explicitly comply with the authority, requirements and prescripts of the law. This 
ensures that any procedural aspect that may render any activities in this regard 
unconstitutional or inconstant with the law is circumvented. 
3.8.1 The South African Police Service Act 
The SAPS was established through the enactment of the South African Police 
Service Act, giving effect to section 199 of the 1996 Constitution. The South 
African Police Service Act introduced several provisions related to the prevention, 
combating and investigation of crime. The South African Police Service Act, as 
discussed in paragraph 3.4.2, confirms the legal mandate of the SAPS in the 
prevention, combating and investigation of: 
• crimes that require “specialised skill in the prevention thereof” (section 
16 of the South African Police Service Act); 
• national priority offences, in particular serious organised crime, serious 
commercial crime and serious corruption (section 17B of the South 
African Police Service Act); 
• national priority offences and selected offences not limited to offences 
referred to in Chapter 2 and section 34 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (section 17D of the South African 
Police Service Act). 
 
The South African Police Service Act does not list the crimes that require 
“specialised skill in the prevention thereof”, nor does it define “serious organised 
crime”, “serious commercial crime” and “serious corruption”. What is, however, 
clear from the legislation, is that the SAPS also have a specific legal mandate to 
prevent, combat and investigate the offences listed in Chapter 2 and section 34 
of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. 
3.8.2 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
The common-law crime of bribery, which was committed in respect of or by 
officials of the state, was abolished in 1992. Bribery of persons who were not 
state officials was an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act (6 of 1958) 
(hereafter referred to as the Prevention of Corruption Act). The Corruption Act 
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(94 of 1992), passed in 1992, repealed both the common-law crime of bribery 
and the previous Prevention of Corruption Act (6 of 1958), and created a new 
offence called corruption, which incorporates both the common-law crime of 
bribery and the offences created by the repealed Prevention of Corruption Act. 
The situation is now dealt with by the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act, which is South Africa's first comprehensive anti-corruption 
legislation (Joubert, 2010b: Vol. 6. par. 221). For the first time, as a result of 
section 5 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, South Africa 
follows international trends by extending its national law to address bribery of 
foreign public officials by its nationals (Omphemetse, 2005:1). Omphemetse 
(2005:2) adds that the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
contains far-reaching and interrelated provisions, which signal the commitment 
and intention of the Government of South Africa to unbundle corruption by 
defining and prohibiting various actions and corrupt practices. 
 
Section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act imposes the 
obligation on persons in a position of authority to report certain corrupt conduct 
and/or transactions, as well as conduct that amounts to theft, fraud, extortion, 
forgery, and uttering of a forged document. Section 34 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act further requires that the report must be made 
in the prescribed format to a member of the Directorate of Priority Crime 
Investigation DPCI. 
 
Theft, fraud, extortion, forgery, and uttering of a forged document are all offences 
in their own right, according to the conventions of current SA law. In perpetrating 
the illegal act of corruption, certain elements of the crime of corruption may 
overlap with these offences and vice versa. It probably explains why these 
offences are included in the reporting obligations under section 34 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. 
 
Omphemetse (2005:4) asserts that: “From a commercial point of view, corruption 
and related activities have far-reaching ramifications. No matter how non-violent 
it may be, the use of bribes or corrupt practices in commercial transactions is 
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costly and deadly like a malignant tumour.” Omphemetse (2005:4) further 
describes the insidious and non-transparent nature of bribery by pointing out that: 
 
The payment of bribes corrodes the pillars of fair 
competition and procurement because the outcome of a 
business deal is determined by a bribe instead of merit. 
Socially and politically, bribery undermines equity, integrity 
and efficiency in the public service as well as in international 
business relations. 
3.8.3 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
According to the long title of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act was legislated with 
the intent and aspirations to, among other things: 
• provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat 
corruption and corrupt activities; 
• provide for the establishment and endorsement of a register in order 
to place certain restrictions on persons and enterprises convicted of 
corrupt activities relating to tenders and contracts; 
• provide for investigative measures in respect of corruption and related 
corrupt activities; 
• place a duty on certain persons holding a position of authority to report 
certain corrupt transactions. 
 
The preamble to the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
acknowledges, among other things, that: 
• there are links between corrupt activities and other forms of crime, in 
particular, organised crime; 
• corruption is a transnational phenomenon that crosses national 
borders and affects all societies and economies and is equally 
destructive and reprehensible within both the public and private 
spheres of life so that regional and international cooperation is 
essential to prevent and control corruption and related corrupt 
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activities and economic crime, including money laundering (my 
emphasis); 
• a comprehensive, integrated and multidisciplinary approach is 
required to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt 
activities efficiently and effectively (my emphasis); 
• the availability of technical assistance can play an important role in 
enhancing the ability of States, including by strengthening capacity 
and by institution building, to prevent and combat corruption and 
related corrupt activities efficiently and effectively. 
 
It is worth noting the reference to “economic crime” as it appears above, as well 
as the inclusion of “money laundering” in this category of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. It is seemingly used as an analogy to 
commercial crime where it appears elsewhere in national legislation, implying that 
money laundering is an economic crime to Smit (2001:21), money laundering 
allows organised criminal groups and individuals to continue their criminal 
activities without fear of punishment and with the prospect of enriching its 
members or themselves. Smit (2001:21-22) asserts that the aim of the money 
launderer during the laundering process and often associated corruption of 
Government, law enforcement officials, politicians and individuals in the business 
community is to gain sufficient control over the institutions of the financial system. 
This, in turn, facilitates the recycling of future profits derived from criminal activity 
(Smit, 2001:22). Smit (2001:23) emphasises that money laundering should be 
combated to protect society and in particular the commercial and financial 
spheres and institutions that function within those spheres. 
 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act, which came into effect on 21 January 
1999, consolidated money-laundering offences in one Act. According to De Koker 
(2002:176), the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act (38 of 2001) (hereafter referred to as the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act) provide a comprehensive legislative framework for money-laundering control 
in South Africa to be divided between the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act. Regardless of the naming convention of the 
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Prevention of Organised Crime Act, the provisions relating to money laundering, 
criminal confiscation and civil forfeiture apply to all types of crime, whether 
committed by organised crime syndicates or individuals acting on their own (De 
Koker, 2002:166). 
 
In keeping with international standards, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
creates the normal money-laundering offences by criminalising any conduct in 
respect of proceeds of crime that is likely to have the effect of concealing or 
disguising the nature, location or movement of the proceeds of crime, or that is 
likely to assist a criminal to avoid prosecution, or to remove or diminish such 
proceeds. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act imposes a legal obligation on 
every person carrying on business and every employee of a business to report 
any transaction, whether it was completed or not, which that person suspects 
involves the proceeds of crime, or of facilitating the transfer of such proceeds (De 
Koker, 2002:166). De Koker (2002:166) asserts that the laundering provisions of 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act are some of the broadest in force 
internationally. 
 
Since it was recognised that effective legislative measures are necessary to 
prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and to effect 
the preservation, seizure and forfeiture of property owned or controlled by, or on 
behalf of, an entity involved in terrorist and related activities, the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act was amended by the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (12 of 2004) to provide 
for such measures. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
realises the commitment of forfeited assets and proceeds to the combating of 
organised crime, money laundering and the financing of terrorist and related 
activities. 
3.8.4 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
Kempen (2016:26) states that one of the purposes of the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act is to combat money-laundering activities. De Koker (2002:166) 
asserts that the Financial Intelligence Centre Act completes the broad legislative 
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framework for money-laundering control in South Africa. The Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act supplements the legislation against mainly criminal 
activities and creates the administrative framework for money-laundering control 
(De Koker, 2003:83). The Financial Intelligence Centre Act established the 
Financial Intelligence Centre and a Counter-money-laundering Advisory Council 
to combat money-laundering activities and the financing of terrorist and related 
activities. De Koker (2007:48) believes that South Africa has a comprehensive 
framework for money-laundering control.  
 
De Koker (2002:170-176) captures the significant money-laundering control 
features of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act under the following headings: 
 
a. Money-laundering control obligations 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act imposes various money-laundering control 
obligations on a variety of persons and accountable institutions. These 
obligations include a duty to:  
• identify clients; 
• keep records of business relationships and single transactions; 
• report certain transactions; 
• appoint a compliance officer; 
• train employees to fulfil their money-laundering control obligations. 
 
b.  Access to information 
Several provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act regulate the access to 
information by the FIC, as well as access to information held by the FIC (De 
Koker, 2002:174). In essence, investigating authorities, SARS and the 
intelligence services have access to information held by the FIC by way of request 
or the initiative of the FIC (De Koker, 2002:174). 
 
c. Measures to promote compliance by accountable institutions 
De Koker (2002:175) declares that the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
introduces the normal compliance obligations associated with money-laundering 
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control systems, which require every accountable institution to formulate and 
implement internal rules concerning the following: 
• The establishment and verification of the identity of persons that it 
must identify in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act. 
• The information that must be kept in terms of the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act. 
• Prescripts on how and where those records must be kept. 
• Steps to be taken to determine when a transaction is reportable to 
ensure that the institution complies with its reporting duties under the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act. 
• Other matters as may be prescribed by regulation (De Koker, 
2002:175). 
 
d.  Offences 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act gives rise to many offences (De Koker, 
2002:175). The offences that occur as a result of FICA relate to failure to comply 
with obligations and duties imposed by FICA. Alberts (2016) states that the duties 
and obligations provided in the FICA create a framework that assists in the 
prevention of financial crimes, or that may be of assistance in the investigation 
thereof. The obligations and duties referred to, of which failure to comply with 
creates offences, are summarised by Alberts (2016) in Table 3.6 (paragraph 
3.11). 
 
e.  Search, seizure and forfeiture 
Under section 30 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, cash that is transported 
across South Africa’s borders may be forfeited if the required report is not filed. 
The report must contain the prescribed particulars concerning the conveyance of 
the cash to a person authorised by the Minister of Finance for this purpose. In 
terms of section 30, a report must be made in the prescribed manner to a person 
authorised by the Minister. Section 28 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
makes it obligatory for all accountable and reporting institutions to report cash 
transactions above the prescribed limit. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
provides for the seizure of any cash that is transported or is about to be 
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transported across South Africa’s borders if the cash exceeds the prescribed limit, 
and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence under section 54 of 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act has been or is about to be committed. If a 
person is convicted of the offence, the court must, in addition to any punishment 
that may be imposed, declare the cash amount that should have been reported, 
to be forfeited to the State (De Koker, 2002:176).  
 
In addition to the money–laundering control measures identified by De Koker 
above, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act also makes provision for matters 
related to the financing of terrorist and related activities. According to Hübschle 
(2006; as quoted by Hübschle, 2007:4), the enactment of the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, amended 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and Financial Intelligence Centre Act to 
accommodate measures against terrorist financing.  
3.8.5 Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and 
Related Activities Act 
Moodley (2008:1) asserts that criminal and terrorist activities share a common 
trait, that is, the need to disguise the source and the utilisation of funds that are 
obtained during these illicit activities. Disguising these funds in the manner 
mentioned, amounts to money laundering. Moodley (2008:76) asserts that money 
laundering is the means by which a criminal protects the proceeds of criminal 
activity, while a terrorist uses money laundering to fund the necessary tools to 
support the spread of terror. 
 
Moodley (2008:2) states that:  
 
The security implications of money laundering illustrate how 
the symbiotic nature of the relationship that was once 
exclusively related to the trafficking in narcotics has been 
transformed into the funding of terrorism to the promoting 
[promotion] of corruption. Sourcing funds has become 
essential to providing terrorists with a way to pay for the 
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necessary means to pursue their goals with money laundering 
acting as the mechanism to shield these funds from 
confiscation and the sources from prosecution as accomplices.  
 
The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act is a legislative effort aimed at combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Moodley (2008:76) asserts that the purpose of the Protection 
of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act was to 
incorporate into domestic legislation the support that South Africa renders to the 
United Nations (UN) Counterterrorism Conventions and Protocols, and the 
African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities 
Act targets money laundering by making the laundering of funds for the purposes 
of financing of terrorist activities an offence. 
3.8.6 Acts Administered by SARS 
SARS’ powers to conduct criminal investigations and generally to administer the 
tax Acts, its legal mandate to investigate offences related to tax evasion and tax 
fraud, and arrangements for disclosure of taxpayer information to other 
government agencies, are contained in the following tax Acts administered by the 
Commissioner for SARS: 
• The Tax Administration Act 
• The Customs Control Act (31 of 2014) (hereafter referred to as the 
Customs Control act)  
3.8.6.1 The Tax Administration Act 
SARS is legally authorised in section 3 of the Tax Administration Act to conduct 
a criminal investigation during the administration of a tax Act under the control 
and direction of the Commissioner to ascertain whether a tax offence has been 
committed. After the laying of criminal charges by SARS in respect of the 
suspected commission of a tax offence, SARS may continue to provide the 
assistance to the SAPS and the NPA that is reasonably required for the 
investigation and prosecution of the tax offence. In providing the assistance, 
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SARS may use the powers assigned to it in terms of information-gathering, 
provided for under Chapter 5 of the Tax Administration Act. When appropriate, 
and when authorised thereto, investigators may resort to using provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) (hereafter referred to as the Criminal 
Procedure Act), once criminal proceedings have commenced. 
 
SARS officials must be granted written authority by a senior SARS official to 
conduct a criminal investigation, as referred to in Part B of Chapter 5 of the Tax 
Administration Act. Chapter 5 deals with the information-gathering powers that 
SARS need to execute its duties, including that of criminal investigations. The 
Tax Administration Act provides for statutory non-compliance tax offences 
(section 234 of the Act), the offences of evasion of tax, and obtaining undue 
refunds by means of fraud or theft (Section 235 of the Act). The offences related 
to evasion of taxes are for all practical purposes the statutory version of the 
common-law crime of fraud referred to as tax fraud.  
3.8.6.2 The Customs Control Act 
The Customs administration plays a critical role in the context of international 
trade and tourism by ensuring effective controls that secure revenue recovery, 
facilitation of legitimate trade, and protection of society at large (Preamble to the 
Customs Control Act). Section 749 of the Customs Control Act provides that the 
provisions of Chapter 33 do not preclude a Customs officer from conducting a 
criminal investigation, whether an offence in terms of the Customs Control Act or 
a tax-levying Act has been committed, including a related common-law offence 
affecting the implementation or enforcement of the Customs Control Act. The 
Customs Control Act provides for general enforcement functions assigned to 
SARS and authorised Customs officials. At the time of finalising this research 
report, the Customs Control Act has not yet become effective and is awaiting the 
date of implementation to be announced in the Government Gazette. 
 
The purpose of these general enforcement functions is to provide powers to 
SARS and Customs officials for the effective enforcement of the Customs Control 
Act to: 
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• ensure that tax and any other money owed to the Commissioner in 
terms of this Act or a tax-levying Act are paid; 
• ensure that goods that are subject to Customs control are dealt with in 
accordance with this Act and the tax-levying Acts; 
• prevent, investigate and take appropriate action against acts or 
omissions constituting breaches of this Act or a tax-levying Act. 
 
The enforcement functions conferred on Customs officers in terms of the 
Customs Control Act include the following powers: 
• Access areas, premises and facilities 
• Customs access to vessels, aircraft, trains, railway carriages and 
vehicles 
• Searching of areas, premises, facilities, vessels, aircraft, trains, 
railway carriages or vehicles 
• Investigative powers 
• Powers of arrest 
• Carrying and use of arms and ammunition 
 
The Customs Control Act provides for a wide range of statutory offences where 
there has been a contravention of or failure to comply with a provision of the 
Customs Control Act or tax-levying Act. Section 887 of the Customs Control Act 
criminalises conduct aimed at providing false, incorrect or misleading information, 
or omission of information with the intention to mislead, which otherwise can also 
amount to criminal liability for the common-law offence of fraud. 
3.9 GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO COMBAT FINANCIAL CRIME 
In this chapter, the components of combating crime in general have been 
identified and discussed. The policy framework, legal framework and key 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime, making up the totality of 
Government initiatives and measures to combat financial crime have been 
determined. It is around this framework and measures that the status of 
Government’s efforts to combat financial crime is considered. The views 
expressed in the news media, journal articles and statements by politicians, 
206 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
heads of agencies and practitioners provide valuable insight into the current state 
of Government’s efforts to combat financial crime. The participants share their 
personal knowledge, experiences and perceptions of Government’s efforts to 
combat financial crime. In the following sections, the current situation regarding 
cooperation and integration of efforts and other factors enabling or constraining 
efforts to combat financial crime effectively is explored. 
 
According to a global economic crime survey conducted by financial services 
company PwC, titled Global Economic Crime Survey 2016, 5th South African 
edition, March 2016, the following results are of significance in that they provide 
a view of the current state of efforts to combat economic crime (Global Economic 
Crime …, 2016): 
• South African organisations have reported the highest rate of 
economic crime in the world over the last two years 
• Economic crime is at a pandemic level in South Africa 
• South Africans exhibit a significantly low level of confidence in local 
law enforcement agencies 
• 70% of organizations believe investigative agencies are inadequately 
resourced and trained to investigate and fight economic crime 
• The survey found that asset misappropriation (theft) reported by 68% 
of participants is the most prevalent form of economic crime, followed 
by procurement fraud (41%) and bribery and corruption (37%) 
 
PwC also observed that from a South African perspective, the top seven most 
reported types of economic crime in South Africa show higher reported levels 
than the global average, except for cybercrime, which is on par with the global 
figure for this crime (Global Economic Crime …, 2016). 
 
The former Regional Head of the NPA: Specialised Commercial Crime Unit 
(SCCU) and commercial crimes prosecutor responsible for prosecuting financial 
crimes, advocate Glynis Breytenbach, was quoted by Baron (2014:9) in the 
Sunday Times’ Business Times supplement as saying, “[t]he capacity to 
investigate and prosecute commercial crime has deteriorated to an 
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‘unimaginable’ extent due to massive demoralisation and a haemorrhaging of 
skills.” Among other things, Breytenbach cited: “The obvious and overt 
politicisation of the NPA”, which has made many people who are qualified in the 
area of commercial crime uncomfortable and not happy with the NPA. This 
comment by Breytenbach implies that the investigation and prosecution of 
financial crimes are not effective because of political meddling and exodus of 
skills. 
 
In an article by Baron (2015:9), the author reports on the failure of the 
investigating authorities to act on wrongdoing uncovered and reported by 
auditors. In the article, Baron (2015:9) quotes the CEO of the Independent 
Regulatory Board of Auditors, Bernard Agulhas, as stating, “Auditors are doing 
‘an excellent job’ of reporting white collar crime, but the authorities don’t do 
anything about it’”. Agulhas blames the dramatic increase in white-collar crime on 
the fact that perpetrators are getting away with it (committing white-collar crimes). 
Agulhas told Baron that, “But mostly the authority to which the board refers 
reported irregularities in the police. And for the most part, the South African Police 
Service doesn’t respond at all.” Agulhas suggested that there is a need for a 
separate police unit to deal with irregularities, “so that the police give it priority 
and respond to it.”, stating further that “First prize for us would be if the specialised 
commercial crimes unit in the NPA could be strengthened.” Theobalt (2015) 
blames the failure of the authorities to investigate and prosecute corporate 
criminality on the fact that police do not act on reports of irregularities, and “the 
abolition of the Scorpions, the dismantling of the Specialised Commercial Crime 
Unit and the National Prosecuting Authority, and the shockingly poor top 
leadership of the police.”  
 
Reflecting on the quality of financial crime investigations undertaken by the 
Hawks, as the DPCI is known, Hunter (2017:6) quotes a source in the NPA, 
stating that: “There was mounting frustration among senior prosecutors over the 
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De Koker (2007:37) asserts that South Africa generally has sufficiently robust and 
comprehensive laws to address financial crime. De Koker, however, believes the 
weaknesses lie in the institutional structures that are required to implement these 
laws and refers to law enforcement, which is hampered by a lack of expertise, 
resources and coordination, emphasising that coordination is a major sticking 
point. 
 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.6 in the interview schedule), “Do you think that financial crime is effectively 
combated in South Africa by the agencies responsible for combating financial 
crime? Please substantiate your answer”, the main themes emerging from the 
participants’ answers were identified. These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 3.7 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to the question.  
 
The participants all responded with a “no” answer to the question whether they 
thought that financial crime was effectively combated in South Africa by the 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime (question 3.6 in the interview 
schedule), resulting in a 100% numeral frequency rate. The participants provided 
a diverse range of reasons why they were of the view that financial crime was not 
effectively combated in South Africa by the agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime. The main themes at the higher end of the scale of frequencies 
provided as reasons by the participants are the following: 
• Mandates and functions are not collectively coordinated (50% 
frequency of themes) 
• Weak and unstructured public sector inter-agency cooperation (40% 
frequency of themes. 
 
The main reasons for all participants believing that financial crime is not 
effectively combated in South Africa by the agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime are related to: 
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• agencies having different mandates that were not aligned, and 
insufficient efforts to coordinate strategies and activities at combating 
financial crime; 
• cooperation between the various agencies being fragmented. 
 
The participants’ responses correspond to the narrative emerging from the 
literature that to combat financial crime effectively there must be cooperation and 
an integrated approach between the various agencies when combating financial 
crime.  
3.9.1 Policy framework and strategic direction  
According to Gottschalk (2009:191), scholars and practitioners emphasise the 
need for improvement in the implementation of strategies in law enforcement and 
policing. Gottschalk (2009:191) asserts that failing to carry out strategies could 
cause lost opportunities, duplication of efforts, incompatibility of organisational 
structures, and waste of resources. Gottschalk (2009:192) argues that the 
measure of the success of strategies against its objectives is determined by the 
implementation. Gottschalk (2009:192) asserts that the lack of implementation 
leads to police officers (investigators) feeling dissatisfied and reluctant to 
continue doing strategic planning type of work. Lack of implementation (of 
strategies, policies, etc.) also creates complications regarding the establishment 
and maintenance of priorities in future planning. 
 
In the study of the literature during the preliminary literature review and referred 
to during the research, it was established that a hypothesis could be developed, 
indicating that the Government’s efforts to accomplish a multidisciplinary and 
integrated synergy across agency boundaries during the combating of financial 
crime fall short. According to Rehbock (2016), delegates from 43 countries 
attended an anti-corruption summit in May 2016. Rehbock (2016) was invited to 
attend the leader’s summit, styled as a gathering only for those countries willing 
to tackle corruption “head-on”. Several countries made country-specific 
commitments to combat corruption, and were willing to go on record on an 
international platform to describe their strategies. Rehbock (2016) points out that 
the document prepared by South Africa contained no encouraging pledges 
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compared to those of other countries’ pledges. The only notable proposition was 
that South Africa was working on redrafting its national anti-corruption strategy, 
something that has been happening for the past couple of years in any case. 
Rehbock (2016) lamented that the feeling among civil society representatives 
was that South Africa’s submission was one of the weakest, and bluntly labelled 
it as “bland” and a failure for providing decisive action.  
 
There is no clear government policy that spells out what Government’s approach 
is to combat financial crime through the integration of various agencies and what 
policies are in place to ensure inter-agency cooperation. There is no centre of 
government operating in a guiding role to create a structure to set expectations, 
set a common agenda, ensure overall accountability or to coordinate the efforts 
of investigative agencies during the combating of financial crime.  
 
Investigative agencies function based on a multitude of strategic plans that do 
not demonstrate harmonisation of a single approach to effectively combat 
financial crime. Many of these plans never become operational. Apart from 
documented intentions and possible plans, there appears to be no clear, 
implemented, decisive, strategic, operational policy stating the official approach 
or architecture to prevent, detect and investigate financial crime.  
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.7 in the interview schedule), “How do policies and strategies for combating 
financial crime or the lack thereof impact on coordination, cooperation and a 
collaborative effort to combat financial crime effectively?”. These themes are 
presented in the frequency table, Table 3.8 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-
ended question where the participants could provide their own answers to the 
question, and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of 
the participants could therefore have provided more than one theme in response 
to the question.  
 
The participants offered a diverse range of views, opinions and reasons regarding 
the impact of policies or the lack thereof on efforts to combat financial crime. The 
211 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
low frequency of consistent themes may be an indication that participants have 
in practise not been giving adequate attention to the role that government policies 
or strategies play in the approaches to combating financial crime. 
 
The main themes emerging from the participant’s answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.8 in the interview schedule), “Are you aware of any government agency or body 
that is developing or implementing government policies or strategies to ensure 
inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration to combat financial 
crime? If so, provide the details of the agency or body and the policies and 
strategy it is developing or implementing.” These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 3.9 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to the question. 
  
The participants responded with a frequency of 60% that they were not aware of 
any government agency or body that is developing or implementing government 
policies or strategies to ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration to combat financial crime (question 3.8 in the interview schedule). 
The rest of the participants responded with a frequency of 40% that they were 
aware of a government agency or body that is developing or implementing 
government policies or strategies to ensure inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration to combat financial crime. 
 
The following agencies were identified with a frequency of 10% by participants 
as government agencies or bodies that are developing or implementing 
government policies or strategies to ensure inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration to combat financial crime: 
• The Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) 
• Outcome 3 of National Development Plan 
• The DPCI Strategic Plan 
• The Round-table Initiative 
• National Intelligence Estimates 
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• The National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) 
established various interdepartmental work groups 
 
The participants are not in agreement with regard to identifying a government 
agency or body that is developing or implementing government policies or 
strategies to ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration to 
combat financial crime. 
3.9.2 Cooperation, collaboration and information sharing between 
agencies 
During an address by the (then) Minister of Finance at the event of a high-level 
conference on illicit financial flows, the Minister made the following statement 
(Gordhan, 2016:8): 
 
Coordination is key – do not work in silos. Enforcement 
agencies must coordinate and communicate, 
domestically and internationally, on financial crime and 
abuses. Domestic enforcement agencies must take care 
not to fall into the trap of silo-approaches and territorial 
battles. 
 
Mabuza (2012) reported that during a crime summit hosted by the SAPS and 
Prisons Civil Rights Union, Professor Somadoda Fikeni, a political analyst, 
warned about the dangers of a lack of coordination. He stated that “... it is yet 
another challenge that has made our criminal justice system less effective”, and 
also adding that “You will find that find [sic.] military intelligence, crime intelligence 
and other intelligence agencies do not share information they should be sharing.” 
 
Although collaboration between various agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime does happen and sometimes successfully so, this does not 
necessarily imply the existence or implementation of a multidisciplinary and 
integrated approach to combating financial crime, as is so often proclaimed by 
politicians, SAPS and other investigative authorities. However, examples of 
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successful cooperation between the NPA and investigative agencies have been 
reported on in the media. Two such examples are the collaboration between the 
SCCU of the NPA and the DPCI responsible for the investigation of commercial 
crime, and between the NPA and SARS responsible for the investigation of tax 
evasion. 
 
Addressing a news conference ahead of his budget speech, the Justice Minister 
stated that the CJS has often been criticised for being too fragmented, with too 
many disparate agencies fighting corruption in silos. The Minister continued to 
explain that “there is a visible growing synergy in the fight against corruption 
amongst the law enforcement agencies which include the Special Investigation 
Unit, the Anti-Corruption Task Team, the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and the 
Hawks.” Minister Masutha referred to this synergy between departments as a 
“new approach” (Hartley, 2014). Unfortunately, the Minister did not explain how 
the “new approach” differed from the previous approaches and how the “visibly 
growing synergy” between the different agencies that ostensibly did not exist 
before, was accomplished. 
 
In October 2014, the Commissioner for SARS addressed the closing plenary 
session of the 35th Annual Crime Stoppers International Conference, Cape Town 
International Convention Centre (Commissioner Tom Moyane ..., 2014). 
Referring to the combating of crime, in general, the SARS Commissioner, Mr Tom 
Moyane, was quoted as saying “[s]haring information and knowledge, pooling 
resources, strengthening of cooperation and mobilising all our citizens that we 
will win this fight [the ongoing fight against crime]”. About cooperation and 
collaboration with other state agencies, the Commissioner stated that SARS was 
bound by the provisions of tax and customs law to safeguard the confidentiality 
of taxpayer information. SARS had put in place a range of operational 
arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that define how 
SARS cooperated and collaborated with law enforcement agencies that they 
worked with. Regarding sharing of information, Commissioner Moyane added 
that “A senior SARS official, working together with a committee of legal and 
functional experts, has been designated to review and decide on all instances 
where disclosure of SARS information to law enforcement agencies may be 
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needed, to ensure that we do not breach any taxpayer confidentiality provisions.” 
From these excerpts, SARS, at least in principle, supports collaboration and 
information sharing with other government agencies, subject to it happening 
within the confines of the law. 
 
Referring to the successful prosecution of tax crimes and cooperation between 
the National Prosecution Service (NPS) and SARS during the investigation, 
Narsee (2016), reporting on a judgement handed down in the Parow Regional 
Court, quotes the presiding magistrate Sikhwivhilu as saying, “Beware – you will 
be caught. We have a highly effective NPS-SARS team that will catch you, and 
when we do, you will pay dearly for the damage you are doing to society.” The 
magistrate further warned, “We are not a team of debt collectors – if we catch 
you, you will go to prison.” This newspaper report illustrates the type of impact 
that can be achieved from effective cooperation between investigators and the 
prosecution and that serves as a deterrent for tax crimes. 
 
The following excerpt from a news article by Moloi (2015) provides an example 
of the lack of communication, collaboration and flow of information between 
various investigative authorities responsible for combating financial crime. Moloi, 
following up on the confiscation of R78m from the suspected Hawala gang 
members at OR Tambo International Airport during August 2015, attempted to 
establish from the authorities why the gang members had not yet been charged. 
Moloi reported that attempts to obtain an answer hit a brick wall. According to 
Moloi (2015), SARS and SAPS claimed not to know what had happened to the 
suspects. In response to queries, SARS referred Moloi to the SAPS, who in turn 
informed Moloi that they also did not know what had happened to the suspects. 
According to Moloi, SARS’ e-mail, drafted by spokesperson Luther Lebelo, 
stated, “The necessary evidence together with the apprehended people was 
handed over to the police. The police should be able to assist you in this regard”. 
The SAPS’ spokesperson, Vishnu Naidoo, responded that the police had not 
received any case number from SARS or a statement, hence had not arrested 
any suspects. Naidoo was quoted as saying, “I do not know about this case. It 
was never handed over to us, so we don’t know where the suspects are. I don’t 
know why SARS keeps referring everyone to us”. However, a spokesperson from 
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the DPCI (Hawks), Brigadier Hangwani Malaudzi, acknowledged that the Hawks 
knew about the case but refused to give details, “due to the sensitivity of the 
matter” (Moloi, 2015). The above example provides an account of an apparent 
breakdown of coordination and cooperation between two agencies pursuing the 
combating of financial crime across mandates, despite putting into place “a range 
of operational arrangements”, as proclaimed by Commissioner Moyane 
(Commissioner Tom Moyane ..., 2014). 
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.9 in the interview schedule), “Do you think there is effective inter-agency 
coordination among government agencies during efforts to combat financial 
crime? Please substantiate your answer”. These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 3.10 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to the question.  
 
The participants responded “no” with a frequency of 90% and “yes” with a 
frequency of 10% to the question whether they thought there was effective inter-
agency coordination among government agencies during efforts to combat 
financial crime (question 3.9 in the interview schedule). The participants provided 
a diverse range of reasons why they were of the view that there was not effective 
coordination by the agencies responsible for combating financial crime. The main 
reason, with a frequency of 30% for ineffective inter-agency coordination, was 
that the sharing of information between agencies is restricted by legislation. The 
participants responded with a frequency of 20% that one agency very seldom 
wanted to accept the responsibility for taking the initiative in respect of the 
coordination of efforts. Coordination among government agencies during efforts 
to combat financial crime is ineffective, due mainly to legislation preventing 
effective sharing of information, according to the participants. 
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
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3.10 in the interview schedule), “Do you think there is effective inter-agency 
cooperation among government agencies during efforts to combat financial 
crime? Please substantiate your answer”. These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 3.11 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to the question. 
  
The participants responded “no” with a frequency of 90% and “yes” with a 
frequency of 10% to the question whether they thought there was effective inter-
agency cooperation between government agencies during efforts to combat 
financial crime (question 3.10 in the interview schedule). The participants 
provided a wide range of reasons why they were of the view that there was not 
effective cooperation between the agencies responsible for combating financial 
crime. The main reason, with a frequency of 30% for ineffective inter-agency 
cooperation, was that the different agencies pursue their own objectives and 
goals. The participants’ responded with a frequency of 20% that once an agency 
was identified to take the lead in an investigation, there was effective inter-agency 
cooperation among government agencies during efforts to combat financial 
crime.  
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.11 in the interview schedule), “Do you think there is effective inter-agency 
collaboration among government agencies during efforts to combat financial 
crime? Please substantiate your answer”. These themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 3.12 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to the question. 
 
The participants responded “no” with a frequency of 80% and “yes” with a 
frequency of 20% to the question whether they thought there was effective inter-
agency collaboration among government agencies during efforts to combat 
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financial crime (question 3.11 in the interview schedule). The participants 
provided a wide range of reasons why they were of the view that there was no 
effective collaboration between the agencies responsible for combating financial 
crime. The themes presented by the participants were too diverse and low in 
frequency of recurring themes to be conclusive about the reasons for 
collaboration between government agencies not being effective.  
 
The main themes emerging from the participant’s answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.12 in the interview schedule), “Do you think that the sharing of information 
among government agencies during efforts to combat financial crime is effective? 
Please substantiate your answer”. These themes are presented in the frequency 
table, Table 3.13 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended question where the 
participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were 
provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore 
have provided more than one theme in response to the question. 
 
The participants responded “no” with a frequency of 80% and “yes” with a 
frequency of 20% to the question whether they thought that the sharing of 
information among government agencies during efforts to combat financial crime 
was effective (question 3.12 in the interview schedule). The participants provided 
a diverse range of reasons why they were of the view that the sharing of 
information among government agencies during efforts to combat financial crime 
was not effective. The themes presented by the participants were too diverse and 
low in frequency to enable the researcher to arrive at a conclusion as to the 
reasons why they are of the view that the sharing of information among 
government agencies during efforts to combat financial crime was not effective. 
 
To gain a better understanding of the views held by the participants regarding the 
status of cooperation, collaboration, information sharing and coordination of 
efforts to combat financial crime, the researcher compared the themes emerging 
from the answers provided in Tables 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 (paragraph 3.11). 
The researcher identified the themes recurring three or four times in the different 
218 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
tables. The following themes occurred more than three times in all the tables. 
(The number of times the themes recurred is provided in brackets.): 
• Mandates of the different agencies not coordinated to achieve the 
desired outcome (four times) 
• Intelligence agencies focus on specific incidents and not on the 
protection of the financial sector or system (four times) 
• The execution of the multidisciplinary approach and the development 
of integrated methodologies are hampered by fragmented mandates, 
organisational culture, lack of joint planning, and lack of shared 
funding and resource allocations (four times) 
• Inconsistent data and information (three times) 
• Agencies pursue their own respective objectives and performance 
goals (three times) 
• Strategies are not aligned (three times) 
• There is no Government structure or mechanism dedicated to the 
combating of financial crime (three times) 
• Weak public sector and private sector coordination (three times) 
 
The graph in Figure 3.6 (paragraph 3.11) illustrates the recurrence of themes 
across the various tables, as indicated above, regarding the status of 
cooperation, collaboration, information sharing and coordination of efforts to 
combat financial crime. These are the themes that represent the main themes of 
what the participants view as the status of cooperation, collaboration, information 
sharing and coordination of efforts to combat financial crime. The reasons 
presented above are broadly consistent with the reasons found in the literature 
as to why governments fail to combat financial crime effectively. The identified 
themes confirm the necessity for investigating the prospect of a Whole-of-
Government approach as an enabler to ensure better coordination, cooperation, 
collaboration and sharing of information during combating of financial crime. 
3.9.3 Constraints 
In the context of effective cooperation, collaboration and information sharing 
during the combating of financial crime, officials in the various agencies, including 
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those from the revenue authorities, the customs authority, FIUs, police, specialist 
law enforcement agencies and prosecution authorities, should recognise that the 
skills and expertise to investigate financial crimes are spread across these 
agencies (OECD, 2013:26). The prevalence of constraints or barriers may 
prevent agencies responsible for combating financial crime from obtaining the full 
benefit of this spread of knowledge and skills, thus limiting the prospect of 
effective inter-agency cooperation (OECD, 2013:26). The constraints or barriers 
mainly fall into three broad groups: legal; operational and political (OECD, 
2013:26). Countries’ strategies to combat financial crime should operate within 
the broader context of their legal systems, administrative practices and cultures 
(OECD, 2013:26). 
3.9.3.1 Legal constraints 
Legal barriers may include specific restrictions and prohibitions that apply to 
prevent one agency from obtaining access to relevant information from another 
(OECD, 2013:26). There are several legislative provisions contained in a vast 
array of statutes providing for various procedures providing the legal framework 
for cooperation and information sharing between SAPS, as the primary law 
enforcement agency responsible for the investigation of crime, and other 
investigative agencies and authorities that may prove to be obstructive to 
interagency cooperation and sharing of information. There are also operational 
and political factors to consider that may be contributing to the current state of 
Government’s perceived dismal efforts and actions to combat financial crime 
effectively. The existence of such factors is explored in the sections below. 
 
The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.13 in the interview schedule), “Are you aware of any constraints of a legal 
nature that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
during efforts to combat financial crime? Please substantiate your answer.” 
These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 3.14 (paragraph 3.11). 
This was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were provided from which they could 
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choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
theme in response to the question. 
 
The participants responded “yes” with a frequency of 60% and “no” with a 
frequency of 40% to the question of whether they were aware of any constraints 
of a legal nature that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime (question 3.13 in the 
interview schedule). The legislation providing for the disclosure of information 
includes specific restrictions and prohibitions that apply to prevent one agency 
from gaining access to relevant information from another. The constraints 
regarding the sharing of information are consistent with the literature. 
3.9.3.2 Operational constraints 
Operational constraints may include complex or lengthy procedures for an 
agency to obtain information from another, the lack of awareness of the 
availability of information from another agency or other mechanisms for 
cooperation, or a lack of specialist knowledge that reduces the effectiveness of 
gateways to information which may exist (OECD, 2013:26). Due to a lack of 
knowledge, officials from the relevant agencies may not be aware of what the 
correct procedure is to request information, the circumstances under which 
information can be requested and ought to be provided, and under which 
legislative provision it must be requested. This may lead to frustration and discord 
between agencies. The provisions of MoUs signed between agencies to establish 
mechanisms for cooperation may not be sufficiently inculcated among members 
of agencies, or incorrectly interpreted, resulting in frustration and discord. 
Considering the nature of financial crime and the challenges it poses to 
investigation thereof, there is a need for cooperation and coordination of efforts. 
Despite this realisation, diverse agencies may find that during cooperation they 
revert to focusing on their traditional roles and approaches - usually in a silo 
manner, which they do not wish to change for the common good of cooperating 
with another agency. 
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The main themes emerging from the participants’ answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 3.14 in the 
interview schedule, “Are you aware of any operational constraints that hamper 
inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat 
financial crime? Please substantiate your answer.” These themes are presented 
in the frequency table, Table 3.15 (paragraph 3.11). This was an open-ended 
question where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, 
and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the 
participants could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to 
the question. 
 
The participants responded “yes” with a frequency of 90% and “no” with a 
frequency of 10% to the question whether they were aware of any operational 
constraints that hampered inter-agency coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime (question 3.14 in the 
interview schedule). The participants provided a diverse range of reasons as to 
why they were of the view that operational constraints hampered inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial 
crime. 
 
The participants believe that there are operational constraints and that these are 
mainly centred around the procedures for obtaining information by one agency 
from another, and the lack of awareness of the availability of information from 
another agency and mechanisms for cooperation. This is consistent with the 
literature. 
3.9.3.3 Political constraints 
Political constraints may include a lack of political support for agencies to adopt 
new approaches to combating financial crime, and to make the changes required 
to reduce the level of legal and operational constraints (OECD, 2013:26). Mabuza 
(2012) reported that during a crime summit hosted by the Police and Prisons Civil 
Rights Union, Professor Somadoda Fikeni, a political analyst, warned that law 
enforcement agencies should not engage in political battles to the detriment of 
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good law enforcement work. Professor Fikene was quoted as saying “intelligence 
agencies are encroaching on political battles. That is why we cannot discover 
who bombed an ATM.” (Mabuza, 2012). 
 
The main themes emerging from the participant’s answers were identified by 
using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
3.15 in the interview schedule), “Are you aware of any constraints of a political 
nature that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
during efforts to combat financial crime? Please substantiate your answer.” 
These themes are presented in the frequency table, Table 3.16 (paragraph 3.11). 
This was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were provided from which they could 
choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
theme in response to the question. 
 
The participants responded “yes” with a frequency of 60% and “no” with a 
frequency of 40% to the question whether they were aware of any constraints of 
a political nature that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime (question 3.15 in the 
interview schedule). The participants provided a diverse range of reasons why 
they were of the view that constraints of a political nature hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial 
crime. 
 
The themes presented by the participants are focused mainly on perceptions or 
experiences of political interference during investigations, inequality in 
prosecutions, and political appointments in the agencies responsible for 
investigations and prosecutions. The current internal political discord is presented 
as a reason for ineffective coordination, cooperation and collaboration during 
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3.10 SUMMARY 
Combating of crime or to combat crime are frequently-used terms that are just as 
frequently used in the context of financial crime as, for example, combating of 
corruption, or combating of farm attacks. The terms are often inconsistently 
applied, and users often confuse their use with the term prevention of crime and 
vice versa. The terms combating of crime and prevention of crime are 
conceptually different. What is, however, important is that the concept combating 
of crime is an “overarching concept” and includes the elements of prevention of 
crime, detection of crime, investigation of crime, and crime intelligence. The 
Constitution of the RSA determines that the objective of the police is to prevent, 
combat and investigate crime, confirming that combating is an umbrella term for 
all kinds of legal activities aimed at fighting crime. 
 
Understanding the concept crime prevention also proves to be problematic. 
There are several definitions available for clarifying the concept. What is, 
however, clear is that it refers to any or all the activities, strategies or measures 
aimed at reducing the risk of crime occurring in the first instance. The research 
indicates that situational (crime) prevention probably offers the best strategy to 
combat financial crime, as it focuses on the setting or place where the crimes 
take place, and it is crime-specific.  
 
Conceptualising investigation of crime or crime investigation is less problematic, 
as the literature provides for very specific definitions, of which the one provided 
by Benson, Jones and Horne (2015:19) is practically applicable within the South 
African legal jurisdiction. The scope of criminal investigation can be said to have 
evolved beyond the scope of just resolving crime and now also includes asset 
forfeiture, intelligence gathering, disruption of criminal networks and taxing the 
proceeds of crime, as fundamental objectives of the criminal investigation 
process. This is an important factor to consider as part of the conception of a 
multidisciplinary approach to combating financial crime. 
 
Detection of crime, which is “driven by the investigative process”, forms part of 
the “totality of efforts” (Hough & Du Plessis, 2003:8) to combat crime (Strategic 
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Plan 2014 – 2019 ..., 2014b). Detection of crime is one of the essential parts of 
the police mandate and is a crucial element of both the criminal justice system 
and SAPS as the main stakeholder. It involves all of SAPS’ operational 
capabilities. Crime detection generally involves activities associated with the 
discovery of crime.  
 
Criminal investigation is one of the activities associated with the combating of 
crime. This research reveals that there is consensus in the literature regarding 
the conceptualisation of criminal investigation, especially in the South African 
context, in terms of the applicable legal framework. Investigative processes are 
no longer concerned only with bringing offenders to justice. Important in the 
context of this research is that asset forfeiture, intelligence gathering, disruption 
of criminal networks, and taxing the proceeds of crime also have to be considered 
as objectives of the criminal investigation process. Crime intelligence, when 
correctly applied and generated, can contribute to the success of combating, 
prevention and investigation of criminal activities, and provides direction to law 
enforcement agencies about complex criminal activity. 
 
South Africa has a comprehensive legal framework, which authorises the SAPS 
as the leading policing agency in South Africa to combat crime in general and 
perform the duties and exercise the powers to prevent, detect, investigate and 
gather crime intelligence in relation to all criminal activities in general. The 
relevant legal provisions were identified and discussed. Similarly, a 
comprehensive legal framework authorises and empowers the key agencies that 
form part of Government’s institutional framework to combat financial crime. The 
relevant legislation has been identified and the provisions relevant to the 
respective mandates and combating of financial crime have been discussed. 
Despite having this robust and sophisticated legal framework, the inability of 
agencies to combat financial crime effectively can be traced to a lack of clear 
policies, and because of various agencies with single mandates operating in silos, 
which culminate in fragmented approaches with regard to cooperation, sharing 
information, and integration of efforts to combat financial crime. 
 
225 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
This research reveals that there is a plethora of policies, strategies and plans 
offered by the Government to combat and prevent crime. This research further 
reveals that despite the statements of intent expressed in policy and strategic 
frameworks, there is very little, if any, information available on how these plans 
and strategies are to be implemented and maintained or whether the 
implementation is monitored.  
 
This research reveals that there is not a single published government policy, plan 
or strategy dedicated to the combating of financial crime or, for that matter, 
commercial crime or economic crime explicitly. Against the background of the 
conceptualisation of the combating of crime and its elements in general, this 
research moved its focus to the more specific combating of financial crime.  
 
This research indicates that with regard to financial crime there are calls that 
investigation thereof requires a multidisciplinary approach. Financial crime 
intelligence plays an increasingly important role as a technique to investigate 
fraud and economic crime. It plays a prominent role during the tracing of the 
proceeds of economic crime and corruption, and is one of the most important 
sources of financial intelligence available to investigators. This is an important 
element of the combating of financial crime, especially when considering the role 
and function of the FIC or FIUs generally in the combating of financial crime. 
 
In the next chapter, the various institutional models available internationally to 
combat financial crime, with specific reference to cooperation and sharing of 
information, are identified and discussed. The key investigative agencies that 
form part of Government’s institutional or organisational framework to combat 
financial crime as determined by the South African legislative framework are 
identified and discussed. The institutional models available to the South African 
jurisdiction to enable effective inter-agency cooperation by making optimal use of 
existing legal gateways are identified and discussed. 
 
The available legal gateways for exchanging information between key 
investigative agencies are identified and analysed. The availability and relevancy 
of legal gateways between the various agencies are analysed and compared to 
226 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
indicate how information held by one agency can be shared with others, making 
use of such gateways. 
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3.11 TABLES AND FIGURES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.1: Frequency table indicating participants’ definitions for 
combating of crime  
Question 3.1: Define the concept combating of crime or  to combat crime in your own words 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




It includes investigative measures 4 40 
Measures implemented to prevent the occurrence of crime  4 40 
It includes prevention of crime measures 3 30 
Entails all aspects of the criminal investigation cycle 2 20 
It includes detection of crime 2 20 
It includes crime intelligence 2 20 
Concept includes various actions 2 20 
Synonymous with the concept of fighting crime  2 20 
Measures to reduce or mitigate the crime threat 2 20 
Measures to reduce the chance of the crime happening 2 20 
Prosecution 2 20 
Arrest 2 20 
To aggressively deal with crime 2 20 
Pursuit of criminal elements guided by crime intelligence 1 10 
It includes a whole package of activities 1 10 
Has as its purpose the eradication of crime 1 10 
Aimed at specific crime threats 1 10 
Measures to reduce the levels of crime 1 10 
Includes proactive and reactive measures 1 10 
To get rid of that type of crime 1 10 
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Figure 3.1: Participants’ frequency of themes defining combating of crime 
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Participants' themes for defining combating of crime
(Participants data - Table 3.1)
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Table 3.2: Participants’ frequency of themes defining crime prevention  
Question 3.2: Define the concept crime prevention in your own words 
Participants’ themes  
Quantificatio
n of this 
theme  
Frequenc
y of this 
theme (%) 
Proactive measures to reduce the opportunity for crime (e.g. 
fraud awareness, due diligence, governance measures) 
6 60 
Mechanisms to act as a deterrent against criminal activities 3 30 
Policies and procedures to prevent crime 1 10 
Physical constraints 1 10 
System-generated warning measures 1 10 
Visible policing 1 10 
Risk-based approaches 1 10 
Media coverage 1 10 
Call centres for whistle-blowers to report crime 1 10 
Stopping crime from happening 1 10 
Result of various activities aimed at stopping crime 1 10 
Reducing the risks and vulnerabilities associated with crime 1 10 
Measures to ensure crime is never committed 1 10 
Effective criminal justice system  1 10 
Effective punishment 1 10 
Do an analysis of emerging crime and deal with it proactively 1 10 
(Source:     Feedback from participants) 
 
Figure 3.2: Participants’ frequency of themes defining crime prevention 
 
(Source: Data presented in Table 3.2)  
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Frequency of themes for crime prevention
(Participants' data - Table 3.2)
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Table 3.3: Participants’ frequency of themes defining investigation of 
crime 
Question 3.3: Define the concept investigation of crime in your own words 
Participants’ themes  Quantification 




Obtain/collection/gathering of evidence 6 60 
For purposes of criminal prosecution 4 40 
For court purposes 3 30 
Prove or disprove allegations 2 20 
To prove the elements of a crime 2 20 
Identification of a crime 2 20 
Identification of the perpetrator 2 20 
Determination of the prejudice 2 20 
Implies the whole investigation life-cycle 1 10 
Reactive process 1 10 
Occurs after the commissioning of a crime 1 10 
It is a systematic inquiry into unlawful conduct 1 10 
It involves intelligence 1 10 
It is an administrative process 1 10 
Methods or techniques utilised to identify the elements of a crime 1 10 
Inquisitorial process  1 10 
To untangle a web of deceit 1 10 
Discover the truth 1 10 
To establish criminal liability 1 10 
Systematically follow all leads 1 10 
Pursue a crime that has been committed 1 10 
Establish if a crime has been committed 1 10 
Refers to a specific methodology of investigating 1 10 
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Figure 3.3: Participants’ frequency of themes defining investigation of 
crime 
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Frequency of themes for crime prevention
(Participants' data - Table 3.3)
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Table 3.4: Participants’ frequency of themes presented to define crime 
detection 
Question 3.4: Define the concept crime detection in your own words 
Participants themes  
Quantification 
of this theme 
Frequency of 
this theme (%) 
Putting systems/processes in place to detect crime 4 40 
Pro-active process 2 20 
Identifying the propensity for crimes to be committed 1 10 
Not yet aware of the commissioning of an offence 1 10 
Leads to crime investigation 1 10 
The act of uncovering or discovering crime 1 10 
Identifying the elements of a crime 1 10 
Information about the commissioning of a crime 1 10 
Methods to determine if a crime has occurred 1 10 
Reactive response to crime 1 10 
Investigation of suspicion of crime 1 10 
Identification of a crime 1 10 
Identification of a suspect 1 10 
Relates to the statistics and detection rates 1 10 
(Source: Feedback from participants)  
 
Figure 3.4: Participants’ frequency of themes defining crime detection 
 
(Source: Data presented in Table 3.4) 
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(Participants' data - Table 3.4)
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Table 3.5: Participants’ frequency of themes defining crime intelligence 
Question 3.5: Define the concept crime intelligence in your own words 
Participants’ themes 
Quantification 




Collecting/Collating of information and data about criminal activity, 
perpetrators of crime and crime trends 
7 70 
Identifying potential crime or crime risks 3 30 
Identification, analysis, processing and dissemination of information 3 30 
Analysing information 2 20 
Information to avert crime 2 20 
Information to advance criminal investigation 2 20 
Not necessarily based on evidence 1 10 
Proving or disproving hypothesis developed about perceived crime 
risks 
1 10 
Follows research methodology 1 10 
Evaluating information 1 10 
Interpreting information 1 10 
Assists decision-makers 1 10 
Is a force multiplier prior to or during investigations 1 10 
Processed information 1 10 
Making sense of information 1 10 
Enrichment of data 1 10 
Development of knowledge 1 10 
Is the product of interpretation and forecasting 1 10 
Used to inform actions 1 10 
Receipt of information from whistle-blowers 1 10 
Data analytics 1 10 
Cross-referencing of data across agencies 1 10 
Surveying of various sources of information 1 10 
Ensures effective policing can take place  1 10 
Assists with crime prevention 1 10 
Assists with the gathering of information to investigate crime 1 10 
Addresses emerging crime trends 1 10 
Enhances strategies to deal with crime  1 10 
Source: (Feedback from participants)   
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Figure 3.5: Participants’ frequency of themes defining crime intelligence 
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Frequency of themes for crime intelligence
(Participants' data - Table 3.5)
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Table 3.6: Offences related to non-compliance with the Financial 







Identify and verify client 21 46 Regulation 2 to 19 & 
21 
GN 1, 2, 3 
PCC03, 03A, 08, 
09, 10, 11, 14 
Duty to keep records 22; 23 & 
24 




•         CTRs 
•         TPRs 










Regulation 22; 22A; 
22B; 22C; 23; 24; 
27A; 27B & 27C 
GN 4 & 5 PCC04 
Formulation and 
implementation of internal 
rules 
42 61 Regulation 25; 26 & 2   
Training of employees 
regarding the FIC Act and 
internal rules 
43(a) 62(a)     
Appointment of the 
compliance officer 
43(b) 62(b)   PCC 12 




61A 27A GN05 PCC05, 
06, 07 
Compliance related to an 
inspection   
45B(2)(a) 62A     
Failure to comply with: 
•         Section 26 – 
warrant  
•         Section 27 – 
Request  
•         Section 32 – 
Request 
•         Section 34 – 
Directive 








      
Explanatory note:  
• The purpose of Public Compliance Communications (PCCs) and Guidance Notes 
(GNs) is to provide an interpretation of issues arising from the FICA 
 
• The “FIC Act” as referred to above means the Financial Intelligence Centre Act. 
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Table 3.7: Themes presented by participants on whether they think 
financial crime in South Africa is combated effectively 
Question 3.6: Do you think that financial crime is effectively combated in South Africa by the agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime? Please substantiate your answer 
Participants’ answers 
Quantification 
of this theme 
or focus 
Frequency of 
this theme or 
focus (%) 
No 10 100 
No - Mandates and functions are not collectively coordinated 5 50 
No - Weak and unstructured public sector inter-agency co-operation 4 40 
No - They have different views of what financial crime entails 2 20 
No - Lack of skills 2 20 
No - Fragmented approaches 2 20 
No – Too much reliance on external organisations  1 10 
No - Their efforts are not directed by crime intelligence 1 10 
No - Lack of insight on complex matters 1 10 
No - Lack of qualifications 1 10 
No – Lack of resources 1 10 
No - Lack of knowledge 1 10 
No – Dissonance about who investigates what 1 10 
No - Loss of focus 1 10 
No - Different mandates in SAPS’ units responsible for investigating 
financial crime  1 10 
No - Weak and unstructured private sector cooperation 1 10 
No – Absence of governance structure to direct efforts 1 10 
No - Intelligence not directed at protecting the financial system. 1 10 
No – No common line of sight between departments 1 10 
No – Lack of information sharing 1 10 
No – Guarding of own turf 1 10 
No – Regulators do not enforce regulations and monitor offenders 1 10 
No – Regulators do not follow up and monitor indicators of crime 1 10 
No -  Regulators tend to focus on licensed individuals and entities 1 10 
No - Agencies do not act in time, leaving it to others to do the job 1 10 
No - Crime intelligence fails to identify and monitor suspicious 
individuals 1 10 
No - High incidence of financial crime is testament to ineffectiveness  1 10 
No – Too many perpetrators get off scot-free 1 10 
No - Too much time between commissioning and conviction. 1 10 
No - Driving force is greed and therefore difficult to combat 2 10 
No -There is an absence of a task force concept 1 10 
No - There are legislative bottlenecks when it comes to information 1 10 
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Table 3.8: Frequency table of themes on how policies and strategies for 
combating financial crime, or the lack of policies, impact on coordination, 
cooperation and a collaborative effort to combat financial crime  
Question 3.7: How do policies and strategies for combating financial crime, or the lack of policies, 
impact on coordination, cooperation and a collaborative effort to combat financial crime effectively? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Uncoordinated efforts lead to an activity-based approach 
deviates from government’s outcomes-based approach 
2 20% 
Lack of implementation leads to failure 2 20% 
There is no common understanding of what financial crime 
entails 
1 10% 
Until there is a common understanding of what financial crime 
entails there will not be a common approach or strategy to 
combat financial crime 
1 10% 
When departments operate in isolation and dedicate resources 
haphazardly, financial crime as a separate category of crime 
will not be effectively addressed. 
1 10% 
MTSF establishes a framework to which all departments 
should align their mandate  
1 10% 
Lack of monitoring leads to failure 1 10% 
Lack of a focused strategy 1 10% 
It creates space for crime to flourish 1 10% 
There is no will to cooperate 1 10% 
What is required is overarching legislation to force/enable 
agencies to cooperate  
1 10% 
No flexibility in sharing of resources 1 10% 
Requires buy-in from all heads of agencies  1 10% 
Practical solutions must be implemented  1 10% 
Prosecutors dealing with more than one investigator in various 
cases simultaneously  
1 10% 
It ensures that priorities are aligned between agencies 
involved 
1 10% 
Ensures that there is collaboration between all the agencies 
involved  
1 10% 
Makes SA vulnerable to financial crime 1 10% 
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Table 3.9:  Participants’ awareness of government agencies or bodies 
developing or implementing policies or strategies that ensure inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration to combat financial crime.  
Question 3.8: Are you aware of any government agency or body that is developing or 
implementing government policies or strategies to ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation 
and collaboration to combat financial crime? If so, provide the details of the agency or body and 
the policies and strategy it is developing or implementing 
 
Participants’ theme  
Quantification 




No 6 60% 
Yes 4 40% 
No - As a matter of policy, Government should prioritize the 
combating of financial crime 
1 10% 
Yes - The ACTT  1 10% 
All government departments are affected  1 10% 
Outcome 3 of the NDP – Tangent points with commercial crime 1 10% 
Yes - The DPCI strategic plan targets proceeds of crime, 
commercial crime and serious economic offences through a 
multidisciplinary approach and integrated methodologies 
1 10% 
Yes – The Round-table initiative 1 10% 
Yes – NICOC established various interdepartmental work 
groups 
1 10% 
Yes – National Intelligence Estimates 1 10% 
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Table 3.10: Frequency table indicating participants’ answers as to whether 
they think there is effective Inter-agency coordination among government 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime 
Question 3.9: Do you think there is effective inter-agency coordination among government 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




No 9 90 
Yes 1 10 
No – Information sharing is lacking/constrained by legislation 3 30 
No - Very seldom an agency taking the lead on coordinating 2 20 
No - Only on paper, not in the execution 1 10 
No - Scramble to get agencies on board for concerted efforts 1 10 
No - The various mandates and functions are not collectively 
coordinated or focused on achieving the required outcomes. 1 10 
No - Weak and unstructured private and public-sector 
cooperation 1 10 
No - There are no appropriate governance structures or 
mechanisms to direct the combating of financial crime. 1 10 
No - The intelligence services are focusing on incidents and 
not the protection of the financial systems 1 10 
No - The multidisciplinary approach and the development of 
integrated methodologies are hampered by uncorrelated 
mandates, organisational culture, joint planning and the lack 
of shared funding and resource allocations, either jointly or 
individually 1 10 
No – No common line of sight between departments 1 10 
No – Each agency is protecting its own turf 1 10 
No – Few joint operations 1 10 
No – Data or core information inconsistent 1 10 
No – Scope of investigations/ extending mandate 
constrained by legislation 1 10 
No – Misaligned strategies 1 10 
No - Priorities of government misaligned with priorities of 
agencies 1 10 
No - Cooperation is difficult 1 10 
No - Disjointed coordination 1 10 
No - Different goals  1 10 
No - Different objectives 1 10 
No – Different performance objectives 1 10 
No - Performance outcomes are measured differently 1 10 
Source: (Feedback from participants) 
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Table 3.11: Frequency table of participants’ answers to whether they think 
there is effective inter-agency cooperation among government agencies 
during efforts to combat financial crime  
Question 3.10: Do you think there is effective inter-agency cooperation among government 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime? 
Participants’ answers 
Quantification 




No 9 90 
Yes 1 10 




Yes – as soon as a lead agency is identified for specific project, 
cooperation is sufficient  
2 
20 
Room for improvement 2 20 
No - Very seldom an agency taking the lead in coordinating 1 10 
No - Only on paper, not in the execution 1 10 
No - Coordination between agencies limited to their own 
objectives and targets 
1 
10 








No- Weak and unstructured private and public-sector cooperation 1 
10 
No - There are no appropriate governance structures or 
mechanisms to direct the combating of financial crime. 
1 
10 
No - The intelligence services are focusing on incidents and not 
the protection of the financial systems 
1 
10 
No - The multidisciplinary approach and the development of 
integrated methodologies are inhabited by uncorrelated 
mandates, organisational culture, joint planning and the lack of 




No – There is no common line of sight between departments 1 10 
No – Information sharing is lacking 1 10 
No – Each agency is guarding its territory 1 10 
No – Low number of joint operations 1 10 
No – Data of core information inconsistent 1 10 
No – Misaligned strategies 1 10 
When cooperation does occur, it appears to be effective 1 10 
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Table 3.12: Frequency table of participants’ answers as to whether they 
think there is effective inter-agency collaboration among government 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime 
Question 3.11: Do you think there is effective inter-agency collaboration among government 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime? 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




No 8 80 
Yes 2 20 
No - I am not aware of sharing or exchange of resources 1 10 
Yes - Task teams are formed   10 
No - The various mandates and functions are not collectively 
coordinated or focused on achieving the required outcomes. 
1 10 
No - Weak and unstructured private and public-sector cooperation 1 10 
No - There are no appropriate governance structures or 
mechanisms to direct the combating of financial crime. 
1 10 
No - The intelligence services are focusing on incidents and not 
on protection of the financial systems 
1 10 
No - The multidisciplinary approach and the development of 
integrated methodologies are inhabited by uncorrelated 
mandates, organisational culture, joint planning and the lack of 
shared funding and resource allocations, either jointly or 
individually  
1 10 
No – No concerted efforts to coordinate collaboration, irrespective 
of enabling legislation. 
1 10 
No – Legislative mandates constrain collaboration  1 10 
No – Agencies focus on their own objectives 1 10 
Constraints in sharing information 1 10 
Constraints in cooperation 1 10 
Misalignment of strategies 1 10 
Cases are dealt with in silos 1 10 
Collaboration affected by insufficient financial resources 1 10 
Collaboration affected by insufficient human resources 1 10 
Yes -  When there are secondments involved 1 10 
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Table 3.13: Frequency table with participants’ answers as to whether they 
think that the sharing of information among government agencies during 
efforts to combat financial crime is effective   
Question 3.12: Do you think that sharing of information among government agencies during efforts 
to combat financial crime is effective? 
 
Participant’s themes  
Quantification 




Yes 2 20 
No 8 80 
No - Concern is how that information is used 1 10 
No - Concern that the information is not used for ulterior purposes 1 10 
No -Legislative limitations between some agencies 1 10 
No - Databases and access to databases not integrated 1 10 
No - The various mandates and functions are not collectively 
coordinated or focus on achieving the required outcomes. 
1 
10 
No - Weak and unstructured private and public-sector cooperation 1 10 
No - There are no appropriate governance structures or 
mechanisms to direct the combating of financial crime. 
1 
10 
No - The intelligence services are focusing on incidents and not on 
the protection of the financial systems 
1 
10 
No - The multidisciplinary approach and the development of 
integrated methodologies are inhabited by uncorrelated mandates, 
organisational culture, joint planning and the lack of shared funding 
and resource allocations, either jointly or individually 
1 
10 
No – Effectiveness should reflect in the number of successful 




No – Agencies pursue their own objectives and performance goal 1 10 
No – Information sharing is lacking/constrained by legislation 1 10 
No – Legislative mandates constrain collaboration 1 10 
No – Information is not shared on time 1 10 
No -There is fragmentation 1 10 
No - Separate budgets, goals, objectives and targets to chase 1 10 
No- Where there has been cooperation on projects the successes 
were as a result of effective sharing of information 
1 
10 
No - Pedantic application of secrecy provisions  1 10 
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Figure 3.6: Recurring themes across tables regarding the status of 
cooperation, collaboration, information sharing and coordination  
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Table 3.14: Frequency table indicating participants’ answers as to whether 
they are aware of any constraints of a legal nature that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat 
financial crime 
Question 3.13: Are you aware of any constraints of a legal nature that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime? 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Yes 6 60 
No 4 40 
No - Legal gateways are in place to enable sharing of 
information 
3 30 
Yes – Legal confidentiality provisions prohibit sharing of 
information and intelligence 
2 20 
Yes - Legal provisions are incorrectly executed 1 10 
Yes - Agencies expect abuse of powers 1 10 
Yes - Gaps in legislation that prevent sharing of information 1 10 
No - Chapter 3 of the Constitution provides for the principles of 
cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. 
1 10 
No – The superseding provisions of POCA also open gateways 
for sharing information 
1 10 
Yes – Provisions of POCA must just be implemented and 
executed. 
1 10 
Yes – Problem lies with the legal battles faced by heads of 
agencies 
1 10 
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Table 3.15: Frequency table indicating participants’ answers as to whether 
they are aware of any operational constraints that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat 
financial crime 
Question 3.14: Are you aware of any operational constraints that hamper inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime? Please substantiate your 
answer? 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 
of this theme  
Frequency of 
this theme (%) 
Yes 9 90 
No 1 10 
Yes – insufficient skills 2 20 
Yes – insufficient resources 2 20 
Yes- Disjointed actions or operations with the same target in 
mind 
1 10 
Yes - No centralised coordination 1 10 
Yes -Targets and objectives not integrated 1 10 
Yes - Absence of a national security system and financial 
crime risk assessment provided by the intelligence agencies 
to direct efforts to address financial crime risks and threats 
through targeted actions. 
1 10 
Yes – insufficient logistics 1 10 
Yes – Ignorance of the legal provisions enabling cooperation 
and information sharing 
1 10 
Yes – resources shared do not have the necessary level of 
authority to make decisions 
1 10 
Yes – SOP prohibits sharing of information 1 10 
Yes – Several levels of authority required before information 
can be shared  
1 10 
Yes – Caseloads between prosecutors and investigators are 
fragmented 
1 10 
Yes – Because of fragmentation of caseloads, prioritisation 
is impossible 
1 10 
Lack of resources forces agencies to focus on their own 
priorities. 
1 10 
Usually, where there is a political will, operational constraints 
are worked around 
1 10 
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Table 3.16: Frequency table indicating participants’ answers as to whether 
they are aware of any constraints of a political nature that hamper inter-
agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to 
combat financial crime 
Question 3.15: Are you aware of any constraints of a political nature that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime? Please 
substantiate your answer? 
 
Participants’ themes or focus 
Quantification 




Yes 6 60 
No 4 40 
Yes - Political interference in the appointment of senior officials 3 30 
Yes - Political interference creates dissonance among agencies 2 
20 
Yes - Instability in DPCI due to political interference 2 20 
Yes - Authority of the state corroded by corruption 2 20 
Yes – Crony appointments of people not fit and able to fill 
prominent positions. HAWKS and NPA are examples 
2 
20 
Yes - Lack of common ground regarding financial crime 1 10 
Yes - Lack of approach regarding financial crime 1 10 
Yes - Instability in NPA due to political interference 1 10 
Yes - Breaks down trust among agencies 1 10 
No - JCPS established by politicians to ensure collaboration 2 10 
Yes - Capture of political office inhibits the execution and 
oversight over legal mandates of stakeholders 
1 
10 
Yes – Interference especially in corruption investigations 1 10 
Yes – The investigation of criminal offences against certain 
individuals is suppressed. 
1 
10 
Yes- A prominent example is the failure of agencies to act 
against the head of state facing allegations of corruption 
1 
10 
Ordinary subjects are prone to investigation, whereas political 
allies are not. 
1 
10 
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CHAPTER 4: INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
During an engagement of three parliamentary committees with the Treasury, 
SARS, the FIC, the Reserve Bank, the Department of Mineral Resources, SAPS 
and the NPA, it emerged that significant gaps in law enforcement and coordination 
were a source of concern in that the fight against illicit financial flows and profit-
shifting was not effective. Regarding financial crimes, the Finance Committee 
chairman, Yunus Carrim, was quoted as saying that there was a need for greater 
coordination between regulators (Ensor, 2017:10). Given the complexity and 
multifaceted nature of financial crime, combating it in all its facets cannot be 
undertaken by a single agency acting in isolation, irrespective of how competent 
the agency and its officers may be. Depending on the legal mandate of agencies 
in respect of combating one or more of the facets of financial crime, one agency, 
such as SARS, may have a legal mandate in respect of investigating tax fraud, 
while another has the legal mandate to seize and forfeit the proceeds of the 
predicate offence (World Bank, 2011:4). Because of the difference in 
responsibilities in terms of agencies’ legal mandates, it is essential that there be 
effective coordination and cooperation between the various critical investigative 
agencies at a national level. Due to the traditional role and arrangement of the 
various agencies in what can be referred to as a silo approach which is focused 
on a particular agency’s role, there is a requirement to explore and develop 
practical ways to enhance cooperation and coordination during combating of 
financial crime (World Bank, 2011:6). 
Cooperation requires that the relevant government agencies responsible for 
combating financial crime interact with each other at policy as well as operational 
level. The interaction can be in the form of exchanging information, cooperation 
in investigations that cut across different agencies, and exchange of staff who can 
share expertise. Generally, it also refers to participation in inter-agency forums on 
a frequent and ongoing basis (World Bank, 2011:5). 
Not only is the ability of governments to share information an indicator of their 
effectiveness to proactively identify risks pertinent to their mandate, but also a 
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prerequisite for effective inter-agency cooperation (Schlenther, 2016:2), and as 
such it relates to the problem addressed in this chapter and highlighted below. 
Regarding inter-agency cooperation and exchange of information between 
investigative agencies during the combating (prevention, detection and 
investigation) of financial crime, Boucher (2011) suggested that the critical 
question to ask is how to do so effectively. In highlighting the problems associated 
with cooperation and exchanging information between agencies involved in 
combating financial crime, Boucher (2011) states that cooperation is difficult and 
challenging, at both an international and domestic level. Cooperation between 
agencies during the various stages of combating financial crime is essential 
(Schlenther, 2016:2). From a financial crime-combating perspective, several 
government agencies may be involved in part or throughout the life-cycle of the 
investigation, depending on the circumstances (Schlenther, 2016:2). 
The OECD (2013:8) conducted “an in-depth analysis of inter-agency cooperation 
in fighting financial crime” in 32-member countries. The OECD published their 
findings in a report titled, “Effective Inter-Agency Co-operation in Fighting Tax 
Crimes and Other Financial Crimes” (2012). During the survey, models for 
cooperation were identified, with a focus on how tax administrations per se share 
information with other key agencies during the combating of financial crime. 
In 2013, the OECD (2013:8) published a second edition of the report, with the 
same title. This time it included 48-member countries in its survey. An addition to 
the second edition is the recognition of the essential role that customs authorities 
play as a critical agency in combating financial crime, and their ability to exchange 
information for use by other agencies during the combating of financial crime 
(OECD, 2013:8). The arrangements and actions for inter-agency cooperation, 
coordination and sharing of information, as viewed by the OECD, are regarded 
as providing a framework from which to explore, build upon and enhance in this 
research. The researcher deepens the level of exploration and analysis at a 
domestic level in this research. In this chapter, the ability to exchange information 
between the key agencies as well as cooperation are considered and analysed. 
The research question regarding the identification of the critical investigative 
agencies for combating financial crime is addressed in this chapter, together with 
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identification of the available institutional settings for ensuring inter-agency 
cooperation within the confines of the legal framework and mandates for 
exchanging (sharing) information. In answering the stated research question, the 
researcher addresses the research objective of identifying the vital investigative 
agencies and institutional arrangements for combating financial crime in South 
Africa. In addition, it relates to the objective of identifying the legal framework 
enabling government agencies to cooperate, coordinate and share information 
during efforts to combat financial crime. 
 
In this chapter, the key agencies in the frontline of combating financial crime 
during the different stages, as well as their roles, are reviewed. The focus then 
shifts from the key agencies and their roles, based on an international generic 
framework, to an in-depth analysis of the South African organisational modality, 
as informed by the South African legal framework, literature and feedback from 
participants. 
 
Sharing of information between key agencies is a fundamental requirement and 
prerequisite for inter-agency cooperation (Schlenther, 2016:2). The flow of 
information between agencies enables them to combat financial crime efficiently 
(Schlenther, 2016:2). The available gateways that make the lawful exchange of 
information possible are analysed. The existence of legal gateways, according to 
South African law, enabling the flow of information between the key agencies as 
a prerequisite for inter-agency cooperation, is identified. An analysis of the legal 
gateways is undertaken in respect of each principal agency in relation to the 
others to indicate the prospect of exchanging information legally.   
The various operational models available at an international level, generally to 
ensure effective inter-agency cooperation, making optimal use of the legal 
gateways that exist and enabling agencies to work together for their mutual 
benefit, are identified in this chapter. These models relate to the various ways in 
which the respective agencies can arrange themselves for purposes of 
cooperation. Similar operational models available in South Africa are identified 
and analysed in this chapter. 
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4.2 KEY AGENCIES 
Government's efforts to combat financial crime throughout the various stages are 
made up of an institutional framework of. government agencies and bodies. Some 
of these agencies are part of the country’s historical institutional framework for 
law enforcement. More recent policy decisions reflect new additions to the 
institutional framework to combat financial crime. When developing strategies for 
inter-agency cooperation, consideration must be given to the distinct features of 
each organisational or institutional framework to ensure that the maximum 
benefits of cooperation are achieved. To reap the desired benefit from 
cooperation between agencies will depend on what agency has responsibility for 
which activity. This will have a direct bearing on the processes and agreements 
required (OECD, 2013:29). When agencies are combating financial crime, their 
activities are spread across various agencies and involve officials attached to 
various agencies, such as the revenue authority, customs administrations, FIUs, 
law enforcement agencies, specialised investigation agencies, and prosecuting 
authorities. These agencies may individually hold operational and strategic 
information that is pertinent to the activities of other agencies for combating 
financial crime (OECD, 2013:29). The various stages of combating financial crime 
may comprise prevention, gathering of intelligence, detection, investigation, 
prosecution, as well as recovering and taxing the proceeds of financial crimes. 
The complexity of financial crime investigations requires the support of the 
relevant agencies that might have a part to play in solving a case, even if it is at 
a marginal level, hence the importance of identifying the key agencies. An 
understanding of the different roles of the key agencies is essential in order to 
appreciate inter-agency cooperation at an international as well as a domestic 
level. For example, if the responsibility for investigating corruption lies with the 
DPCI, the activities of the DPCI directly impact on the arrangements with other 
agencies required to investigate the aspects of tax and proceeds of crime. In 
South Africa, SARS is legally mandated and responsible for initiating, directing 
and conducting a criminal investigation where there is an indication of the 
commissioning of a tax offence. SARS is charged with the subsequent laying of 
formal criminal charges at the SAPS, followed by rendering assistance to the 
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SAPS and NPA with regard to the investigation and prosecution of the offence as 
required (section 3(2)(f), section 43, section 44 and section 235(3) of the Tax 
Administration Act). 
 
In the following paragraphs, the general responsibility of individual agencies is 
described regarding the combating of financial crime, as structured internationally 
and domestically. This information is provided to facilitate an understanding of 
the inter-agency cooperation or relationship in existence. Later in this chapter, 
the institutional framework to combat financial crime in South Africa is explicitly 
identified and the roles of the various agencies elaborated on. 
From the research conducted of the national legislation, literature and feedback 
from the participants it is apparent that South Africa does not have a dedicated 
agency or authority with the sole legal mandate to combat and prevent financial 
crime exclusively. From what has previously been stated in this research it is 
evident that other agencies and authorities also play a role and may be involved 
at any of the stages of combating financial crime. Just as there are different 
statutes that deal with different financial crimes and types of conduct that fall in 
the category of financial crime, there are agencies and investigative authorities 
with specific legal mandates dealing with financial crimes or sub-categories 
thereof at various stages. In the discussions that follow in this chapter, the focus 
of the examination is on the legislative responsibilities, duties and functions of the 
respective agencies and authorities during the various stages of combating 
financial crime, in accordance with the relevant empowering (authorising) 
statutes. 
 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 4.1 in the 
interview schedule, “List the government agencies and/or investigative authorities 
responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa”, the entities emerging 
from the participants’ answers were listed and presented in the frequency table, 
Table 4.1 (paragraph 4.8). The question was open-ended, therefore they could 
provide their own answers to the questions, as no choices were provided from 
which they could choose to answer. Some of the participants could therefore have 
listed more than one entity in response to the question. The frequency of the 
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themes as presented in Table 4.1 (paragraph 4.8) by the participants regarding 
a listing of the government agencies and/or investigative authorities responsible 
for combating financial crime in South Africa expressed as a percentage is 
graphically depicted in Figure 4.1 (paragraph 4.8). 
 
The AFU is represented by a relatively low frequency of 30% in the answers 
provided by participants (question 4.1 in the interview schedule). The most 
prominent themes emerging from the answers of the participants regarding listing 
the government agencies and/or investigative authorities responsible for 
combating financial crime in South Africa in descending order are: 
• The FIC, with a frequency of 100% 
• SAPS, DPCI, Crime Intelligence Unit, with a frequency of 100% 
• SARS with a frequency of 100% 
• South African Reserve Bank (SARB), with a frequency of 70% 
• NPA with a frequency of 60% 
• Financial Services Board (FSB) with a frequency of 50% 
• Special Investigation Unit (SIU) with a frequency of 50% 
 
The identification by the participants of the government agencies and/or 
investigative authorities responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa 
is consistent with the agencies identified in the literature and discussions that 
follow below.  
4.2.1 Tax administration 
Tax administration is generally responsible for revenue collection on behalf of a 
government, and includes obtaining and processing information about individuals 
and corporate entities that are subject to tax, including their personal details, 
property titles, investments, financial transactions and business operations for 
purposes of assessing their tax liability (OECD, 2013:30). Tax administrations 
employ large numbers of trained specialists and investigators with experience in 
auditing and analysing financial data, and investigating suspicious or irregular 
transactions. Tax administrations are likely to have extensive powers to access 
information and documentation from taxpayers and third parties. They typically 
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play a central role in preventing, detecting and investigating tax crime. Once the 
suspicion of a tax crime exists, individual countries apply different models to 
determine the extent to which a tax administration may be involved in a 
subsequent criminal investigation and prosecution (OECD, 2013:30). 
Generally, there are four models for comparing tax authorities, based on criteria 
that may impact on the tax authority’s role and ability to participate in the 
combating of financial crime and obtaining information from other authorities 
relevant to an investigation (OECD, 2013:30). The four primary models or 
configurations are as follows:  
a. The tax administration directs and conducts investigations. 
b. The tax administration conducts investigations as directed by a prosecutor. 
c. A specialist tax agency outside the tax administration conducts 
investigations. 
d. The police or prosecutor conducts investigations. 
Established in terms of the South African Revenue Service Act (34 of 1997) 
(hereafter referred to as the South African Revenue Service Act) as an 
autonomous agency, SARS is responsible for administering the South African tax 
system and customs service. SARS’ statutory responsibilities include (What 
SARS does ..., 2016): 
• the collection and administering of all national taxes, duties and levies; 
• the collection of revenue that may be imposed under any other 
legislation, as agreed on between SARS and a state entity entitled to 
the revenue; 
• providing a customs service that facilitates trade, maximises revenue 
collection, and protects South Africa’s borders from illegal importation 
and exportation of goods, and 
• advising the Minister of Finance on all revenue matters. 
 
Within SARS, there is a specific division that has as its function the combating of 
tax evasion and customs offences, as well as assistance to other law 
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enforcement agencies in efforts to combat crime, from a revenue and customs 
perspective. Their activities are described below (OECD, 2013:331):  
• Conducting preliminary investigations and enquiries where there are 
grounds to believe that tax or customs offences of a serious nature 
have been committed. The aim is to determine the most appropriate 
action based on the circumstances of the individual case. The relevant 
division considers capacity and workload in the greater CJS and seeks 
alternatives beyond criminal proceedings, such as administrative 
penalties, as a deterrent.  
• Conducting criminal investigations aimed at proving criminal liability in 
order to lay criminal charges at the SAPS or NPA, and aid these two 
institutions, as is reasonably required for the successful investigation 
or prosecution of the case.  
• Conducting financial investigations, as provided for in section 45 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act.   
• Conducting project-driven criminal investigations involving tax 
offences in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of the Tax 
Administration Act.  
• Conducting accelerated debt management activities, i.e. liquidation or 
sequestration of taxpayers, agent appointments, pursuing third-party 
liabilities, and preservation of asset orders.  
 
When enforcing the Acts administered by the Commissioner for SARS, the latter 
plays a particular role within the CJS. SARS is legally mandated to conduct 
criminal investigation into tax offences. When an investigation of an alleged tax 
offence is finalised, a criminal complaint is filed at the SAPS to gain access to the 
CJS. The evidence collected is presented to the NPA to decide whether the 
person or entity should be charged with a crime and prosecuted (SARS and the 
criminal justice system ..., 2016). SARS supports other government agencies in 
the investigation of money laundering and corruption activities. SARS is an active 
participant in the Multi-Agency Work Group (MAWG) and the ACTT that are 
assigned to combat corruption in Government. Working through these forums has 
empowered SARS to challenge elaborate international schemes that SARS 
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cannot achieve on its own. There is also legislation, such as the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and Prevention 
of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act (70 of 2008), which oblige SARS to 
support the SAPS, the FIC and other agencies in criminal investigations (SARS 
and the criminal justice system ..., 2016). 
Swanepoel and Coetzee (2014:2) assert that when fraud or corruption is 
committed, taxation may come into play. Swanepoel and Coetzee (2014:2) 
further state that, depending on the nature or extent of the fraud committed, 
SARS may be deprived of revenue as a result of one of the tax-levying Acts. 
Chaikin and Sharman (2009:38) state that a country’s tax system is a natural 
source of intelligence on corruption and money laundering, as it is dependent on 
the generation and analysis of vast amounts of financial information. This notion 
is underscored when considering the legal arrangements for the exchange of 
specific information between SARS and the FIC regarding money-laundering 
activities and tax evasion. A practical way to illustrate the interaction between tax 
evasion and other forms of financial crime such as money laundering is found in 
the question posed by Swanepoel and Coetzee (2014:2), when they ask: “Do 
fraudsters perpetrate fraud or corruption to conceal taxation consequences, or do 
the taxation consequences merely result from the perpetration of fraud or 
corruption?” The answer to this question can possibly be found in the opinion 
offered by Spreutels and Grijseels (2000:2) who assert that, although money 
laundering and tax evasion are separate crimes, there is a relationship between 
them. The successful execution of each of these crimes is dependent on the 
capability to hide the financial trail of the income. Money launderers, such as 
those involved in financial crime, seek to transform illegally-earned income into 
legal income for fear of the income being recovered, while tax evaders seek to 
conceal income, whether legally or illegally earned, from detection and 
confiscation by the tax authorities (Spreutels & Grijseels, 2000:2). This affirmation 
intersects with the statement by Chaikin and Sharman (2009:1) regarding the 
symbiotic relationship between financial crimes. 
The interaction in existence between tax evasion and other forms of financial 
crime, as illustrated above, requires that close attention be given to reporting 
obligations, disclosure and sharing of information between SARS and other 
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agencies. Chaikin and Sharman (2009:38) observe that revenue authorities in 
most countries have strong investigative powers to combat tax evasion and that 
such powers are useful in advancing investigations into other forms of financial 
crime. This observation is confirmed in the following declaration provided in 
paragraph 2.1 of the Memorandum to the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill, 
2011 (The Tax Administration Bill, 20, B11B of 2011 was assented to by the State 
President on 2 July 2012 and is now known as the Tax Administration Act. The 
Tax Administration Act extends SARS' powers, for example, its information 
gathering, assessment and collection powers to enhance tax compliance. In this 
regard, the following: 
a. The Tax Administration Act gives recognition to the fact that most taxpayers 
are compliant and want a more modern and responsive revenue 
administration, but that there is a minority that seeks to evade tax or defraud 
the Government. 
b.  SARS has a duty to actively pursue tax evaders to maintain confidence in 
the integrity of the tax system. 
c. Tax evasion undermines compliant taxpayers' morale and places an unfair 
burden on them if it is not efficiently countered. 
d. Over the years, it became apparent that stricter enforcement powers are 
required to target increasingly sophisticated tax evaders and tax evasion 
schemes. 
The participants were undivided in their view that the SAPS (DPCI), SARS and 
the FIC are responsible for combating financial crime. It would therefore follow 
that a participant who did not identify a specific agency in response to question 
4.1 in the interview schedule would not be able to respond to the question 
regarding the responsibility of that agency when answering question 4.2 in the 
interview schedule, as listed in Table 4.1 (paragraph 4.8). 
Using a content analysis, the themes focused on by the participants who referred 
to SARS were identified and listed. The themes are presented in the frequency 
table, Table 4.2 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended question where the 
participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were 
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provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore 
have provided more than one theme in response to the question.  
The themes presented by the participants regarding the responsibility of the 
SARS to combat financial crime are consistent with the literature. The researcher 
observed from the themes presented by the participants that although the 
question referred to “combating” of financial crime, the themes refer mainly to 
investigation and enforcement. No reference is made to the other facets of 
combating referred to in the literature, namely prevention, detection and provision 
or obtaining crime intelligence. When participants are asked to consider the 
responsibility of specific agencies as regards the combating of financial crime, 
the focus shifts to the specific mandates of the agencies, namely responding to 
financial crime in a reactive manner, and not considering all the aspects of 
combating financial crime, including proactive measures. 
4.2.2 Customs authority 
Customs authorities are vital agencies in preventing, detecting and investigating 
financial crime. Customs agencies are adept at monitoring the movement of 
people, goods and funds across national borders, using sophisticated systems. 
During the administration of customs control, customs and excise duties and 
Value-added Tax (VAT), Customs maintains records on individuals, companies 
and transactions. Customs authorities may be established as agencies separate 
from that of the tax authority, or in some countries they form part of a joint tax 
authority (OECD, 2013:33). In South Africa, the customs administration forms 
part of a single tax and customs revenue agency. 
The customs administration is a division housed within SARS under the control 
of the Commissioner for SARS. The core functions are to (OECD, 2013:331): 
• enforce customs as well as related trade laws; 
• collect duties and taxes; 
• ensure the social welfare of the citizens of South Africa by controlling 
the import and export of prohibited and restricted goods;  
• ensure timely clearance of goods and facilitate the speedy movement 
of travellers through South African borders; 
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• support South Africa’s integration into the global economy in a way 
that benefits all South Africans; 
• ensure that where elements of serious duties/levies evasion are 
identified, such matters are handed over to the Tax and Customs 
Investigations Unit for further investigation and enforcement activities. 
 
SARS has a role in administering laws that are not necessarily related to revenue 
collection or customs control but are essential to protect the South African 
economy. For example, Customs must prevent harmful goods from entering 
South Africa, such as alien species that may endanger the natural resources or 
South African citizenry (SARS and the criminal justice system ..., 2016). 
4.2.3 The police and other specialist enforcement agencies 
Essentially, the police are the primary or lead agency with the responsibility of 
enforcing the law, protecting property and maintaining law and order. In some 
countries, the capacity to investigate crime is institutionalised within the police, or 
some functions may be established as separate agencies outside the police, as 
specialist units (OECD, 2013:36). In other countries there may be specialist units 
within or outside the structure of the police responsible for the investigation of 
financial crime or aspects of it, or for types of financial crime (OECD, 2013:36). 
The role and position of the police and other specialised law enforcement 
agencies with regard to the combating of financial crime are expanded on below  
4.2.3.1 The South African Police Service 
The SAPS is a separate state organ resorting under the control of the Minister of 
Police, and is statutorily tasked to (OECD, 2013:36):  
• prevent, combat and investigate crime; 
• maintain public order;  
• protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; 
• uphold and enforce the law. 
 
The SAPS have the principal statutory duty to combat and prevent crime 
generally, which by default includes financial crime, irrespective of whether it has 
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been stated explicitly as such. The SAPS is mandated to prevent and combat 
national priority offences such as serious organised crime, serious commercial 
crime and serious corruption (section 17B of the South African Police Service 
Act), as well as offences referred to in Chapter 2 and section 34 of the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.  
The themes focused on by the participants who referred to the SAPS were 
identified and listed, using a content analysis the themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 4.3 (paragraph 4.8). The question was put as an open-
ended question. The participants could give their own answers to the question, 
and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the 
participants could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to 
the question. 
The themes presented by the participants regarding the responsibility of the 
SAPS in combating financial crime are consistent with the literature. The 
researcher observed from the themes presented by the participants that although 
the question referred to “combating” of financial crime, the themes mainly refer to 
investigation (frequency of 50%), prevention (frequency of 20%) and combating 
of crime (frequency of 20%). This is generally consistent with the literature. There 
is, however, no reference made to the other components of combating as referred 
to in the literature, namely detection and the provision of crime intelligence. There 
is little focus on crime detection and the gathering or provision of crime 
intelligence during the combating of financial crime. 
4.2.3.2 The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
The SAPS has established specialist units for combating financial offences. 
These units are part of the DPCI and are nicknamed “the Hawks”. The DPCI was 
established as an independent directorate within the SAPS in terms of Section 
17C of the South African Police Service Act. In terms of Section 17B and 17D of 
the South African Police Service Act, the DPCI is statutorily responsible for the 
combating, prevention and investigation of national priority crimes such as 
serious organised crime, serious commercial crime and serious corruption which, 
in the opinion of the Head of the Directorate, must be addressed by the 
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Directorate. Such a directive may be subject to policy guidelines issued by the 
Ministerial Committee. The DPCI also investigates any other offence or category 
of offences referred to it from time to time by the National Commissioner of Police. 
Such referral may be subject to policy guidelines issued by the Ministerial 
Committee. The DPCI organisationally forms part of the SAPS as an organ of 
state, but Parliament effectively oversees the functioning of the Directorate 
(section 17K(1) of the South African Police Service Act), and not the National 
Commissioner of Police, in order to enjoy adequate independence to perform its 
functions. 
Regarding its independence, Mashego (2016) quotes [Brigadier] Malaudzi who 
stated that “The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation is an independent 
entity and is not accountable to Brooklyn [Police Station].” This statement 
confirms the separate functioning of the DPCI, which is in accordance with the 
provisions of section 17K of the South African Police Service Act.  
The SAPS is responsible for administering the reporting obligation imposed by 
section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. The report 
must be made to a member of the DPCI. Section 34 of the Act regarding the duty 
to report corrupt transactions and the process to follow to make the report, 
provides as follows: 
34. Duty to report corrupt transactions— (1) Any person 
who holds a position of authority and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected that any other 
person has committed— 
(b) the offence of theft, fraud, extortion, forgery or uttering a 
forged document, involving an amount of R100 000 or more, 
must report such knowledge or suspicion or cause such 
knowledge or suspicion to be reported to the police official 
in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation referred to 
in section 17C of the South African Police Service Act.   
(3)(a) Upon receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1), 
the police official concerned must take down the report in 
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the manner directed by the National Head of the Directorate 
for Priority Crime Investigation, appointed in terms of 
section 17C(2)(a) of the South African Police Service and 
forthwith provide the person who made the report with an 
acknowledgment of receipt of such report. 
(4) For purposes of subsection (1), the following persons 
hold a position of authority, namely— 
(a) the Director-General or head, or equivalent officer, of a 
national or provincial department; 
(b) in the case of a municipality, the municipal manager 
appointed in terms of section 82 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998); 
(c) any public officer in the Senior Management Service of 
a public body; 
(d) any head, rector or principal of a tertiary institution; 
(e) the manager, secretary or a director of a company as 
defined in the Companies Act (61 of 1973), and includes a 
member of a close corporation as defined in the Close 
Corporations Act (69 of 1984); 
(f) the executive manager of any bank or other financial 
institution; 
(g) any partner in a partnership; 
(h) any person who has been appointed as chief executive 
officer or an equivalent officer of any agency, authority, 
board, commission, committee, corporation, council, 
department, entity, financial institution, foundation, fund, 
institute, service, or any other institution or organisation, 
whether established by legislation, contract or any other 
legal means; 
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(i) any other person who is responsible for the overall 
management and control of the business of an employer; or 
(j) any person contemplated in paragraphs (a) to (i), who 
has been appointed in an acting or temporary capacity. 
Within the DPCI there are sub-units responsible for the investigation of 
certain aspects and different types of financial crimes. These units are 
identified as focusing on three primary areas (personal interview with 
participant P003, 2016):  
• Serious Organised Crime Investigations 
• Serious Corruption Investigations 
• Priority Crime Specialised Investigations 
• Priority Crimes Management Centre 
• Serious Commercial Crime Investigations 
o Specialised Technical Investigations 
▪ Cybercrime 
▪ Digital Forensic Lab 
o Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (FAFI) 
▪ Money Laundering 
▪ Asset Forfeiture 
▪ Investigation Support 
o Forensic Investigation and Specialised Research 
In executing its mandate accordingly, the DPCI takes the lead role in preventing, 
combating and investigating national priority offences, serious organised crime, 
serious commercial crime, and serious corruption (section 17B(a) of the South 
African Police Service Act). According to an article, “Hawks tell SACP: Present 
your evidence in court” (2016), a spokesman for the “Hawks”, Brigadier Hangwani 
Malaudzi, was quoted as saying, “We [the Hawks] would like to remind the SACP 
that the Hawks has one mandate, which is to combat, prevent and investigate all 
serious corruption and serious commercial crime.” 
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The themes focused on by the participants who referred to the DPCI were 
identified and listed, using a content analysis. The themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 4.4 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore simply have provided more than one theme in response to the 
question.  
 
The researcher observed that the themes presented by the participants focused 
mainly on the investigation, prevention and combating of crime. The common 
themes presented by the participants regarding the responsibility of the DPCI in 
combating financial crime are broadly consistent with the literature. However, no 
reference was made to the other components of combating crime as referred to 
in the literature, namely detection and the provision of crime intelligence. Another 
observation is the reference to “Investigate large and complex commercial 
crimes” in the context of combating financial crime. The participants use the terms 
financial crime and commercial crime interchangeably and view them as similar 
concepts.  
4.2.4 Financial intelligence units 
Schott (2006:VII-1) states that those who are engaged in the fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing must have access to certain kinds of financially-
related information in order to conduct financial investigations. In this regard, the 
FIU has a critical role to play in the process. An FIU is defined as follows (Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units, 2004:3): 
A central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as 
permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the 
competent authorities, disclosures of financial information (i) 
concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required by 
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4.2.4.1 The function of a financial intelligence unit 
Schott (2006:VII-3) summarises the requirements set by the FATF, which is 
recognised as the international standard-setter for anti-money-laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism, provided in The Forty Recommendations on 
Money Laundering (The Forty Recommendations) as follows: 
Each country should establish an FIU [Financial Intelligence 
Unit]. Further, FATF urges countries to impose measures on 
financial institutions and certain non-financial businesses 
and professions requiring them to maintain records on the 
identities of their clients and their transactions and to report 
any suspicious transactions. Information generated by 
these reporting and recordkeeping requirements is to be 
reported to the country’s FIU and is used to reconstruct 
transactions, to establish the link between individual clients 
and a particular business, to prove the “state of mind” of an 
individual, and finally, to identify the role of an individual in 
a criminal or terrorist financing activity. Information reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements generate substantial 
financial data, much of which is not readily usable by 
competent authorities without further analysis. If a country’s 
AML [Anti-money-laundering] and CFT [Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism] institutional frameworks are to be at 
all effective, the country must institute a reliable, efficient 
system for processing, analysing, and disseminating this 
information. Without such a system in place, law 
enforcement has a much more difficult time detecting 
criminal or terrorist financial dealings. 
Schott (2006:Vii-4), using the Forty Recommendations set by the FATF as a 
reference, lists the core functions of an FIU as follows: 
• Centralised repository of reported information 
• Analytical function 
• Domestic information sharing 
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• International information sharing 
 
Schott (2006:VII-9) asserts that countries generally choose one of four primary 
models in establishing or improving the operations of an FIU. According to the 
descriptions of the four primary models provided by Schott (2006:VII-9), the 
“administrative model” proposed by Schott most closely resembles the model 
configured for South Africa. The features of an administrative-type FIU are 
described by Schott as those of “a separate agency, placed under the supervision 
of a ministry or administration (autonomous).” The rationale behind this 
arrangement is to “establish an [sic.] ‘buffer’ between the financial sector (and, 
more generally, non-financial businesses and professionals subject to reporting 
obligations) and the law enforcement authorities in charge of financial crime 
investigations and prosecutions.” 
Individual countries apply different models in respect of where the FIU should be 
situated within their financial systems or law enforcement agencies. The various 
models encountered in respect of individual countries where an FIU has been 
established are as follows (OECD, 2013:37): 
• FIU established within police or public prosecutor’s office 
• FIU established within financial regulator 
• FIU established within or under Ministry of Finance 
• FIU established under Ministry of Justice 
• FIU established within or under another agency 
 
In South Africa, the model that has been adopted is that of the FIU situated within 
or under the Ministry of Finance (OECD, 2013:37). 
4.2.4.2 The Financial Intelligence Centre  
From the above discussion it should be clear that the FIC represents the South 
African version of a Financial Intelligence Unit, as prescribed by the FATF. South 
Africa has a long-standing commitment to combating money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism, having ratified the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption in 2004, and joining the multilateral FATF in 2003.   
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In its draft Guidance on the Implementation of New Measures to be introduced 
by the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act (1 of 2017), the FIC states 
(Draft Guidance on …, 2017:2):  
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (the FIC Act) 
established the Centre which is the national point for the 
gathering, analysis and dissemination of financial 
intelligence. The Centre was established to identify 
proceeds of crime and combat money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism and in so doing has a primary role to 
protect the integrity of South Africa’s financial system. The 
Centre develops and provides financial intelligence to a 
range of agencies supporting the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal activity by helping to identify the 
proceeds of crime, combat money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism.  
The FATF is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and develops and 
promotes policies to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These standards are used as 
benchmarks in formal peer review and evaluation processes to test the 
robustness of a country’s measures against these illicit activities, and the integrity 
of its financial systems (Memorandum on the Objects of Financial Intelligence 
Centre Amendment Bill (B 33B of 2015). The function of FIC is to (National 
Treasury 2011/12 Annual Report…, 2012): 
• identify the proceeds of crime; 
• combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism; 
• share relevant information with law enforcement authorities, SARS 
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The FIC also shares such information with its counterparts globally. Key focus 
areas for the FIC include:  
• legal and policy (responsible for the administration of the FICA, 
engagement with international organisations and providing strategic 
policy advice); 
• compliance;  
• prevention (responsible for oversight of the FICA and guidance to 
accountable and reporting institutions, supervisory bodies and others 
regarding their obligations); 
• monitoring and analysing (receives and conducts an analysis of 
financial transaction data, shares relevant analysis with law 
enforcement authorities, intelligence agencies and SARS, where 
necessary, for further follow-up); 
• information and communication technology (provides information 
technology infrastructure and business system support).  
 
Burrel (2000:304) quotes the OECD, stating that “Money laundering authorities 
should be committed to the greatest extent possible to pass information to their 
tax authorities to support the investigation of tax-related crime”. Much of the work 
undertaken by an FIU (such as the FIC) concerns the identification and analysis 
of assets, capital flows and financial transactions. It is, therefore, possible that an 
FIU (such as the FIC) may hold significant information, which may be relevant to 
a country’s revenue authority for tax administration and assessing of tax liability 
(OECD, 2013:82). It has been reported that the FIC has said that (Ramothwala, 
2016:1): 
It shares the products of its analyses with a range of 
competent authorities including law enforcement 
agencies, intelligence services, SARS and supervisory 
bodies. The information shared by the FIC assists theses 
authorities in discharging their responsibilities by, for 
example, enabling them to conduct investigations, 
prosecutions and the forfeiture of assets based on the 
leads supplied by the FIC. 
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Most countries have strict confidentiality provisions governing the disclosure of 
information obtained by FIUs. In the countries where the revenue authorities have 
access to this information, there is a legal basis, sometimes expressed as a legal 
“gateway”, to provide this access. In South Africa, the FIC may disclose 
information relevant to the administration of tax and assessment to SARS on 
request (OECD, 2013:84). 
The themes focused on by the participants who referred to the FIC were identified 
and listed, using a content analysis. The themes are presented in the frequency 
table, Table 4.5 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended question where the 
participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were 
provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore 
have provided more than one theme in response to the question.  
 
The participants presented a diverse range of themes in response to the question 
regarding the responsibility of the FIC in combating financial crime. The recurrent 
themes are broadly consistent with the responsibilities of the FIC identified in the 
literature. The participants have a broad, general understanding of the 
responsibility of the FIC in respect of combating financial crime. 
4.2.5 The prosecuting authority 
The prosecuting authority is the government agency responsible for representing 
the State in criminal matters before a criminal court of law. The prosecution office 
can be structured according to the following different models (OECD, 2013:39): 
• Central prosecution authority responsible for criminal investigations 
• Central prosecution authority with no responsibility for criminal 
investigations 
• Law enforcement agencies may prosecute offences directly 
 
In South Africa, the prosecuting authority is arranged according to the second 
model, which means that judges and the prosecution are not directly involved in 
the investigation. Prosecutors may, however, advise investigative agencies on 
the judicial process and law of evidence. Investigations are conducted by the 
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police, revenue authority or other agencies, and cases are forwarded to the 
central public prosecution authority for consideration. A prosecutor may then 
submit the case for prosecution before a court, refer it back to the investigating 
agency with a request for further evidence, or a ‘decline to prosecute’ (OECD, 
2013:41). 
4.2.5.1 The National Prosecuting Authority 
Section 179 of the 1996 Constitution created a single NPA. Legislation governing 
the prosecuting authority is the National Prosecuting Authority Act (32 of 1998) 
(hereafter referred to as the National Prosecuting Authority Act). The 1996 
Constitution, read in conjunction with the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 
provides the prosecuting authority with the power to institute criminal proceedings 
on behalf of the State and to carry out any necessary functions incidental to 
instituting criminal proceedings and discontinuing criminal proceedings. The NPA 
is a separate state organ under the control of the Ministry of Justice (Effective 
Inter-Agency Co-operation ..., 2013). 
The NPA comprises seven core business units, of which the following relate to 
the prosecution, possible prosecution or combating of financial crimes (About the 
NPA …, 2014):  
• Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) 
• Specialised Commercial Crime Unit (SCCU) 
 
The themes focused on by the participants who referred to the NPA were 
identified and listed, using a content analysis. The themes are presented in the 
frequency table, Table 4.6 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to the question. 
 
Four participants participating in answering question 4.1 in the interview schedule 
did not identify the NPA as a principal agency with responsibility for combating 
financial crime and therefore did not provide feedback in response to this question 
in relation to the NPA (question 4.2 in the interview schedule). The recurring 
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themes are broadly consistent with the responsibilities of the NPA identified in the 
literature. The participants have a broad, general understanding of the 
responsibility of the NPA in combating financial crime. 
4.2.5.2 Specialised Commercial Crime Unit of the NPA 
In an answering affidavit submitted to the South Gauteng High Court (Case No. 
SS40/06) in the matter of Porrit and Bennett v The National Director of Public 
Prosecutions AO, the Senior Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, advocate 
Glynnis Breytenbach in her capacity as the Regional Head of the Specialised 
Commercial Crime Unit of the NPA (hereafter referred to as the SCCU) made the 
following statement with regard to the background and operations of the SCCU: 
6. The SCCU was established on 1 August 1999 to improve 
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of 
commercial crime. The SCCU emerged from a partnership 
between the South African Police Service (“SAPS”), the 
NPA, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Business against Crime (“BAC”). 
7. The BAC was established in 1996 in response to a 
request from the former South African President, Nelson 
Mandela, inviting business to join hands with the South 
African Government in the fight against crime. The National 
Crime Prevention Strategy approved by the Government 
has the active support of BAC, which provides funding for 
many of the projects implemented in terms of this strategy 
in an attempt to assist with the combating of crime in South 
Africa. 
8. The innovative approach adopted by the SCCU lies in the 
nature of the working relationship and procedural integration 
between the prosecutors and the police officers responsible 
for the investigation. Although SAPS remain primarily 
responsible for the investigation of cases, these 
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investigations are conducted in a consultative manner with 
the appointed prosecutor at the SCCU. 
Altbeker (2002:31) asserts that the investigators, prosecutors and magistrates 
form a virtually seamless criminal justice process, entirely dedicated to dealing 
with cases falling within the mandate of the SAPS Commercial Crime Unit in the 
jurisdiction of the relevant regional courts. Altbeker (2002:31) further states, “The 
existence of this court, and, more importantly, the integration of the three main 
functions of the CJS — investigation, prosecution and adjudication — is regarded 
by many as one of the best examples of successful criminal justice reform 
implemented.” Altbeker (2002:31) states that the SCCU consists of a team of 
prosecutors led by a deputy director of public prosecutions, and is tasked with 
bringing cases of commercial criminality to trial. The court consists of regional 
courts, presided over by distinguished magistrates.  
The SCCU and, therefore, the Commercial Crime Court, handle criminal cases 
investigated by the Commercial Crime Unit within the DPCI and brought before it 
by the SCCU of the NPA. These cases involve cases of “commercial criminality”, 
as the name suggests (Altbeker, 2002:33). Altbeker (2002:31) asserts that this is 
a “somewhat vague classification” and that it involves crimes such as a range of 
different types of fraud, some categories of theft, and a variety of statutory 
offences centred on the conduct of business in South Africa, irrespective of the 
classification of the crimes. Altbeker (2002:33) maintains that the core work of the 
unit revolves around fraud and theft cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
regional courts. 
Altbeker (2002:33) states that the staff attached to the SCCU maintain that there 
are several advantages to the model used by the SCCU that include the following:  
Investigations, being the joint responsibility of investigators and prosecutors, are 
generally better managed and completed more speedily. 
• Prosecutors are better prepared when their cases eventually come to 
trial. 
• All role-players, magistrates included, understand and appreciate the 
legal and factual issues at stake in these cases because of their high 
level of expertise and experience. 
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4.2.5.3 Asset Forfeiture Unit  
The AFU was established in May 1999 in the Office of the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions to focus on the implementation of Chapters 5 and 6 of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act. The AFU was created to ensure that the 
powers in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act to seize criminal assets would 
be used to their maximum effect in the fight against crime, and particularly 
organised crime. One of the key objectives of the AFU is to establish excellent 
relationships with its key partners, especially the SAPS, and the SARS (Asset 
Forfeiture Unit …, 2014). 
4.2.6 Financial regulators 
Financial regulators, including central banks, are usually responsible for 
maintaining confidence in the financial system and ensuring the competence of 
the providers of financial services. This encourages stability and good 
governance in the financial sector. Financial regulators accomplish good 
governance through regulation and supervision, together with the investigation of 
possible statutory or regulatory breaches. They are also responsible for 
combating crime related to financial markets, such as insider trading and market 
manipulation, and during their supervisory and regulatory activities, collect and 
hold information on individuals, institutions and transactions (OECD, 2013:42).  
4.2.6.1  The South African Reserve Bank 
SARB is a separate organ resorting under the control of the Ministry of Finance. 
The Bank Supervision Department is a component within the SARB, resorting 
under the control of the Governor of the SARB (OECD, 2013:333). 
The Financial Surveillance Department of the SARB is responsible for the 
administration of exchange control in terms of the authority delegated by the 
Minister of Finance. The responsibilities of the Financial Surveillance 
Department, inter alia, entail (Participant P002, 2016): 
• implementing exchange control policy and administering the 
Exchange Control Regulations; 
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• gathering, analysing and disseminating information on cross-border 
flows; 
• ensuring compliance by authorised dealers in foreign exchange, who 
adhere to anti-money-laundering control measures in terms of the 
FICA. 
 
The Bank Supervision Division of the SARB is one of the bank’s core divisions, 
which is committed to achieving its mission of promoting the soundness of the 
domestic banking system and contributing to financial stability. The Review Team 
of the SARB conducts specific reviews on banks and/or the banking sector to 
assess compliance with the Banks Act (94 of 1990) the regulations relating to 
banks, and other relevant legislation, such as the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act (Participant P002, 2016). 
4.2.6.2 Financial Services Board 
The FSB is a statutory body established in terms of section 2 of the Financial 
Services Board Act (97 of 1990), and is an independent regulatory institution 
established by law to oversee the South African non-banking financial services 
industry. It governs South Africa's non-bank financial services sector, including 
securities firms, participation bond schemes, portfolio management, insurance 
companies, pension funds, and mutual funds. The FSB is a separate organ under 
the control of the Ministry of Finance (OECD, 2013:333). The Executive Officer 
of the FSB is, in terms of various statutes, the Registrar, for purposes of enforcing 
legislation applicable to financial institutions. As such, the Executive Officer is the 
Registrar of Long-term and Short-term Insurance, the Registrar of Collective 
Investments Schemes, the Registrar of Pension Funds, the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies, the Registrar of Security Services, and the Registrar of Financial 
Services Providers (Participant P002, 2016). 
 
A graphic portrayal of a summary of the key investigative agencies and regulatory 
bodies that comprise the framework to combat financial crime in accordance with 
the survey conducted by the OECD (2013) and its South African equivalents as 
per the literature and feedback from the participants is presented in Figure 4.2 
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(paragraph 4.8). The key investigative agencies (mentioned in the literature) 
responsible for combating financial crime and the roles of their South African 
counterparts are summarised in Table 4.7 (paragraph 4.8). 
4.3 INFORMATION SHARING AS PREREQUISITE FOR COOPERATION 
Sharing of information between agencies is a necessary prerequisite for effective 
inter-agency cooperation (OECD, 2013:13). Schlenther (2016:15) asserts that 
the “foundations for cooperation lie first and foremost in information sharing”. It is 
only then that there can be collaboration that is premised on a clear line of sight 
among agencies of the objective, which is to combat financial crime. While 
performing their duties and exercising their powers, various agencies responsible 
for combating financial crime, collect and control information on individuals, 
corporate entities and transactions that may be regarded as relevant to other 
agencies that are also combating financial crime (OECD, 2013:14). Other 
agencies may find it useful for the purpose of analysis, to detect breaches of law 
and regulations, or for use in ongoing investigations.  
According to Meyer et al. (2017:3), the timeous sharing of information is crucial 
to the success of many investigations conducted by investigative agencies in the 
law enforcement domain.  Meyer et al. (2017:3) assert that many investigations 
are hampered by one or more of many constraints related to efficiently sharing of 
information among investigators and organisations. These may include technical, 
workflow and legal constraints. 
The sharing of information may prove useful as intelligence to agencies 
combating financial crime because it may provide clues to possible 
contraventions of laws or regulations, or new avenues of inquiry in ongoing 
investigations. In some cases, the agency obtaining the information attains a type 
of information it cannot directly access in the ordinary course of its 
responsibilities, especially where the information is of a specialised nature such 
as, for instance, from SARS, subject to following the correct legal process 
(gateways). An additional investigative advantage is that agencies do not have to 
duplicate requests for information from third parties if the information requested 
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by one agency from a third party can be shared with other agencies, thereby 
increasing effectivity and reducing the costs of investigations. 
The use of information obtained from various sources has the potential to 
increase investigators’ understanding of crime-related aspects, or the activities of 
a suspect. This, in turn, may lead to a more effective investigation. The likelihood 
of the proceeds of crime being recovered is increased through mechanisms 
enabling information sharing. It may also aid in improving the prevention and 
detection of financial crimes, enabling investigations to be conducted more 
effectively and efficiently, resulting in faster and more successful prosecutions 
(OECD, 2013:14). Establishing operational arrangements to share information 
may lead to the development of relationships between agencies and essential 
personnel in those agencies that in turn may foster enhanced forms of inter-
agency cooperation (OECD, 2013:45). 
A content analysis was used for interpreting the response to question 4.3 in the 
interview schedule, “What do you think are the benefits of sharing information 
among the revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-laundering regulators 
and other government agencies during the combating of financial crime? Please 
substantiate your answer.” The central themes emerging from the participants’ 
answers were listed and are presented in the frequency table, Table 4.8 
(paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended question where the participants could 
provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were provided from 
which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided 
more than one theme in response to the question. 
In response to the question regarding the benefits of sharing information among 
the revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-laundering regulators and 
other government agencies during the combating of financial crime (question 4.3 
in the interview schedule), the participants offered a broad and diverse range of 
themes (30 themes offered). The frequency of the themes recurring is too low to 
provide new, meaningful categories in respect of the benefits of sharing 
information. The participants have their own individual views about the benefits 
of sharing information. Each of the benefits as viewed by the participants has its 
276 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
own merits, and underscores the importance of sharing information between 
agencies in the combating of financial crime.  
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 4.4 in the 
interview schedule, “In your opinion, what can be done to improve sharing of 
information among government agencies in an effort to combat financial crime 
more effectively? Please substantiate your answer”, the themes emerging from 
the participants’ answers were listed and are presented in the frequency table, 
Table 4.9 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended question where the 
participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no choices were 
provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants could therefore 
have provided more than one theme in response to the question. 
In response to the question regarding what steps can be taken to improve 
information sharing between the revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-
laundering regulators and other government agencies during the combating of 
financial crime (question 4.4 in the interview schedule), the participants offered a 
broad and diverse range of answers (23 themes offered). The frequency of the 
themes recurring is too low to provide new ideas that can be used to improve the 
sharing of information. Each of the participants has his/her own view about the 
steps that can be taken to improve the sharing of information. Each of the 
measures proposed by the participants has its own merit that can be considered. 
A participant who requested to remain anonymous (Participant P003, 2017) 
elaborated on measures to improve the sharing of information, stating: “It should 
be contextualised by understanding its purpose, as each area has different needs 
for information”. The participant provided the following exposition of suggested 
measures to improve sharing of information among government agencies to 
combat financial crime more effectively: 
• The management of financial crime risks 
• The determination of financial crime threats 
• Investigation or law enforcement related to financial crime 
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The above-mentioned are three areas to articulate the 
understanding and is not an exhaustive list, or necessarily 
mutually exclusive.   
 
The Management of Financial Crime Risks 
This relates to information sharing by and within those 
entities affected by financial crime with the aim of reducing 
vulnerability, risk exposure, or potential harm that could be 
associated with the maturing of such risk. Government 
finances, the economic sector and industry, and civil society 
are three key nodes where financial crime poses economic 
risks over the short, medium and longer terms. 
 
Securing such “nodes” is necessary for the sustainable 
growth and development of the South African economy, 
including combating the illicit economy. 
 
The sharing of such information between sectors or even 
[business] competitors will enhance the prevention of 
financial crime exposure [to risk] and incidents, but will 
inherently also provide for strategic and tactical exposure 
between and with the sectors. 
 
An example is the South African Banking Risk Information 
Centre (SABRIC) where the sharing of information with 
regard to bank, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) and Cash-
in-transit (CIT) robberies exposed the risk of individual 
banks to competitors. The simple use of information on ATM 
robberies, where one bank’s ATMs were more prone to 
attacks could be exploited by competitors and cause a client 
shift between banks. This was resolved by establishing a 
trust circle and confidentiality systems within the SABRIC 
Stakeholders supported by the Banking Council of South 
Africa. 
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Information sharing could be enhanced by the following: 
• The enhancement of sectoral and industry 
cooperation with regard to serious crime that poses 
as collective threat 
• The establishment or enhancement of sectoral 
forums to establish a trust circle and confidentiality 
systems for the sector or industry 
• Conducting of focussed Financial Crime Risk 
assessments and information sharing agreements 
affecting industries 
 
The Determination of Financial Crime Threats 
Financial crime in its various forms poses direct national 
security threats to well-being, development and upliftment 
of the South African people, the stability of the Republic, the 
constitutional order and state institutions and the 
sustainable growth and development of the South African 
economy. 
 
The National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) 
is the specific intelligence sharing mechanism established 
by the government for the sharing of actionable information 
between stakeholders. Inter-sectoral cooperation with 
NICOC should be enhanced. 
 
Investigation or law enforcement related to Financial Crime 
A working relationship has to be developed, integrated and 
formalised between Government and industry. The 
relationship can be facilitated through a partnership with the 
SAPS to create a formal mechanism to enable a more 
effective, coordinated and integrated strategic approach 
towards the prevention, combating and investigation of 
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serious crimes, including financial crime. Such a formal 
mechanism will secure an undertaking by both parties to 
work towards long-term strategic and coordinated 
partnership mechanisms between the Government and 
industry. 
4.4 LEGAL GATEWAYS 
For information to be shared, legal gateways must exist between the relevant 
agencies. In some countries, enhanced forms of cooperation have been put in 
place to obtain maximum benefit from legal gateways that may exist between 
agencies for sharing information (OECD, 2013:13). The disclosure and sharing 
of information between agencies must be legally authorised and executed in 
accordance with the prescribed legal prescripts and procedures for its use to be 
legitimate and admissible in court proceedings. Among the constraints related to 
efficiently sharing information between investigators and organisations are legal 
issues that concern restrictions on information use and sharing (Meyer et al., 
2017:3). Information obtained under a warrant for a specific investigation by one 
agency may not be used to advance an investigation performed by another 
agency. Agencies are restricted in respect of what information they can share 
with other agencies. Where the sharing of information may actually be legally 
permitted in specific instances, concerns about prudence and governance may 
result in restrictions of what may actually be shared through the adoption of 
policies and SOPs. 
The disclosure or sharing of information between various agencies may take on 
different forms. National legislation provides the legal framework for cooperation. 
Legislation may require that one agency is obliged to share a particular type of 
information with another, or is entitled to receive such information. In other 
instances, legislation may place restrictions on the disclosure of certain types of 
information or strictly control it. This may hamper agencies’ ability to share or 
disclose information, which may strain relationships between agencies. Where 
legal gateways for sharing and disclosure of information do exist, these can be 
followed up or strengthened through operational agreements or Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) to ensure that operational procedures are in place for 
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requesting and receiving information. These measures must be within the 
confines of what is permitted by law. 
In the South African context, the use of the term sharing of information has to be 
considered. Sharing may imply a two-way returning flow of information, which is 
legally and practically not necessarily the case. In the South African context, the 
disclosure of information by one agency to another may be legally authorised, 
subject to specific requirements and preconditions having been met, and then 
only for the purposes authorised. (OECD 2013:14). For all types of cooperation 
with respect to sharing information among different agencies, it is essential to 
protect the confidentiality of information and the integrity of work carried out by 
other agencies. 
With regard to sharing information among various agencies, four different 
categories of legal gateways generally in existence have been identified among 
the 48 countries surveyed by the OECD (2013:45). These categories are:  
• direct access to information contained in agency records or databases  
• a legal obligation to provide information spontaneously (sometimes 
expressed as a reporting obligation) 
• an ability, but not an obligation, to provide information spontaneously 
• an obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
  
The various categories and their applicability across the key agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime are explained and analysed in the 
sections that follow. 
4.4.1 Direct access to records and databases 
Individual agencies may allow direct access to their records and information 
stored in their databases to designated individuals from other authorities. Access 
may be provided for a variety of purposes, or limited to specific cases or 
circumstances. The advantage of this model is that an agency requiring 
information can search for the information directly and obtain it quickly. However, 
individual databases may contain large quantities of data that has been arranged 
for the purposes of the holding agency and not those of the receiving agency. 
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This may prove difficult for officials unfamiliar with the other agency’s systems to 
identify the relevant information. In some instances, where officials investigating 
are unaware of information contained in a database, it goes unexploited, even 
though access is available. Direct access to records may carry a risk in that data 
may be accessed for purposes other than those for which access was authorised. 
It may, therefore, be sensible for countries to reduce their risk by introducing 
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information, for example by 
restricting access to databases to a small number of designated individuals and 
maintaining records of what information was accessed and for what purpose 
(OECD, 2013:45). 
During this research, information could not be found in the literature that could 
clarify whether there are agencies in South Africa that are engaged in combating 
financial crime that have linked or shared databases or have direct access to 
records or databases held by or in the custody of another agency. Agencies are 
therefore compelled to obtain access to information or records held by another 
agency by making use of one or more of the arrangements explained in the 
sections below. 
4.4.2 Reporting obligation 
An agency may be required by law to willingly provide specific categories of 
information to another agency, without the receiving agency having to request the 
information. This type of legal gateway is referred to as a reporting obligation. 
The benefit of a reporting obligation is that the information to be shared or 
disclosed is identified by officials working at the agency in whose custody and 
control it is. They are likely to have a better understanding of the information 
under their control (OECD, 2013:4). However, for this type of sharing to be 
efficient, the holding agency must have clear rules, procedures and mechanisms 
in place to identify the type of information it must share in accordance with its 
obligation. This may be simple, where a legal obligation exists to provide all 
information of a particular type, class, category or description (for example 
information obtained by a tax authority during an audit that may be indicative of 
money laundering occurring or having occurred). This may, however, be complex 
where discretion must be applied to identify the information that is potentially 
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relevant to an investigation or for specific use by another agency. This 
arrangement does not allow for investigating officials requesting information to 
advance an investigation. This type of information is pertinent to alert another 
agency of possible unlawful activities, previously not known. 
In South Africa, several reporting obligations are imposed on agencies provided 
for in different statutes. These legal provisions stipulate that information held by 
an agency, or which comes into possession of the agency during the execution 
of its duties or exercising of its powers, must be disclosed to the agency 
authorised to receive the information. 
4.4.3 Spontaneous sharing of information  
Individual agencies may have the authority to provide specific categories of 
information freely but may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to do so or 
not (OECD, 2013:46). Where this process functions well, it can be at least as 
useful as the previous method. Information is shared freely, but officials in the 
holding agency may exercise their discretion to provide only information deemed 
valuable and not all information of a specific class or category. This type of 
gateway for sharing information is useful when it is supported by operational 
agreements between agencies and a good understanding by officials in each 
agency of the information needs of the other agency. This means that, even 
where a specific reporting obligation does not exist, information sharing between 
agencies can be very useful.  
In South Africa, however, such spontaneous and discretionary sharing of 
information may be statutorily limited to specific types of information and only in 
a manner prescribed by law (for example information obtained by a tax authority 
in the administration of a tax Act relevant to the SAPS, but not related to a tax 
offence can be shared only if it relates to specific threats, and then only by means 
of a court order authorising SARS to disclose that information). Where models 
exist for information sharing that requires discretion to be exercised, it requires 
clear rules for how this is to be executed. The effectiveness of this type of legal 
gateway depends on the ability of officials to identify relevant information and 
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their preparedness to exercise discretion to provide information (OECD, 
2013:46). 
4.4.4 Sharing information on request 
In this category of gateway, an agency provides information only upon request 
from another. This can be regarded as the simplest of the four categories of 
gateways for sharing information. There is less need for rules or mechanisms to 
identify information for sharing or to provide access to records. It also has the 
added benefit of allowing agency officials to specify precisely the information 
required (OECD, 2013:46). 
In the South African context, it is possible for some agencies to request 
information from another legally. However, there are often legal prescripts and 
requirements for doing so and in some instances, only in relation to specific types 
or categories of information, which may further be limited to information only for 
specific purposes. 
4.5 ANALYSIS OF LEGAL GATEWAYS  
In the preceding sections, the categories of gateways for the exchange or 
disclosure of information held by one agency to another have been identified, and 
their nature discussed. The advantages and disadvantages that have also briefly 
been referred to will vary, depending on the agencies involved, the type of 
information requested, and the purpose for which the information is required. In 
South Africa, a combination of the respective models is applied, depending on 
the legal provisions that provide gateways to facilitate the exchange or disclosure 
of information. In this section, the details of the legal gateways available to the 
various agencies responsible for combating financial crime are analysed. These 
gateways relate to information and records held by the following entities: 
• The South African Revenue Service 
• The Customs Division of the South African Revenue Service 
• The South African Police Service 
• The Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation 
• The National Prosecuting Authority 
• The Financial Intelligence Centre 
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The result of the analysis is set out in the sections below, with comments on 
practices. For practical reasons, it does not consider the complexity of the 
different types of information and prevailing circumstances under which 
information can be made available. It indicates the legal provisions that provide 
the gateway in existence for exchanging or disclosing information, as well as the 
enabling mechanisms between agencies. 
4.5.1 Information held by SARS 
The Memorandum on the Objects of Tax Administration Bill, 2011, states that in 
several developed countries and in South Africa it is recognised that it is essential 
that tax information be available to other organs of state within the legal prescripts. 
In the context of law enforcement, where specific information is likely to be of 
value to a criminal investigation, and in the interest of the public that taxpayer 
information be made available to law enforcement agencies within the legal 
prescripts, such limited disclosure will ensure that there is a potential for the 
exchange of information in two directions, i.e. between the revenue authority and 
law enforcement and vice versa.  
The disclosure of taxpayer information and SARS confidential information in the 
custody and control of SARS to, among others, the SAPS, the FIC, the AFU and 
the NPA, is regulated by the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Tax Administration 
Act. This Chapter 6, dealing with “Confidentiality of Information”, clearly gives 
effect to the intent regarding the availability of tax information to other organs of 
state expressed in the Memorandum on the Objects of Tax Administration Bill, as 
referred to above.  
The legal provisions providing the gateways for the disclosure of information per 
its various categories held by SARS, thereby establishing the ability to share 
information between SARS and other agencies, are identified and described in 
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4.5.1.1 Direct access to records and databases 
In terms of the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Tax Administration Act, which 
arranges for disclosure of taxpayer information and SARS confidential 
information held by SARS, there are no legal prospects for agencies involved in 
the combating of financial crime that will enable them to have direct access to 
records held by and information stored on SARS’ database. 
 4.5.1.2 Reporting obligations 
In terms of the provisions of section 36 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
the SARS has a duty to report to the FIC any knowledge or suspicion that an 
accountable institution wittingly or unwittingly has received or is about to receive 
the proceeds of unlawful activities, or has been used or may be used in future for 
money-laundering purposes. SARS should furnish the FIC with all information 
and any records regarding that knowledge or suspicion that the FIC may 
reasonably require identifying the proceeds of unlawful activities or to combat 
money-laundering activities or financing of terrorist and related activities.   
In terms of section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 
a person in the employ of, inter alia, SARS, who holds a position of authority and 
who knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that another person 
has committed an offence under Part 1, 2, 3 or 4, or section 20 or 21 (insofar as 
it relates to the afore-mentioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act; or the offence of theft, fraud, extortion, 
forgery or uttering a forged document, involving an amount of R100 000,00 or 
more, must report such knowledge or suspicion or enable the reporting of such 
knowledge or suspicion to the police official in the DPCI referred to in section 17C 
of the South African Police Service Act. 
4.5.1.3 An ability, but no obligation, to provide information freely 
In terms of the provisions of section 69(2) of the Tax Administration Act, a current 
or former SARS official may in the performance of his or her duties under a tax 
Act or customs and excise legislation, disclose taxpayer information to the SAPS 
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or NPA if the information relates to, and constitutes material information for the 
proving of a tax offence. 
Section 71(3) of the Tax Administration Act provides that when a senior SARS 
official is of the opinion that SARS has information that may reveal evidence that 
an offence (other than a tax offence) has been or may be committed in respect 
of which a court may impose a sentence of imprisonment of exceeding five years; 
that may be relevant to the investigation and prosecution of the offence; or of an 
imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk, SARS may apply ex 
parte to a judge in chambers for an order authorising SARS to disclose the 
information stated above. 
4.5.1.4 An obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
Section 71(4) of the Tax Administration Act provides that the National 
Commissioner of the SAPS, the National Director of Public Prosecutions or a 
person acting under their respective control may bring an ex parte application to 
a judge in chambers for an order requiring SARS to disclose information relating 
to, inter alia, an offence that is not a tax offence, which has been or may have 
been committed in respect of which a court may impose a sentence of 
imprisonment of exceeding five years, and that may be relevant to the 
investigation and prosecution of that offence (including an offence that fits the 
description of a financial crime). 
Section 71 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, dealing with access to 
information, provides that the National Director of Public Prosecutions may 
request that any person employed in or associated with, inter alia, SARS to 
furnish him or her with all information that may reasonably be required for any 
investigation in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, and such person 
shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law that prohibits 
or precludes him or her from disclosing any information relating to the activities, 
affairs or business of any other person; or from permitting any person to have 
access to any registers, records or other documents, or electronic data that have 
a bearing on the said activities, affairs or business, be compelled to furnish the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions with such information and permit the 
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National Director to have access to any registers, records, documents, and 
electronic data that may contain such information. 
Section 73 of Prevention of Organised Crime Act, notwithstanding the 
confidentiality provisions of Chapter 6 of the Tax Administration Act, and with 
regard to any other secrecy provision in similar legislation, provides that, 
whenever any investigation is instituted in terms of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, including an investigation into any offence referred to in Schedule 1 of 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, and an investigation into the property, 
financial activities, affairs or business of any person, the Commissioner of the 
SARS, or any official designated by him or her for this purpose, shall be notified 
of such investigation with a view to mutual cooperation and the sharing of 
information. 
In analysing the provisions above, a summary in tabular format indicating the 
availability of legal gateways that enable other agencies to obtain information held 
by SARS is provided in Table 4.10 below: 
Table 4.10: Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by 
SARS 
Categories of gateway in relation to 
information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY SARS 
 SAPS DPCI NPA FIC CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No Yes 
Reporting obligation No Yes No Yes No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
4.5.2 Information held by the Customs Division of SARS 
Chapter 1, Part 5, of the Customs Control Act regulates the confidentiality 
provisions that arrange for disclosure of any information acquired by the customs 
authority that results from the exercising of powers or duties by its officials.  
The legal provisions providing the gateways for the disclosure of information per 
its different categories held by the SARS Customs division, thereby establishing 
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the ability to share information between SARS Customs division and other 
agencies, are identified and described in the sections below:  
4.5.2.1 Direct access to records and databases 
In terms of the provisions of Chapter 1, Part 5 of the Customs Control Act, there 
are no legitimate prospects for agencies involved in the combating of financial 
crime that enable them to have direct access to records held by and information 
stored in the Customs authority’s databases. 
4.5.2.2 Reporting obligations 
The Customs Division of the SARS is subject to the same reporting obligations 
imposed on SARS as discussed under paragraph 4.5.1.2 above. 
4.5.2.3 An ability, but no obligation, to provide information freely 
In terms of the provisions of section 21 of the Customs Control Act dealing with 
the confidentiality of information acquired by SARS and its officials in the 
exercising of powers or duties, no SARS official, customs officer or person 
referred to in section 12 (3) (a) of the Customs Control Act and no person who 
was such an official, officer or person, may disclose any information acquired by 
him or her in the exercising of powers or duties concerning the private or 
confidential matters of any person, except, inter alia: 
• if there is a serious and imminent risk to public health or safety or the 
environment and the public’s interest in the disclosure outweighs the 
official, officer or person’s duty of confidentiality 
• if the person that will be affected by the disclosure has consented to 
the disclosure 
• to an authorised recipient, subject to the provisions of section 22 of the 
Customs Control Act 
• that such disclosure will be authorised subject to the provisions of 
section 22 of the Customs Control Act, which limits any disclosure in 
terms of section 21 (as provided above) to, inter alia 
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o the SAPS or the National Director of Public Prosecutions, to be 
confined to information relating to the alleged commission of 
offences 
o the Director of the FIC, to be confined to information required for 
the performance of the Centre’s functions in terms of the FICA. 
 
An authorised recipient may use the information disclosed as described above 
only for the purpose for which the information was disclosed. Information 
disclosed by the SAPS or the National Director of Public Prosecutions may be 
used only for investigating the alleged commission of an offence and as evidence 
in prosecuting a person for an offence. 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 69 (2) of the Tax Administration Act, a current 
or former SARS official may in the performance of his or her duties under a tax 
Act or customs and excise legislation disclose a taxpayer’s information to the 
SAPS or NPA if the information relates to, and constitutes, material information 
for proving a tax offence. 
4.5.2.4 An obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
In terms of the provisions of section 21 of the Customs Control Act dealing with 
the confidentiality of information acquired by SARS and its officials in exercising 
their powers or duties related to the private or confidential matters of any person, 
no SARS official, customs officer or person referred to in section 12 (3) (a) of the 
Customs Control Act and no person who was such an official, officer or person, 
may disclose any information acquired by him or her in the exercising of powers 
or duties related to the private or confidential matters of any person, except if that 
official, officer or person is summoned to give evidence as a witness before a 
court or tribunal, and the Commissioner has authorised that official, officer or 
person to disclose the information, or is required to do so by a court. 
The provisions of sections 71 and 73 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 
as referred to in paragraph 4.5.1.4, above, are applicable to the Customs division 
in SARS. 
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A summary of the analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways that enable other agencies to obtain information held 
by SARS Customs division, is provided in Table 4.11 below. 
Table 4.11:  Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by 
Customs 
Categories of gateways in relation 
to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY CUSTOMS 
 SAPS DPCI NPA FIC SARS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No Yes 
Reporting obligation No Yes No Yes No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
4.5.3 Information held by the SAPS 
The South African Police Service Act does not contain specific provisions that 
regulate the disclosure of records or information held by or in the custody of the 
SAPS to other agencies involved in the investigation of financial crime. Section 
70 of the South African Police Service Act provides for a general prohibition on 
the unauthorised disclosure of information by a member of the SAPS. Section 70 
of the South African Police Service Act provides as follows: 
70. Unauthorised disclosure of information. —Any member 
who willfully discloses information in circumstances in which 
he or she knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, 
that such a disclosure will or may prejudicially affect the 
exercise or the performance by the Service of the powers or 
the functions referred to in section 215 [sic.] of the 
Constitution, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years. 
Although there is a general prohibition in respect of the disclosure of information, 
it applies only to a disclosure by a member of SAPS if the disclosure is or may be 
prejudicial to the performance by the Service, or to the powers or the functions of 
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SAPS referred to in section 215 [sic.] of the Constitution. A member wishing to 
make a disclosure must exercise caution before making such a disclosure, to 
ensure that it is not prejudicial or potentially prejudicial to the performance by the 
Service of the powers or the functions referred to in section 215 [sic.] of the 
Constitution. It is important to note that the reference to “section 215 of the 
Constitution”, as referred to above, is apparently a printing error or an erroneous 
reference, and that the legislator probably had section 205 of the Constitution in 
mind, which is the relevant section of the 1996 Constitution dealing with the 
establishment and objectives of the SAPS.   
The legal provisions providing the gateways for the disclosure of information per 
its different categories held by SAPS, thereby establishing the ability to share 
information between SAPS and other agencies, are identified and described in 
the sections below:  
4.5.3.1 Direct access to records and databases 
In view of the provisions of section 71 of the South African Police Service Act, it 
is inconceivable that any SAPS officer will authorise another investigative 
agency’s direct access to information held by SAPS or the SAPS database, in 
order to combat financial crime. Although it is technically possible for a SAPS 
officer to authorise another agency’s direct access to information held by SAPS 
or its databases for combating financial crime, no evidence of such an 
arrangement emerged during this research.   
4.5.3.2 Reporting obligations 
The SAPS is not exempt from the reporting obligations under section 34 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. It is conceivable that the 
reporting obligation under this section will apply to the SAPS only with regard to 
the SAPS becoming aware of new suspicions of offences, as referred to in section 
34, other than those that have already been reported under the reporting 
obligation of section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 
or that are being investigated by SAPS. 
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4.5.3.3 An ability, but not an obligation to provide information freely 
Section 70 of the South African Police Service Act does not exclude the possibility 
of a SAPS official disclosing information that does not fall within the ambit of the 
prohibition on the disclosure of information. It is therefore conceivable that under 
the provisions of section 70 of the South African Police Service Act, a member of 
SAPS could exercise discretion to disclose information in circumstances other 
than those where he or she knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, 
that such a disclosure will or may be prejudicial to the exercise or the performance 
by the SAPS of the powers or the functions referred to in section 205 of the 
Constitution.  
4.5.3.4 An obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
Section 71 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, dealing with access to 
information, provides that the National Director of Public Prosecutions may 
request that any person employed in or associated with, inter alia, SAPS to 
furnish him or her with all information that may reasonably be required for any 
investigation in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, and such person 
shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law that prohibits 
or precludes him or her from disclosing any information relating to the activities, 
affairs or business of any other person; or from permitting any person to have 
access to any registers, records or other documents, or electronic data that have 
a bearing on the said activities, affairs or business, furnish the National Director 
with such information and permit the Director to have access to any registers, 
records, documents, and electronic data that may contain such information. 
A summary of the analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways that enable other agencies to obtain information held 




© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
Table 4.12: Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by 
SAPS 
Categories of gateways in relation 
to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY SAPS 
 DPCI NPA FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
Yes No No No No 
Reporting obligation Yes No No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
4.5.4 Information held by the DPCI 
The discussion under paragraph 4.5.3 relating to information held by SAPS, 
applies to the DPCI. In addition, it must be borne in mind that section 17B of the 
South African Police Service Act determines that there is a requirement to ensure 
that, where appropriate, the DPCI implements a multidisciplinary approach and 
an integrated methodology involving the cooperation of all relevant government 
departments and institutions. 
In this research and especially in this chapter it has emerged that cooperation 
between the relevant agencies to a considerable extent concerns the capability 
or at least potential of sharing information between the relevant agencies, and 
the existence of legal gateways to enable and ensure the flow of relevant 
information. An analysis of the South African Police Service Act indicates that it 
is possible to lawfully disclose information held by SAPS to other agencies. There 
are, however, no specific provisions regulating or prescribing the process for 
SAPS to disclose information to other agencies or for agencies to request that 
information in the context of “the cooperation of all relevant government 
departments and institutions”, as envisaged in section 17B of the South African 
Police Service Act. 
The legal provisions providing the gateways for the disclosure of information per 
the respective categories held by the DPCI, thereby establishing the ability to 
share information between the DPCI and other agencies, are identified and 
described in the sections below: 
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4.5.4.1 Direct access to records and databases 
The discussion in paragraph 4.5.3.1 is applicable to this heading. 
4.5.4.2 Reporting obligations 
The discussion in paragraph 4.5.3.2 is applicable to this heading. 
4.5.4.3 An ability, but no obligation, to provide information freely 
The discussion in paragraph 4.5.3.3 is applicable to this heading. 
4.5.4.4 An obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
The discussion in paragraph 4.5.3.4 is applicable to this heading. 
A summary of the analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways that enable other agencies to obtain information held 
by the DPCI, is provided in Table 4.13 below: 
Table 4.13: Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by the 
DPCI 
Categories of cooperation in 
relation to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY THE DPCI 
 SAPS NPA FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
Yes No No No No 
Reporting obligation Yes No No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
4.5.5 Information held by the NPA 
The National Prosecuting Authority Act provides for the general prohibition of the 
unlawful disclosure of information to any person that has come to the knowledge 
of another person in the performance of his or her functions in terms of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act or any other law. Section 41(6) of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act provides as follows: 
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(6) Notwithstanding any other law, no person shall without 
the permission of the National Director or a person 
authorised in writing by the National Director disclose to any 
other person— (a) any information which came to his or her 
knowledge in the performance of his or her functions in 
terms of this Act or any other law;  
(b) the contents of any book or document or any other item 
in the possession of the prosecuting authority; or  
(c) the record of any evidence given at an investigation as 
contemplated in section 28 (1), except—  
(i) for the purpose of performing his or her functions in terms 
of this Act or any other law; or  
(ii) when required to do so by order of a court of law.  
Although the National Prosecuting Authority Act does not explicitly exclude the 
prospect of the disclosure of information or data held by the NPA to another 
person, subject to the requirements provided, it does not make any special 
arrangements for procedures to enable other investigative agencies to obtain 
information or data, or for the disclosure of such information or data to other 
investigative agencies. 
The legal provisions providing the gateways for the disclosure of information as 
per the different categories held by the NPA, thereby establishing the ability to 
share information between the NPA and other agencies, are identified and 
described in the sections below: 
4.5.5.1 Direct access to records and databases 
Considering the provisions of section 41(6) of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act, it is inconceivable that the National Director or a person authorised in writing 
by the National Director will authorise the direct, unsupervised access to records 
and databases held by the NPA. 
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4.5.5.2 Reporting obligations 
In terms of section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 
a person in the employ of, inter alia, the NPA, holding a position of authority and 
who knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that any other 
person has committed an offence under Part 1, 2, 3 or 4, or section 20 or 21 
(insofar as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2; or the offence 
of theft, fraud, extortion, forgery or uttering a forged document, involving an 
amount of R100 000,00 or more, must report such knowledge or suspicion or 
cause such knowledge or suspicion to be reported to the police official in the 
DPCI referred to in section 17C of the South African Police Service Act. 
It is conceivable that the reporting obligation will apply only to a person holding a 
position of authority in the NPA in circumstances where the said offence came to 
the attention of the person holding a position of authority because of an internal 
matter, or where the commissioning of the said offence was not previously known 
to or investigated by SAPS or the DPCI. 
4.5.5.3 An ability, but no obligation, to provide information freely 
Under the provisions of section 41(6) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, a 
“person”, as envisaged in section 41(6) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 
will be able to disclose information to another agency if that “person” has 
permission of the National Director or a person authorised in writing by the 
National Director to disclose any information or if the disclosure is made for the 
purpose of performing his or her functions in terms of the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act or any other law. 
4.5.5.4 An obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
Under the provisions of section 41(6)(c)(ii) of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act, a “person” will potentially be able or obliged to disclose information held by 
the NPA to another agency in terms of a court order obtained, as envisaged in 
section 41(6)(c)(ii) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act. 
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An analysis of the provisions detailed above is summarised in Table 4.14 below 
and indicates the availability of legal gateways that enable other agencies to 
obtain information held by the NPA. 
Table 4.14: Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by the 
NPA 
Categories of cooperation in 
relation to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY THE NPA 
 SAPS DPCI FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No No 
Reporting obligation No Yes No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
4.5.6 Information held by the FIC 
Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act regulates and authorises the 
disclosure of information held by the FIC. Regarding the disclosure of that 
information, it is essential to consider that one of the objectives of the FIC is to 
share information with law enforcement authorities, supervisory bodies, 
intelligence services and SARS. 
The legal provisions providing the gateways for the disclosure of information per 
its different categories held by the FIC, thereby establishing the ability to share 
information between the FIC and other agencies, are identified and described in 
the sections that follow: 
4.5.6.1 Direct access to records and databases   
In terms of the provisions of Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
there are no legitimate prospects for agencies involved in the combating of 
financial crime to enable them to have direct access to records held by and 
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4.5.6.2 Reporting obligations 
In terms of section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 
a person in the employ of the FIC, holding a position of authority, who knows or 
ought reasonably to have known or suspected that any other person has 
committed an offence under Part 1, 2, 3 or 4, or section 20 or 21 (insofar as it 
relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2; or the offence of theft, fraud, 
extortion, forgery or uttering a forged document, involving an amount of R100 
000,00 or more, must report such knowledge or suspicion, or must cause such 
knowledge or suspicion to be reported to the police official in the DPCI referred 
to in section 17C of the South African Police Service Act. 
4.5.6.3 An ability, but no obligation, to provide information freely 
Section 44 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act provides that, where the FIC 
in the performance of its functions has reasonable grounds to suspect that an 
accountable institution, or any other person other than a supervisory body that is 
subject to the provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, has contravened 
or failed to comply with any provision of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, or 
any rule or guideline applicable to that accountable institution, or person that 
facilitates compliance with the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, it may, if it 
considers it appropriate to do so, refer the matter to, inter alia, a relevant 
investigating authority together with any recommendation the Centre considers 
appropriate. An investigating authority is defined in section 1 of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act as “an authority that in terms of national legislation may 
investigate unlawful activities”. 
In terms of section 40(7) of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, the FIC may 
make available any information obtained by it during an inspection of, inter alia, 
an organ of state. 
4.5.6.4 An obligation or ability to provide information only on request 
Section 40(1)(a) of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act states that no person is 
entitled to information held by the Centre, except an investigating authority inside 
the Republic, the South African Revenue Service, and the intelligence services, 
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which may be provided with such information subject to the written authority of 
an authorised officer if the latter reasonably believes that such information is 
required to investigate suspected unlawful activity or at the initiative of the FIC, if 
the FIC reasonably believes such information is required to investigate suspected 
unlawful activity. 
An “authorised officer” is defined in section 1 of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act as any official from the following entities: 
• The SAPS, authorised by the National Commissioner (of SAPS) to act 
under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
• The NPA, authorised by the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
to act under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
• An intelligence service, authorised by the Director-General of that 
service to act under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
• The SARS, authorised by the Commissioner for that Service to act 
under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 40(3) of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
the Director of the FIC may make such reasonable procedural arrangements and 
impose such reasonable safeguards regarding the furnishing of information 
referred to in, inter alia, subsection (1) (a) (as referred to above) as the Director 
of the FIC considers appropriate to maintain the confidentiality of that information. 
The provisions of sections 71 and 73 of Prevention of Organised Crime Act, as 
referred to in paragraph 4.5.5.2 above, also apply to the FIC. An analysis of the 
provisions detailed above is summarised in Table 4.15 below and indicates the 
availability of legal gateways that enable other agencies to obtain information held 
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Table 4.15:  Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by the 
FIC 
Categories of cooperation in 
relation to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY THE FIC 
 SAPS DPCI FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No No 
Reporting obligation No Yes No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
4.6 OPERATIONALISING INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
As is abundantly evident, a prerequisite for effective inter-agency cooperation in 
the combating of financial crime is the exchange of information between 
agencies. To enhance inter-agency cooperation, countries must make progress 
and develop operational models that make the most efficient use of the legal 
gateways that exist for the sharing of information. The failure of agencies or 
departments to link information/intelligence often plagues complex financial crime 
investigations (FATF, 2012:11). Mechanisms that can be employed to promote a 
productive exchange of information and inter-agency cooperation are as follows: 
• Establishing information-sharing systems whereby all incorporated 
investigative agencies would be aware of previous or ongoing 
investigations carried out against the same persons and/or legal 
entities, and avoiding replication.  
• Conducting conflict resolution discussions and promoting cross-
fertilisation. 
• Establishing policies and procedures that promote the sharing of 
information/intelligence within intra-agency and inter-agency 
cooperative frameworks; such policies and procedures should 
promote the strategic sharing of the necessary information.  
• Establishing a process whereby intra-agency or inter-agency disputes 
are resolved in the best interests of the investigation. 
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• Competent authorities should consider establishing written 
agreements such as MoUs or similar agreements to formalise these 
processes. 
 
The central themes emerging from the participants’ answers were listed and 
interpreted, using a content analysis for interpreting the response to question 4.5 
in the interview schedule, “What do you think are the benefits of cooperation and 
collaboration among the revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-
laundering regulators and other government agencies during the combating of 
financial crime? Please substantiate your answer”. These themes are presented 
in the frequency table, Table 4.16 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-ended 
question where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, 
and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the 
participants could therefore have provided more than one theme in response to 
the question. 
 
In response to the question regarding the benefits of cooperation and 
collaboration between the revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-
laundering regulators and other government agencies during the combating of 
financial crime (question 4.5 in the interview schedule), the participants offered a 
diverse variety of themes (24 themes identified). The frequency of recurring 
themes is too low to provide meaningful categories or new ideas about the 
benefits of cooperation and collaboration. Each of the participants has his/her 
own view about the benefits of cooperation and collaboration. Each of the benefits 
as viewed by the participants has its own merits and underscores the importance 
of sharing of information between agencies during the combating of financial 
crime. Many of the themes identified are broadly consistent with the literature. 
To obtain a better understanding of the views held by the participants regarding 
the benefits of sharing information (Table 4.8 – paragraph 4.8) and cooperation 
and collaboration (Table 4.16 – paragraph 4.8), the researcher compared the 
common themes emerging from their answers provided in Table 4.8 (paragraph 
4.8) and Table 4.16 (paragraph 4.8). The following themes are common to the 
ones presented in Tables 4.8 (paragraph 4.8) and 4.16 (paragraph 4.8): 
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• The same information is viewed from different perspectives 
• It creates several propositions for prosecution 
• It clarifies mandates among the respective agencies 
• Data held by various agencies can be compared 
• More cost-effective 
• Guides prioritisation 
 
The themes listed above are uppermost in the minds of the participants when 
considering cooperation and sharing of information between agencies. 
Examples exist where several countries have developed operational models for 
enhancing the exchange of information and cooperation, thus enabling agencies 
to work together for their mutual benefit. These operational models should not be 
viewed separately but rather as part of a strategy, requiring agencies to 
coherently move forward in the same direction towards a common goal. Ideally, 
agencies should endeavour to move beyond the gateways for sharing 
information, but from a practical viewpoint they should add mechanisms for 
working together and sharing knowledge and skills (OECD, 2013:104).  
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to Question 4.6 in the 
interview schedule, “From your experience and observations, can you describe 
how the agencies responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa are 
arranged?”, the central themes emerging from the participant’s answers were 
listed and are presented in the frequency table, Table 4.17 (paragraph 4.8). This 
was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were provided from which they could 
choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
theme in response to the question. 
The frequency of the themes recurring is too low to provide meaningful categories 
or a definitive idea of how the agencies responsible for combating financial crime 
in South Africa are arranged. The following themes emerging from the answers 
by the participants, as presented in Table 4.17 (paragraph 4.8), are consistent 
with those found in the literature: 
• Various agencies conduct financial crime investigations 
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• SAPS/DPCI is the leading agency to conduct financial crime 
investigations 
• Different aspects of financial crimes are pursued by different agencies 
• Agencies operate in silos 
 
Participant P003, as well as all other participants during the interview, was asked 
the question, “From your experience and observations, can you describe how the 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa are arranged? 
(question 4.6 in the interview schedule). The participant, who wished to remain 
anonymous, explained to the researcher that the current arrangement of 
agencies to combat financial crime is divided into three areas, each focusing on 
a different category of operational capability, namely regulatory enforcement, 
detection of financial crime, and resolving of financial crime (Participant P003, 
2017). The participant then proceeded to list the agencies under each operational 
capability together with its responsibility. The researcher developed a graph to 
illustrate the arrangement of the agencies in accordance with the exposition 
provided by the participant (Participant P003, 2017). The graph, illustrating the 
arrangement of the agencies, is shown in Figure 4.3 (paragraph 4.8). 
 
From a practical point of view, there is no real limit, barring legislative constraints, 
to the ways in which agencies can be arranged in organisational structures to 
work together (OECD, 2013:103). From the literature it emerged that 
internationally there are several operational models available that demonstrate 
the possibility that agencies could make structural arrangements to enable them 
to work together, based on their requirements and experience. These operational 
models have been identified as consisting of four primary structures (OECD, 
2013:103): 
• Joint investigation teams 
• Inter-agency centres of intelligence 
• Secondment and co-location of personnel 
• Other models 
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The above-mentioned operational models are evaluated and discussed in 
Chapter 5, as approaches to enable effective cooperation, coordination and 
sharing of information during efforts to combat financial crime. 
4.6.1 Joint investigation teams 
By nature, financial crimes are complex and sophisticated. Criminal activity may 
include several crimes that are interconnected. Different agencies may be 
involved in the investigation of different crimes that interconnect. Although there 
may be legal gateways in place to share information between the agencies 
involved in investigating the various offences, in several countries joint 
investigation teams are used to enable agencies to cooperate directly in the 
investigation of the various offences. Such mechanisms allow for several 
agencies to share information directly and coordinate their investigations to make 
the best use of their specific technical skills and legal powers. Joint investigation 
teams offer the following benefits (OECD, 2013:104): 
• Enables officials from different agencies to develop a network of 
contacts 
• Increases the level of understanding of each other’s work 
• Improves efficiency of other areas of cooperation 
• Enables cost savings by reducing duplication during parallel 
investigations 
  
In South Africa, investigative agencies often cooperate by forming joint 
investigation teams comprising specialists from the various agencies. Where 
SARS assigns officials to joint investigation teams, a SARS official may not use 
the legislative powers to conduct criminal investigations into tax offences or to 
obtain information during the administration of the tax Acts with the objective of 
furthering investigations into offences other than a tax offence. Where criminal 
conduct includes other offences as well as tax offences, the SARS will cooperate 
but run its own parallel investigation and share information with the joint 
investigation team in accordance with the provisions of the legal gateways 
provided (Sections 67(1) and (2) of the South African Revenue Service Act). 
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 4.6.2 Inter-agency centres of intelligence 
These are centres for intelligence that are organised in different ways and for 
different purposes. They are generally established to coordinate exchanges of 
information and in some cases, the transfer of practical skills between agencies. 
In some instances, inter-agency centres of information may be established to 
focus on operational or strategic information. Operational information relates to 
specific information or investigations. Strategic Information relates to the 
assessment of specific risks or threats. In some instances, the centre performs 
analyses of information obtained directly or from other agencies, or obtained via 
legal gateways for information sharing, or by means of its own information-
gathering powers where they exist. Inter-agency centres of intelligence offer the 
following benefits (OECD, 2013:210): 
• Cost-effective way of obtaining intelligence and conducting analysis 
• Each agency gains access to a broader range of experts than what it 
would generally employ 
• Staff gain experience in the legal and practical aspects of information 
sharing, which can be used to improve the effectiveness of legal 
gateways 
 
An international example of an inter-agency centre of intelligence is the Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACC). The ACC is overseen by an inter-
agency board, comprising members of the tax administration, federal police, state 
and territory police, the Customs and Border Protection Service, the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission, the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation and the Attorney-General’s department. The ACC has enforceable 
powers, enabling it to source information that may be unavailable through 
traditional methods, and in addition maintains the national criminal intelligence 
database (OECD, 2013:119). The ACC has since been replaced by the Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), which commenced duties on 1 July 
2016. It was established through the merger of the ACC and Australia’s Police 
CrimTrac Agency. The example of the ACC and ACIC is provided here to 
illustrate the composition of the inter-agency board as represented by the various 
agencies. 
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During this research, the existence of a government body within the intelligence 
structures, styled as the NICOC became evident. From the information provided 
during the interviews, it appears that NICOC may be representative of a domestic 
example of an inter-agency centre of intelligence. The researcher could not 
establish the availability of any official documentation regarding the work of 
NICOC with regard to the combating of financial crime. According to a participant 
(Participant P003, 2017), NICOC “plays a pivotal role in the sharing of actionable 
information between government agencies and industry stakeholders”. 
4.6.3 Secondment of personnel between agencies 
In some countries, secondments and co-location of personnel are used as an 
instrument to improve collaboration between agencies. This instrument augments 
the efficiency of other arrangements for inter-agency cooperation. It has the 
additional benefit of improving the capability of agencies to recognise the 
potential for cooperation and to increase the speed and efficiency of information 
sharing. It enables officials to work near one another.  It furthermore encourages 
the exchange of skills and networking between officials, who often help to build 
prospects for continued future cooperation. In several countries, arrangements 
exist for secondments of officials between separate agencies. (OECD, 
2013:118).   
In South Africa, section 17F (2) of the South African Police Service Act makes 
provision for the secondment of personnel from any other government 
department or institution to the DPCI in order to ensure, whenever necessary, the 
adequate performance of the functions of the DPCI. In terms of the provisions of 
section 17F (3) of the South African Police Service Act, the DPCI shall be assisted 
in the performance of its functions by personnel seconded by the relevant 
government departments or institutions, which may include personnel from the 
SARS, the FIC, and the Department of Home Affairs. According to the provisions 
of section 17F (4) of the South African Police Service Act, the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions must ensure that a dedicated component of prosecutors 
is available to assist and cooperate with members of the Directorate in conducting 
its investigations. Section 17F (6) of the South African Police Service Act states 
that the Directorate shall be supported by the Crime Intelligence Division (CID) of 
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the SAPS to gather, correlate, evaluate, coordinate and use crime intelligence in 
the performance of its functions.  
The extent to which the DPCI makes use or has made use of the legal apparatus 
to second officials from other agencies to the DPCI is not known, and evidence 
of it has not emerged in this research. The aspect of the aspirations of the DPCI 
to implement a multidisciplinary approach is attended to in section 4.6.4 below.  
4.6.4 Multidisciplinary groups or task teams  
Large, complex financial investigations may require that multidisciplinary groups 
or task teams be assembled to ensure the efficient handling of the investigation, 
prosecution and eventual confiscation (FATF, 2012:10). It is judicious that there 
should be a strategic approach to intra-agency and inter-agency cooperation. 
This should be aimed at efforts to support sharing of information/intelligence 
within and between the various agencies participating in the group or team.  
Multidisciplinary groups or task teams may comprise a range of individuals, 
including specialised investigators, experts in financial analysis, forensic 
accountants, forensic computer specialists, prosecutors, and tax officials (FATF, 
2012:10). Such individuals may be appointed or seconded from other agencies, 
such as a regulatory authority, the FIU, a tax authority, or even drawn from the 
private sector on an as-needed basis. Multidisciplinary groups could possibly 
include individuals with the expertise necessary to analyse significant volumes of 
financial, banking, business and accounting documents, including wire transfers, 
financial statements and tax or customs records. They should also include 
investigators with experience in gathering business and financial 
information/intelligence, identifying elaborate illegal schemes, following the 
money trail, and using such investigative techniques as undercover operations, 
intercepting communications, accessing computer systems, and controlling 
delivery. 
Multidisciplinary groups should also include criminal investigators who have the 
necessary knowledge and experience in effectively using traditional investigative 
techniques within their legal mandates and within the parameters of the legal 
framework that governs their activities (FATF, 2012:11). Prosecutors also require 
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similar expertise and experience to present the case in court effectively. After 
assembling a multidisciplinary group or task team, it is imperative to maintain 
efficient and effective coordination between members of the team as well as all 
agencies involved. 
It is possible to conceive that the “multidisciplinary approach and an integrated 
methodology”, as referred to in section 17B(b)(i) and the provision for 
secondment of personnel from other agencies, as provided for in section 17F of 
the South African Police Service Act, is a hybrid between the models, 
secondment of personnel between agencies (refer to par. 4.6.3) and 
multidisciplinary groups or task teams. 
4.6.5 Multi-agency task forces 
Where agencies have different information gathering and sharing powers (as is 
the case on the domestic front), multi-agency task forces have proved to be a 
notable model for effective cross-agency collaboration (Inquiry into financial …, 
2015:7). The Australian Project Wickenby is mentioned as a notable example of 
an efficient task force that combined expertise and resources from various 
agencies working together in a collaborative manner to achieve common goals 
(Inquiry into financial …, 2015:10). The Project Wickenby multi-agency task force 
was established in 2006 to protect the integrity of Australia's financial and 
regulatory systems by preventing people from promoting or participating in the 
abusive use of secret havens (OECD, 2013:23). The Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO) was the lead agency of the overall project. The other participating agencies 
in the project were the ACC, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, the FIU, the Attorney-General's Department and the Australian 
Government Solicitor. Legislation that was specially enacted enabled agencies 
to share information more widely for the purposes of Project Wickenby 
investigations than was generally allowed.  
It was announced in 2015 that the very successful Project Wickenby was to be 
terminated in 2015 and replaced by a new task force styled named the “Serious 
Financial Crime Taskforce” to build on the excellent work done during the 
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existence of Project Wickenby. It draws on the best practice and experience 
gained during Project Wickenby, and for different agencies to extend their 
cooperative reach across the broader financial crime risk (Inquiry into financial 
…, 2015:14). One of the views expressed by the committee conducting the 
Inquiry into Financial Crime by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement (Inquiry into financial …, 2015:14) was that multi-agency task forces 
have more effective arrangements in the sharing of information and intelligence, 
something that would otherwise not have been possible in a non-task-force 
setting. A South African example of a joint investigation team comprising 
specialists from different agencies is the ACTT. A discussion of the ACTT follows 
in Chapter 5, par. 5.9.2.4. 
4.6.6 Other models 
Other models for improved cooperation include shared databases, intelligence 
briefings, and training sessions between agencies and joint committees. These 
approaches, of which some are quite pioneering in nature, often supplement 
other models for sharing information or enhanced cooperation (OECD, 
2013:120). In South Africa, there are mechanisms for enabling joint working 
ventures, which include inter-agency committees under the control of different 
government departments or ministries (OECD, 2013:123). There is the MAWG, 
which seeks to improve compliance and identify system solutions to failures in 
the finance and procurement system. The central themes emerging from the 
participants’ answers were listed and interpreted, using a content analysis for 
interpreting the response to question 4.7 in the interview schedule, “Are you 
aware of any available models that can be applied or modified for domestic 
application to improve sharing of information, coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration among agencies in their efforts to combat financial crime more 
effectively? If so, please describe what these models entail.” The themes are 
presented in the frequency table, Table 4.18 (paragraph 4.8). This was an open-
ended question where the participants could provide their own answers to the 
question, and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of 
the participants could therefore have provided more than one theme in response 
to the question. 
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The participants provided a description or an example of a variety of models they 
believe can be applied or modified for domestic application to improve sharing of 
information, coordination, cooperation and collaboration among agencies in their 
efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. The frequency of recurring 
themes is, however, too low to discover consistent ideas. Some of the themes 
identified from the answers provided by the participants corresponded to the 
examples found in the literature.  
The participants, including Participant P003 (2017), were asked question 4.7 in 
the interview schedule, “Are you aware of any available models that can be 
applied or modified for domestic application to improve sharing of information, 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration among agencies in their efforts to 
combat financial crime more effectively? If so, please describe what these models 
entail”. The participant, wishing to remain anonymous, provided the following 
exposition to the researcher (Participant P003, 2017): 
Formal information-sharing models and mechanisms that are focused on 
improving the sharing of information, coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
are the following, in accordance with their individual mandates:  
• Government 
o National Intelligence Coordinating Committee  
o Financial Intelligence Centre  
o ACTT up to 2015 
• Sectoral Partnerships 
o Business Against Crime South Africa 
o Insurance Industry 
▪ South African Insurance Association 
▪ South African Insurance Crime Bureau 
o Banking Industry 
▪ South African Banking Risk and Information Centre 
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o Retail Industry 
▪ Consumer Goods Council South Africa 
o Vehicle Rental and Leasing Industry 
▪ Southern African Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association 
o Petroleum Industry 
▪ Petroleum Security Initiative 
o Mining Industry 
▪ Chamber of Mines 
o Tourism Industry 
▪ Tourism Business Council of South Africa 
The above answer is an indication that there are efforts underway between 
Government and sectorial partnerships regarding the sharing of information, and 
that these efforts can be regarded as formal models for cooperation and sharing 
of information. The participant’s answer also provides insight into the various 
business sectors and the initiatives established to cooperate and share 
information. The participant did not elaborate on how the information-sharing 
models and mechanisms that are focused on improving the sharing of 
information, coordination, cooperation and collaboration are to be 
operationalised. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
Sharing of information between agencies responsible for combating financial 
crime and inter-agency cooperation is a fundamental and essential requirement 
for effective combating of financial crime. In this chapter, the researcher identifies 
and analyses the arrangements available internationally for ensuring inter-
agency cooperation and integration of efforts by the various key agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime, as well as how to do so effectively. For 
practical purposes, the available arrangements for inter-agency cooperation are 
categorised and sub-categorised as follows: 
• Key agencies responsible for combating financial crime 
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o Identification of the key agencies responsible for combating     
financial crime 
o Role of agencies during the various stages of combating financial 
crime  
• Sharing of information as a prerequisite for inter-agency cooperation 
o Legal gateways as requirement for sharing information 
o Legislative requirements and conditions for sharing information 
o When and how information can be shared 
• Operational arrangement between agencies for enhanced inter-
agency cooperation 
 
In this chapter, the identification of the key agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime, as well as their main activities in the international spectrum, are 
determined. The analysis focused on their South African counterparts, according 
to the literature and feedback from participants. The principal agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa, according to the 
literature and feedback from participants, are graphically depicted in Figure 4.2 
(paragraph 4.8). 
 
Government agencies are at various stages involved in the combating of financial 
crime. These stages may include prevention, gathering of intelligence, detection, 
investigation, prosecution as well as recovery and taxing the proceeds of crime. 
The roles of the key agencies in the various stages of combating financial crime 
are divided among the respective agencies, and these roles are summarised in 
Table 4.7 (paragraph 4.8). These institutions may generally, as the OECD 
(2013:30-42) survey indicates, include revenue authorities, customs authorities, 
financial intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies (police), specialised 
investigation agencies, authorities or units, and prosecution authorities (refer to 
Figure 5.1 – paragraph 5.14).   
Sharing of information as a prerequisite for better cooperation between the 
agencies is dependent on the existence of legal gateways that allow for the legal 
exchange of information between the various key agencies. The legal gateways 
provide for various reporting obligations and the potential of sharing information 
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or having access to information. The various legal gateways, as presented in 
South African legislation relevant to the various agencies, are analysed and 
commented on. Operational arrangements for sharing of information are 
dependent on the existence of legal gateways to enable the lawful exchange of 
information. Regarding the sharing of information among various agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime, it has been established that there are 
four different categories of cooperation determined by legislation, namely:  
• Direct access 
• A legal obligation to provide information 
• Spontaneous disclosure of information 
• Provision or disclosure of information only on request 
 
These categories are then contextualised to the South African legislative 
provisions for sharing of information between the various agencies and 
summarised accordingly. The process of sharing or disclosing information 
between the respective agencies is determined in accordance with the various 
requirements and conditions in the legal provisions that provide the legal 
gateways. Once the legal gateways in existence between the agencies for 
sharing information had been determined, an analysis of the legal gateways was 
undertaken. The result of the analysis is presented in tables, showing the 
possibility of exchanges of information between the respective agencies. Sharing 
or disclosure of information can be undertaken between agencies in accordance 
with the various categories for information sharing (refer to Tables 4.11 to 4.15 
above in this chapter). 
 
The failure between agencies to link information/intelligence can hamper complex 
financial investigations. To make the most efficient use of gateways for sharing 
information, agencies have to advance and develop operational arrangements, 
i.e. to give effect to the intention to enhance cooperation, which enables agencies 
to work together for their mutual benefit. In this chapter, the various operational 
arrangements in existence among countries surveyed by the OECD (2013) who 
are making optimal use of existing legal gateways, are identified and analysed. 
Operational models for enhanced cooperation should not be viewed in isolation 
but rather as part of a strategy requiring agencies to have a common line of sight 
314 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
onto their common objective and how to achieve it by means of mutual 
cooperation. From a practical viewpoint, barring legislative constraints, there is 
no limit to the ways in which agencies are capable of working together 
operationally. The following examples of operational arrangements models were 
presented and evaluated. To a certain extent, some have been applied in South 
Africa, with varying levels of success and transparency: 
• Joint investigation teams 
• Inter-agency centres of intelligence  
• Secondment of personnel 
• Other models 
 
In the next chapter, the management principle known as a Whole-of-Government 
approach is examined and explained. The prospect of applying Whole-of-
Government as an approach to more efficiently operationalising cooperation, 
coordination and sharing of information among the various key agencies is 
evaluated. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether the Whole-of-
Government approach could provide a model for ensuring that key agencies 
communicate effectively, make efficient use of legal gateways to share 
information, and cooperate and coordinate activities efficiently towards a 
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4.8 TABLES AND GRAPHS REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 4 
Table 4.1: Frequency table of participants’ listing the agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime 
Question 4.1: List the government agencies and/or investigative authorities responsible for 








FIC 10 100 
SAPS -  DPCI, Crime Intelligence 10 100 
SARS 10 100 
SARB 7 70 
NPA 6 60 
FSB 5 50 
SIU 5 50 
ACTT 3 30 
AFU 3 30 
National Treasury 3 30 
SSA 3 30 
NICOC 1 10 
IPID 1 10 
Witness Protection Unit 1 10 
Auditor General 1 10 
National Anti-corruption Forum 1 10 
Public Service Commission 1 10 
Department of Public Service and Administration 1 10 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts 1 10 
Public Protector 1 10 
IRBA 1 10 
National Credit Regulator 1 10 
Estate Agents Board 1 10 
Master of the High Court 1 10 
Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission 1 10 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1 10 
DTI 1 10 
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Figure 4.1: Participants’ frequency of themes regarding listing national 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime  
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Figure 4.2: Graph of the composition of the key agencies responsible for 
combating financial crime 
 
(Source: Analysis of the literature and feedback from participants presented in Table 4.1) 
 
Table 4.2: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on the 
responsibility of SARS to combat financial crime 
Question 4.2: What is the responsibility of SARS, regarding combating of financial crime? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




To conduct tax crime investigations 8 80 
Focus on tax crimes 1 10 
Investigate tax-related corruption  1 10 
Investigate tax fraud 2 20 
Enforcement of tax laws/legislation 3 30 
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Table 4.3: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on the 
responsibility of the SAPS to combat financial crime  
Question 4.2: What is the responsibility of the SAPS as regards combating of financial crime? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification of 
this theme  
Frequency of this 
theme (%) 
Crime prevention 2 20% 
Combat crime 2 20% 
Investigate crime 5 50% 




Investigate commercial crimes 5 50% 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
 
Table 4.4: Frequency table showing participants’ focus on the 
responsibility of the DPCI to combat financial crime  
Question 4.2: What is the responsibility of the DPCI as regards combating of financial crime? 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 
of this theme 
Frequency of 
this theme (%) 
Crime investigation 5 50 
Prevent national priority crimes 2 20 
Combat national priority crimes 2 20 
Investigate priority crimes 2 20 
Must implement a multidisciplinary approach 1 10 
Investigate organised financial crime  1 10 
Functions overlap with those of SAPS 1 10 
Investigate large and complex commercial crimes 1 10 




Investigation of priority commercial crime 1 10 
Conducting financial investigations 1 10 
Asset recovery investigations 1 10 
Investigate financial aspects of crime 1 10 
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Table 4.5: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on the 
responsibility of the FIC to combat financial crime 
Question 4.2: What is the responsibility of the FIC, as regards combating of financial crime? 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Making available information to other investigation agencies 3 30 
Gathering information 2 20 
Exchange of information with external agencies. 2 20 
Develops financial intelligence 2 20 
Combat money-laundering activities 2 20 
Identification of proceeds of unlawful activities 2 20 
Combat financing of terrorism 2 20 
Processing, analysing, and interpreting information disclosed to it 2 20 
Administrates the anti-money-laundering measures. 1 10 
Coordinate the exchange of information 1 10 
Protect the integrity and stability of financial systems 1 10 
Exchange information with FIUs in other countries 1 10 
Informing, advising, and cooperating with investigative authorities, 
supervisory bodies, the SARS and the intelligence services 1 10 
Monitoring and giving guidance to accountable institutions, 
supervisory bodies, and other persons regarding the performance 
of their duties and compliance with the provisions of FICA 1 10 
Retaining all information received pursuant to compliance with the 
provisions of FICA 1 10 
Identify money laundering 1 10 
Identify terrorist financing 1 10 
Gathering of intelligence 1 10 
Reporting and investigation in terms of the FICA  1 10 
Support to investigators 1 10 
Deal with SARs received from financial institutions 1 10 
Deal with the cash threshold reports fed from the financial 
institutions 1 10 
Detect if crime has been committed 1 10 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
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Table 4.6: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on the 
responsibility of the NPA to combat financial crime 
Question 4.2: What is the responsibility of the NPA as regards combating of financial crime? 
Participants’ themes or focus 
Quantification 




Criminal prosecution 4 66 
Prosecution of financial crimes (SCCU) 2 33 
Institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state 1 17 
Power to discontinue proceedings 1 17 
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Table 4.7: Different agencies’ roles in combating financial crime 
According to the Literature Key South African Agency Role in Combating FC 
Tax Administration South African Revenue Service  Tax administration 
detects, directs and 
conducts criminal 
investigation into tax 
crimes. Taxes proceeds 
of crime 
Customs Administration Customs Division within the 
SARS 
Customs administration 
detects, directs and 
conducts criminal 
investigation into tax 
crimes. Taxes the 
proceeds of crime 
Police and other law 
enforcement agencies 
South African Police Service  Combats financial crime 
and serious financial 
crime 
Financial Intelligence Units Financial Intelligence Centre 
(FIC) 
Detects the proceeds of 
crime, combats money 
laundering and financing 
of terrorism, and shares 
information with relevant 
investigation agencies. 
Maintains financial 
intelligence records and 
disseminates information 
Prosecution Authority NPA Institutes prosecution on 
behalf of the State, and 
carries out the functions 
incidental thereto 
Financial regulators South African Reserve bank; 
and 
Financial Services Board 
Maintains confidence in 
the financial system and 
takes measures aimed at 
detecting and addressing 
abuses of the products 
and services offered by 
financial institutions. 
Recovery of the proceeds of 
crime 
Asset Forfeiture Unit Applies the provisions of 
Chapters 4 & 5 of the 
POCA to seize criminal 
assets to its maximum 
effect 
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Table 4.8: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on the benefits 
of sharing information among agencies 
Question 4.3: What do you think are the benefits of sharing information among the revenue service, 
law enforcement, anti-money-laundering regulators and other government agencies in combating 
financial crime? Please substantiate your answer. 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Effective decision-making 2 20 
Not aware of any 1 10 
It is a prerequisite for cooperation 1 10 
It is a precondition for inter-agency cooperation 1 10 
It is required for all the stages of prevention, detection, investigation, 
prosecution and recovery of proceeds of crime. 
1 
10 




Establishes possible predicate offences 1 10 
Creates different options for prosecution 1 10 




It assists in clarifying an agency mandate to other agencies 1 10 
Data-matching can be performed 1 10 
Enforcement will be more effective and efficient 1 10 
Expedites appropriate actions 1 10 
Increases detection, prevention and prosecution 1 10 
Increases economic activity 1 10 
Increases investor confidence 1 10 
Increases revenue collection 1 10 
If applied correctly, the benefits can be huge 1 10 
More cost-effective 1 10 
Time-saving 2 10 
Better focus 1 10 
Informed prioritisation 1 10 
Better identification of ‘quick win’ cases 1 10 
The benefits can be huge 1 10 
It can prevent minor financial crimes from escalating 1 10 
Can demonstrate that we are a Whole-of–Government at work 1 10 
It enables an integrated understanding of the financial crime risks, 
threats, responses.  
1 
10 
It results in addressing financial crimes as a collective concern 
among all stakeholders. 
1 
10 




It empowers stakeholders in their efforts to combat financial crime as 
part of a Whole-of-Government and Societal Approach 
1 
10% 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
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Table 4.9: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on suggestions 
to improve sharing of information among government agencies  
Question 4.4: In your opinion, what can be done to improve sharing of information among 
government agencies in an effort to combat financial crime more effectively? 
 
Participants’ themes or focus 
Quantification 




Sharing of information should be contextualised by 
understanding its purpose, as each area has different needs for 
information 
2 20 
The political will to combat financial crime 1 10 
Appointment of suitably qualified persons as heads of agencies 1 10 
Appointment of suitably qualified personnel 1 10 
A Whole-of-Government approach should be adopted 1 10 
Government should prioritise financial crime as a specific focus 
area 
1 10 
A specific agency should take ownership of the execution of 
commonly-defined strategy 
1 10 
More guided effort should be undertaken to obtain relevant 
information 
1 10 
Change legislation to enable legal gateways between agencies 
to share information for cooperative purposes 
1 10 
Share common goals 1 10 
Interaction between agencies 1 10 
Use resources proactively and on time 1 10 
Sharing of information should be enforced and regulated by 
legislation 
1 10 
Compulsory monthly meetings between agencies 1 10 
Establish information-sharing platforms 1 10 
Establish a multidisciplinary unit 1 10 
Inclusive of all agencies involved in the combating of financial 
crime 
1 10 
Divide unit into teams led by investigator and prosecutor. 1 10 
Focus on crimes with potential to generate income for the State 1 10 
Focus on impactful cases 1 10 
Creation of a task force focusing on financial crime 1 10 
Model can be agreed on in terms of terms of reference where 
the principles are agreed 
1 10 
Needs the concurrence of all the affected ministers 1 10 
Sharing of information should be contextualised by 
understanding its purpose as each area has different needs for 
information 
2 20 
(Source:   Feedback from participants) 
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Table 4.16: Frequency table indicating the benefits of cooperation and 
collaboration between agencies.  
Question 4.5: What do you think are the benefits of cooperation and collaboration among the 
revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-laundering regulators and other government 
agencies during the combating of financial crime? Please substantiate your answer. 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Saves time  3 30 
More cost-effective 2 20 
Prevents duplication of efforts 2 20 
Better flow of information between agencies 1 10 
Assists in understanding each other’s mandate 1 10 
Assists in understanding each agency’s contribution towards 
specific issues 
1 10 
Allows for the pooling of resources for specific high-profile 
investigations 
1 10 
Better understanding among agencies regarding their activities 1 10 
Assist with matching data held by different agencies 1 10 
The same information is viewed from different perspectives 1 10 
Information is enhanced and reintegrated, providing prosecutors 
with the best options to advance a case. 
1 10 
It may establish predicate offences from which to advance an 
investigation 
1 10 
Better focus 1 10 
Informed prioritisation 1 10 
Better identification of ‘quick win’ cases 1 10 
See the picture from different angles 1 10 
Cooperation enables the flow of information  1 10 
From cooperation, collaboration follows, where required 1 10 
Action can be expedited 1 10 
Prevent dissipation of assets or destruction of evidence 1 10 
Prevents knee-jerk reactions when investigations must be done 
under pressure, when red flags were visible, but information was 
not shared 
1 10 
Enables a more effective and coordinated, integrated and 
strategic approach towards the combating of serious crimes, 
including financial crime 
1 10 
Assists in the establishment of an integrated or Whole of 
Government approach towards collaboratively reducing the threat 
of financial crime 
1 10 
It enables the utilisation of a broad range of legal mandates and 
legal instruments to address the business system of crime 
1 10 
(Source:   Feedback from participants) 
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Table 4.17: Frequency table listing participants’ themes describing the 
institutional arrangement of agencies to combat financial crime  
Question 4.6: From your experience and observations, can you describe how the agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa are arranged? 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Various agencies conduct financial crime investigations. 3 30 
SAPS is the leading agency to conduct financial crime investigations 2 20 
Agencies operate in silos. 2 20 
They are arranged in several ministerial departments for political 
oversight 
2 20 
Other agencies conduct financial investigations in support of SAPS: 1 10 
Different aspects of financial crimes are pursued by different agencies, 1 10 
National and regional offices 1 10 
Sometimes task teams are established 1 10 
Regulatory enforcement 1 10 
Detection 1 10 
Resolving crime, 1 10 
Civil recovery litigation 1 10 
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Figure 4.3: Arrangement of agencies to combat financial crime in 

























































SARB - Economic growth and financial stability 
FSB – Non-banking financial services and market conduct 
FIC – Protect the integrity and stability of the SA financial system 
National Treasury – Financial systems of Government 
SARS - Taxation 
SAPS – Economic, financial, and commercial crime investigation 
FIC – Financial intelligence 
DPCI - Economic, financial, and commercial crime investigation, 
Financial and asset forfeiture investigation 
SSA – Securing sustainable growth and development of the SA 
economy 
SIU – Civil litigation – corruption, malpractice and maladministration 
SAPS – Crime intelligence - proceeds 
SARS - Tax 
National Treasury – Government financial systems 
SIU - Investigation of corruption, malpractice and maladministration 
SARS – Tax fraud 
NPA – Serious Commercial Crime Unit 
National Treasury – Government financial systems 
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Table 4.18: Frequency table listing participants’ models to improve 
sharing of information, coordination, cooperation and collaboration among 
agencies 
Question 4.7: Are you aware of any available models that can be applied or modified for domestic application 
to improve sharing of information, coordination, cooperation and collaboration among agencies during efforts 
to combat financial crime more effectively? If so, please describe what these models entail. 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Task teams such as the ACTT 2 20 
Not aware of any 1 10 
Netherlands Tax and Customs administration criminal investigations (FIOD) 1 10 
A centralised agency: nodal point for case management and evaluation of 
completed cases, develops networks of cooperation; establishes and 
maintains partnerships for sharing information; Explores new strategies and 
techniques to combat money laundering 
1 10 
Coordinating agency consisting of representatives of the different agencies. 1 10 
Coordinating agency responsible for giving operational guidance and 
coordinating intelligence that directs the activity of the agencies 
1 10 
Secondments of personnel between agencies 1 10 
Joint Investigation teams on a small scale and case-by-case basis 1 10 
Collaboration with special interest groups on digital Web-based platforms 1 10 
Must have a prosecutorial component 1 10 
Must have sufficient teams, adequately staffed 1 10 
One agency has the responsibility for directing and conduction investigations 1 10 
Agencies conduct investigations under the auspices of the public prosecutor 1 10 
Specialist agency is constituted outside the departmental framework but 
under the auspices of a ministry to conduct investigations 
1 10 
The police or the public prosecutor has the responsibility for conducting all 
investigations 
1 10 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), UK  1 10 
A permanent task team for the purposes of combating financial crime as part 
of an integrated anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering strategy 
1 10 
High-level body responsible for setting policy in the fight against financial 
crime. 
1 10 
Collaboration that is joined together by way of memoranda of understanding 
or agreed terms of reference 
1 10 
The establishment of a dedicated task force 1 10 
The affected ministries must concur with the terms of reference 1 10 
There must be a lead department whose minister takes responsibility 1 10 
Formal Information-sharing models and mechanisms that are focused on 
improving sharing of information, coordination, cooperation  
1 10 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
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CHAPTER 5: WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The system to combat financial crime in South Africa is institutionalised into 
single-purpose agencies with vertical responsibilities for combating certain 
aspects of financial crime at various stages. Certain agencies operate in isolation. 
They work in silos, and their efforts have become fragmented, with the result that 
cooperation and coordination suffer, which renders their efforts ineffective. 
Agencies carry out their efforts in parallel and focus on their own piece of the 
puzzle. 
 
Montesh (2009:192) argues against the implementation of what he terms a “multi-
agency approach” to deal with organised crime, corruption, and financial or 
economic crime. According to Montesh (2009:192), a multi-agency approach has 
proved to be problematic and inefficient, adding that it has become an 
international norm that a single-agency approach is used to deal with organised 
crime, corruption, and financial or economic crime (a multi-agency should not be 
confused with a multi-purpose agency, where the latter is a reference to a single 
agency performing more than one purpose). The reference to “multi-agency” is 
seemingly a reflection on numerous agencies that have been assigned separate 
functions to safeguard South Africans against, among other things, financial or 
economic crime and to combat such crime. According to Montesh (2009:192) it 
is an international norm that a “single-agency approach” is used to solve these 
problems. Montesh (2009:192) therefore argues in favour of the establishment of 
a “single-agency approach”.  The reference to “single-agency” is a reference to 
one overarching agency taking responsibility for all the functions performed by 
the respective agencies in combating, among other things, financial and 
economic crime. The current system to combat financial crime in South Africa is 
organised into distinct and specialised “single-purpose” agencies. What Montesh 
is apparently referring to here is what Cilliers and Greyvenstein (2012:2) describe 
as “organisational silos”. However, since the publication of the research report by 
Montesh (2009), Government has strengthened the multi-agency approach with 
regard to combating financial crime, using multiple agencies. For example, the 
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legislator has enacted legislation that grants the SARS new and enhanced single-
purpose criminal investigative powers by covering only tax and customs offences 
(Sections 3(2)(f) and 44 of the Tax Administration Act and section 4D of the 
Customs and Excise Act (91 of 1964). This arrangement forms part of a multi-
agency approach.  
 
The arrangement of key investigative agencies in silo-based, single-purpose 
agencies provides an opportunity to explore alternative approaches such as a 
Whole-of-Government response to combat financial crime, favoured by the 
OECD, which focuses on increased inter-agency coordination and collaboration 
between single-purpose agencies.   
 
In Chapter 4 it was established that an essential requirement for effective 
cooperation between the main agencies involved in the combating of financial 
crime is the sharing of information. It was shown that various structural or 
organisational arrangements are available to facilitate cooperation and exchange 
of information between the main agencies. It was determined that in South Africa, 
various agencies have separate legal mandates regarding their roles and function 
during the various stages of combating financial crimes, and that there are 
various legal gateways for disclosing information in respect of each agency. 
Cooperation is arranged between agencies by using various legal and 
institutional arrangements or models, but fundamentally each agency remains 
responsible for its own role and mandate. 
 
However, in this research, the prospect is explored of using a Whole-of-
Government approach as a framework to harness the capacity of the existing 
single-purpose government agencies that are in existence, in order to combat 
financial crime more effectively. This chapter is concerned with examining the 
prospect of implementing Whole-of-Government approaches as a response to 
fragmented efforts to combat financial crime, and to enhance integration, 
cooperation, sharing of information, coordination and capacity. 
 
Accordingly, in this chapter, the Whole-of-Government approach, as a model to 
strengthen cooperation across the respective key agencies responsible for 
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fighting financial crime, is investigated as an enabler to integrate efforts to combat 
financial crime more effectively. This relates to the objectives and research 
question examined in this chapter, about determining what the concept Whole-
of-Government entails and how can it be applied or adapted for implementation 
by the Government to serve as a model framework to ensure effective multi-
agency cooperation and integration of efforts to combat financial crime. In this 
chapter, a conceptual model is proposed for implementing a Whole-of-
Government approach that can support the Government in implementing a 
system that uses all its key agencies to combat financial crime more effectively. 
The conceptual model serves to illustrate the prospect or possibility of having a 
single agency with multiple functionalities operating across institutional 
boundaries to achieve a common objective, namely to combat financial crime 
more effectively. 
5.2 PERSPECTIVES ON SILO FORMATION  
Ho (2017:18) declares that governments are organised into vertical silos, not 
unlike any large hierarchy. The literature and responses by participants in this 
research prove that the structures or arrangement of key agencies by 
Government to combat financial crime are organised in silos representing single-
purpose agencies. Besides, in this study it is highlighted that one of the 
shortcomings of the current system of multiple or single-purpose agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime is the fact that they function in silos. 
The short discussion below about organisational silos is presented to foster an 
understanding of the meaning and relevance of silos in the context of the 
discussion of a Whole-of-Government approach, as explained in this chapter.  
 
Cilliers and Greyvenstein (2012:9) assert that the concept of silos is often used 
in practice. As is evident in this research, this figure of speech is used by 
participants and in the literature to describe a form of organisational arrangement 
of the main government agencies, and is cited as a contributing factor as to why 
the current system is failing to combat financial crime. One of the limitations of 
multiple single-purpose agencies being responsible for combating financial crime 
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and which the Whole-of-Government approach aims to address is the formation 
of silos, as it inhibits cooperation and fosters a fragmented approach.  
 
The reference to ‘silos’ is a metaphor used in the literature to describe 
organisational behaviour that refers to grain silos (Greenberg & Baron, as quoted 
by Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012:3). In the literature, silos have also been 
compared figuratively to a tube (Mulgan, 2005:177). The image provided by 
Mulgan (2005:177) is one where “the tubes or silos [represent conduits] down 
which money flows from [the] government to people and localities” and is part of 
the reason why the Government is inept at solving problems. Silos provide an 
image of how, for example, the respective key agencies of an organisation, in this 
case the State, function in a manner that is disconnected from the others (Cilliers 
& Greyvenstein, 2012:2). Cilliers and Greyvenstein (2012:2) maintain that the 
concept is based on the traditional view and systematic way in which 
organisations are structured. Silo structures often emerge as a feature of 
differentiation and specialisation, which is one of the hallmarks of a traditional 
bureaucracy (Weber, as quoted by Finn & Bannister, 2010:122). Mulgan 
(2005:177) posits that vertical organisations by their nature angle government 
efforts away from certain functions, such as prevention, stating that the benefits 
of preventive action often flow to another department. Mulgan (2005:177) argues 
that over time, “siloed” organisations reinforce a tendency common to many 
bureaucracies of devoting more energy to the protection of turf than to serving 
the public.  
 
The silo metaphor is used to signify dysfunction and fragmentation in 
organisations (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012:2). It is likened to the left hand not 
knowing what the right hand is doing. It creates an image of one silo (individual 
or single-purpose agency) in the organisation being in opposition to the other 
silos (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012:2). According to Cilliers and Greyvenstein 
(2012:3), silos create barriers, fragmenting organisations, and in doing so create 
an “us and them mentality”, which makes crossing the boundaries difficult. The 
nature of silos and the obstacles they present, as highlighted above, hampers 
integration of efforts between agencies and prevents cooperation and 
collaboration between the various agencies to combat financial crime effectively. 
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According to Finn and Bannister (c2010:122), coordination between activities in 
silo-oriented organisations tends to be poor and in some cases even non-
existent. This lack of coordination leads to anomalies that may include duplication 
of processes and data, conflicts in activities, inconsistency and replication of work 
(Finn & Bannister, c2010:122). 
 
A practical example of uncoordinated and fragmented approaches manifesting in 
silos emerged during a briefing delivered by the Home Affairs Director-General, 
Mkuseli Apleni, to the National Assembly Committee on Home Affairs (Meeting 
report BMA …, 2016). During the briefing, Mr Apleni, referring to control of South 
Africa’s borders, remarked that various structures had been put in place to 
coordinate the mandates and actions of the respective organs of state, including 
immigration control, customs control and border policing, and that these 
structures resulted in the emergence of a silo approach to border control, border 
law enforcement and border protection. These structures did not have authority 
and enforcement powers, and thus failed to address systemic and structural 
problems of the coordination model associated with fragmented border 
management. Ho (2017:18) claims that organisations that dismantle vertical silos 
encourage the natural horizontal flow of information, thereby improving the 
chances of forming connections that would otherwise have been hidden, and 
ensuring that complexities are discovered early. 
5.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION  
The term integration is often referred to in the literature in the context of Whole-
of-Government. Before a meaningful discussion on Whole-of-Government can 
commence, it is essential that the meaning and relevance of the words integrated, 
integrate or integration in relation to cooperation between agencies are 
understood. The DPCI has a clear objective and legal mandate to pursue an 
“integrated methodology” and “multidisciplinary” approach that involves requiring 
the cooperation of all relevant Government departments and institutions as part 
of its efforts to combat organised crime and serious commercial crime (Section 
17B of the South African Police Service Act). There are several practical 
examples where the concept of a multidisciplinary and integrated approach is 
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bandied about by heads of agencies or public officials in statements to the public. 
In the absence of conceptual clarity, the use of the concepts multidisciplinary and 
integrated approach in conjunction with, or to denote, the concept of Whole-of-
Government is sometimes confusing. It is not always clear in what context the 
term integration is used and what it means, given the context. 
 
The following analysis of the concepts integrated and multidisciplinary in the 
context of fighting financial crime is provided to clarify their usage and meaning, 
and to avoid confusion in the context of Whole-of-Government. Integration refers 
to the forming of a single multidisciplinary and inter-agency team to perform a 
task (The Integrated Approach …, 2010). Integration is driven by the process of 
resources from different agencies consisting of varied disciplines working 
alongside each other at several levels to ensure that their mandates and roles 
support each other to improve the impact of activities. The researcher interprets 
that the reference to various disciplines “working alongside each other” is an 
apparent reference to a multidisciplinary integration of the skills and knowledge 
that officials from other agencies may contribute to the effort or team. With regard 
to the scope and nature of integration, Ryan (2016:2) quotes the UK Stabilisation 
Unit (The Integrated approach, 2010), which states that: 
 
Integration is forming a single multidisciplinary and multi-
departmental team to take on a task. The task may be 
planning, it may be designing a programme, or it may be 
delivering a project. When asked to work together, government 
departments generally look to liaise or coordinate, to retain 
their own teams whilst negotiating with other departments. 
Experience from the field has shown in the complex, fast 
moving and highly pressurised environment of conflict this 
does not work. (my emphasis) 
 
Integration requires cooperation at the operational level, coordination at a mid-
level and an alignment of strategic objectives at a senior level (The Integrated 
Approach …, 2010). The aim of integration is to improve the flow of information, 
and to achieve a shared understanding of stabilising challenges and responses.  
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Integration should lead to a reduction of policies and delivery of public services in 
a manner opposed to the provision of services in silos (which is not the ideal 
situation). 
5.3.1 Integrated methodology 
Chapter 6A of the South African Police Service Act makes provision for the 
establishment of the DPCI. Section 17B(b)(i) in Chapter 6A of the Act provides 
that the DPCI implements, where appropriate, a multidisciplinary approach and 
an integrated methodology whereby the cooperation of all relevant government 
departments and institutions is recognised and considered. This provision clearly 
articulates in no uncertain terms the intentions and aspirations of the legislature, 
namely that the DPCI in fulfilling its objectives must ensure that it does so by 
using a multidisciplinary and integrated methodology.  
 
The South African Police Service Act does not explain the concept of a 
multidisciplinary approach and integrated methodology, although it does refer to 
the secondment of officials from other departments to the DPCI, as well as the 
cooperation of all relevant government departments. A multidisciplinary approach 
implies the involvement or mobilisation of all relevant investigative agencies 
(World Bank, 2009:5) to combat financial crime. The Council of the European 
Union (2011:17) provides some guidance on the rationale behind a 
multidisciplinary approach, when stating the following with regard to the 
combating of organised crime: “...acknowledging the multi-faceted aspects of 
organised crime and thus the necessity to forge a multi-disciplinary response.” 
Considering the multi-faceted aspects of financial crime, it can be argued that the 
same rationale for a multidisciplinary approach will apply to financial crime. A 
multidisciplinary approach is not an alternative to the criminal law approach to 
combating crime but should be a complementary strategy (Council of the 
European Union, 2012:3). 
 
Using a content analysis to interpret the response to the question (question 5.1 in 
the interview schedule), “In your own words, explain what an integrated 
methodology and multidisciplinary approach means to you”, the focus areas 
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emerging from the participant’s answers were listed and presented in the 
frequency table, Table 5.1 (paragraph 5.14). This was an open-ended question 
where the participants could provide their own answers to the question, and no 
choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of the participants 
could therefore have provided more than one answer in response to the question. 
 
There is little or no clarification or definition in South African literature regarding 
the meaning of integrated methodology and multidisciplinary approach in relation 
to combating of financial crime by the responsible agencies in South Africa. The 
question (question 5.1 in the interview schedule) was posed to the participants to 
shed light on the meaning of “integrated methodology and multidisciplinary 
approach”. A diverse variety of themes (28 themes) emerged from the feedback 
from the participants. The theme with the highest recurring frequency (50%) 
regarding the meaning of “integrated methodology and multidisciplinary approach 
is, “[i]t brings together different skills sets and expertise”. The low frequency of 
recurring themes in the remainder of the answers provided by participants is 
insufficient to enable the researcher to develop new ideas about the meaning of 
an “integrated methodology and multidisciplinary approach”. 
5.4 CONTEXTUALISING WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT  
The multi-agency approach can be equated to a theory and concept in the realm 
of public management sciences, referred to as New Public Management (NPM). 
A central principle of the NPM concept is that separate agencies each have 
specialised single roles, functions and tasks (single-purpose organisations). NPM 
organises public agencies into distinct and separate sectoral pillars or silos. They 
have specialised roles, functions and tasks, which would, at least in theory, make 
them more efficient, avoid overlap, produce clearer role enactment, assign 
accountability and lead to systematic changes (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011:13). 
 
A central principle of the NPM steering concept in the public management sphere 
is single-purpose organisations, which organise public organisations into distinct 
and separate sectoral pillar or silo. They have specialised roles, functions and 
tasks, which would, in theory, make them more efficient, avoid overlap, produce 
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clearer role enactment, assign accountability and lead to systematic changes 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2011:13).  
 
After many years of applying NPM, there is a change of emphasis away from 
structural devolution, disaggregation, and single-purpose organisations toward a 
Whole-of-Government approach (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007:1059). 
Christensen and Lægreid (2011:13) argue that the horizontal challenge has 
become greater than the vertical because the number of sectoral pillars or silos 
that have been created appears to obstruct solutions to horizontal problems, 
bringing about greater fragmentation and complexity. It strains political and 
administrative leaders’ capacity to solve problems in society (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2011:15). The discontent regarding fragmentation and complexity is 
concomitant with the problems identified by Montesh in his thesis (2009:192) and 
the general theme of the OECD conference arguing in favour of a Whole-of-
Government approach. At the OECD conference, the notion of a Whole-of-
Government approach was introduced during the conference proceedings as a 
means to combat financial crime more effectively (The launch of the Oslo 
Dialogue…, 2011). In response to the greater complexity and fragmentation 
brought about by NPM, there is now an increased focus on the idea of increased 
inter-agency coordination and collaboration. According to Ho (2017:17), given the 
complexity of today’s environment, interdisciplinary collaboration is essential for 
solving the significant challenges. Ho (2017:17) concludes by saying “there has 
to be a lot of internal coordination, and sharing of information.” 
 
Several of the countries participating at the OECD Tax and Crime Conference in 
Oslo, Norway in 2011 have experience in the Whole-of-Government approach 
(Colgan, Kennedy & Doherty, 2014:15). These countries include Canada, 
Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Finland and the Netherlands (The Launch of the 
Oslo Dialogue ..., 2011).  As indicated in the previous paragraph, it was during 
this conference that the notion of a Whole-of-Government approach was 
proposed. The proposal was put forward as a solution to “weak inter-agency 
cooperation” and to promote “greater transparency, more strategic intelligence 
gathering and improved efforts to harness the capacity of various government 
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agencies to work together to detect, deter and prosecute these crimes [financial 
crimes]” (The Launch of the Oslo Dialogue ..., 2011). 
5.5 CONCEPTUALISING WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
According to Colgan, et al. (2014:9) it is fair to say that there is “difficulty in 
untangling the concept of Whole-of-Government.”  Definitions for Whole-of-
Government vary (Colgan et al., 2014:9). Colgan et al. (2014:09) highlight the 
following focus areas presented in various definitions to clarify the meaning of 
Whole-of-Government presented in the literature. The areas are summarised for 
comparison in Table 5.2 below: 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of focus in definitions for Whole-of-Government in 
the literature  
Focus Source 
“... enhance coordination and integration within public sectors 
...” (my emphasis).  
(The Efficacy Unit, 2009)  
“...seek to align incentives, structures and cultures of authority 
...” (my emphasis). 
(The Efficacy Unit, 2009)  
“... a shared goal and an integrated response ...” (my 
emphasis). 
(Connecting government …, 
2004:1)  
“... where the aim is to generate outcomes that cannot be 
achieved by units working in isolation.” (my emphasis) 
Halligan, Buick & O’Flynn, 
2011:75)  
(Source: Adapted from a summary of definitions in Colgan et al., 2014:09) 
 
The following definition, which is often quoted in the literature, is provided to aid 
in conceptualising the term Whole-of-Government: 
 
Wüole-of-Government denotes public service agencies 
working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared 
goal and an integrated government response to particular 
issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can 
focus on policy development, program management and 
service delivery (Connecting government …, 2004:1). 
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In analysing the above definitions and definitional focus areas identified by Colgan 
et al. (2014:9), as presented in Table 5.2 above, the following functional definition 
of Whole-of-Government was developed by the researcher to demonstrate its 
applicability as an enabler to combat financial crime more effectively: 
 
The Whole-of-Government approach in combating financial 
crime denotes key agencies working across portfolio 
boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated 
response to barriers preventing effective cooperation, 
collaboration, sharing of information and resources. 
Approaches can be formal and informal, focusing on 
policies and operational agreements to combat financial 
crime, and development and implementation of 
organisational structures to carry out Whole-of-Government 
work during efforts to combat financial crime. 
 
The concept of Whole-of-Government is referred to as joined-up government in 
the United Kingdom, while in Australia integrated or collaborative government are 
used as similar terms (Hunt, 2005:8). According to Hunt (2005:8), Whole-of-
Government likely refers to a “set of processes” that is intent on more integrated 
policy and service delivery outcomes for Government. Christensen and Lægreid 
(2011:17) conclude that Whole-of-Government appears to be mostly about 
working together in a practical and intelligent manner. Its distinguishing 
characteristic is that there is an emphasis on objectives shared across 
organisational boundaries, as opposed to working solely within an organisation 
(Connecting Government …, 2004:3). Ling (2002:616) provides more conceptual 
clarity by describing Whole-of-Government as an encapsulating term for a 
category of responses to address the problem of increased fragmentation of the 
public sector and utilities. The term is used where there is a desire to improve 
integration, coordination and capacity. Ho (2017:18) describes Whole-of-
Government as “an environment in which officers consider the spill-over effects 
of what they do and their impact on the policies and plans of other agencies”.  
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The focus areas emerging from the participants’ answers were listed and 
presented in the frequency table, Table 5.3 (paragraph 5.14), using a content 
analysis to interpret the response to the question (question 5.2 in the interview 
schedule), “Are you aware of an approach referred to as a Whole-of-Government 
approach, which aims for actions to more effectively combat financial crime?”. 
This was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were presented from which they could 
choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
answer in response to the question.  
 
The participants answered “no” with a frequency of 20%, “yes” with a frequency 
of 20%, and a 40% “heard of it” frequency regarding being aware of an approach 
referred to as a “Whole-of-Government approach”. Several other themes were 
presented by the participants, although the frequency of recurring themes was 
too low to discover any significant pattern or meaningful categories. The 
participants are of the view that the term Whole-of-Government is a buzzword 
that is lobbied about and used as a catchphrase that does not find practical 
application in the field.  
 
Participant P009, as well as all other participants during the interview, was asked 
the question (question 5.2 in the interview schedule), “Are you aware of an 
approach referred to as a Whole-of-Government approach, which aims for 
actions to more effectively combat financial crime?”. The participant, wishing to 
remain anonymous, provided the following answer to the researcher (Participant 
P009, 2017). 
 
No, I am not. However, the term Whole–of- 
Government approach may be a difficult term to 
understand unless it is simplified to the fact that all 
government departments that play a role in combating 
financial crime must cooperate and provide members 
to the teams to be formed under one collocated 
investigation and prosecution unit. (my emphasis) 
 
340 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
The exposition provided by the participant represents a conceptualisation of the 
term Whole-of-Government in the context of combating financial crime from the 
perspective of a practitioner (Participant P009, 2017). The theme of cooperation 
between all government departments that play a role in combating financial 
crime and the sharing of resources within a single body (single-agency 
performing more than one purpose) responsible for combating financial crime 
clearly comes to the fore. The participant’s response focuses on the investigation 
and prosecution of financial crime (Participant P009: 2017). The above-
mentioned answer is also applicable to the question posed to the participants 
regarding their understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in relation 
to the actions to combat financial crime effectively that are recorded in Table 5.4 
(paragraph 5.14). 
5.6 OPERATIONALISING WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
Implementing a Whole-of-Government approach starts with the development of 
a shared understanding of what it means to work in a Whole-of-Government 
manner (Melchor, 2008:5). Whole-of-Government requires a mentality among 
officials to willingly work together to achieve common outcomes benefiting society 
as a whole, as opposed to serving the specific interest of individual agencies (Ho, 
2017:18). According to Melchor (2008:5), this may involve some changes in 
structures and legislation, but most importantly it requires a change in 
organisational culture and individual expectation. Through a Whole-of-
Government approach, horizontal coordination and integration are implanted in 
the process of policy design and implementation (Melchor, 2008:6). The 
reference to public service agencies “working across portfolio boundaries”, as 
encountered in the definition of what Whole-of-Government means, is a reference 
to a large proportion of the collaborative activities undertaken between agencies 
on a day-to-day basis (Connecting Government …, 2004:9). An example is the 
constant contact between an FIU and a revenue authority on financial crime 
issues. It can thus be argued that the day-to-day realities of trying to work across 
boundaries will be the real challenge of Whole-of-Government work (Connecting 
Government …, 2004:9). This translates to what the researcher likens to a close 
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fellowship between the various agencies on a day-to-day basis in pursuit of a 
common goal or objective, irrespective of their own specific mandates. 
 
Ho (2017:18) asserts that although Whole-of-Government looks highly viable on 
paper, it is not easily achieved. Ho (2017:18) asserts that this might be because 
of a “deeply-ingrained bureaucratic instinct to operate in silos” that contributes to 
critical information not being shared. Institutional identity is so strong that it 
determines how an agency views national interests or priorities (Ho, 2017:18). 
For Whole-of-Government to work properly, the instinct to work in silos must be 
overcome. This requires of leaders to constantly remind officials that a Whole-of-
Government approach takes precedence over narrow, sectoral interests and 
views so that information can flow horizontally to reach other agencies (Ho, 
2017:18). 
 
Although the literature suggests that there is conviction about the effectiveness 
of Whole-of-Government responses, it warns about its ill-considered use, stating 
that it is costly and that competing political agendas could undermine its 
objectives (Connecting Government …, 2004:10). Literature suggests that 
Whole-of-Government approaches should not be undertaken as a response to 
dealing with everyday, straightforward issues. These can be addressed by means 
of a “culture of collaboration” to assist easy sharing of research, experience and 
expertise in dealing with obstinate problems (Connecting Government …, 
2004:10). 
 
The literature further suggests that Whole-of-Government could be especially 
useful to solve complex issues in what is sometimes referred to as ‘wicked 
problems’ (De Bri & Bannister, 2010 in Colgan et al., 2014:14). Wicked problems 
refer to far-reaching issues, such as crime, poverty, education and health. Ho 
(2017:14) says that wicked problems “hardly ever sit conveniently within the 
responsibility of one agency”. Ho (2017:14) also asserts that wicked problems 
tend to have many stakeholders, each of whom sees the problems from different 
perspectives and has his/her own goals. Ho (2017:15) concludes that no one 
agency is equipped to deal with a wicked problem in its entirety. Ho (2017:18) 
states that the Whole-of-Government approach is a significant response to 
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dealing with complexity and wicked problems. In what is regarded as being of 
great importance to this research is the suggestion in the literature that a Whole-
of-Government approach is suitable for ensuring that a specific issue is given 
joint priority and attention by the relevant agencies, for example, fighting financial 
crime (Connecting Government …, 2004:11). Whole-of-Government responses 
may also be suitable for a limited time to address a particular issue, as an 
approach to ensure that it is given joint priority and attention by the relevant 
agencies (Connecting Government …, 2004:11). 
 
In deciding whether a Whole-of-Government approach is an appropriate 
response, the literature suggests that every situation should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. Where issues are of such importance, the initiative to 
address the issue by using a Whole-of-Government approach may be the 
prerogative of Parliament or the political head of a department. In other instances, 
the challenge to Government is to realise when an issue is of such importance 
that it should be addressed by using a Whole-of-Government approach. 
Promoting and supporting a Whole-of-Government approach has been a 
common focus and priority for public administrations in a range of countries and 
international organisations, as is evident in the notion announced by the OECD 
for countries to respond to financial crime by using a Whole-of-Government 
approach (Connecting Government …, 2004:11). 
  
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
5.3 in the interview schedule), “What is your understanding of the Whole-of-
Government approach in relation to the actions to combat financial crime 
effectively?”, the focus areas emerging from the participant’s answers were listed 
and presented in the frequency table, Table 5.4 (paragraph 5.14). This was an 
open-ended question where the participants could provide their own answers to 
the question, and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some 
of the participants could therefore have provided more than one reply in response 
to the question. The frequency of the themes listed in Table 5.4 by the participants 
regarding their understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in relation 
to the actions to combat financial crime effectively expressed as a percentage is 
graphically depicted in Figure 5.1 (paragraph 5.14). 
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A diverse variety of themes emerged from the feedback from the participants in 
their response to their understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in 
relation to the actions to combat financial crime (question 5.3 in the interview 
schedule). The following recurring themes are meaningful, as they intersect with 
the objectives of Whole-of-Government as presented in the literature: 
• Coordination between departments (40% frequency of theme)  
• The Whole-of-Government and society to target crime as a collective 
concern and responsibility (30% frequency of theme) 
• Working towards a common goal/objective (30% frequency of theme) 
 
The participants have a broad understanding of the concept in relation to 
combating financial crime. However, other themes indicate that they are sceptical 
about its implementation. The participants are unsure about the 
operationalisation of a Whole-of-Government approach as an organisational 
approach or architecture for enabling single-purpose agencies to work across 
boundaries, and they did not provide new ideas about how to ensure its 
implementation. 
5.7 PRACTICAL UNDERPINNING OF WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
According to Christensen and Lægreid (2011:15), “A feature of Whole-of-
Government is the notion that working across organisational boundaries will 
enable more efficient and/or effective policy development, implementation and 
service delivery”. The trend is a move away from fragmentation and autonomous, 
single-purpose, silo-based agencies, towards integration, and multi-agency and 
collaborative partnership approaches (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011:15). This 
notion seems to be in agreement with the themes of interagency and multi-
agency cooperation between various agencies, sharing information and 
resources, and working together, encountered in the OECD narrative promoting 
the notion of a Whole-of-Government approach. Colgan et al. (2014:9) state that 
the justification for Whole-of-Government is as follows: 
• Eliminate silos  
• Prevent departments working in isolation from each other  
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• Achieve a seamless (integrated) Government approach 
• Avoid having various cross-cutting policies undermining each other  
• Optimise the impact of Government by using all the resources at the 
disposal of the State in an integrated way to deliver specific outcomes 
• Reduce costs and inefficiencies 
 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
5.4 in the interview schedule), “According to your understanding, describe what 
it means for different agencies to work together, across agency boundaries with 
the aim of combating financial crime through inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration by following a Whole-of-Government approach” 
the focus areas emerging from the participants’ answers were listed and 
presented in the frequency table, Table 5.5 (paragraph 5.14). This was an open-
ended question where the participants could provide their own answers to the 
question, and no choices were provided from which they could choose. Some of 
the participants could therefore have provided more than one entity in response 
to the question.  
 
The literature provides information that enables the conceptualisation of the term 
Whole-of-Government and an understanding of what it entails. The literature 
does not provide sufficient information to enable understanding of what it entails 
to combat financial crime by using a Whole-of-Government approach, as 
promoted by international institutions concerned with combating financial crime. 
To provide clarity, the participants were asked to describe what it means in 
practice for various agencies to work together, across agency boundaries, with 
the aim of combating financial crime through inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration in accordance with a Whole-of-Government 
approach.  
 
The participants offered a wide range of themes in their response to the question 
(question 5.3 in the interview schedule). The participants’ themes recurred with a 
low frequency. The themes are too inconsistent to formulate meaningful 
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categories or develop new ideas to provide clarity about the convergence of a 
Whole-of-Government approach and the combating of financial crime. 
 
A participant (Participant P003, 2016), as well as all other participants during the 
interview, was asked the question about understanding and describing what it 
means for different agencies to work together, across agency boundaries, with 
the aim of combating financial crime through inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration, following a Whole-of-Government approach. The 
participant, wishing to remain anonymous, provided the following detailed 
exposition to the researcher regarding the question posed (Participant P003, 
2016):  
 
The fight against serious crime and corruption is a 
continuous and dynamic process, and as new 
manifestations are revealed, gaps in the existing approach, 
strategies, interventions and application of existing 
legislation and policies are identified for review and 
strengthening. In the majority of Government’s recent policy 
deliberations, and its strategic policy documents, we 
[Government] acknowledge the significant challenges 
posed by crime and corruption and how it undermines good 
governance, state authority and service delivery.  
 
These challenges and its [their] root causes have been 
clearly articulated in the National Planning Commission’s 
Diagnostic Report in 2011 and in the 20 Year Review. The 
National Security Strategy (NSS), approved by Cabinet in 
December 2013, elevates countering corruption and 
serious crime to a national security priority. This compels 
the Government and different agencies to work together 
and to adopt a Whole-of-Government approach towards 
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This approach places new demands for executive and 
operational capabilities and structures in collaboration with 
other stakeholders such as the National Intelligence 
Coordinating Committee (NICOC) for addressing national 
priority offences. 
 
Such an approach would be dependent on the following 
key factors: 
• The development of a collective approach across 
Government to targeting the financial systems and 
benefits of crime. 
• The collective planning and governance to embed 
such an approach in an outcome-based planning 
framework for Government, government clusters and 
the departments through its strategic and operational 
plans and budget submissions. 
• The collective development of new crime-fighting 
practices and capabilities in line with the FATF 
 
The exposition provided above assists with providing clarification from the 
perspective of an active practitioner of what has to be done, and the approach 
that should be taken to adopt and implement a Whole-of-Government approach 
to combat financial crime.  
5.8 BENEFITS OF WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
Mulgan (2009) in Colgan et al. (2014:9) states that the benefits of Whole-of-
Government are acquired as a result of the ability to integrate resources, 
confronting problems early, and using other benefits that are also associated with 
Whole-of-Government, such as timeous information sharing. This allows 
governments to act preventively and in a pre-emptive manner before problems 
become too costly and severe. Colgan et al. (2014:12) assert that the benefits of 
Whole-of-Government approaches are as follows: 
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• It increases or improves: 
o Efficiency 
o Information sharing 
o Working environment 
o Competitiveness 
o Accountability 
o Policy coherence, and 
• Decreases or reduces: 
o Costs 
o Waste 
o Duplication of work 
o Conflicting policies  
o Time needed to complete a task. 
 
Having determined the benefits of Whole-of-Government, it is important to 
recognise that different governments have varied approaches about how to drive 
Whole-of-Government responses, consistent with their philosophies and 
approaches to public sector management (Connecting Government …, 2004:11). 
The next section identifies and provides a discussion of the respective 
organisational structures for implementing Whole-of-Government, as presented 
in the literature. 
5.9 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT 
 When implementing Whole-of-Government, it is imperative to realise that there 
is no one size fits all approach to Whole-of-Government. Several organisational 
options should be available to successfully deliver outcomes across 
organisational boundaries. Whichever structure is selected, it should match the 
task (Connecting Government …, 2004:11). The organisational options available 
to address the fighting of financial crime that are most likely to deliver favourable 
Whole-of-Government outcomes are explored and discussed in the sections 
below (Connecting Government …, 2004:17).  
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According to Colgan et al. (2014:9), the focus of Whole-of-Government work can 
vary quite considerably. Colgan et al. (2014:10) assert that Whole-of-Government 
work could be aimed at: 
• an organisational level, for example interdepartmental or national, or 
at a local level; 
• particular social groups such as disabled persons and the youth; 
• a specific policy issue, for instance, the Information and 
Communication Technologies Policy for South Africa; 
• a specific geographical area such as the regeneration of a city centre; 
• a mode of service delivery such as a one-stop system for social grants 
and services. 
 
The literature presents several possible organisational structures that can be 
used for Whole-of-Government work. Traditionally, Whole-of-Government work 
has been conducted via interdepartmental committees, but in recent years, 
according to (Connecting Government …, 2004:25; Colgan et al., 2014:50), it has 
also been supplemented by the introduction of the following: 
• Task forces 
• Interdepartmental partnerships forming joint teams 
• Cross-departmental partnerships forming agency arrangements 
• Special-purpose agencies forming frontier agencies 
 
The type of organisational structure that can be utilised will depend on the nature 
of the task, its urgency, priority, level of connection and difficulty, and availability 
of resources (Connecting Government …, 2004:25). These decisions are usually 
taken at a senior level. Different agencies may influence decisions, based on the 
examples of organisational structures as shown below. Once a decision has been 
made, agencies may recommend which best practices to follow, depending on 
the mechanism selected to perform the Whole-of-Government work (Connecting 
Government …, 2004:25; Colgan et al., 2014:50). The various types of 
organisational structures, their features and applications as presented in the 
literature are elaborated upon in the following sections, namely:  
• Interdepartmental committees 
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• Task force / task team 
• Interdepartmental joint teams 
• Cross-departmental agency arrangements 
• Special-purpose/frontier agencies 
5.9.1 Interdepartmental committees 
The most traditional form of cross-departmental coordination is found in 
interdepartmental or IMCs (Connecting Government …, 2004:25). International 
experience indicates that the term “interdepartmental committee” comes across 
as quite formal and bureaucratic. This has led to interdepartmental committees 
sometimes being referred to as task forces or work groups (Connecting 
Government …, 2004:27). Task forces should not be a synonym for an 
interdepartmental committee. For this discussion, as suggested in the literature 
(Connecting Government …, 2004:27), the term task force denotes a less 
representative form of cross-departmental structure. An intergovernmental 
committee may also present itself as a standing committee, especially with regard 
to the execution of established policies, or for an ad hoc committee to address a 
particular issue or event (Connecting Government …, 2004:27). According to the 
literature (Connecting Government …, 2004:27), interdepartmental committees 
are ideal for coordinating action, assigning responsibilities for shared tasks, and 
documenting agreements. International experience indicates that 
interdepartmental committees work very well, and they continue to be the 
organisational structure of choice for most formal interdepartmental coordination 
(Connecting Government …, 2004:27). 
5.9.1.1 Characteristics defining interdepartmental committees 
The features that define interdepartmental committees are (Connecting 
Government …, 2004:26; Colgan et al., 2014:50) as follows: 
• Employees meet formally as representatives of their departments 
• They are expected to speak to their department’s authority and seek 
appropriate clearance for the positions they advance 
• The scope of business and membership of the committee are defined 
and its establishment authorised at a suitable level 
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• Decision-making is by consensus 
• Records of outcomes are kept 
• The minimum expectation is to clarify options and establish agreed 
facts 
• Could be efficient and responsive to Government, but less useful for 
an agreement on contentious issues where stakeholders disagree 
• Interdepartmental committees could become a bureaucratic habit 
5.9.1.2 Domestic examples of interdepartmental committees 
In the South African context, the corresponding term for an Interdepartmental 
Committee is likely to be an Inter-Ministerial Committee. IMCs form part of the 
establishment of a new system of governance to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness (President Zuma appoints …, 2014).  IMCs are nominated by the 
president and in some instances by the Cabinet to serve a very specific purpose 
that is deemed to require the dedicated attention of a certain team of ministers 
(President Zuma appoints …, 2014). IMCs are responsible for streamlining and 
coordinating the work of Government for faster and better results. Their mandates 
are limited to the matter that they are established to execute.  
 
An example of an IMC is the “IMC on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption” (President Zuma appoints …, 2014). The mandate of the Anti-
corruption Inter-ministerial Committee (ACIMC) is to coordinate and oversee the 
work of state organs aimed at fighting and combating the scourge of corruption 
in public and private sectors (National Assembly Question No. 3977 ..., 2015). 
According to this description, the ACIMC in broad terms is useful to the activities 
described above. The Minister in The Presidency for Planning, Performance 
Monitoring chairs the ACIMC, which comprises the following ministers (President 
Zuma appoints …, 2014): 
• Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
• Minister of State Security 
• Minister of Police 
• Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
• Minister for Public Service and Administration 
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• Minister of Finance 
• Minister of Home Affairs 
• Minister of Social Development 
• Minister in the Presidency responsible for Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
 
The following departments are represented in the ACIMC (National Assembly 
Question No. 3977 ..., 2015):  
• The Presidency (as the lead department) 
• Department of Public Service and Administration 
• Department of Social Development 
• Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
• Department of Home Affairs 
• National Treasury 
• State Security 
• South African Police Service 
 
Achievements of the ACIMC include the following (National Assembly Question 
No. 3977 ..., 2015): 
• Coordinated approach for the implementation of Government agenda 
on the prevention and combating of corruption, as stipulated in the 
National Development Plan 
• Coordinated reporting on identified international anti-corruption 
obligations 
 
Another domestic example of what appears to be an interdepartmental committee 
is the Ministerial Clusters (Ministerial Clusters Reconfigured …, 2009). They were 
introduced as part of Government’s efforts to improve coordination within 
Government and enhance the delivery of services. Ministerial clusters were 
established “to foster an integrated approach to governance that is intended to 
improve planning, decision making and service delivery”. The main objective is 
to ensure proper coordination of all public programmes at national and provincial 
levels. According to this description, the ministerial clusters, in broad terms, are 
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useful to the activities described in paragraph 5.9.1.2 above, especially with 
regard to programme management, service delivery and cross-cutting activities 
(Ministerial Clusters Reconfigured …, 2009).  
 
The main functions of ministerial clusters are the following (Ministerial Clusters 
Reconfigured …, 2009): 
• Ensuring alignment of Government-wide priorities 
• Facilitation and monitoring of priority programmes 
• Implementation of priority programmes 
• Provisioning of a consultative platform on cross-cutting priorities and 
matters dealt with by Cabinet 
 
In the context of this research, the ministerial cluster to take note of from a 
combating of crime perspective is the JCPS. The naming convention of the JCPS 
does not imply that it is representative of an interdepartmental committee. It is 
surmised that it is rather the composition and stated function that imply that it is 
an Interdepartmental Committee. The cluster deals with crime prevention and the 
transformation of the judicial system of South Africa. The JCPS is chaired by the 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, and the deputy is the Minister of Police. 
Ministries in this cluster include (Department of Communications, 2014:1-3): 
• Justice and Correctional Services 
• Defence 
• Home Affairs 
• Police 
• State Security 
 
The literature and Government publications provide little information about the 
type of work undertaken by the JCPS in relation to the combating of financial 
crime. In fact, little information about the work of the JCPS, in general, is available 
from the literature and Government publications. From time to time, Government 
releases information to the press that does not contain much detail about the 
work the JCPS undertakes. The press releases mention statements and 
comments regarding criminal justice, public safety and security matters but not 
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much about the nature of actual work being done. Their Whole-of-Government 
work is obscure. In an apparent reference to the credibility of the JCPS in respect 
of their efficiency an editorial in the Sunday Times puts it as follows: “At the heart 
of it all is a state security cluster that is collapsing because of political interference 
and high-level infiltration by criminal networks” (Sunday Times, 2017:16). What 
is also noticeable in relation to the composition of the JCPS with regard to the 
combating of financial crime is the absence of the Minister of Finance, under 
whose political oversight the SARS, FIC, SARB and FSB resort. They are 
regarded as essential agencies in combating financial crime. According to 
feedback received from a participant during an interview, the JCPS was 
established by politicians to ensure collaboration between departments 
(Participant P002, 2015). 
5.9.2 Task force/Task team 
A modality for organising structures for Whole-of-Government work that has 
become popular in recent years is task forces, aimed at addressing specific 
issues whose lifespan is limited. Task forces/teams became popular because of 
concerns about the slow and consensual nature of interdepartmental committees 
(Connecting Government …, 2004:29-30). By their nature, task forces have the 
capacity to do fresh and original work, and have proved to be very effective at 
solving difficult problems and developing complexly integrated packages. They 
enable highly skilled agency officials to put their departmental interests behind 
them and join expert and creative outsiders to focus on developing outcomes 
backed by comprehensive analysis (Connecting Government …, 2004:30). 
 
Unlike interdepartmental committees, the decisions taken by a task force are not 
necessarily by consensus. The head of a task force/team accepts responsibility 
for its decisions/recommendations. Senior employees frequently lead task 
forces/teams seconded from other departments for the duration of the life of the 
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5.9.2.1  Characteristics defining task forces / task teams 
According to the literature (Connecting Government …, 2004:30-31; Colgan et 
al., 2014:50), the characteristics that define task forces are as follows:  
• Task forces/teams focus on joint problem-solving for a shared 
outcome 
• A task force/team is a stand-alone structure  
• Members have time limits and objectives to provide a clear outcome 
• Members are engaged to bring skills and experience to joint problem-
solving 
• Members are sometimes expected to keep their home agency 
informed and involved in support of the task force's work 
• Members can be drawn from outside the public service, as well as from 
the departments directly concerned, and reflect an appropriate range 
of disciplines and experience 
• Members are frequently engaged full-time in the Whole-of-
Government task and are accountable to the task force leader 
• Members frequently undergo a conscious separation from line 
accountabilities in the host department 
• Members often report to a political departmental head, parliamentary 
committee or both 
• Members often engage with a consultative interdepartmental 
committee drawn from the affected departments and conduct 
consultations with community organisations 
• Members put their agency’s interests behind them 
• Task forces/teams can be expensive and may fail to consider all the 
options 
• Task forces/teams offer participants valuable development 
opportunities but may alienate people from their home agencies 
5.9.2.2 International example of task force / task team 
An international example of a task force/team is the Australian Serious Financial 
Crime Task Force (SFCT). The SFCT forms part of the Australian Federal Police-
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led, Multi-agency Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre (Serious Financial Crime …, 
2015:1). The Australian Federal Police leads the coordination of cross-agency 
efforts to address SFCT priorities. The heads of each SFCT agency meet 
regularly to provide governance and focus on cross-agency collaborative efforts. 
The SFCT is a multi-agency task force that includes the following entities:  
• Australian Federal Police  
• Australian Tax Office  
• Australian Crime Commission  
• Attorney-General's Department 
• Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
• Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
• Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
• Australian Border Force. 
 
The SFCT was established to bring together the knowledge, resources and 
experiences of appropriate law enforcement and regulators to identify and 
address severe and complex financial crimes (Serious Financial Crime …, 
2015:1). The resources of the task force are focused on operational activities, 
collecting and sharing intelligence, and identifying and initiating reform measures 
to: 
• remove wealth from criminal activity and prosecute facilitators and 
promoters of severe financial crime; 
• deploy deterrent and preventive strategies other than criminal justice 
action. 
 
The intelligence priorities of the SFCT focus on financial retirement products and 
investment fraud, identity crime and professional facilitators (Serious Financial 
Crime …, 2015:2). A professional facilitator is an industry professional or service 
provider that assists to facilitate criminal activity. Some facilitators are willing and 
paid helpers; others may help because they are coerced through blackmail and 
intimidation. Some may be unaware that they are facilitating crime. The 
operational activities focus on Phoenix fraud, trust fraud and international tax 
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evasion fraud. Phoenix fraud involves a company deliberately liquidating assets 
to avoid paying creditors, taxes and employee entitlements. 
5.9.2.3 Domestic example of task force/task team 
A South African example of a joint investigation team comprising specialists from 
various agencies cooperating with each other, is the ACTT. The ACTT was 
established in 2010 under the auspices of the DPCI. The objective was to better 
coordinate government’s efforts to deal with issues of corruption and fraud from 
various angles by adopting a multi-agency approach comprising a range of 
institutions (The Anti-Corruption Task Team is ..., 2015). Although the ACTT is 
labelled a task team, it functionally represents a joint interdepartmental team, as 
referred to in paragraph 5.9.3 below. The team consists of employees from two 
or more departments working together while they continue to be subject to the 
management and control of their relevant agency. As an example of a joint team 
set up by the Government in South Africa to combat a specific type of financial 
crime, namely corruption, the ACTT does not receive approval. Dubase (2016) 
quotes the chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) 
as saying that the ACTT “is a toothless body which has dismally failed in carrying 
out its mandate”. Task teams set up by SAPS to investigate specific crimes are 
criticised in a newspaper editorial, captioned,  
 
“Brazen heist shows the rot in our security” by stating that: “[b]ut as we all know, 
police task teams have acquired the same reputation as the commissions of 
enquiry set up by the president – they seldom result in criminal prosecutions” 
(Sunday Times, 2017:16). 
5.9.3 Interdepartmental joint teams 
Joint teams represent a new and relatively uncommon form of interdepartmental 
cooperation. They differ from task forces because they are mixed structures that 
do not stand on their own. They do not represent a separate unit reporting to one 
leader who has the final say. Joint teams consist of employees from two or more 
departments working together in a common management structure while 
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continuing to be subject to the management control of the relevant head of the 
agency (Connecting Government …, 2004:33). 
 
For interdepartmental arrangements to be successful requires a high level of trust 
between the executives of the partner departments, as well as their political 
heads, and among the members of the joint team. Clearly, the mission of the 
team should be relevant to all the partners and more readily achieved jointly than 
separately. Agency cultures must be broadly compatible, and team members 
must be prepared to commit to understanding and appreciating the differences 
where they exist. Success breeds success, and real experiences in a joint team 
could encourage better relations and joint work in other areas (Connecting 
Government …, 2004:33). 
5.9.3.1 Characteristics defining interdepartmental joint teams 
According to the literature (Connecting Government …, 2004:33; Colgan et al., 
2014:51), the features that define interdepartmental joint teams are as follows:  
• Mixed, not stand-alone, structures 
• Officials from two or more agencies work together to deliver shared 
outcomes in a mixed functional organisation with an expected lifespan 
of several years 
• No agency has the lead role, and joint decision-making occurs 
between the team managers, the heads of the departments and the 
ministers, as appropriate 
• There are adequate governance arrangements to allow this to happen 
efficiently 
• Formal financial accountability for funds appropriated to the team rests 
with each agency, and each department remains accountable under 
the relevant legislation in terms of which its employees were 
appointed. Such employees continue to work under the personnel 
provisions of their home agency 
• Cross-delegations enable joint team managers to administer mixed 
groups 
358 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
• To external clients, employees are identified as members of the joint 
team rather than in terms of their home agencies 
• Trust at the highest level is essential 
• Joint teams comprise officials from two or more agencies but they are 
co-located 
• Funding is appropriated to one agency, but decisions about allocations 
are made jointly 
• Joint governance mechanisms are needed 
5.9.3.2 International example of an interdepartmental joint team 
An international example of a joint team aimed at combating financial crime is the 
Joint Serious Offences Team (JSOT) established in 2013 in Ontario, Canada. It 
is an enforcement partnership between the Ontario Securities Commission, 
Ontario Provincial Police Anti-rackets Unit; The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Financial Crimes Program, and the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, in 
order to share information and facilitate investigations across boundaries (About 
our partners …, 2017). According to Mann (2014), quoting Karen Manarin, the 
deputy director of the enforcement for the Ontario Securities Commission, the 
JSOT was established to combat the worst of financial crimes. It acts like a 
partnership, made up of specialists, including investigators, litigators 
investigators and forensic accountants. It operates very much in the same way 
as an independent law enforcement agency (Mann, 2014). 
5.9.3.3 Domestic example of an interdepartmental joint team 
An example of a hybrid joint team/task force organisational arrangement between 
different agencies under the auspices of a lead agency to conduct a criminal 
investigation, using Whole-of-Government, was reported in the Daily Dispatch 
Live newspaper (Mukhuthu, 2017). In the article, the DPCI spokesman, Brigadier 
Hanghwani Malaudzi, is quoted as saying that a municipal manager was arrested 
on charges of fraud and corruption by members of a special task team formed by 
the Hawks in Pretoria. The task team was appointed by the national head of the 
Hawks, Lieutenant-General Mthandazo Ntlemeza. It was reported that the team 
was led by a brigadier with extensive experience and skills, and that the task team 
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comprised investigators from the Hawks, the AFU and NPA prosecutors. From 
the facts mentioned, it emerged that the hybrid choice of a task force/joint team 
was applied for Whole-of-Government work, managing an emerging crisis where 
multi-disciplinary skills and resources were required. A first decision could be 
identified, and clearly defined links existed between the agencies. Joint task team 
arrangements are suited for cross-agency engagement where there are complex 
issues, a high-level of cooperation required, and clear governance arrangements 
exist (Connecting Government …, 2004:32). 
5.9.4 Cross departmental agency arrangements 
Another form of organisational adaptability of Whole-of-Government structures is 
for an existing Government department or agency to deliver services on behalf of 
one or more others. This may typically occur because of an ability of an agency 
to provide more efficient or more convenient service (Connecting Government …, 
2004:36). 
5.9.4.1 Characteristics defining cross-departmental agency 
arrangements 
According to the literature (Connecting Government …, 2004:36-37; Colgan et 
al., 2014:51), the characteristics that define cross-departmental partnerships or 
agency arrangements are as set out below: 
• An existing Government department or agency delivers services on 
behalf of one or more others 
• Agency services are provided via 
o core platforms 
o staffing networks 
o functions 
o skill sets 
• Policy agencies set standards that providers deliver 
• One-stop shops provide a single point of service 
• One-stop shops aim to meet citizens’ demands for seamless delivery 
• There is potential for involvement in policy development processes 
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5.9.4.2 International example of cross-departmental agency 
arrangements 
The Australian Customs service provides an excellent example of one 
government agency delivering a service on behalf of another agency. In providing 
a customs control function at an international border, it provides a range of 
services to other government portfolios (Connecting Government …, 2004:36). A 
customs officer performing an inspection at a border post can detect offences in 
respect of the illegal possession, smuggling and transportation of a variety of illicit 
goods, counterfeit goods, prohibited goods, restricted goods and substances, as 
well as currency, wildlife or people smuggling. 
5.9.4.3 Domestic example of cross-departmental agency arrangements 
The Customs Division of the SARS represents a good domestic example of one 
agency delivering services on behalf of others. SARS has a role in administering 
laws that are not necessarily related to tax and customs but are essential to 
protect the South African economy. For example, Customs must prevent 
dangerous goods from entering South Africa, such as alien species that may 
endanger our natural resources or South African residents (SARS and the 
Criminal Justice System…, 2016). For Customs to fulfil its customs control 
function, the importation and exportation of certain goods are subject to controls 
required by other government agencies (Customs External Standard …, 2016:3). 
SARS’ Customs Division is mandated to control prohibited and restricted goods 
on behalf of other government agencies, including the following:  
• Department of Trade and Industry 
• Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
• Department of Environmental Affairs 
 
SARS provides revenue collection services and administration of various other 
taxes levied by other departments, for instance unemployment insurance levies 
from employers on behalf of the Department of Labour (section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the 
South African Revenue Service Act). The SARS also provides other agencies 
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with access to data to trace defaulters who do not comply with their obligations 
to pay back study loans to the State once they start employment and earn an 
income. National Student Financial Aid Scheme spokesperson Kagisho 
Mamabolo was quoted as saying he believes that working with state agencies 
would make it easier for the National Student Financial Aid Scheme to track down 
all non-paying debtors (SARS to disclose …, 2016). 
5.9.5 Special-purpose frontier agencies  
Special–purpose or frontier agencies are created outside of the normal 
departmental or ministerial structures to deal with issues that are important, thus 
their establishment symbolises their Whole-of-Government status. The creation 
of these Special-purpose Agencies (hereafter referred to as SPAs) is facilitated 
by amendments to existing legislation and new laws. (Connecting Government 
…, 2004:36). 
 
The agents deployed or seconded to an SPA will probably be drawn from several 
home agencies. Early planning is essential to the successful creation of a frontier 
agency. Planning should focus on inculcating a new set of values related to the 
new agency’s charter and could encompass physical co-location, single 
Information Technology (IT) and financial systems, and staff development work 
to create a new culture and set of values relevant to the new agency’s charter or 
founding legislation (Connecting Government …, 2004:41). 
5.9.5.1  Characteristics defining special-purpose agencies 
According to the literature (Connecting Government …, 2004:39-40; Colgan et 
al., 2014:51), the features that define SPAs are as follows: 
• Frontier agencies are structures that symbolise to stakeholders a 
coherent Whole-of-Government approach to a contentious and 
complex issue. 
• They provide expertise, dispassionate advice and programme 
administration in respect of complex issues. 
• Employees will probably be drawn from several home departments, 
and at first the structure may represent conflicting policy views or will 
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focus on a narrower group of external stakeholders that they dealt 
with before. 
5.9.5.2 International examples of a special-purpose (frontier) agency  
The examples provided in the sections below illustrate the notion that when 
implementing Whole-of-Government, it is essential to realise that there is no one 
size fits all approach to Whole-of-Government. Although the examples indicated 
below share characteristics and application with those of a frontier agency 
engaged in Whole-of-Government work, there is room for deviation and ingenuity 
to suit the specific outcomes sought. More than one example of organisational 
arrangements is provided to emphasise the point. 
 
a. The National Crime Agency (NCA) (UK)  
The National Crime Agency is a crime-combating law enforcement agency in the 
UK, responsible for leading the UK’s fight to combat serious and organised crime. 
The NCA supersedes the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 
Johnston (2013) refers to it as a “front-line organisation in the war against the 
crime bosses”.  Johnston (2013) quotes the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, 
as stating that it [NCA] would “relentlessly” hunt down underworld crime lords and 
confront the growing menace of international gangs and cyber warfare in a 
coordinated way. The NCA was ostensibly established and based on the same 
rationale for the establishment of SOCA, i.e. a necessity to merge several 
specialist crime-fighting forces because of a perceived lack of joined-up (Whole-
of-Government) thinking and cooperation. The view was held that criminals were 
being allowed to get away with their crimes because the overlapping structures 
of various agencies diminished the effectiveness of the latter. The myriad 
organisations involved include MI5, MI6, GCHQ, Customs and Excise, local 
Special Branches, the Serious Fraud Office, specialist investigators attached to 
the Immigration Department and the Inland Revenue, as well as the international 
links of Interpol, Europol, Eurojust (the EUs judicial cooperation unit), Cepol (the 
European Police College), Olaf (the European Anti-fraud Office) and others. In 
defending the establishment of the NCA, Theresa May argued that when it came 
to tackling organised crime, “no one was in charge of operations. Worse still, 
363 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
agencies operated more like rivals, often failing to share information, protecting 
their own patches and building their own empires.”  
b. Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst (FIOD)  
(The Fiscal Information and Investigation Service of the Netherlands) 
 
It is the policy of the Government of the Netherlands that fraud can be combated 
effectively only if Government organisations work together. The Netherlands, 
therefore, has a Government-wide (joined-up or Whole-of-Government) anti-
fraud strategy (Combating tax and benefit fraud ..., [s.a.]). In following a 
Government-wide approach, the Netherlands Government services work 
together more closely to identify the most effective means to detect and prosecute 
fraudsters, and they coordinate their operations. For example, the various law 
enforcement organisations coordinate their use of the criminal law. The FIOD is 
the special tax and customs investigation component of the revenue authority of 
the Netherlands (FIOD Aansprekend Opsporen …, 2014:4).  
 
The FIOD gives effect to a Government-wide approach during fraud 
investigations. FIOD investigates (Combating tax and benefit fraud ..., [s.a.]) the 
following:  
• Tax fraud, e.g. VAT carousel fraud excise duty fraud and undeclared 
foreign assets 
• Financial and economic fraud, e.g. insider trading, bankruptcy fraud, 
property fraud and money laundering 
• Fraud in relation to particular goods, e.g. strategic goods and 
sanctions, raw materials for drugs, and intellectual property 
 
To combat fraud as efficiently as possible, the FIOD works in close collaboration 
with the tax authority and other regulating authorities, such as the (Combating tax 
and benefit fraud ..., [s.a.]) following:  
• National Crime Squad of the Police Services Agency 
• Financial Intelligence Unit of the Netherlands  
• Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment  
• Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate  
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• Information and Investigation Service of the Dutch Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority 
 
Any of these authorities can present cases to FIOD for possible criminal 
investigation (FIOD Aansprekend Opsporen …, 2014:9). Decisions regarding the 
pursuance of criminal investigations take place in consultation with the regulating 
authority, the FIOD and the public prosecutor.  
 
The FIOD also works closely with other special investigation services in the 
Financial Expertise Centre (FEC) (Combating tax and benefit fraud ..., [s.a.]). The 
FEC is responsible for supervision, control, investigation and prosecution in the 
financial sector to strengthen the sector's integrity. In turn, the FEC partners with 
the following entities: 
• General Intelligence and Security Service  
• Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets   
• Dutch Central Bank   
• Public Prosecution Service  
• Netherlands Police 
 
Cooperation and knowledge-sharing between criminal investigations services are 
crucial. Each service has a specific field of work (FIOD Aansprekend Opsporen 
…, 2014:7). Exchange of information is vital, subject to privacy laws and secrecy 
provisions in the legislation. The special investigation services actively join forces 
in the fight against crime, for example the fight against organised crime, fraud 
and money laundering, but also people trafficking, illegal trade in animal species, 
and environmental crime. The special investigation services are working more 
closely together and combine their efforts by sharing information, capacity and 
expertise. Through the utilisation of specific skills and knowledge of the specific 
special investigation service, they contribute to identifying and detecting 
corruption and unethical conduct in the financial services industry. 
 
Allegations and suspicions of fraud are reported to the FIOD on a daily basis 
(FIOD Aansprekend Opsporen …, 2014:9). The reports are received from the tax 
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and customs administration and other regulatory agencies. Reports are also 
received from industry, business and individuals. The FIOD always works in close 
collaboration with the prosecuting authority. Ultimately, it is the prosecutor who 
will decide which cases will be investigated for criminal prosecution. FIOD 
collaborates with the prosecuting authority on a strategic and operational level. 
The FIOD consults on the use of capacity, nature and extent of the case, but also 
about the best approach to dealing with an investigation. For instance, when a 
suspect is questioned or placed under surveillance, it will not happen without the 
consent of the prosecutor. The FIOD presents a high-level graphic depiction of 
how it is structured for interdepartmental and interagency cooperation (FIOD 
Aansprekend Opsporen …, 2014:9). From a South African perspective, it is 
possible to relate to the graphic depiction because the political arrangement of 
Dutch ministerial departments and agencies responsible for combating financial 
crime more or less mirrors the domestic arrangement. The formation of silos is 
perceptible in the graph, with the arrows indicating the operationalisation of a 
Whole-of-Government approach to enable cooperation between departments 
and agencies to combat financial crime. A high-level depiction of the 
organisational structure of the FIOD as provided by FIOD (FIOD Aansprekend 
Opsporen …, 2014:9) is presented in Figure 5.2 (paragraph 5.14).  
5.9.5.3 Domestic example of a special-purpose (frontier) agency 
An example of what in future may constitute an SPA is the Border Management 
Authority (BMA), of which the proposed establishment is provided for in the 
Border Management Authority Bill, No. B9 of 2016 (Border Management 
Authority Bill, 2016). In the preamble to the Border Management Authority Bill, 
the intention of the legislator is stated as follows: 
 
RECOGNISING that border management is exercised by 
multiple organs of state with the purpose of securing the 
borders of the Republic and protecting national interest; 
RECOGNISING FURTHER that there is a need for 
integrated and coordinated border management that 
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facilitates secure travel and legitimate trade in accordance 
with the ... 
 
During public hearings on 13 September 2016, with Minister of Home Affairs in 
attendance under the chairmanship of Mashile (ANC), the Minister of Home 
Affairs briefed the Committee on the outstanding concerns surrounding the Border 
Management Authority Bill that had been raised at a previous meeting (Border 
Management Authority Bill [B9-2016]: public hearings ... 2016): 
He described the three underlying principles on which the 
Cabinet had based the functioning of the BMA. These were 
that the BMA should be responsible and accountable for the 
entire border environment, its role should be to ensure its 
coordination, collaboration, oversight, control and 
management, and the proper management of BMA would 
be achieved through an integrated and cooperative system. 
From the outset, the view of the Cabinet had been that the 
BMA would be an integrated entity, which would take control 
of the entire management of the borders. This conclusion 
had been reached simply because all entities that were 
currently managing the borders were regulated by various 
[pieces of] legislation, establishing different mandates. As a 
result, mandates and visions were fragmented, resulting in 
management being fragmented. What had been 
problematic was the absence of a single entity among 
equals, which could play the role of integrating the 
fragmented mandates.  
 
The above excerpts are clearly representative of the hallmarks of a special-
purpose or frontier agency. There are complex issues at stake, there are disputes 
across a range of stakeholders, and there are governance arrangements to 
ensure Whole-of-Government approaches. The establishment of a BMA for South 
Africa presents an interesting conceptual framework for establishing a special-
purpose agency to combat financial crime across a range of agencies regulated 
by various legislation and several mandates.  
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5.10 OPERATIONALISING 
There is no one favoured blueprint for organising a structure for Whole-of-
Government work. The discussions above referring to the various organisational 
options should be helpful when one considers what the most suitable 
organisational structure is for Whole-of-Government, work, depending on the 
requirements of the relevant agencies and the desired outcomes. Keeping in mind 
the complexities of financial crime, the symbiotic nature, several key agencies 
with different mandates involved at various stages, and the notion that there is no 
“one size fits all” approach, the Government can consider which of the 
organisational structures are best suited for Whole-of-Government work.  
 
The type of criminal conduct that constitutes a financial crime is wide-ranging. 
Fighting the various types of conduct that manifest as financial crime falls within 
the mandate of various essential investigative agencies, and in some cases, there 
is an overlap between mandates. In other instances, separate stages of 
combating financial crime are conducted by various organisational structures 
working as joint teams or task forces responsible for several categories or types 
of financial crime. The state of affairs concerning the current efforts to combat 
financial crime is reminiscent of the reasons offered by Home Affairs Director-
General Mkuseli Apleni for the establishment of a single Border Management 
Authority, i.e. as a solution to ensure South Africa’s security, since the 
coordinating arrangement at the time was inadequate. There was no single 
command and control. Apleni is quoted as having said: “We are all under one roof, 
but we are not sharing information” (Merten, 2016). 
 
The establishment of a Border Management Authority provides an example of a 
blueprint for further exploration of what a prospective model for a front-line agency 
to combat financial crime may look like if further pursued and developed. It is 
against the backdrop of having explored various organisational arrangements, 
examined in this chapter, that the researcher proposes that a special-purpose 
frontier agency may provide a model for a long-term Whole-of-Government 
solution to combat serious financial crime. However, any of the other 
organisational modalities for Whole-of-Government work, depending on the 
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specific requirements, could have been explored, using the guidelines provided 
for direction.  
 
A high-level outline and discussion to establish a policy framework (White Paper) 
for the establishment of a special–purpose frontier agency to combat financial 
crime are provided below as an example. Such an agency should consider the 
symbiotic nature and interconnectedness of financial crime, which tends to spawn 
other criminal acts. For example, people involved in the illicit trade of rhino horn 
will almost invariably launder the proceeds of crime for fear of the predicate crime 
being detected by the authorities and their income being taxed. In some cases, 
the proceeds may be used to fund terrorist activities or other criminal enterprises. 
If any government officials are involved in the illegal trade, as is often the case, 
corruption will invariably be present and will, in turn, spawn additional tax evasion 
and money-laundering offences. For this reason and the fact that financial crimes 
are detrimental to the financial systems of a country, it is conceivable that such a 
front-line agency should represent an organisation with a Whole-of-Government 
responsibility outside of the normal departmental structures. It should work across 
the range of functions, symbolising its Whole-of-Government status and being 
accountable to the minister responsible for the Treasury. Such an agency should 
have clear terms of reference or a mandate from Government expressed in 
legislation. For illustrative purposes, an imaginary naming convention or 
derivatives thereof reflecting on the intent and purpose of such a special-purpose 
agency are used in this discussion and presented as follows: 
 
Serious Financial Crimes Agency (hereafter referred to as the Agency). 
 
It will be noted that the naming convention refers to serious financial crime. It is 
inconceivable that all financial crime can be combated by a single special-purpose 
agency. This implies some case-selection criteria or case-screening method. 
Some types of crimes, although eligible for being categorised as financial crimes, 
constitute mere statutory non-compliance conduct, which does not necessarily 
require any form of specialised skills or expert knowledge to investigate. These 
can be dealt with by the SAPS Commercial Crime Unit and other investigative 
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authorities with a mandate to conduct legal investigations into non-compliance 
financial crimes.  
 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
5.5 in the interview schedule), “Do you think that a Whole-of-Government 
approach in the South African context is a viable approach to ensure inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial 
crime more effectively?”, the focus areas emerging from the participant’s answers 
were listed and presented in the frequency table, Table 5.6 (paragraph 5.14). This 
was an open-ended question where the participants could provide their own 
answers to the question, and no choices were presented from which they could 
choose. Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one 
reply in response to the question. 
 
The literature does not provide information on whether a Whole-of-Government 
approach in the South African context is a viable approach to ensure inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial 
crime more effectively. To establish what the view is of practitioners in the field, 
the participants were asked the question to obtain clarity on the issue.  
 
The participants answered “yes’” with a frequency of 100% on whether a Whole-
of-Government approach in the South African context is a viable approach to 
ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to 
combat financial crime more effectively. Some of the participants expanded on 
their answers to the question and offered the insights listed in the themes 
presented in Table 5.6 (paragraph 5.14).   
 
A participant (Participant P003, 2016), as well as all other participants during the 
interview, were asked the question (question 5.5 in the interview schedule) 
whether they thought a Whole-of-Government approach in the South African 
context is a viable approach to ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. The 
participant, requesting to remain anonymous, provided the following detailed 
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exposition to the researcher regarding the question posed (Participant P003, 
2016b): 
 
The combating of financial crime is not an exclusive focus 
or functional mandate of a single agency. It cuts across 
administrative functionalities such as National Treasury, the 
Financial Services Board, the civil investigative and 
litigation responsibilities of the Special Investigating Unit 
(SIU), the intelligence functions of the South African 
Intelligence Community, in specific [sic.] the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC), and the enforcement focus of the 
SA Police Service, the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation and the National Prosecuting Authority 
through its prosecutions and asset forfeiture. 
 
The development of new single agencies to address 
financial crime is a costly endeavour.  
 
The Whole-of-Government approach is currently the only 
viable approach to ensure inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat 
financial crime more effectively. The mandate of the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation is representative 
of operationalising such an approach. 
 
It is however heavily dependent on collective governance, 
strategic and operational leadership to implement. 
 
Using a content analysis for interpreting the response to the question (question 
5.6 in the interview schedule), “How, in your opinion, should a Whole-of-
Government approach be applied to ensure effective inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime more 
effectively?”, the focus areas emerging from the participant’s answers were listed 
and presented in the frequency table, Table 5.7 (paragraph 5.14). This was an 
371 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
open-ended question where the participants could provide their own answers to 
the question, and no choices were presented from which they could choose. 
Some of the participants could therefore have provided more than one reply in 
response to the question. 
 
The literature does not provide information on how, in the opinion of the 
participants, a Whole-of-Government approach should be applied to ensure 
effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts 
to combat financial crime more effectively. To establish what the view is of 
practitioners in the field, the participants were asked the question to obtain clarity 
on the issue.  
 
The participants offered a wide range of themes in their response to the question 
(question 5.6 in the interview schedule) on how, in their opinion, the Whole-of-
Government approach should be applied to ensure effective inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial 
crime more effectively. The participants’ recurring themes are presented with a 
low frequency. The themes are too inconsistent to formulate meaningful 
categories or ideas on how a Whole-of-Government approach must be applied to 
ensure effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during 
efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. 
 
A participant (Participant P009, 2017), as well as all other participants during the 
interview, was asked the question how, in their opinion, a Whole-of-Government 
approach should be applied (implemented) to ensure effective inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial 
crime more effectively (question 5.6 in the interview schedule) The participant, 
requesting to remain anonymous, provided the following detailed exposition to 
the researcher regarding the question posed (Participant P009, 2017):   
 
A multidisciplinary unit consisting of representatives of all 
the different government units involved in combating and 
investigating financial crime, collocated and working in 
teams where each prosecutor and investigating officer 
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(primary responsible persons) and everyone assigned to 
the team take collective responsibility for the cases 
assigned to them. The ideal would be to limit the cases 
dealt with by these teams to those cases that has [sic.] 
the most potential to bear fruits [sic.], save or make 
money for the State [AFU] and would have the biggest 
effect of discouraging financial crime. 
 
The participant added (Interview with Participant P009: 2017): 
Such a unit could function in a manner very similar to that of the previous Office 
for Serious Economic Offences before it became the Scorpions. The Directorate 
of Special Operations, however, would prosecute its own cases and not refer 
them to any of the Directors of Public Prosecutions.  
 
The participant’s focus in the response above is on a multi-disciplinary approach, 
with resources divided into teams and forming part of a specialised investigation 
authority responsible for the investigation and prosecution of cases. Participant 
P010 and the other participants in the interview were asked the question how, in 
their opinion, a Whole-of-Government approach should be applied (implemented) 
to ensure effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
during efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. The participant, 
requesting to remain anonymous, provided a schematic drawing of how he saw 
the implementation of a Whole-of-Government approach to combat financial 
crime. Due to the participant’s handwriting being identifiable on the draft 
schematic drawing, the researcher converted it into graphics, as presented below 
(Participant P010, 2017). Figure 5.3 (paragraph 5.14) is a schematic 
representation of a conceptual model for the organisational structure of how a 
Whole-of-Government structure can be organised to combat financial crime.  
 
The participant’s view is based on a three-tier level of responsibility, with one 
department, namely the Department of the Treasury, taking the overall political 
responsibility and the other departments sharing functional responsibilities for 
combating financial crime by means of the agencies reporting to the respective 
political heads. The coordination of these functions should be undertaken by a 
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secretariat consisting of the relevant directors-general of the relevant 
departments.  The above-mentioned concept intersects with features of the FIOD 
model shown in Figure 5.2 (paragraph 5.14), where in this case the secretariat 
can be seen to fulfil the coordinating and operational function of the FIOD. 
5.11 A CONCEPTUAL FRONT-LINE AGENCY MODEL 
The proposal for a conceptual model takes some of its leads from the public 
management principles related to Whole-of-Government examined in this 
chapter, the arrangement of the FIOD, and the example provided for in the 
development and establishment of a single special-purpose frontier Border 
Management Authority (Africa, 2016:1). In the Netherlands, just as in South 
Africa, the functions related to the combating of financial crime are distributed 
among various agencies. 
 
Similarly, the responsibility for managing the security and safety of South Africa’s 
borders is also spread among several agencies. A broad outline of a project to 
develop a policy framework, principles and draft legislation to establish a special-
purpose frontier agency with the objective to combat serious financial crime is 
presented and discussed in the following sections. The conceptual and essential 
elements for a proposed conceptual frontline agency are also provided, together 
with operational steps for executing the work. 
5.11.1 Develop a policy framework (White Paper) 
Colgan et al. (2014:33) suggest that the Whole-of-Government implementation 
process starts with a systematic policy development stage. At this juncture, 
policymakers ascertain whether a Whole-of-Government approach provides a 
suitable answer to the particular policy challenge (Colgan et al., 2014:33). In this 
research, the present challenge to effectively combating financial crime is 
identified as the fragmented and uncoordinated efforts between the various 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime.  
 
To address these issues, Government may want to consider developing a policy 
framework (White Paper) in which it is acknowledged that financial crime in all its 
374 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
manifestations presents a grave risk to the financial systems of the country, and 
that it is detrimental to the socio- and economic development of the country. 
Government has shown that it is not averse to developing national strategies to 
address specific issues or achieve specific objectives. Policy-makers are also 
familiar with the concept of Whole-of-Government and have entertained the idea 
in strategic documents, policies or White Papers addressing specific issues, as is 
evident from the following documents published by Government: 
• National Anti-Corruption Strategy Discussion Document: Towards a 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy for South Africa (National Anti-
Corruption Strategy ..., 2016:2). 
• National Integrated ICT Policy: White Paper (National Integrated ICT 
Policy ..., 2016:6). 
 
The policy framework may further contain an expression of intent to establish a 
front-line agency in South Africa to combat financial crime in an integrated 
manner. The policy may consider: 
• that since 1994, SA has made big strides in introducing legislation to 
combat financial crime, criminalising conduct that constitutes a 
financial crime, and introducing various capabilities and agencies to 
give effect to the combating of financial crime; 
• the symbiotic nature and interconnectedness of financial crime; 
• formulating a catalogue containing the classification of the types of 
criminal conduct classified as financial crime; 
• the consequence of establishing these various organs of state, e.g. 
FIC, SARS, DPCI, NPA, FSB, SIU, SARB and other regulators, which 
resulted in the emergence of a silo approach to combating financial 
crime; 
• that various structures were put in place to attempt to or assist in 
coordinating the mandates and actions of these distinct organs of state 
in fighting financial crime: 
o ACTT 
o Multi-agency Work Group  
o Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster 
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o Various investigating task teams established in terms of section 17F 
of the South African Police Service Act; 
• that those perceptions of the public, reports in the media citing specific 
cases, studies and reports have pointed to the failure of these 
structures to effectively combat financial crime, which is associated 
with an uncoordinated, fragmented approach; 
• that the piecemeal approach to combating financial crime results in: 
o non-alignment and inefficiencies in the fight against financial crime, 
and unfavourable outcomes of investigations; 
o compromised joint efforts and results arising from various 
intelligence sources, ineffective dissemination of information risk 
management tools and approaches; 
o the ineffective utilisation of public resources due to limited 
information sharing; 
o failure to enforce a standard approach in dealing with serious 
financial crime; 
o an inability to identify predicate offences to money laundering and 
tax evasion; 
o failure to identify money laundering and tax fraud or evasion in 
instances where the existence of income from crime and criminal 
enterprises is identified or suspected; 
o failure to confiscate proceeds of crime that are subject to forfeiture;  
o corruption and organised crime thriving in a fragmented 
management environment; 
o formation of silos, with agencies focusing on their own mandates. 
5.11.2 Develop principles and draft legislation  
Principles guiding the development of a White Paper and Bill should be identified 
and formulated (Africa, 2016:16) The Bill must ensure the establishment of a 
special-purpose agency and give expression to the principles guiding the Bill. It is 
proposed that in formulating the Bill, principles should be considered to indicate 
that there are clear governance arrangements to ensure a Whole-of-Government 
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approach. It is suggested that the principles can be applied, among other things, 
to address the following aspects: 
5.11.2.1 Culture and capability 
“Culture and capability critically shape the success of Whole-of-Government 
activities.” (Connecting Government …, 2004:45). To inculcate culture and 
capability within the agency, the following issues should be considered for 
provision in the legislation: 
• Uniform organisational culture and identity 
• Alignment of culture and skills development to the objectives and 
outcome of the agency 
• Rational and efficient grouping of issues  
5.11.2.2 Single implementation entity and budget 
• Under a single executive authority, e.g. the Treasury 
• Constituted as a single accounting authority  
• Established by an enabling Act, e.g. Serious Financial Crimes Agency 
Act (illustrative purposes only) 
5.11.2.3 Information management and infrastructure 
Information is critical, as it empowers agencies to deliver on Government’s 
outcomes and to meet community expectations. More and more, effective sharing 
of information is essential to the success of Whole-of-Government outcomes. 
Information and communications technology reinforces and allows for improved 
information sharing as well as data management approaches by agencies. 
Exchange of information plays a critical role in generating better decision-making 
and delivery of outcomes (Connecting Government …, 2004:60). The capacity to 
share information across systems must be available to all agencies to improve 
productivity and ease of data transfer and exchanges (Connecting Government 
…, 2004:61). The following guidelines are presented in the literature regarding 
the management of information in a Whole-of-Government fashion (Connecting 
Government …, 2004:59-60): 
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The requirement for sharing information among agencies or across the Whole-of-
Government broadly falls into four categories: 
 
a. Dealing with an emergency or pulling together all available information about 
a specific issue.   
b. Integration of information custodians through acquiring, integrating and 
analysing available information across government agencies. 
c. Integrating efforts by providing outcomes across agencies in a seamless 
way, for example, instituting prosecution, forfeiture of proceeds of crime, and 
taxing income from the proceeds of crime. 
d. Managing areas of joint activity by encouraging the sharing of information 
within Government and throughout all jurisdictions. 
5.11.2.4 Assuming control of all activities in relation to the combating of 
financial crimes 
The policy-makers and legislative drafters should consider that all the functions 
concerned with the combating of financial crime shall fall within the operational 
responsibility of the agency. This may include the following: 
• Obtainment of financial intelligence relevant to the investigation of 
financial crime 
• Obtainment and analysis of crime intelligence 
• Prevention of financial crime 
• Detection of financial crime 
• Identification and forfeiture of proceeds of financial crime 
• Identification and criminal investigation of financial crimes 
• Prosecution of financial crimes 
5.11.2.5 Several of the main agency’s functions and resources to be 
seconded and transferred to the frontier agency 
The enabling legislation should provide for the secondment or transfer of officials 
from the key agencies to perform a variety of functions, while retaining their 
powers from the transferring agency and assuming any new powers and duties 
that the Agency may lawfully assign to them such as: 
378 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
• analysing and developing crime intelligence; 
• obtaining, analysing and disseminating financial information; 
• conducting financial investigations to trace financial flows; conducting 
direct and indirect methods to ascertain income and growth in net 
worth; 
• conducting criminal investigation of serious financial crime such as 
corruption, money-laundering and tax evasion; 
• tracing and securing proceeds of financial crime and assets for 
forfeiture proceedings; 
• sharing information with other investigative authorities and foreign 
jurisdictions where legally permissible and subject to any treaties. 
5.11.2.6 Lessons learnt and best practises 
Lessons learnt, and best practices observed from developing and implementing 
the Border Management Authority and Border Management Authority Bill can be 
carried over to the development work on the “Serious Financial Crimes Agency”. 
Together with the guidance from the literature regarding a special-purpose frontier 
agency and the example of FIOD, the conceptual model described in section 5.12 
is presented as an operationally viable model for combating financial crime, using 
a Whole-of-Government approach.   
5.12 CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR A FRONTIER AGENCY 
Based on the discussion and examples in the literature of an organisational 
structure for a frontier agency to facilitate a Whole-of–Government approach, the 
researcher developed a conceptual model for an agency to combat financial 
crime. To illustrate the functioning of the conceptual model for a Whole-of-
Government single-purpose frontier agency to combat financial crime, a high-
level diagram is provided in Figure 5.4 below. The final development of such a 
model will have to be guided by a White Paper/policy discussion on a Whole-of-
Government financial crime-combating approach and enabling legislation. 
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Figure 5.4: Concept Operational Frontier Agency Model 
 
(Source: Concept developed by researcher) 
5.12.1  Essential elements of the conceptual model  
The explanation of the key elements provided in the concept operations model, 
Figure 5.4 above, is aimed at providing insight into the potential for 
operationalisation of a Whole-of-Government frontier agency model for 
implementation by Government. The explanation below is for illustrative purposes 
only, to demonstrate the scope of creating a frontier agency based on the 
organisational structure discussed in paragraph 5.11. The paragraph numbers 
below relate to the corresponding numbers assigned to the entities depicted in 
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(1) Special-purpose frontier agency   
The Special-purpose Frontier Agency denotes an agency assuming control of all 
activities in respect of the combating of financial crimes. It represents the entry 
point for Whole-of-Government efforts to fight financial crime. It also represents 
the type of organisational modality for a Whole-of-Government approach to 
combating financial crime. Its initiation may be superseded by a White Paper 
announcing a policy for combating financial crime in an integrated Whole-of-
Government fashion, and its establishment and mandate enabled by legislation. 
In this model, the proposed agency is established outside normal departmental 
structures to deal with combating financial crime and with the intention to 
symbolise its Whole-of-Government status.  
 
(2) and (7) Political oversight and accountability 
Considering that identifying the breadth of stakeholder interests that must be 
publicly addressed through the creation of the frontier agency it is conceivable 
that the agency would be accountable to the Department of the National 
Treasury. It is also possible that the frontier agency would be established under 
a single executive and accounting authority, as in the case of the BMA (Africa, 
2016:16). These provisions effectively give the head of the agency the same 
powers and obligations as the director-general of a department. It may also place 
the agency head in a similar relationship to the responsible minister or ministers. 
 
The Department of the National Treasury of the RSA (hereafter referred to as the 
National Treasury) is responsible for the implementation of the so-called modified 
twin peaks model, where various agencies are given the responsibility to fulfil 
essential policy objectives to ensure (National Treasury ..., 2012:4): 
• financial stability; 
• consumer protection and market conduct; 
• access to financial services; 
• combating of financial crime. 
 
The FSB and FIC report to the Minister of Finance (National Treasury ..., 
2012:38), whereas concerning the PFMA, the Commissioner of the SARS is 
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accountable to the Minister of Finance. It is conceivable that the Special-purpose 
Frontier Agency may report to the National Treasury for political oversight and 
financial accountability. Such a placement is, of course, subject to a political and 
policy decision, based on the department that is most suitably positioned to 
coordinate the efforts and mandate of the special-purpose frontier agency. 
 
(3) and (8) JCPS cluster national departments 
Considering the role and function of the JCPS ministerial cluster, it will probably 
be an influential contributor to the establishment of a frontier agency to combat 
financial crime. The JCPS Ministerial Cluster is conceivably the best suited to 
coordinate the contributions by the respective departments, agencies and 
stakeholders in developing a policy framework and White Paper for implementing 
a special-purpose frontier agency to combat financial crime and assume 
responsibility for the drafting of an enabling legal framework. 
 
The national departments in the cluster are vital ministries in the efforts to fight 
crime and ensure the safety of communities. It is, therefore, conceivable that they 
are included in the stakeholder relationship with the agency and with a view to 
sharing information, crime intelligence and operational knowledge. It is also 
possible that they may be able to report financial crimes to the agency for 
consideration, evaluation and further investigation. The cluster may be involved 
in the coordination between the various government departments on formulating 
policy and determining the Government’s national-level response to financial 
crime to formulate an integrated approach. 
 
(4) and (9) Key investigative agencies 
The key investigative agencies are responsible for the criminal investigation of 
criminal conduct that is categorised as financial crime. In the context of a special-
purpose frontier agency, it is from these bodies that the bulk of investigative 
resources, knowledge and skills will be drawn for secondment or transfer to 
investigate financial crime. The key investigative agencies will also be 
responsible for referring cases that fall within the case criteria to the office for 
criminal investigation and analysis of information. With regard to matters related 
to or incidental to financial crime, the key investigative agencies will be 
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responsible for providing information, evidence and crime intelligence to the 
agency by means of the secure legal gateways. It is possible that the entire 
investigative capacity of some of the key investigative agencies could be 
incorporated into the frontier agency.  
 
(5) and (10) Essential regulators 
The key investigative agencies are responsible for the oversight and regulation 
of the financial and banking sector, and in conjunction with the FIC are also 
responsible for the gathering, analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence 
in a coordinated manner. In the context of a special-purpose frontier agency, it 
will be possible to draw intelligence officers, analysts and investigators for 
secondment or transfer to the agency. The essential regulators during the 
execution of their respective mandates will also be responsible for referring cases 
that fall within the case criteria to the agency for criminal investigation and 
analysis of information. Concerning matters related to or incidental to financial 
crime, the key investigative agencies will be responsible for the provisioning of 
information, evidence and crime intelligence to the agency by means of the 
established legal gateways. 
 
(6) and (11) Community, business, financial institutions, NGOs and 
Commerce and Industry 
Community, Business, Financial Institutions, NGOs and Commerce and Industry 
represent society and the bulk of potential victims and targets of financial crimes. 
It is this category of people/institutions who are entitled to protection from the 
state, to prevent them from falling victim to financial crimes. They are entitled to 
the effective investigation and prosecution of the crimes when they do fall victim. 
They are also assigned certain legal obligations to comply with various statutes, 
such as compliance with the tax laws and the reporting obligations imposed on 
them, depending on their legal status. Organisations such as NGOs and industry 
can also share information with the frontier agency and engage in partnerships 
to bolster efforts by the State to combat financial crime effectively. The industries, 
business, financial service providers and institutions that provide financial 
services and products to society are monitored and regulated by the essential 
regulating agencies (9). They are required to conduct proper due diligence on 
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behalf of their customers and maintain customer and transaction information in 
records that are accessible by supervisory agencies and investigative authorities 
(National Treasury ..., 2012:73). 
5.12.2 Conceptual procedural process 
The operational, procedural steps will almost invariably follow a generic 
approach. The precise steps are a matter for practical consideration, and can be 
formulated by studying similar agencies such as the FIOD and international best 
practices that have been developed throughout the operationalisation of the 
agency. It goes without saying that whatever operational steps are followed, such 
action will be guided by law, such as the Criminal Procedure Act. Conceptually it 
is envisaged that the agency will receive complaints or reports on financial crime, 
or information regarding suspicious activities that relate to the possible 
commissioning of financial crime, from internal as well as external sources. 
Internal referrals may be received from the main regulating agencies (5 in Figure 
5.4) and the main investigative agencies and its components, such as the crime 
intelligence service (4 in Figure 5.4). Information, complaints or reports regarding 
financial crime may also be received from external sources such as the 
community, financial institutions, commerce and industry (6 in Figure 5.4) and 
foreign jurisdictions.  
 
It is envisioned that an integral part of the staff component for the agency will 
consist of independent, full-time prosecutors seconded to the agency from the 
NPA, who will always be engaged on a strategic and operational level. It is 
envisioned that the agency will consult with the prosecutors about the use of 
capacity, nature and extent of investigative activities and approach to an 
investigation. For example, searches and suspect interviews do not happen if the 
prosecutors have not been consulted, and use of investigative powers has not 
been authorised by the appropriate legal supervising authority in accordance with 
the applicable legal framework. A broad, high-level conceptualisation of the 
operational steps of how the agency depicted in Figure 5.4 (paragraph 5.12) 
could function is described below for illustrative purposes:  
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Step 1:  Investigation assessment 
After the initial report or information is brought to the attention of the agency, as 
contemplated above, the available information is processed. It is only logical that 
with limits to capacity, in accordance with the agency’s legal mandate, not all 
reports or cases will be eligible for investigation by the agency. It is assumed that 
not all allegations and reports received would warrant or be suitable for 
investigation. There will be limits to capacity to consider, and in accordance with 
the agency’s legal mandate, not all reports or cases will be eligible for 
investigation  
 
Investigators are a precious (and expensive) resource in the investigation 
process and should be used as effectively and efficiently as possible. The initial 
assessment of the information should establish which cases should be allocated 
to a follow-up investigation, or what course of action should be followed. Case 
screening is a management tool that facilitates the decision-making process. It is 
envisaged that cases for possible investigation will be selected, based on a 
predetermined gauge. After an initial assessment of the report or complaint to 
determine whether it is eligible for further investigation, a preliminary investigation 
or inquiry is envisaged to decide on an investigative focus and approach.   
 
To assist in the initial investigation, as much as possible information relevant to 
the investigation and suspected offence should be collected on as broad a scale 
as possible, by the relevant agencies represented in the agency. The gathering 
of information pertaining to the crime and possible suspects should form the crux 
of a preliminary investigation report. If determined that it is a matter of urgency to 
take immediate enforcement action, the assistance of the SAPS detective service 
or DPCI can be utilised to intervene with appropriate actions. 
 
Step 2:  The Investigation proposal 
The preliminary investigation report can serve as the basis for a consultative 
process between a representative from the NPA, a seconded prosecutor, and the 
internal partners represented in the agency. The purpose of the consultative 
process is to consider, among other things, the financial and social impact of a 
prosecution. In consultation with the NPA, a decision is taken whether to pursue 
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a criminal investigation or not. If decided to pursue a criminal investigation, the 
scope and course should or can be captured in a proposal for investigation. 
Ultimately, depending on the complexity and sophistication of the offence, a 
project plan or a criminal investigation plan should be developed. In some 
instances, the desired enforcement or prosecution outcome may be more 
efficient if there is one large, comprehensive investigation, and in other cases, 
some smaller investigations are deemed to be more effective.  
 
Some matters may be disposed of more efficiently by the relevant statutory 
agency by means of administrative enforcement such as through the levying of 
administrative penalties or fines. For example, the behaviour of a first-time 
offender in respect of tax evasion of income not linked to the proceeds of illegal 
activities can be more efficiently remedied through the imposition of an 
administrative penalty. Resources can then focus on the more severe cases, 
where other measures may be considered to make the impact on the combating 
of financial crime more effective. 
 
Step 3: Capacity estimation 
Inevitably, the ability and resourcing of the agency will be subject to limitations. It 
is, therefore, conceivable that for every contemplated investigation, the 
investigation proposal sets out an estimate of the resources and capacity 
required. It is furthermore envisaged that an annual assessment is conducted of 
the various focus areas based, among other things, on crime patterns, 
behavioural patterns, risk evaluation and target groups that should be pursued 
for the greatest impact. The strategic agreement reached between the 
stakeholders can be captured in an MOU or other form of communication 
between the various parties. 
 
Step 4: Investigation approach, methods and resources  
Before discussing different investigative approaches and the use of powers to 
obtain information, one should remember that investigators function within a legal 
framework. Depending on whether there will be separate enabling legislation or 
whether existing legislation is amended to permit the formation of a special-
purpose front-line agency, the enabling legislation determines the legal 
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framework within which investigators work. The powers to obtain information, the 
judicial oversight for obtaining authority to exercise the powers, and the 
monitoring mechanisms have to be established in a legal framework. During this 
step, the investigative procedures and approaches that should be applied in 
combination with the powers to be used are selected and considered. This may 
include methods such as enquiries, searches, electronic interception and 
monitoring, among other things. These coercive methods will be applied only if 
the necessary authority has been obtained and other less intrusive methods have 
been considered. 
 
Step 5: Acceptance of the investigation proposal 
It is envisaged that the investigations undertaken by the agency should be 
approved by a person responsible for the decision-making process. This person 
may be a retired judicial officer or prosecutor with the responsibility for approving 
investigations, based on the investigation proposal. The research proposal 
represents a detailed overview of the information-gathering activities, 
investigation approach, time frames, and capacity requirements. The responsible 
officer determines whether the proposed investigation would potentially yield 
sufficient evidence that may result in a prosecution. If all the facts have been 
weighed carefully and the investigation is approved, the follow-up investigation 
can` commence. 
 
Step 6: The investigation 
It is conceivable that an investigation team may be assembled that consists of 
agency members selected according to their skills, speciality and knowledge. The 
team performs the actual follow-up investigation aimed at the objectives usually 
associated with a criminal investigation and the results are systematically 
recorded for use in possible criminal proceedings.  
 
It is envisaged that throughout the investigation process, a management structure 
is applied that clearly demonstrates the lines of accountability and responsibility. 
This is not necessarily based on seniority of officials but on their roles of 
responsibility. During the investigation, the focus remains on proving the alleged 
or suspected offences. Investigation methods and techniques are applied in 
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accordance with the objective and may include methods to obtain the required 
evidence that may provide the basis for a successful prosecution. Throughout the 
investigation, there may be regular consultations with the prosecutor to discuss 
the progress and evidence, and other matters in relation to the investigation. 
 
Step 7: Prosecutions 
When the investigation is complete in the manner contemplated above, it is 
envisaged that the case will be presented to a prosecutor to decide on 
prosecution or otherwise. If a decision is taken to institute criminal proceedings, 
the process of apprehending the suspects, or alternative processes that have to 
be followed procedurally to arraign the suspects before a court, are determined 
in consultation with the prosecutor. 
 
The above discussion concludes the proposition by the researcher of an 
organisational and operational structure within the national legal and institutional 
framework for a special-purpose frontier agency to combat financial crime in 
accordance with a Whole-of-Government approach. This proposition provides a 
viable conceptual model for consideration by the authorities to empower them to 
combat financial crime more effectively. 
5.13 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to Whole-of-Government as a public 
management approach where there is a need for government departments and 
various agencies to work across mandates to achieve a common goal and an 
integrated response to a specific problem. In this chapter, the public management 
concept of Whole-of-Government as an approach to combat financial crime more 
effectively was examined. The examination focused on what the concept Whole-
of-Government entails and how its application can improve cooperation between 
various agencies and integrate efforts to solve complex problems such as 
financial crimes and the fragmented efforts to combat such crime. Having 
determined what it entails and what the rationale is that underpins Whole-of-
Government, a discussion is presented on the different formats of Whole-of-
Government. The various organisational modalities available for operationalising 
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Whole-of-Government are identified, and the applications for which they are best 
suited are analysed. Examples of combating crime and financial crime 
internationally and, where possible, nationally, are presented. Some of the 
organisational structures identified for Whole-of-Government are not totally 
unfamiliar concepts, as they were already identified in Chapter 4 to be enablers 
for cooperation. 
 
Although several organisational modalities are presented, there is one modality 
that is singled out in this chapter for likely operationalisation, namely the special-
purpose frontier agency. Internationally, the example submitted by the FIOD of 
the Netherlands focuses on financial crime, and the respective agencies involved 
in combating financial crime are more or less similar to agencies in South Africa. 
In South Africa, the special-purpose frontier agency as a form of operationalising 
Whole-of-Government or an adaptation thereof seems to have found favour for 
resolving the fragmented and uncoordinated approach across all spheres of 
Government in order to protect the country’s international borders. In seeking a 
solution to the problem, policy discussions resulted in the acceptance of a Bill 
that will ultimately lead to the establishment of a BMA. The establishment of the 
BMA demonstrates that where there is a wicked problem, Whole-of-Government 
approaches can be implemented as a solution if there is a political will, as 
evidenced by the relevant policy and stated by the lawmakers.  
 
In this chapter, a conceptual model for combating financial crime is put forward. 
It is broadly based on the special-purpose frontier agency organisational 
modality, using as a framework the international example provided by the FIOD, 
and the domestic example set out in the establishment of the BMA. It is submitted 
that the conceptual framework could serve to demonstrate the available 
prospects for implementing a Whole-of-Government approach to combat 
financial crime more effectively. This may provide an opportunity for further in-
depth exploration and set in motion the development of a policy framework for 
the establishment of a special-purpose frontier agency or alternative 
organisational modality for Whole-of-Government combating of financial crime.  
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The findings of this research are presented and discussed in the final chapter, 
Chapter 6. The findings are followed by recommendations. Conclusions reflecting 
on the outcome of the study will be submitted to complete the study. 
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5.14 TABLES AND FIGURES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 5 
Table 5.1: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on the meaning 
of “integrated methodology and multidisciplinary approach”  
Question 5.1: In your own words, explain what an integrated methodology and multidisciplinary 
approach mean to you. 
 
Participants’ themes or focus 
Quantification 
of this theme  
Frequency of 
this theme (%) 
Bringing together different skills sets and expertise 5 50 
Deciding/identifying critical role-players such as investigators 
and agencies to work together for the best possible 
outcome/common objective  
2 20 
It is a holistic approach 2 20 
Resources across agencies working together with a common 
objective/purpose 
2 20 
The involvement and use of various capabilities and legal 
mandates of different government agencies 
2 20 
Working together to devise a strategy 1 10 
Avoid duplication of functions to recover assets 1 10 
Make use of both administrative and criminal enforcement efforts 1 10 
Secondment of another government official to SAPS 1 10 
Officials from other agencies will act as de facto SAPS officials 1 10 
Officials from other agencies will conduct investigations on 
SAPS’ behalf 
1 10 
SAPS will act as the coordinating agency 1 10 
Incorporating the mandates of the different agencies into one 
overarching agency 
1 10 
Combine powers and information 1 10 
Involves the cooperation of all government departments and 
institutions 
1 10 
The outcome of the investigation takes precedence over 
departmental considerations 
1 10 
Following a uniform approach 1 10 
Utilising the best methods offered by different disciplines 1 10 
Never been properly implemented or utilised 1 10 
Investigators and prosecutors work together in PGI 1 10 
Prosecutors and investigators share the same caseload 1 10 
Prioritise cases 1 10 
Identify ‘quick wins’ 1 10 
One team consisting of all expertise 1 10 
All agencies part of one team 1 10 
Less red tape 1 10 
More effectively gather evidence 1 10 
Standardisation of methods across different stakeholders to 
enable sharing of information 
1 10 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
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Table 5.3: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on awareness 
of the Whole-of-Government approach about effective combating of 
financial crime  
Question 5.2:  Are you aware of an approach referred to as a Whole-of-Government approach, that 
aims for actions to more effectively combat financial crime?” 
 
Participants’ themes  
Quantification 




Heard of it 4 40 
Yes 4 40 
No 2 20 
Catchphrase/buzzword 2 20 
Phrase being lobbied about 1 10 
Have not seen the effect of it 1 10 
No noticeable difference 1 10 
Whole of Government and Society Approach to deal with challenges 1 10 
Set out in the Policy Framework for the government-wide monitoring 
and evaluation systems: 2007  
1 10 
Improving government performance: our approach 2009 1 10 
Given effect through the NDP 1 10 
First heard the term used in the context of a holistic approach 1 10 
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Table 5.4: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on their 
understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in relation to actions 
to combat financial crime effectively  
Question 5.3: What is your understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in relation to the 
actions to combat financial crime effectively? 
Participants’ themes 
Quantification 
of this theme  
Frequency of 
this theme (%) 
Coordination between departments 4 40 
Working towards a common goal/objective 3 30 
Galvanise the whole of government and society to target 
crime as a collective concern and responsibility 
3 30 
It can either share information or assist the other 2 20 
Its purpose is to operationalise the integrated and multi-
disciplinary approach (Sect 17F of South African Police 
Service Act) 
2 20 
Conceptualisations abound 1 10 
Heads of departments have different concepts 1 10 
No common understanding at high level of government 
departments 
1 10 
Lip service without results 1 10 
Priorities of different departments should be cross-matrixed 1 10 
It takes the concept of intergovernmental task teams further 1 10 
Departments which now have their own forensic 
investigation capacity must be included 
1 10 
Dismantling of silos 1 10 
Integrate collaborative efforts of all departments, agencies 
and society 
1 10 
Full inclusion of each department playing its role to achieve 
an objective set by Government 
1 10 
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Figure 5.1: Participants’ frequency of themes regarding their 
understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in relation to the 
actions to combat financial crime  
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(Participants' data - Table 5.4)  
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Figure 5.2: High-level Depiction of FIOD structure for interdepartmental 
and inter-agency cooperation  
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Figure 5.3: Participants’ view of the application of a Whole-of-Government 
approach  
 








































































































































































































Participant’s explanatory notes (Interview with Participant P010, 2017): 
1. The structure should be guide by a Memorandum of Understanding or Terms of Refence 
granting them operation space, authorisation to share information, methods to collaborate, co-
ordinate, implement and execute. 
2. Coordinated feedback through Directors-General. 
3. Future planning on addressing all challenges identified in addressing financial crimes and any 
other issue on financial crime in executing the Whole-of-Government approach. 
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Table 5.5: Frequency table indicating participants’ focus on 
understanding what it means for different agencies to work together, 
across agency boundaries to combat financial crime, following a Whole-of-
Government approach  
Question 5.4:  According to your understanding, describe what it means for different agencies to work 
together, across agency boundaries, with the aim of combating financial crime through inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration, following a Whole-of-Government approach 
Participants’ themes 
Quantification 
of this theme  
Frequency of 
this theme (%) 
Agencies working across organisational boundaries to share 
information 
2 20 
Working towards a common goal/objective 2 20 
To work together holistically 2 20 
Each department should execute its own mandate as effectively as 
possible 
1 10 
Key issues and concerted decision-making are dealt with 1 10 
The powers of different agencies are consolidated 1 10 
Use different disciplines residing in agencies 1 10 
They supplement each other 1 10 
Integrating government's response to a specific issue 1 10 
Creation of an organisational structure to host representatives of 
different agencies 
1 10 
Representatives should be able to access systems and information 
held by other agencies 
1 10 
Reliant on quick retrieval and integration into combined product 1 10 
Private sector should participate 1 10 
Awareness among agencies of each other’s mandate 1 10 
It is the only feasible approach to effectively combat financial crime 1 10 
Combating serious crime and corruption is a continuous and 
dynamic process and as it develops, legislation and policies must 
be reviewed and strengthened  
1 10 
National Security Strategy elevates countering corruption and 
serious crime to a national security priority, compelling government 
to adopt a Whole-of-Government approach 
1 10 
Developing a collective approach across government to combat 
crimes targeting the financial systems and proceeds of crime 
1 10 
Collective planning and governance ensuring an outcome-based 
planning framework for government departments and government 
clusters 
1 10 
Collective development of crime-fighting practises and capabilities 
aligned to FATF approaches 
1 10 
The lead agency coordinates sharing of information through a 
shared portal 
1 10 
Concurrence of all the ministers of the different departments 
involved in combating financial crime 
1 10 
It is important to establish if it is a permanent structure or once-off 
to deal with a specific event 
1 10 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
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Table 5.6: Frequency table indicating participants’ views on whether 
Whole-of-Government in the SA context presents a viable option to ensure 
inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration to combat 
financial crime more effectively 
Question 5.5: Do you think that a Whole-of-Government approach in the South African context is a 
viable approach to ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts 
to combat financial crime more effectively?” 
 
Participants’ theme  
Quantification 




Yes 10 100 
The only sustainable/viable approach 2 20 
They must first have a common understanding of the meaning of 
financial crime 
1 10 
Requires enabling legislation to work 1 10 
Essential for economic and financial stability 1 10 
Combating of financial crime is not an exclusive focus or functional 
mandate of a single agency 
1 10 
Development of new single agencies to address financial crime is 
a costly endeavour 
1 10 
The mandate of the DPCI is representative of operationalising 
such an approach. 
1 10 
Implementation depends heavily on collective governance, 
strategic and operational leadership 
1 10 
We just need the right people to drive the process 1 10 
Should be administered by the Minister of Finance through the 
FIC 
1 10 
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Table 5.7: Frequency table indicating participants’ views on how a 
Whole-of-Government approach should be applied to ensure effective inter-
agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration  
 
(Source: Feedback from participants) 
Participants’ themes 
Quantification 
of this theme 
Frequency of 
this theme (%)
It is about defining outcomes 2 20
It is about prioritising 1 10
It is about setting the parameters 1 10
Staying within the parameters 1 10
Share powers 1 10
Policy implementation must be outcomes based 1 10
Integration of efforts to achieve outcomes 1 10
Optimisation of state resources 1 10
Linking to policy outcomes between different agencies 1 10
Enables government to address complex policy challenges 1 10
Use of knowledge and skills within different agencies 1 10
Focus on preventative measures 1 10
Tackling issues from a systemic perspective before it 
becomes embedded. 1 10
A shared vision in support across all agencies is required for 
implementation 1 10
Recognising and managing interdependencies across all 
levels of implementation. 1 10
Independent organisational structure 1 10
A working space can be created in a virtual organisational 
structure if too expensive. 1 10
Requires a high level of commitment 1 10
Explore what is the best way of working together 1 10
Developed a mandate for a multidisciplinary approach 1 10
All organs of state must cooperate on matters of mutual 
interest 1 10
Cooperation is not the sole prerogative of the DPCI 1 10
Sharing of information should be regulated by enabling 
legislation 1 10
Regular communication between heads of agencies 1 10
Regular communication within agencies 1 10
Ensure that inter-agency relations are in place 1 10
Inculcate a culture of working together 1 10
Teams made up of members of the main agencies must be 
merged into one investigation and prosecution unit 1 10
Must consist of permanent members from key agencies 1 10
As and when required accommodate ad hoc involvement 1 10
Can be modelled on the previous Office for Serious Economic 
Offences conducting own prosecutions 1 10
The combatting of financial crime should be a collective 
strategy to combat serious crime. 1 10
The financial crime strategy should be articulated through 
policy and strategy frameworks 1 10
The operationalisation of strategic and policy frameworks 
should be done by aligning 1 10
Development of a financial crime intelligence framework 1 10
Development of a financial crime operational 1 10
Must be managed at different tiers from the political level at 
the to the operational level 1 10
Question 5.6: How, in your opinion, should a Whole-of-Government approach be applied to 
ensure effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to 
combat financial crime more effectively
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the findings and recommendations of this study are addressed. 
The aims of the study and research questions central to this research 
undertaking, as formulated in Chapter 1 (paragraphs 1.4 and 1.6) and dealt with 
in this study, are reaffirmed. This is followed by a discussion of the primary and 
secondary findings of the research questions in dealing with the research aim, 
and subsequently the presentation of recommendations emerging from the 
findings.  
 
The methodology of this study is explained in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.14. An 
analysis of the literature was undertaken to discover useful information and gain 
insight into issues under investigation referred to in the research problem and 
objectives of the research. 
 
This was followed by conducting interviews with the participants in order to 
understand the meaning provided and attributes assigned to the problems and 
objectives being researched. In Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, a review was conducted 
of the relevant literature, both international and national, to gain an understanding 
of the research rationale and related international views that explain, clarify or 
provide insight into the concepts and problems under investigation, as well as the 
current situation of combating financial crime in South Africa. The South African 
legislation was explored to explain the current legal framework that forms the 
underpinnings so as to address the research problem. Cooperation, sharing of 
information and organisational structures or architecture to enable authorities to 
work across boundaries was explored by determining how other agencies 
implement models to address the issue. Definitions and characteristics that exist 
in the identification of financial crime were determined. The exploration of 
previous research, literature, document study and interviews were used as a 
guide to develop new conceptual models and to describe and explain the future 
application of the findings derived from this research. 
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6.2 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study seeks to evaluate the prospect of a Whole-of-Government approach 
by Government to enable integration of efforts, inter-agency cooperation, 
collaboration and sharing of information between the key investigative agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime that can be implemented as a model on 
which to base this effort.  
 
The purpose of this research is firstly to analyse the category of crime known as 
financial crime, the emergence of various forms of it, and how it is carried out in 
practice. The research is also meant to result in a better understanding of the use 
of the terminology related to the crime, and for it to be used efficiently and 
accurately during communication, based on a systematic classification system. 
Secondly, the research aims to understand what is meant by the concept 
combating of crime and what its different components are so that those who use 
the term will apply it correctly in the context of combating financial crime. Thirdly, 
the organisational arrangement to combat financial crime and the accompanying 
problems is analysed to enable cooperation and coordination of action between 
the respective agencies and in the context of possible solutions to achieve more 
effective combating. Lastly, the researcher analyses the concept Whole-of-
Government in order to understand what it entails and how it can be used in the 
context of available organisational models to assist efforts to combat financial 
crime more effectively. In doing so, the researcher identifies a conceptual model 
for integrating the functions, knowledge and skills of the various agencies to 
combat financial crime more effectively in accordance with a Whole-of-
Government approach. 
 
The specific research objectives of this study, to address the research aim 
indicated above, were divided into the following seven categories for exploration, 
explanation, determination and identification:  
 
a. To explore and describe the concept, nature, and characteristics of financial 
crime.  
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b. To explain how financial crime can be practically and systematically 
categorised (codified), using a descriptor of the type of unlawful conduct as 
a reference.  
c. To explore and describe the application of the terms combating or to combat 
crime within the South African institutional, legislative, policy and strategic 
framework. 
d. To determine the key investigative agencies and institutional arrangements 
for combating financial crime. 
e. To explore what are the legal, institutional or organisational models for 
ensuring inter-agency cooperation and integration of efforts for combating 
financial crime, considering the legal framework, which provides for 
legislative mandates and sharing of information. 
f. Determine what the concept Whole-of-Government entails and how it can 
be applied or adapted for implementation by the Government to serve as a 
model framework to ensure effective multi-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts to combat financial crime. 
g. To identify and explain models for implementing a Whole-of-Government 
approach that is able to support the Government in implementing a strategy 
or policy framework, using all its key agencies to combat financial crime 
more effectively.  
 
This study presents an original contribution to the phenomenon of combating 
financial crime more effectively, using as an organisational approach the Whole-
of-Government models presented herein that consequently contribute to and 
influence local, regional and international knowledge and practices.  
6.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to (i) specify what will be investigated by doing this research, to (ii) 
provide direction and structure to the study, to (iii) better understand the rationale 
behind the study that will enable the researcher to contribute to the resolution of 
the research problem and the associated issues under investigation, as well as 
to (iv) achieve the research objectives, purpose and aims that are identified in the 
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study, the researcher formulated the following research questions in the study 
and provided answers to them: 
 a. What do the concept, nature and characteristics of financial crime entail?  
b. How can financial crime be categorised systematically (codified) in practical 
terms, using as a reference a descriptor of unlawful conduct?  
c.  What does combating or to combat crime entail within the South African 
legislative, policy and strategic framework? 
d. Which are the key investigative agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime? 
e. What institutional models for ensuring inter-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts for combating financial crime are available, considering 
the legal framework that provides for legislative mandates and sharing of 
information?  
f. What does the concept Whole-of-Government entail and how can it be 
applied or adapted for implementation by the Government to serve as a 
model framework to ensure effective multi-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts to combat financial crime? 
g. Are models for implementing a Whole-of-Government approach available to 
support Government in implementing an organisational system, using all its 
key agencies, and integrating efforts to combat financial crime more 
effectively? 
6.4  FINDINGS 
The results of this research study are found on information that was obtained 
from international and domestic sources, as well as from the participants 
interviewed, and are reported on below to answer the specific research questions 
in this study.  
6.4.1 The concept, nature, characteristics and examples of financial 
crime 
Research in Chapter 2 was essentially undertaken in two parts to answer two 
research questions. The first question relates to what the concept, nature and 
characteristics of financial crime entail. The second part was undertaken to 
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respond to the research question of how financial crime can be categorised 
systematically (codified) in practical terms, using as a reference a descriptor of 
unlawful conduct, with the intention of developing a model for a catalogue to 
classify financial crime. The information obtained from the literature and 
responses from interviews answered this question, and provided the information 
for the development of a conceptual catalogue to classify financial crime.  
6.4.1.1 The concept financial crime 
One of the preliminary steps for Government, government agencies, agency 
officials and practitioners to combat financial crime is to understand the meaning 
and scope of financial crime and to know what type of unlawful acts and conduct 
constitutes crime that resorts under the category of financial crime. The literature 
reflects that in the context of developing strategies, actions or policies to deal with 
financial crime, policy-makers and heads of investigative agencies should have 
a shared understanding of what it is they must combat. The literature further 
indicates that there is confusion among researchers and practitioners when 
communicating about examples of financial crime.  
 
The literature reveals that from an international perspective, there is no generally 
accepted definition of financial crime. Depending on the jurisdiction and the 
context, the term financial crime expresses different concepts. In many 
jurisdictions, there is a lack of a precise definition of the term financial crime but 
in practice there are numerous definitions. The term financial crime is often used 
in common phrasing and is thus one of which we assume we know its meaning. 
Where definitions are found, they are less precise than for instance the definitions 
encountered for fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing.  
 
The researcher turned his focus to the data provided by the participants to 
establish how they viewed the understanding of the concept financial crime. An 
analysis of the responses received from the participants revealed that 50% of the 
participants believed there is a common understanding of the meaning of financial 
crime. Of the participants, 50% were of the view that there is no common 
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understanding of the meaning of financial crime and, 20% believed that most 
people have a general idea of the meaning of financial crime.  
6.4.1.2 Nature and characteristics of financial crime  
The literature indicates that the term financial crime is not in general use in South 
Africa. South African law enforcement agencies normally use the terms 
commercial crime and economic crime. In practice, the term financial crime is 
more suitable when referring to offences such as serious fraud, insider trading, 
money laundering and terrorist financing. However, financial crime is part of the 
commercial crime family, as they share the same general characteristics, and 
when the term financial crime is used it should be narrowed down to activities 
that pertain to the financial markets or investment business, and those adversely 
impacting on or prejudicing or harming the financial systems of a country. In 
official communications, the terms economic crime and commercial crime are 
sometimes used interchangeably and analogously. From the variety of themes 
presented in the literature and the data obtained from the participants, it is almost 
impossible to formulate a conclusive, absolute conceptualisation of the nature 
and characteristics of financial crime from an international as well as a South 
African perspective. The literature and the data provided by the participants, 
however, provide valuable guidance for narrowing down the characteristics to a 
practical guide for categorising and identifying financial crime. 
 
The literature further describes the nature and characteristics of financial crime 
to entail the following: 
• Makes use of deception/fraud (frequency of 42%) 
• Results in financial loss (frequency of 29%) 
• Crime against property (frequency of 29%) 
• Involves unlawful conversion of property (frequency of 14%) 
• Personal use and benefit (frequency of 14%) 
• Profit-driven (frequency of 14%) 
• Breaches trust (frequency of 14%) 
• Conceals/hides true nature of activities (frequency of 14%)  
• For illegal gain (frequency of 14%) 
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• Intentional (frequency of 14%)  
• Opportunity-driven (frequency of 14%)  
• Conversion of profits into cash (frequency of 14%) 
• Mechanical process (frequency of 14%) 
• Committed by persons with a certain level of standing in business 
(frequency of 14%)  
• Economic crime is perpetrated by white-collar criminals (frequency of 
14%) 
 
The following are themes that highlight the characteristics of financial crime 
presented in the responses from the participants: 
• Acquiring a direct or indirect financial/monetary 
advantage/gain/benefit (frequency of 60 %)  
• Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim (frequency of   50%) 
• Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation (frequency of 30%) 
• Involves sophisticated methods (frequency of 20%) 
• Involves various methods (frequency of 20%) 
• Non-violent (frequency of 10%) 
• The proceeds invariably are laundered (frequency of 10 %) 
• Motivated by greed (frequency of 10 %) 
• Usually involves documents (frequency of 10%) 
• Usually involves technology (cyber technology) (frequency of 10 %) 
• Can be either organised or transactional crime (frequency of 10%) 
• When organised, has the same characteristics as organised crime 
(frequency of 10%) 
• It bridges conventional borders and jurisdictions (frequency of 10%) 
• State responses battle to keep up with technology in financial systems 
(frequency of 10%)   
• The focus of financial crime is in the criminal economy and business 
systems (frequency of 10%) 
• It represents crimes related to illicit economy (frequency of 10%)  
• It is directed at illegally obtaining property (frequency of 10%) 
• Focuses on money (frequency of 10%) 
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Some of the themes identified in the data provided by the participants regarding 
the identifiable characteristics of financial crime overlap with some of the topics 
related to the definitions of financial crime they provided. The topics presented 
by the participants when describing the characteristics of financial crime broadly 
match those characteristics described in the respective definitions and are 
summarised as follows, where the first frequency is representative of the 
definition and the second representative of the features submitted by the 
participants: 
• Non-violent (10% - 10%) 
• Acquires a direct or indirect financial/monetary advantage/gain/benefit 
(60% - 60%) 
• Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim (50% - 50%) 
• It is crime aimed at the financial systems of a country (10% - 10%) 
• The focus of financial crime is in the criminal economy and business 
systems (10% - 10%) 
• Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation (10% - 30%) 
• The proceeds invariably are laundered (10% - 10%) 
 
The convergence of the relatively consistent frequencies presented by the 
participants in response to two separate questions provides a practical guide for 
identifying the characteristics of financial crime from a South African perspective. 
The feedback from participants is broadly consistent with the characteristics 
presented in the literature and provides a comprehensive version of the 
characteristics of financial crime. The themes presented by the participants that 
are widely consistent with those presented in the literature are summarised as 
follows, where the first frequency as a percentage represents input from the 
participants and the latter the literature: 
• Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation (30% - 42%) 
• Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim (50% - 29%) 
• Acquires a direct or indirect financial/monetary advantage/gain/benefit 
(60% - 14%) 
• It is directed at illegally obtaining property (10% - 14%) 
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• Focus on money (10% - 14%) 
 
The above-mentioned intersecting characteristics presented by the participants 
provide additional guidance for identifying and refining the features of financial 
crime from a South African practitioner’s perspective. It may also be useful as a 
departure point for defining financial crime for use in the South African context.   
 
The data presented by the participants showed that there is a 30% frequency of 
the view that in South Africa the term financial crime is associated with the term 
commercial crime. There is a 10% frequency of the theme presented by the 
participants that financial crime and commercial crime are used interchangeably. 
The emerging themes are consistent with the narrative that emerges from the 
literature with regard to the use of the terms financial crime and commercial crime 
in South Africa, where participants regard financial crime as the following: 
• Representative of that category of commercial crime from which a 
financial benefit is derived 
• Representative of that category of commercial crime aimed at the 
financial sector or systems 
• Being part of the commercial crime family 
 
The Financial Sector Regulation Bill, reinforces the finding that statutory financial 
crimes predominantly refer to crimes that threaten the: 
• financial stability; 
• safety and soundness of financial institutions; 
• financial customers; 
• efficiency and integrity of the financial system. 
6.4.1.3 Definition of financial crime 
The literature study shows that no internationally accepted definition of financial 
crime exists and that in practice there are numerous definitions of financial crime. 
Where these are encountered, they are not as precise as the definitions provided 
for specific crimes. From the variety of themes presented in the literature and the 
data obtained from the participants it is almost impossible to arrive at a certain, 
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absolute definition of financial crime from an international as well as a South 
African perspective. 
 
The researcher carefully analysed the definitions of financial crime presented in 
the literature to assist him with defining financial crime. From these definitions, 
he was able to formulate the following integrated definition for financial crime: 
 
Financial crime refers to a variety of non-violent, profit-
driven, unlawful conduct that targets financial systems, 
financial institutions, or property belonging to another, in 
order to gain access or control thereof, or to convert 
property for one’s own personal use or benefit, that 
generally results in a financial loss. It may involve the use 
of deception, breaches of trust, concealment of the truth, 
and often includes criminal offences such as fraud, theft, 
corruption, money laundering and tax evasion. 
 
By integrating the main themes emerging from the answers provided by the 
participants regarding their definition of financial crime, the researcher formulated 
the following definition: 
  
Financial crime is any unlawful, non-violent conduct that is 
financially prejudicial to another or society, often making 
use of fraud and dishonesty aimed at financial systems, 
business and individuals, with the intent to obtain a financial 
benefit, or for self-enrichment to which the perpetrator is not 
legally entitled or for the purpose or use by a criminal 
business enterprise system. 
 
The conceptual definition formulated above is in broad terms vaguely similar to 
the definition formulated from the themes presented in the literature. The 
reference to “intent” and “unlawful” in the definition may be a conscious reference 
to the definitional elements of “intent” and “unlawfulness” in common-law crimes, 
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and more specifically fraud, as there is also a requirement for the causal element 
of “prejudice” to others. 
 
The Financial Sector Regulation Bill, provides a statutory definition of financial 
crime. An interpretation of this definition reveals that it is not necessarily inclusive 
of all the statutory offences that could be included in a general definition of 
financial crime, and that it caters for new offences created in the Bill. For example, 
tax evasion, which predominantly features as an example of a financial crime, is 
excluded from the definition. The latter is therefore not inclusive of all the crimes 
that can be categorised as financial crime but inclusive of the crimes that relate 
to the objects contained in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill. 
6.4.1.4 Examples of financial crime 
The concept financial crime covers a broad range of offences. In the literature, 
the various authors provide several examples of offences classified as financial 
crime. Many of the examples quoted as a crime, or constituting a financial crime, 
merely constitute a description of a type of unlawful conduct and do not describe 
a crime in accordance with the convention of our laws. An example of such a 
description of that kind of conduct is “computer-related crime”. This description is 
so wide that it can refer to any crime where a computer was used, such as during 
the commissioning of the offence, or to convey a misrepresentation, or submit a 
fraudulent document. The mere fact that a computer was used during the 
commissioning of a crime by the perpetrator or an accomplice is insufficient to 
classify the conduct as a financial crime. From the variety of themes presented in 
the literature and the data obtained from the participants, it is almost impossible 
to arrive at an absolute, conclusive list of financial crime from an international as 
well as a South African perspective. The literature and the data provided by the 
participants provide valuable guidance to narrow down the crimes and unlawful 
conduct to a useful list for providing examples of financial crime. 
 
The literature was analysed for examples of crimes categorised as financial crime 
and revealed the examples referred to in Table 6.1 (paragraph 6.7). The 
examples of financial crime from the literature as shown in Table 6.1 (paragraph 
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6.7) indicate that they do not necessarily correspond to the information provided 
in the literature and the feedback from the participants regarding the nature, 
characteristics or definitions of financial crime. The examples of financial crime in 
the literature confirm the view held in the literature that different countries have 
different legal characterisations and classifications for specific (unlawful) acts or 
conduct. 
 
The participants provided examples of financial crime, differentiating between 
those offences classified as common-law offences and those of statutory origin, 
according to their understanding of the conventions of South African law. The 
examples listed in Table 6.2 (paragraph 6.7) show that some of the examples of 
statutory financial crimes are not classified as a contravention of a statute in terms 
of the strict conventions of South African law, for example “identity theft”. This is 
an instance where financial crime is described in accordance with the nature of 
the conduct, rather than as the strict conventions of a statutory provision under 
the law. There is also confusion in the differentiation between the conventions of 
statutory and common-law offences when financial crime is described, making a 
case for classification according to a description of the type of conduct.  
 
Examples of financial crime in the literature are presented irrespective of whether 
they constitute a common-law offence or statutory crime in terms of the 
differentiation in South African law. There is a requirement to categorise financial 
crime in accordance with its descriptors of the type of conduct and not only 
according to the strict classification applicable to the conventions of the law, i.e. 
common law and statutory law. Such a classification will offer a more realistic and 
practical reflection than a classification based solely on the conventions of law. 
For example, tax fraud, which is a manifestation of the common-law crime of 
fraud, involves the same type of unlawful conduct described under the statutory 
offence of tax evasion in section 235 of the Tax Administration Act to accrue 
criminal liability. Most people will, however, interchangeably refer to tax fraud or 
tax evasion, notwithstanding the fact that the first example constitutes a common-
law offence and the latter a statutory offence. A description of the conduct, for all 
practical purposes, also describes the offence. A convergence of the themes from 
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the literature and those from the participants could align better if based on a 
descriptor only. 
6.4.2 Categorisation of financial crime 
As can be seen from the use of the term financial crime and other umbrella terms 
such as economic crime, commercial crime and white-collar crime as indicated in 
the literature, it is apparent that jurists are not the only group who have developed 
their own classification of crimes in accordance with the interests that the various 
laws protect. Researchers, practitioners and authorities have also developed 
their own classification of financial crimes in accordance with the characteristics, 
manifestations and type of conduct inherent to the crime.  
 
An analysis of the literature reveals that provision is not made for a category of 
crime referred to as Financial Crime, thus leading to the failure by Government 
to accomplish clear policy development and planning with regard to financial 
crime per se. The literature provided a model for categorising or classifying 
financial crime systematically and methodically, in accordance with descriptors of 
the types of acts or conduct, identifiable or associated with crimes/offences in 
terms of South Africa’s laws. Crimes or offences as defined in law are typically 
associated with actions or behavioural and contextual characteristics that are 
universally considered to be an offence. This aspect is also recognisable in 
respect of financial crimes, as encountered in the literature. According to the 
model encountered in the literature, based on this premise as proposed by the 
UNODC, an Events-based approach of crime classification avoids issues created 
by legal complexities, resulting in a simplified, applicable classification. 
 
The researcher applied an adapted version of the Events-based approach to 
categorising financial crime, based on the data received from the participants and 
a review of the literature. The modified version of the Events-based approach to 
categorising financial crime, as developed by the researcher, is presented as a 
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6.4.3 Combating crime 
Research in Chapter 3 was essentially undertaken in two parts in order to answer 
two research questions. The first question relates to what the concept combating 
or to combat crime entails in the South African legislative, policy and strategic 
framework, and then more explicitly regarding combating financial crime. The 
second question relates to identifying the key investigative agencies responsible 
for combating financial crime.   
6.4.3.1 Conceptualising combating of crime 
The literature shows that there is confusion about what the term combating or to 
combat crime entails. The use of and distinction between combating of crime and 
crime prevention creates confusion. The term combating is sometimes used 
when the term prevention of crime is intended and vice versa. 
  
The literature explains that the concept combating of crime is more than 
prevention alone, and that it should be construed to include activities such as 
crime prevention and policing. This means that crime combating could be 
regarded as an umbrella term for all kinds of legal activities aimed at fighting 
crime, whether it is to prevent, reduce, control, deter, or solve crime, and may 
also include policing activities such as law enforcement, the maintenance of 
public order and visible policing. The terms crime combating, and crime fighting 
can be used interchangeably, and a phrase such as tackling crime has a similar 
meaning. 
 
The literature indicates that combating of crime is an overarching term or concept, 
inclusive of the terms prevention, investigation, detection, and intelligence. The 
data obtained from the participants present the following as components of 
combating crime: 
• It includes investigation measures (40% frequency of themes) 
• It includes prevention of crime measures (30% frequency of themes) 
• It includes detection of crime (20% frequency of terms) 
• Encapsulating concept of various actions (20% frequency of themes) 
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• Synonymous with the concept of fighting crime (20% frequency of 
themes) 
• Includes proactive and reactive measures (10% frequency of themes) 
• It is the whole package (10% frequency of themes) 
 
a. Prevention of crime 
The literature indicates that the terms combating of crime and crime prevention 
is used incongruously. The term crime prevention means different things to 
different people. It is therefore essential to distinguish that the concept prevention 
of crime is a separate concept that forms part of the broader concept of crime 
combating. The feedback from the participants regarding their understanding of 
the meaning of financial crime returned a broad variety of non-recurring themes 
confirming the view put forward in the literature that defining crime prevention will 
always be problematic. 
  
b. Investigation of crime 
The literature reveals that investigation of crime is an effective technique to 
prevent crime. Also, the literature confirms that effective criminal investigation 
deters criminals, preventing them from committing crime. An analysis of the 
themes stated by the participants provides the following broad description of 
criminal investigation: “Criminal investigation concerns the obtaining, collection 
and gathering of evidence for court purposes including for use in criminal 
proceedings”. 
 
c.  Detection of crime 
The literature shows that crime detection is one of the activities associated with 
the combating of crime, and that prevention, investigation and detection of crime 
are the central part of the police mandate that forms part of a totality of efforts to 
combat crime. From the definitions for crime detection provided in the literature, 
it was possible to formulate the following integrated definition of detection of crime 
in accordance with the literature: 
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Crime detection is a pro- or reactive process during which 
a crime or a probable crime is detected or uncovered by the 
police or law enforcement after receiving a complaint or an 
indication of the commissioning of an offence or probable 
offence requiring verification, investigation or identification 
of the perpetrator for arrest and prosecution. 
 
The data received from the participants shows that detection of crime is:  
• processes that have been put in place to detect crime (40% frequency 
of themes) 
• a proactive process (20% frequency of themes) 
• uncovering or discovering crime (10% frequency of themes) 
• the identification of a suspect (10% frequency of themes) 
• a reactive response to crime (10% frequency of themes) 
 
d.  Crime intelligence 
The literature indicates that if crime intelligence is correctly applied in policing, 
enormous successes in crime prevention and combating can be achieved. The 
essence of effectively combating crime is reliant, among other factors, on the 
availability of reliable and accurate information about crime in the form of crime 
intelligence. Crime intelligence is a component essential to combating crime.  
  
The data presented by the participants widely intersect with the themes emerging 
from the definitions and discussion regarding crime intelligence presented in the 
literature:  
• Collecting information about criminal activity (70% frequency of 
themes) 
• Identification, analysis, processing and dissemination of information 
(30% frequency) 
• Analysing information (20% frequency of themes) 
• Information to avert crime (20% frequency of themes) 
• Information to advance criminal investigation (20% frequency of 
themes) 
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• Ensures effective policing can take place (10% frequency of themes) 
• Assists with the gathering of information to investigate crime (10% 
frequency of themes) 
 
A wide variety of themes (28) emerged from the answers by the participants in 
their response to the request to define the term crime intelligence, with a low 
frequency of recurring themes present in the replies. The reason why the 
researcher interprets the great diversity coupled with the low frequencies is that 
among the participants or the agencies they represent: 
• there is an underutilisation of crime intelligence during the combating 
of financial crime; 
• there is an under-appreciation of the value of crime intelligence during 
the combating of financial crime; 
• there is a lack of capacity to develop and analyse intelligence 
regarding financial crime; 
• there is an under-appreciation of the value of financial intelligence 
centres during combating of financial crime; 
• there is insufficient cooperation and sharing of intelligence between 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime. 
6.4.3.2 The legislative framework to combat crime 
A study of the literature and legislation indicates that the broad legal framework 
to combat financial crime is in the first instance derived from section 205(3) of the 
Constitution of the RSA, which makes provision for the objects of the police 
service that includes “[t]o prevent, combat and investigate crime” (my emphasis). 
At the next level, section 17B of the South African Police Service Act provides 
that in the establishment of the DPCI, recognition should be given to the need to 
establish a directorate in the police service to inter alia “[p]revent, combat and 
investigate national priority offences, in particular, serious organised crime, 
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6.4.3.3 Policy framework for combating crime  
A study of the literature revealed that the policy framework set out by Government 
to combat crime is encapsulated in various initiatives produced by Government 
to set forth its agenda, strategies priorities and plans in relation to combating of 
crime. The documents published by Government are:  
• National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) 
• National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) 
• The 2017 White Paper on Safety and Security 
• The 2017 White Paper on Policing 
• The South African Police Service Strategic Plan 
 
By using the literature study, the researcher found that the various plans, 
strategies and programmes are very impressive in appearance. However, the 
actual realisation of these appears to be wanting, as the real perceptions reflected 
in the literature seem to suggest otherwise.  
 
a. National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) 
The literature indicated that this strategy has run its course and is no longer 
functional. 
 
b. National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) 
The literature shows that the NCPS is a strategy document prepared by an 
Interdepartmental Strategy Team comprising the Departments of Correctional 
Services, Defence, Intelligence, Justice, Safety and Security, and Welfare. The 
Cabinet initiated and approved the NCPS in March 1995. The literature further 
explains that the NCPS refers to a long-term interdepartmental strategy at a 
national level, involving various government departments and civil society, that 
contains a mixture of both policy and strategy. The NCPS has lost momentum 
and has become latent as a strategy. 
 
c. White Paper on Safety and Security 
Utilizing the literature study, the researcher established that there is a White 
Paper on Safety and Security, published by the Civilian Secretariat for the Police 
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Service in 2016. The objectives of the White Paper are, among other things, to 
provide an overarching policy for safety and the prevention of crime and violence.  
 
d. White Paper on Policing 
By means of the literature study, the researcher established that there is a White 
Paper on Policing. The Paper provides insight into the principles and approaches 
that will probably form the foundation with regard to the combating of crime 
generally (South Africa, 2016) and guide the role, approaches and responsibility 
of Government and, more explicitly, the SAPS as the leading agency with regard 
to the combating of crime generally (South Africa, 2016). 
 
e. South African Police Service Strategic Plan 
Using the literature study, the researcher established that the SAPS annually 
publishes a strategic plan that is a continuation of the written police plans, in 
another form, and that covers a new period. 
6.4.3.4 Legislative mandates for combating crime 
A study of the legislation produced the relevant statutes that provide government 
agencies with the legal mandate to combat crime. The researcher determined 
that in accordance with the 1996 Constitution and the South African Police 
Service Act, the SAPS is mandated to combat all crime in general in South Africa. 
6.4.3.5 Non-statutory institutional framework 
The literature shows that when Government sets its priorities, policy coordination 
and implementation of the respective departments, it views them in terms of the 
“clusters” that have been formed via the IMCs such as: 
• National Crime Prevention Centre 
• Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster 
 
a. National Crime Prevention Centre 
The literature indicates that the NCPC was established to achieve the objectives 
of the NCPS, which functions as a component of visible policing within the SAPS, 
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the latter being the lead agency for the implementation of the NCPS. The NCPS 
was never fully implemented due to inherent limitations. 
 
b. Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster  
The literature discloses that the JCPS guides crime prevention efforts in South 
Africa and is composed of national and provincial departments responsible for 
security, law enforcement and crime prevention.  
6.4.4  Combating financial crime 
It can be argued that in the context of combating financial crime, the 
interchangeable use of the terms financial crime, white-collar crime, economic 
crime and commercial crime is irrelevant. The reason that is put forward to 
advance this statement is that in the event of literature and official documents 
referring to combating financial crimes by using terms such as financial crime, 
white-collar crime, economic crime and commercial crime, they will inadvertently 
include crimes and types of conduct that resort under the category of offences 
referred to as financial crimes. In some instances, however, reference might be 
made to the combating and prevention of specific crimes, such as money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and corruption, which clearly fall in the category of 
offences and conduct called financial crime. In such cases, it can be readily 
inferred, unless indicated otherwise, that the measures are unique and distinctive 
of the type or category of conduct or offence.  
6.4.4.1 Prevention of financial crime 
The literature overview shows that the traditional methods of controlling financial 
crime, consisting predominantly of investigation and prosecution, have failed. The 
literature further explains that the challenges posed by financial crime should be 
seen from a holistic perspective, which should involve prevention by creating a 
hostile environment for perpetrators. To this end, Government, business and 
individuals must combine their resources to eliminate financial crime at its source.  
 
In the South African context, the literature shows that the White Paper on Policing 
does not refer to financial crime or the combating thereof in explicit terms. It does, 
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however, refer to commercial crime, which is a term that, as research indicates, 
may sometimes include financial crime in the South African context. The literature 
furthermore shows that Government is conscious of the prevalence and increase 
in sophistication of financial crimes such as cybercrime, and the adverse 
economic impact that these crimes have on the economy of the country.  
 
The literature confirms that it is the function of the DPCI, “to identify, counter and 
deal with selected organised and transnational crime, corruption and serious 
national priority crimes based on sound analysis of criminal threats, patterns and 
trends, intelligence forecasting and information-sharing” (White Paper on 
Policing, 2016a:32). Although the White Paper deals with the functions of the 
DPCI, there is a curious absence of a specific reference to serious commercial 
crime, although section 17B of the South African Police Service Act specifically 
refers to it. 
6.4.4.2 Investigation of financial crime 
The literature indicates that the investigation of financial crime requires a multi-
disciplinary approach that includes accounting, auditing, legal, fiscal and banking 
expertise. The symbiotic relationship between corruption and money laundering 
requires strategies to deal with financial crimes such as money laundering and 
corruption in a systematic and integrated fashion. The literature shows that the 
(new) National Anti-Corruption Strategy Discussion Document unfortunately 
deals with only one aspect of financial crime in isolation, namely corruption, as 
opposed to dealing with it holistically, considering its symbiotic relationship with 
other financial crimes. 
6.4.4.3 Detection of financial crime 
The literature states that financial crime is detected via controls, by accident, 
whistle-blowing, auditors and well-constructed programmes of detection, but that 
the detection of financial crime is difficult because it is not as visible as common 
crime. The literature further shows that sharing information can be a valuable tool 
for the detection of financial crimes. 
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6.4.4.4 Financial crime intelligence 
The literature review shows that intelligence-based techniques to investigate 
fraud and economic crime are increasingly becoming the norm and providing a 
basis for many different aspects of an investigation, as well as playing a 
prominent role during tracing of the proceeds of economic crime and corruption. 
The literature furthermore states that during the investigation of offences that 
have as an objective the acquisition of financial gains, such as corruption, or 
involving the movement of money, the most valuable source available to 
investigators is financial intelligence. 
6.4.4.5 Legal framework for combating financial crime 
The literature indicates that since the early 1990s, South Africa has adopted and 
implemented new laws and initiatives, thus establishing a comprehensive 
framework to deal with financial crime.  
 
a. The South African Police Service Act 
The literature states that the legal mandate of the SAPS is the prevention, 
combating and investigation of national priority offences, in particular serious 
organised crime, serious commercial crime and serious corruption. The South 
African Police Service Act does not define serious commercial crime and serious 
corruption. 
 
b. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
The literature informs us that the common-law crime of bribery, which was 
committed in respect of or by officials of the state, was abolished in 1992. Bribery 
of persons who were not state officials was an offence under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act. The Corruption Act passed in 1992, repealed both the common-
law crime of bribery and the previous Prevention of Corruption Act, and created 
a new offence called corruption, which incorporates both the common-law crime 
of bribery and the offences created by the repealed Prevention of Corruption Act. 
The situation is now dealt with by the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act, which is South Africa's first comprehensive anti-corruption 
legislation. 
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c. Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
The literature indicates that the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act was legislated with the intent and aspirations to, among other aspects, 
provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent, combat and provide for 
investigative measures in respect of corruption and related corrupt activities. The 
literature further shows that there are links between corrupt activities and other 
forms of crime (organised crime) and that regional and international cooperation 
is essential to prevent and control the corruption and related corrupt activities and 
economic crime, including money laundering. It requires a comprehensive, 
integrated and multidisciplinary approach to prevent and combat corruption and 
related corrupt activities efficiently and effectively. The Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act was amended by the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act to provide measures to prevent and combat 
the financing of terrorist and related activities. 
 
d. Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
The literature states that the Financial Intelligence Centre Act supplements the 
mainly criminal legislation, creating the administrative framework for money-
laundering control in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
established the Financial Intelligence Centre and a Counter-money-laundering 
Advisory Council to combat money-laundering activities and the financing of 
terrorist and related activities.  
 
e. Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act 
The literature review indicates that both criminal and terrorist activities have the 
need to disguise the source and the application of funds obtained from illicit 
activities. Disguising these funds amounts to money laundering. Terrorists use 
money laundering to fund the necessary tools to support the spread of terror. The 
literature further explains that The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act is a legislative effort aimed at combating 
money laundering and terrorist financing.  
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f. Acts administered by SARS 
The literature review shows that SARS administers the following two Acts that 
provide its legal mandate to conduct criminal investigations related to tax evasion: 
• The Tax Administration Act 
• The Customs Control Act 
 
At the time of finalising this report, the Customs Control Act had not yet been 
implemented, with the date of implementation to be announced. When it is 
implemented, the Customs Control Act will become effective and the current 
Customs and Excise Act will be renamed the Excise Control Act and will be 
applicable in excise matters. 
6.4.5 Government’s efforts to combat financial crime 
The literature shows that the views expressed in the news media, journal articles 
and statements by politicians, heads of agencies and practitioners provide 
valuable insight into the current state of Government’s efforts to combat financial 
crime. The participants in this research survey share their knowledge, 
experiences and perceptions of Government’s efforts to combat financial crime.   
 
The literature provides a view of the current state of efforts to combat economic 
crime and describes it as follows: 
• South African organisations reported the highest rate of economic 
crime in the world over the last two years 
• Economic crime is at a pandemic level in South Africa 
• South Africans exhibit a significantly low level of confidence in local 
law enforcement agencies 
• 70% of organisations believe that investigative agencies are 
inadequately resourced and trained to investigate and fight economic 
crime 
• The prevalence of misappropriation is the most prevalent form of 




© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
The literature also reports that research has indicated that the top seven most 
reported types of economic crime in South Africa show higher reported levels 
than the global average, except for cybercrime, which is on par with the global 
figure for this crime. The literature further shows that South Africa has sufficiently 
robust and comprehensive laws to address financial crime. However, the 
weaknesses lie in the institutional structures that are required to implement these 
laws, as well as in law enforcement, which is hampered by a lack of expertise, 
resources and coordination. 
 
Data obtained from the participants in respect of the question whether they think 
financial crime is effectively combated in South Africa, and for which they were 
requested to substantiate their answers, showed that all the participants were of 
the opinion that financial crime was not effectively combated in South Africa. The 
reasons provided in the motivations given by the participants supporting this view 
are presented in Table 6.3 (paragraph 6.7) in descending order of frequency of 
themes as listed by the participants. 
 
Table 6.3 (paragraph 6.7) indicates that, based on the data, the main reasons 
why the participants believe that financial crime is not combated effectively are 
as follows: 
• Mandates and functions are not collectively coordinated (50% 
frequency) 
• Weak and unstructured public sector inter-agency cooperation (40% 
frequency) 
 
The reasons offered by the participants relate to: 
• agencies having different mandates that are not aligned;  
• fragmented cooperation between the various agencies. 
6.4.5.1 Policy framework and strategic direction 
The literature emphasises that there is a requirement for improving the 
implementation of strategies in law enforcement and policing, explaining that 
failure to carry out strategies could cause lost opportunities, duplication of efforts, 
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incompatibility of organisational structures, and a waste of resources. The 
literature further informs that implementation of the strategies determines the 
measure of success of strategies in line with their objectives.  
 
The literature furthermore maintains that operationally there is no clear 
Government policy that spells out what its approach is to combat financial crime, 
because there is no centre of government operating in a guiding role to create 
structure in accordance with set expectations, set a common agenda, ensure 
overall accountability, or to coordinate the efforts of investigative agencies during 
the combating of financial crime. Investigative agencies function in agreement 
with a multitude of strategic plans that do not demonstrate the harmonisation of 
approaches to combat financial crime effectively. Many of these schemes never 
become operational. 
 
Responses from the participants regarding their views on how policies and 
strategies for combating financial crime or the lack thereof impact on 
coordination, cooperation and a collaborative effort to combat financial crime 
effectively, resulted in the participants providing a variety of answers, of which 
the following carried the most weight: 
• Uncoordinated efforts lead to an activity-based approach that deviates 
from Government’s outcomes-based approach (20% frequency). 
• Lack of implementation leads to failure (20% frequency). 
6.4.5.2 Cooperation, collaboration and information sharing among 
agencies 
An overview of the literature revealed that investigative agencies should not fall 
into the trap of adopting silo approaches and accommodating territorial battles, 
and that they must coordinate and communicate, domestically and 
internationally, in respect of financial crime and abuses. 
 
The literature further revealed that Government’s view is that “there is a visibly 
growing synergy in the fight against corruption among the law enforcement 
agencies, which include the Special Investigation Unit, the Anti-Corruption Task 
425 
© Botha, A.E.  University of South Africa 2018 
Team, the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Hawks” (Hartley, 2014), calling this 
synergy between departments a “new approach”. Unfortunately, it is not clear 
from the literature how this “new approach” differs from the previous approaches 
and how it is being implemented. The literature further reveals examples of 
situations where cooperation between agencies has failed, and where it has been 
successful. 
 
Data obtained from the participants regarding whether they think there is effective 
inter-agency coordination, cooperation, collaboration, and sharing among 
government agencies when combating financial crime, led to a variety of 
answers: 
• 90% of the participants stated that they do not believe that there is 
effective inter-agency coordination. The most prominent reason 
provided was that sharing of information was restricted by legislation 
(30% frequency). 
• 90% of the participants stated that they do not believe that there is 
effective inter-agency cooperation. The most prominent reason 
provided was that agencies pursue their objectives and performance 
goals (30% frequency). 
• 80% of the participants stated that they do not believe that there is 
effective inter-agency collaboration. 
• 80% of the participants stated that they do not believe that there is 
effective sharing of information between agencies. 
The recurring data obtained from the participants in response to all the questions 
regarding cooperation, coordination, collaboration and exchange of information 
resulted in the following themes: 
• Mandates not coordinated 
• The intelligence agencies focus on particular incidents and not on the 
protection of all financial systems  
• No dedicated structure 
• Focus on own objectives  
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• Weak public sector and private sector cooperation  
6.4.5.3 Constraints 
An overview of the literature shows that cooperation, collaboration and 
information-sharing may be inhibited by constraints or barriers preventing 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime from obtaining the full benefit 
from the spread of knowledge and skills. This may limit the prospect of effective 
inter-agency cooperation. The constraints or barriers mainly fall into three broad 
groups, namely legal, operational and political.  
 
a. Legal Constraints 
The literature explains that legal impediments may include specific restrictions 
and prohibitions that are applied to prevent one agency from obtaining access to 
relevant information from another. There are several legislative provisions 
contained in a vast array of statutes that cater for various procedures that 
constitute the legal framework for cooperation and information sharing between 
the various agencies. These legal provisions may, however, prove to be 
obstructive to interagency cooperation and sharing of information. 
 
In response to being asked whether they were aware of any constraints of a legal 
nature that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
during efforts to combat financial crime, 60% of the participants answered that 
they were aware of legal constraints. They offered a variety of reasons for their 
beliefs. 
 
b. Operational Constraints 
The literature indicates that operational constraints may include complex or 
lengthy procedures hampering any agency in its efforts to obtain information from 
another, lack of awareness of the availability of information from another agency, 
or other mechanisms for cooperation, or a lack of specialist knowledge. Officials 
may not be aware of the correct procedures to request information, the 
circumstances under which information can be requested and ought to be 
provided, and under which legislative provision it must be requested. The 
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literature further states that MOUs between agencies may not be sufficiently 
inculcated among the members, or may be incorrectly interpreted. Considering 
the nature of financial crime and the challenges it poses to investigation, there is 
a requirement for cooperation and the coordination of efforts.  
 
In response to being asked whether they were aware of any operational 
constraints that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
during efforts to combat financial crime, 90% of the participants answered that 
they were aware of operational constraints, and provided a variety of reasons for 
their beliefs.  
 
c. Political Constraints 
The literature showed that political constraints include a lack of political support 
for agencies to adopt new approaches to combating financial crime, or to make 
the changes required to reduce the level of legal and operational constraints. 
During a crime summit, a political analyst warned that law enforcement agencies 
should not engage in political battles to the detriment of good law-enforcement 
work. 
 
In response to being asked whether they were aware of any political constraints 
that hamper inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during 
efforts to combat financial crime, 60% of the participants answered that they were 
aware of operational constraints, and provided a variety of reasons for their 
beliefs. 
6.4.6 Inter-agency cooperation 
The literature states that, given the complexity and multifaceted nature of financial 
crime, combating the crime in all its facets cannot be undertaken by a single 
agency acting in isolation, irrespective of how competent the agency and its 
officers may be. It is also stated that significant gaps in law enforcement and 
coordination are a source of concern. The literature further shows that there is a 
requirement to explore and develop practical ways to enhance cooperation and 
coordination during combating of financial crime to ensure that the relevant 
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government agencies responsible for combating financial crime interact with each 
other at policy as well as operational level. Interaction may be in the form of 
exchanging information, cooperation in investigations that cut across different 
agencies, and sharing of staff who can share expertise. The literature further 
explains that sharing of information between the main agencies is a fundamental 
requirement and a prerequisite for inter-agency cooperation. 
6.4.6.1 Key agencies 
A study of the literature produced an account of the activities involved when the 
fight against financial crime is spread across various institutions and involves 
officials attached to revenue authorities, customs administrations, FIUs, law 
enforcement agencies, specialised investigation agencies and prosecuting 
authorities. The complexity of financial crime investigations requires the support 
of the relevant bodies that might have a part to play in solving a case, even if it is 
at a marginal level, hence the importance of identifying the key agencies. An 
understanding of the respective roles of the key agencies is critical in order to 
appreciate inter-agency cooperation at an international as well as a domestic 
level. From the overview of the literature research conducted in respect of the 
national legislation, literature and feedback from the participants, it is apparent 
that South Africa does not have a dedicated agency or authority with the sole 
legal mandate to combat and prevent financial crime exclusively. 
 
When participants were asked to identify the key agencies and investigative 
authorities responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa, the data 
received revealed that the listing of the most prominent government agencies, in 
descending order, is as follows: 
• The Financial Intelligence Centre, with a frequency of 100% 
• SAPS, DPCI, Crime Intelligence Unit, with a frequency of 100% 
• SARS, with a frequency of 100% 
• The AFU, with a frequency of 100% 
• SARB, with a frequency of 70% 
• NPA, with a frequency of 60% 
• FSB, with a frequency of 50% 
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• SIU, With a frequency of 50% 
 
Figure 6.1 (paragraph 6.7) shows the identification and institutional arrangement 
of key agencies to combat financial crime in South Africa according to the 
literature and information received from the participants. 
 
a. The Tax Administration 
An overview of the literature indicates that tax administrations are responsible for 
the collection of revenue on behalf of a Government, that employs large numbers 
of trained specialists and investigators with experience in auditing and analysing 
financial data and investigating suspicious or irregular transactions. They typically 
play a central role in preventing, detecting and investigating tax crime. 
  
The literature explains that internationally there are four models for a tax 
authority’s role and ability to participate in the combating of financial crime, and 
to obtain information from other authorities relevant to an investigation. The 
models are the following: 
• The tax administration directs and conducts investigations 
• The tax administration conducts investigations as directed to by a 
prosecutor 
• A specialist tax agency outside the tax authority conducts 
investigations 
• The police or prosecutors conduct investigations 
 
The literature asserts that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) was 
established in terms of the South African Revenue Service Act, as an 
autonomous agency responsible for administering the South African tax system 
and Customs Service. The literature further informs us that within the SARS 
organisational structure, a specific division exists that has as its aim the 
combating of tax evasion and customs offences, as well as assistance to general 
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The participants who identified SARS as a key agency in the combating of 
financial crime were asked to explain the responsibility of SARS in regard to this 
matter. The data presented by the participants provided the following information: 
• Conduct criminal investigations in respect of tax (frequency of 80%) 
• Enforcement of tax laws/legislation (frequency of 30%) 
• Investigate tax fraud (frequency of 20%) 
• Investigate tax-related corruption (frequency of 10%) 
• Focus on tax crimes (frequency of 10%) 
 
b. Customs Authority 
The literature states that customs organisations are a key agency in preventing; 
detecting and investigating financial crime, and that they have sophisticated 
systems for monitoring the movement of people, goods and funds across national 
borders. They may be established as agencies separate from that of the tax 
authority, or in some countries they form part of a joint tax administration, such 
as in South Africa. Also, the Customs Division of SARS has a role in administering 
laws that are not necessarily related to tax and customs but are essential to 
protect the South African economy. 
 
c. The Police and other Specialist Enforcement Agencies 
The literature indicates that in some countries, the capacity to investigate crime 
is institutionalised within the police, or it may be established in separate agencies 
outside the police as specialist units responsible for the investigation of financial 
crime, or specific types of financial crimes. 
 
 i. The South African Police Service 
The literature informs us that the SAPS is a separate state organ 
resorting under the control of the Minister of Police, and having the 
principal statutory duty to combat and prevent crime in general, which by 
default includes financial crime, irrespective of whether it has been stated 
explicitly as such.  
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The participants who identified SAPS as a key agency in the combating 
of financial crime were asked to explain the responsibility of SAPS in that 
regard.  The data presented by the participants disclosed the following 
information: 
• Investigate crime (frequency of 50%) 
• Investigate commercial crimes (frequency of 50% 
• Investigate fraud, theft, racketeering, money laundering, bribery, 
corruption (frequency of 30%) 
• Combat crime (frequency of 20%) 
• Crime prevention (frequency of 20%) 
 
ii. The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
The literature shows that the SAPS has established specialist units for 
combating financial crimes. These units are situated within the DPCI, 
which has been named “The Hawks”. The DPCI is an independent 
directorate within the SAPS in terms of Section 17C of the South African 
Police Service Act. In terms of Section 17B and 17D of the South African 
Police Service Act, the DPCI is statutorily responsible for the combating, 
prevention and investigation of national priority crimes such as serious 
organised crime, serious commercial crime and serious corruption which, 
in the opinion of the Head of the Directorate, have to be addressed by 
the Directorate, subject to any policy guidelines issued by the Ministerial 
Committee.  
 
The literature further shows that the DPCI is responsible for administering 
the reporting obligation imposed by section 34 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. Feedback from a participant 
regarding the structure of the DPCI indicates that within the DPCI there 
are sub-units responsible for the investigation of certain aspects and 
different types of financial crimes, focusing on three primary areas:  
• Serious Organised Crime Investigations 
• Serious Corruption Investigations 
• Priority Crime Specialised Investigations 
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• Priority Crimes Management Centre 
• Serious Commercial Crime Investigations 
o Specialised Technical Investigations 
▪ Cybercrime 
▪ Digital Forensic Lab 
o Proceeds of Crime/Financial Investigations 
▪ Money Laundering 
▪ Asset Forfeiture 
▪ Investigation Support 
o Forensic Investigation and Specialised Research 
 
The literature further reports that a senior spokesman of the DPCI 
commented as follows: “We [the Hawks] would like to remind the SACP 
[South African Communist Party] that the Hawks has one mandate, which 
is to combat, prevent and investigate all serious corruption and serious 
commercial crime.” The participants who identified the DPCI as a key 
agency in the combating of financial crime were asked to explain the 
responsibility of the DPCI regarding the combating of financial crime. The 
data presented by the participants disclosed the following information: 
• Crime investigation (frequency of 50%) 
• Prevent national priority crimes (frequency of 20%) 
• Combat national priority crimes (frequency of 20%) 
• Investigate priority crimes (frequency of 20%) 
• Investigate organised financial crime (frequency of 10%) 
• Functions overlap with those of SAPS (frequency of 10%) 
• Investigate large and complex commercial crimes (frequency of 
10%) 
• Investigate large and complex frauds involving listed companies 
(frequency of 10%) 
• Investigate priority commercial crime (frequency of 10%) 
• Conduct financial investigations (frequency of 10%) 
• Asset recovery investigations (frequency of 10%) 
• Investigate financial aspects of crime (frequency of 10%) 
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• Must implement a multi-disciplinary approach (frequency of 10%) 
 
d. Financial intelligence units 
An overview of the literature shows that FIUs play a critical role in the financial 
investigation process. An FIU is a central, national agency responsible for 
receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the 
competent authorities, disclosures of financial information concerning suspected 
proceeds of crime or, as required by national legislation or regulation, to counter 
money laundering. 
 
The literature further lists the core functions of an FIU as follows: 
• Centralised repository of reported information 
• Analytical function 
• Domestic information sharing 
• International information sharing. 
 
i. The Financial Intelligence Centre 
A review of the literature indicates that the FIC is the South African 
version of an FIU, and its functions are to: 
• identify the proceeds of crime; 
• combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism;  
• share relevant information with law enforcement authorities, SARS 
and state security agencies.  
 
The literature states that the work of the FIC includes sharing the 
products of its analysis with a range of competent authorities, including 
law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, SARS and supervisory 
bodies. The information shared by the FIC assists these authorities with 
discharging their responsibilities by, for example, enabling them to 
conduct investigations, prosecutions, and the confiscation of assets 
based on the leads supplied by the FIC. 
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The participants who identified the FIC as a key agency in the combating 
of financial crime were asked to explain the responsibility of the FIC in 
that regard. The data presented by the participants disclosed the 
following information: 
• Making available information to other investigation agencies 
(frequency of 33%) 
• Gathering information (frequency of 22%) 
• Exchanging information with external agencies (frequency of 22%) 
• Developing financial intelligence (frequency of 22%) 
• Combating money-laundering activities (frequency of 22%) 
• Identifying proceeds of unlawful activities (frequency of 22%) 
• Combating the financing of terrorism (frequency of 22%) 
• Processing, analysing, and interpreting information disclosed to it 
(frequency of 22%) 
• Protecting the integrity and stability of financial systems (frequency 
of 11%) 
• Coordinating the exchange of information (frequency of 11%) 
• Administrating the AML measures (frequency of 11%) 
• Exchanging information with FIUs in other countries (frequency of 
11%) 
• Informing, advising, and cooperating with investigative authorities, 
supervisory bodies, the SARS and the intelligence services 
(frequency of 11%)  
• Monitoring and giving guidance to accountable institutions, 
supervisory bodies, and other persons regarding the performance 
of their duties and compliance with the provisions of FICA 
(frequency of 11%) 
• Retaining all information received pursuant to compliance with the 
provisions of FICA (frequency of 11%) 
• Identifying money laundering (frequency of 11%) 
• Identifying terrorist financing (frequency of 11%) 
• Gathering of intelligence (frequency of 11%) 
• Reporting and investigating in terms of the FICA (frequency of 11%) 
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• Supporting investigators (frequency of 11%) 
• Dealing with SARs received from financial institutions (frequency of 
11%) 
• Dealing with the cash threshold reports fed from the financial 
institutions (frequency of 11%) 
• Detecting whether crime has been committed (frequency of 11%) 
 
e. The prosecuting authority 
The literature shows that the prosecuting authority is the government agency 
responsible for representing the State in criminal matters before a criminal court 
of law.  
 
i. The National Prosecuting Authority 
An overview of the literature reveals that South Africa has a single 
National Prosecution Authority with the power to institute criminal 
proceedings on behalf of the State, to carry out any necessary functions 
incidental to instituting criminal proceedings, and to discontinue criminal 
proceedings. The literature further reveals that the NPA comprises seven 
core business units, of which the following relate to the prosecution, 
possible prosecution or combating of financial crimes:  
• Asset Forfeiture Unit 
• Specialised Commercial Crime Unit 
 
The participants who identified the NPA as a key agency in the combating 
of financial crime were asked to explain the responsibility of the NPA 
regarding combating of financial crime. The data presented by the 
participants disclosed the following information: 
• Criminal prosecution (frequency of 40%) 
• Prosecution of financial crimes (SCCU) (frequency of 33%) 
• Instituting criminal proceedings on behalf of the State (frequency of 
16%) 
• Power to discontinue proceedings (frequency of 16%) 
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ii. Specialised Commercial Crime Unit of the NPA 
An overview of the literature explains that the Specialised Commercial 
Crime Court Unit (SCCCU) of the NPA SCCU was established to improve 
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of commercial crime, and 
was the result of a partnership between the SAPS, the NPA, the 
Department of Justice, and Constitutional Development and Business 
against Crime. 
 
The literature furthermore describes the advantages of the model utilised 
by the SCCU as being that: 
• investigations, being the joint responsibility of investigators and 
prosecutors, are generally better managed and more speedily 
completed; 
• prosecutors are better prepared when their cases eventually come 
to trial; 
• all role-players, magistrates included, understand and appreciate 
the legal and factual issues at stake in these cases because of their 
increased expertise and experience. 
 
iii. Asset Forfeiture Unit 
The literature overview indicates that the AFU exists in the office of the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions. Its focus is on the 
implementation of Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act concerning the seizure of criminal assets.  
 
f. Financial regulators 
The literature discloses that financial regulators, including central banks, are 
responsible for maintaining confidence in the financial system by ensuring the 
competence of financial service providers. In addition, financial regulators 
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i. The South African Reserve Bank 
The literature shows that the SARB falls under the control of the Ministry 
of Finance, and the Bank Supervision Department is a component within 
the SARB resorting under the supervision of the Governor of the SARB. 
 
ii. The Financial Services Board 
The literature reflects that the FSB is an independent regulatory 
institution established by statute to oversee and govern the South African 
non-banking financial services industry, including securities firms, 
participation bond schemes, portfolio management, insurance 
companies, pension funds, and mutual funds falling under the control of 
the Ministry of Finance.  
6.4.6.2 Information sharing as prerequisite for cooperation 
The literature informs us that a necessary prerequisite for effective inter-agency 
cooperation is the sharing of information, because it is only then that there can 
be collaboration, which is premised on a clear line of sight among agencies. 
Timeous exchange of information is crucial to the success of many investigations. 
Effective sharing of information among investigators and organisations can be 
hampered by technical, workflow and legal constraints. Establishing operational 
arrangements to share information may lead to the development of relationships 
between agencies and key personnel in those agencies that may enhance other 
forms of inter-agency cooperation. 
 
The data received from the participants showed that they have their own diverse 
and separate views about the benefits of sharing information and the steps that 
can be taken to enhance sharing. The data received from the participants further 
indicated that each of the participants has his own diverse and separate views 
about the steps that can be taken to improve sharing between agencies. Each of 
the benefits as viewed by the participants has its own merits and underscores the 
importance of taking steps to improve the exchange of information between 
agencies in the combating of financial crime. 
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A participant who requested to remain anonymous elaborated on measures to 
improve the sharing of information, stating that “[i]t should be contextualised by 
understanding its purpose as each area has different needs for information”.  
6.4.6.3 Legal gateways 
The literature study shows that for information to be shared, legal gateways must 
exist between the relevant agencies. Enhanced forms of cooperation can be put 
in place to obtain the maximum benefit from legal gateways for sharing 
information that may exist between agencies. The disclosure and sharing of 
information between agencies must be legally authorised and executed in 
accordance with the prescribed legal prescripts and procedures for its use in 
order to be legitimate and admissible in court proceedings. Agencies are 
restricted with regard to what information they can share with other agencies. The 
disclosure or sharing of information between different agencies may take on 
various forms. 
 
The literature further reveals that in the South African context, the release of 
information by one agency to another may be legally authorised, subject to certain 
requirements and preconditions having been met, and then only for the purposes 
for which its use is intended and permitted. The literature also indicates that there 
are four different categories of legal gateways generally in existence. These are: 
• direct access to information contained in agency records or databases; 
• a legal obligation to provide information spontaneously (sometimes 
expressed as a reporting obligation); 
• an ability, but not an obligation, to provide information spontaneously; 
• an obligation or ability to provide information only on request. 
6.4.6.4 Analysis of legal gateways 
The literature shows that a combination of categories for sharing information is 
applied in South Africa, depending on the legal provisions. An analysis of the 
various legal provisions indicates that there are distinct provisions for information 
and records held by: 
• The South African Revenue Service 
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• The Customs Division of the South African Revenue Service 
• The South African Police Service 
• The Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation 
• The National Prosecuting Authority 
• The Financial Intelligence Centre 
 
In this research, the researcher contributes by providing a summary regarding 
the disclosure of information between agencies, first according to categories for 
sharing information and then about the agency holding the information in 
accordance with the prescript of the legal provisions as indicated in the statutes 
and literature. 
 
a. Information held by SARS 
A summary of an analysis of the literature in tabular format, showing the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by 
SARS, is provided in Table 6.4 below: 
Table 6.4:  Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by 
SARS 
Categories of gateway in relation to 
information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY SARS 
 SAPS DPCI NPA FIC CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No Yes 
Reporting obligation No Yes No Yes No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
 
Table 6.4 above illustrates the categories of information sharing and the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by 
SARS. 
 
b. Information held by the Customs Division of SARS 
A summary of an analysis of the literature in tabular format, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
Customs Division of SARS, is provided in Table 6.5 below: 
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Table 6.5:  Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by 
Customs Division of SARS 
Categories of gateways in relation to 
information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY CUSTOMS 
 SAPS DPCI NPA FIC SARS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No Yes 
Reporting obligation No Yes No Yes No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
 
Table 6.5 above illustrates the categories of information sharing and the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
Customs Division of SARS.  
 
c. Information held by SAPS 
A summary of an analysis of the literature in tabular format, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
SAPS, is provided in Table 6.6 below: 
Table 6.6: Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by 
SAPS 
Categories of gateways in relation to 
information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY SAPS 
 DPCI NPA FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
Yes No No No No 
Reporting obligation Yes No No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
Table 6.6 above illustrates the categories of information sharing and the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by 
SAPS. 
 
d. Information held by the DPCI 
A summary of an analysis of the literature in tabular format, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
DPCI, is provided in Table 6.7 below: 
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Table 6.7: Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by the 
DPCI 
Categories of cooperation in 
relation to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY THE DPCI 
 SAPS NPA FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
Yes No No No No 
Reporting obligation Yes No No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
 
Table 6.7 above illustrates the categories of information sharing and the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
DPCI.  
 
e.  Information held by the NPA 
A summary of an analysis of the literature in tabular format, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
NPA, is provided in Table 6.8 below: 
Table 6.8:  Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by the 
NPA 
Categories of cooperation in 
relation to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY THE NPA 
 SAPS DPCI FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No No 
Reporting obligation No Yes No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
 
Table 6.8 above illustrates the categories of information sharing and the 
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f. Information held by the FIC 
A summary of an analysis of the literature in tabular format, indicating the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information held by the 
FIC, is provided in Table 6.9 below: 
Table 6.9:  Availability of legal gateways to obtain information held by the 
FIC 
Categories of cooperation in 
relation to information sharing 
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL GATEWAYS TO OBTAIN 
INFORMATION HELD BY THE FIC 
 SAPS DPCI FIC SARS CUSTOMS 
Direct access to records and 
databases 
No No No No No 
Reporting obligation No Yes No No No 
Spontaneous sharing of information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing information on request Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Source: Analysis of the literature) 
 
Table 6.9 above illustrates the categories of information sharing and the 
availability of legal gateways to other agencies to obtain information accordingly 
held by the FIC.  
 6.4.6.5 Models for Inter-agency cooperation 
The literature study indicates that there is a resolve by countries to advance and 
develop operational models that make the most efficient use of the legal 
gateways that exist for the sharing of information. The study recommends the 
following mechanisms that can be employed to promote an effective exchange of 
information and inter-agency cooperation: 
a. Establishing exchange of information systems whereby all incorporated 
investigative agencies would be aware of previous or ongoing investigations 
made on the same persons and legal entities to avoid duplication; 
conducting conflict resolution discussions, and promoting cross-fertilisation. 
b. Establishing policies and procedures that promote the sharing of 
information/intelligence within intra-agency and inter-agency cooperative 
frameworks; such policies and procedures should promote the strategic 
exchange of the necessary information.  
c. Establishing a process whereby intra-agency or inter-agency disputes are 
resolved in the best interest of the investigation. 
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d.  Competent authorities should consider setting up written agreements such 
as MOUs or similar agreements to formalise these processes. 
 
The participants provided data that enabled the formulation of the following 
benefits of sharing information, as well as cooperation and collaboration: 
• The same information is viewed from different perspectives 
• It creates various propositions for prosecution 
• It clarifies mandates among the respective agencies 
• Data held by the various agencies can be compared 
• More cost-effective 
 
The literature further indicates that several countries have developed operational 
models for enhancing the exchange of information and cooperation. These 
operational models should be viewed as part of a strategy, requiring agencies to 
cohesively move forward in the same direction towards a common goal.  
 
The data obtained from participants indicate that the respective agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime are institutionally arranged as follows: 
• The various agencies conduct financial crime investigations 
• SAPS/DPCI is the leading agency to conduct financial crime 
investigations 
• The various agencies pursue different aspects of financial crimes 
• Agencies operate in silos 
 
Also, the response from the participants indicates that the agencies responsible 
for combating financial crime can also be arranged in accordance with their 
operational capabilities, which are summarised in Figure 6.2 (paragraph 6.7). The 
literature shows that in practice, subject to legislative constraints, there is no real 
limit to the possible ways according to which it is possible to arrange agencies 
organisationally in order to work together. The literature further indicates that 
there are several operational models for agencies to make structural 
arrangements to enable them to work together. The operational models have 
been identified as consisting of four main structures, namely: 
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• Joint investigation teams 
• Inter-agency centres of intelligence 
• Secondment and co-location of personnel 
• Other models 
 
The feedback from the participants reflected on the following models that can be 
applied, or provided examples of such models to improve sharing of information, 
cooperation and collaboration between agencies: 
• The Netherlands Tax and Customs administration Criminal 
Investigations Department (FIOD) (frequency of 10%) 
• ACTT (frequency of 10%) 
• Secondment of personnel between agencies (frequency of 10%) 
• Joint investigation teams (frequency of 10%) 
• Serious Organised Crime Agency UK (SOCA) (frequency of 10%) 
• Task teams (frequency of 10%) 
• Task forces (frequency of 10%) 
 
a. Joint investigation teams 
The literature indicates that financial crimes are complex and sophisticated, and 
that several are interconnected. Various agencies are involved in the 
investigation of crimes that interconnect. The literature further indicates that joint 
investigation teams enable agencies to cooperate, allowing them to share 
information directly and coordinate investigations, making the best use of various 
technical skills and legal powers. 
 
b. Inter-agency centres of intelligence  
The literature indicates that centres for intelligence are organised in a variety of 
ways and for different purposes. They are established to coordinate sharing of 
information and, in some cases, application of practical skills between agencies. 
Inter-agency centres of information can also focus on operational information or 
strategic information, and perform analysis of information obtained directly or 
from other agencies, under legal gateways for information sharing, or by means 
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of its information-gathering power, where it exists. Inter-agency centres of 
intelligence offer the following benefits:  
• Cost-effective way of obtaining intelligence and conducting analysis 
• Each agency gains access to a broader range of experts than what it 
would generally employ 
• Experience is gained in the legal and practical aspects of information 
sharing, which can be used to improve the effectiveness of legal 
gateways. 
 
An international example of an inter-agency centre of intelligence is the Australian 
Crime Intelligence Commission (ACIC). Data received from the participants 
indicate that the NICOC may be representative of a domestic example of an inter-
agency centre of intelligence.  
 
c. Secondment of personnel between agencies 
The review of the literature shows that secondments and the co-location of 
agency officers are used to improve co-working between agencies. It enhances 
the effectiveness of other forms of inter-agency cooperation, with officials working 
closer to one another.  The literature further indicates that section 17F(2) of the 
South African Police Service Act makes provision for the secondment of 
personnel from any other government department or institution to the DPCI.  
 
d. Multi-agency task forces 
The literature indicates that where agencies have different information-gathering 
and -sharing powers, multi-agency task forces have proved to be an effective 
model for cross-agency collaboration. The literature indicates that the Australian 
Project Wickenby is a notable example of an effective task force that combined 
expertise and resources from various agencies working together collaboratively 
to achieve common goals. The literature further indicates that the ACTT is a 
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e. Other models 
The literature shows that there are also other models of which some are quite 
innovative, often supplementing other models with regard to sharing information 
or enhanced cooperation, which may include shared databases, intelligence 
briefs, inter-agency training sessions and joint committees. The literature further 
indicates that in South Africa there is the MAWG, which seeks to improve 
compliance and identify systems solutions to failures within the financial and 
procurement system. 
 
The feedback from the participants in the study indicates the following formal 
information-sharing models and mechanisms between government agencies and 
commerce that are focused on improving the exchange of information, 
coordination and collaboration in terms of their mandates, as depicted in Figure 
6.3 (paragraph 6.7). 
6.4.7 Whole-of-Government 
The literature tells us that the system to combat financial crime in South Africa is 
institutionalised into sector-based, single-purpose agencies with vertical 
responsibilities for combating certain aspects of financial crime at various stages. 
The respective agencies operate in isolation. They work in organisational silos, 
and their efforts have become fragmented, with the result that cooperation and 
coordination suffer, which renders their efforts ineffective. Agencies carry out 
their efforts in parallel and focus on their piece of the puzzle. The data received 
from participants also indicate that agencies operate in silos. 
6.4.7.1 Perspectives on silo formation 
The literature shows that governments are organised into vertical silos 
representing single-purpose agencies, this being one of the shortcomings of the 
current system of multiple single-purpose agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime. The reference to silos is used by participants and in the literature 
to describe a form of organisational arrangement of the main government 
agencies, cited as a reason why the current system is failing to combat financial 
crime effectively. 
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The literature further explains that the concept is based on the traditional view, 
and the systematic way in which organisations are structured. Organisations 
therefore appear as a feature of differentiation and specialisation, which lead to 
reinforcing a tendency common to many bureaucracies, namely that of devoting 
more energy to the protection of turf than to serving the public. 
 
The data received from the participants in this study also referred to the protection 
of turf as an inhibiting factor to effective cooperation. The lack of coordination 
leads to irregularities, which may include duplication of processes and data, 
conflicts in activities, inconsistency, and duplication of work. 
6.4.7.2 The importance of integration 
The literature states that the term integration is often referred to in relation to 
Whole-of-Government. The literature tells us that integration is driven by the 
process of acquiring resources from various agencies. The resources consist of 
varied disciplines working alongside each other at several levels to ensure that 
their mandates and roles reinforce each other in improving the impact of activities. 
The literature further explains that integration implies forming a single 
multidisciplinary and multi-departmental team to take on a task, and that 
integration requires cooperation at the operational level, coordination at a mid-
level and alignment of strategic objectives at a senior level. 
6.4.7.3 An integrated methodology 
A study of the literature indicates that Section 17B(b)(i) of the South African Police 
Service Act stipulates that in the establishment of the DPCI, it should be 
recognised and considered that the DPCI must implement, where appropriate, a 
multidisciplinary approach and an integrated methodology involving the 
cooperation of all relevant government departments and institutions. 
 
The data received from the participants explained the meaning of an “integrated 
methodology and multidisciplinary approach” as having a broad range of 
meanings, with the most prominent presented being the following: 
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• Bringing together different skills sets and expertise (frequency of 50%) 
• Identifying critical role–players, with investigators and agencies 
working together for the best possible outcome/common objective 
(frequency of 20%) 
• It is a holistic approach (frequency of 20%) 
• Resources across agencies working together with a common 
objective/purpose (frequency of 20%) 
• The involvement and use of various capabilities and legal mandates 
of different government agencies (frequency of 20%) 
6.4.7.4 Contextualising Whole-of-Government 
An overview of the literature reveals that Whole-of-Government has its origins in 
a public management approach that moves away from structural devolution, 
disaggregation, and single-purpose organisations. It is based on an argument 
presented in the literature that the horizontal challenge has become greater than 
the vertical because the number of sectoral pillars or silos that have been created 
appears to obstruct solutions to horizontal problems, bringing about greater 
fragmentation and complexity.  
6.4.7.5 Conceptualising Whole-of-Government 
From the definitions provided in the literature, conceptualising the term Whole-of-
Government, the researcher was able to formulate the following practical 
definition to demonstrate Whole-of-Government’s applicability as an enabler to 
foster cooperation in order to combat financial crime more effectively: 
 
Whole-of-Government, in the context of combating financial 
crime, denotes key agencies working across portfolio 
boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated 
response to barriers that prevent effective cooperation, 
collaboration, sharing of information and resources. 
Approaches may be formal or informal, focusing on policies 
and operational agreements to combat financial crime, and 
on development and implementation of organisational 
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structures to carry out Whole-of-Government work in efforts 
to combat financial crime. 
 
The data received from the participants indicate that Whole-of-Government is not 
a universally understood concept and that it is viewed as a buzzword being 
lobbied about, or that it is being used as a catchphrase that does not find 
application in the field. From a practical perspective, cooperation between all 
government departments plays a role in combating financial crime, and in the 
sharing of resources to a single body (single-agency performing more than one 
purpose) responsible for combating financial crime. The participant’s response 
focuses on the investigation and prosecution of financial crime. 
6.4.7.6 Operationalising Whole-of-Government 
The literature indicates that in order to implement a Whole-of-Government 
approach, a shared understanding of what it means to work in a Whole-of-
Government manner is essential, and requires a mentality among officials to 
willingly work together to achieve common outcomes of a social nature, as 
opposed to serving the specific interest of individual agencies. The literature 
further explains that this may involve some changes in structures and legislation, 
but most importantly, it requires a change in organisational culture and individual 
expectations. Horizontal coordination and integration are implanted in the 
process of policy design and implementation. The day-to-day realities of trying to 
work across boundaries are the real challenge of Whole-of-Government work, 
translating to what the researcher likens to a close fellowship between the 
respective agencies. The literature suggests that when a decision must be made 
as to whether a Whole-of-Government approach is an appropriate response, 
every situation should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The data produced by the participants regarding what it means to implement a 
Whole-of-Government approach to combat financial crime more effectively 
focused on the following themes: 
• Coordination between departments (40% frequency of theme)  
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• The Whole-of-Government and society to target crime as a collective 
concern and responsibility (30% frequency of theme) 
• Working towards a common goal/objective (30% frequency of theme) 
 
All the participants in this study agreed that a Whole-of-Government approach in 
the South African context is a viable approach to ensure inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration in efforts to combat financial crime 
more effectively. One of the participants expressed his/her opinion as follows: 
 
The Whole-of-Government approach is currently the only 
viable approach to ensure inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat 
financial crime more effectively.  
6.4.7.7 Practical underpinning of Whole-of-Government 
The literature shows that implementing a Whole-of-Government approach can be 
justified by the need to: 
• eliminate silos; 
• prevent departments working in isolation from each other; 
• achieve a seamless (integrated) government approach; 
• avoid having various cross-cutting policies undermining each other; 
• optimise the impact of Government by using all the resources at the 
disposal of the State in an integrated way to deliver specific outcome; 
• reduce costs and inefficiencies. 
 
According to the data received from the participants about what it means for 
various agencies to work together, across agency boundaries, with the aim of 
combating financial crime through inter-agency coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration, following a Whole-of-Government approach, the following 
exposition is provided: 
 
The fight against serious crime and corruption is a 
continuous and dynamic process, and as new 
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manifestations are revealed, gaps in the existing approach, 
strategies, interventions and application of existing 
legislation and policies are identified for review and 
strengthening.  In the majority of Government’s recent 
policy deliberations, and its strategic policy documents, we 
[Government] acknowledge the significant challenges 
posed by crime and corruption and how it undermines good 
governance, state authority and service delivery.  
 
These challenges and its [their] root causes have been 
clearly articulated in the National Planning Commission’s 
Diagnostic Report in 2011 and in the 20-Year Review. The 
NSS approved by Cabinet in December 2013 elevates 
countering corruption and serious crime to a national 
security priority. This compels the Government and various 
agencies to work together and adopt a “Whole-of–
Government” approach towards executing their mandate 
through a multi-disciplinary approach. 
 
This approach places new demands for executive and 
operational capabilities and structures in collaboration with 
other stakeholders such as the NICOC for addressing 
national priority offences. 
 
Such an approach would be dependent on the following key 
factors: 
• The development of a collective approach across 
[throughout] Government to target the financial 
systems and benefits of crime. 
• The joint planning and governance to embed such an 
approach in an outcome-based planning framework 
for Government, government clusters and the 
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departments through its [their] strategic and 
operational plans and budget submissions. 
• The collective development of new crime-fighting 
practices and capabilities in line with the FATF. 
6.4.7.8 Benefits of Whole-of-Government 
The literature states that the benefits of Whole-of-Government are as follows: 
• The ability to: 
o Integrate resources 
o Confront problems early  
o Share information timeously.  
o Allow governments to act preventively and pre-emptively, thus 
mitigating cost and severity of issues / “wicked” problems 
• It increases or improves: 
o Efficiency 
o Information sharing 
o Working environment 
o Competitiveness 
o Accountability 
o Policy coherence, and 
• Decreases or reduces: 
o Costs 
o Waste 
o Duplication of work 
o Conflicting policies  
o Time needed to complete a task 
6.4.7.9 Organisational structures for Whole-of-Government 
An overview of the literature indicates that different governments have mixed 
approaches on how to manage Whole-of-Government responses consistent with 
their philosophies and approaches to public sector management, cognisant that 
there is no “one size fits all” approach. There are several organisational options 
available to deliver outcomes across organisational boundaries successfully that 
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would match the task. Agencies could recommend which best practices to follow, 
depending on the mechanism selected to perform the Whole-of-Government 
work. 
 
The literature furthermore explains that Whole-of-Government work could be 
aimed at: 
• an organisational level, for example interdepartmental, national or 
local level; 
• particular social groups such as disabled persons and the youth; 
• a specific policy issue, for instance, the Information and 
Communication Technologies Policy for South Africa; 
• a specific geographical area such as the regeneration of a city centre; 
• a mode of service delivery such as a one-stop system for social grants 
and services. 
 
The literature offers several possible organisational structures that could be used 
for Whole-of-Government work, namely: 
• Task forces 
• Interdepartmental partnerships, forming joint teams 
• Cross-departmental partnerships, forming agency arrangements 
• Special-purpose agencies, forming frontier agencies 
 
a. Interdepartmental Committees 
The literature states that in the South African context, the corresponding term for 
an Interdepartmental Committee is likely to be an Inter-Ministerial Committee. 
IMCs form part of the establishment of a new system of governance to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness to serve a particular purpose that is deemed to 
require the dedicated attention of a certain team of ministers responsible for 
streamlining and coordinating the work of Government for faster and better 
results. Their mandates are limited to the matter that they are established to 
execute. The concept is not an unfamiliar concept in the South African context 
and has found application in the ACIMC to coordinate and oversee the work of 
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state organs aimed at fighting and combating the scourge of corruption in public 
and private sectors. 
 
b. Task Force/Task Team 
A study of the literature indicates that a modality for organising structures for 
Whole-of-Government work that has become popular in recent years is task 
forces, aimed at addressing specific issues and whose lifespan is limited by their 
nature, task forces bring the capacity to do fresh and original work and have 
proved to be very effective at solving difficult problems and developing complexly 
integrated packages. They enable highly-skilled agency officials to put their 
departmental interests behind them and join expert and creative outsiders to 
focus on developing outcomes backed by comprehensive analysis. The concept 
is not unfamiliar in the South African context and has found application in the form 
of the ACTT, under the auspices of the DPCI, to better coordinate Government’s 
efforts to deal with issues of corruption and fraud. 
 
c. Interdepartmental Joint Teams 
 The literature indicates that joint teams represent a new and relatively 
uncommon form of interdepartmental cooperation. Joint teams differ from task 
forces because they are mixed structures that do not stand on their own. A joint 
team does not represent a separate unit reporting to and through one head who 
has the final say. Joint teams consist of employees from two or more departments 
working together in a common management structure while continuing to be 
subject to the management control of the relevant head of their original agency. 
The concept is not unfamiliar in the South African context, where joint task teams 
are required in cases of complex issues, such as an intricate criminal 
investigation where a high level of cooperation is required, and clear governance 
arrangements exist. 
 
d. Cross-departmental Agency Arrangements 
A study of the literature shows that another form of organisational adaptability of 
Whole-of-Government structures is for an existing government department or 
agency to deliver services on behalf of one or more others. The concept is not 
unfamiliar in the South African context where, for instance, the Customs Division 
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of the SARS constitutes a good domestic example of one agency delivering 
services on behalf of others. 
 
e. Special-purpose Frontier Agencies 
Special-purpose agencies or frontier agencies are created outside of the normal 
departmental structures symbolising their Whole-of-Government status. Creation 
of these agencies is facilitated by amendments to existing legislation and the 
introduction of new laws. An agency is created outside of normal departmental 
structures to deal with issues that are important. The concept is not unfamiliar in 
the South African context, and it has found application in, for example, the Border 
Management Authority, established by the Border Management Authority Act. 
6.4.7.10 Organising a structure for Whole-of-Government work 
The literature indicates that there is no single favoured blueprint for organising a 
structure for Whole-of-Government work. The findings regarding the various 
organisational options should help when considering what the most suitable 
organisational structure is for Whole-of-Government. It will depend on the 
requirements of the relevant agencies and the desired outcomes. With regard to 
the complexities of financial crime, the symbiotic nature, and the many key 
agencies with different mandates involved at various stages, plus the notion that 
there is no “one size fits all” approach, Government policymakers or heads of 
agencies should consider which of the organisational structures are best suited 
for Whole-of-Government work. 
 
The literature informs us that the establishment of a Border Management 
Authority provides an example of a blueprint for further exploration on what a 
prospective model for a front-line agency to combat financial crime may look like 
if further pursued and developed. It is against the backdrop of having explored 
various organisational arrangements examined in this chapter that the researcher 
proposes that a special-purpose frontier agency must provide a model for a long-
term Whole-of-Government solution to combat serious financial crime. However, 
any of the other organisational modalities for Whole-of-Government, work 
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depending on the specific requirements, could have been explored, using the 
guidelines provided for direction. 
 
During the interview, the participants were asked the question how, in their 
opinion, a Whole-of-Government approach should be applied (organised) to 
ensure effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during 
efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. A participant, requesting to 
remain anonymous, provided the following detailed exposition to the researcher 
regarding the question posed (interview with P009: 2017): 
 
A multidisciplinary unit consisting of representatives of all 
the different government units involved in combating and 
investigating financial crime, co-located and working in 
teams where each prosecutor and investigating officer 
(primary responsible persons) and each other individual 
assigned to the team take collective responsibility for the 
cases assigned to them. The ideal would be to limit the 
cases dealt with by these teams to those cases that has 
[sic.] the most potential to bear fruits, save or make money 
for the State [AFU] and would have the biggest effect of 
discouraging financial crime. 
 
The participant added the following thoughts (Interview with Participant 009: 
2017): 
 
Such a unit could function very similar to the previous 
OSEO [Office for Serious Economic Offences] – before it 
became the Scorpions [The Directorate of Special 
Operations]. However, they will prosecute their own cases 
and not refer them to any Director of Public Prosecutions 
offices. 
 
During the interview, the participants were asked the question as to how, in their 
opinion, a Whole-of-Government approach should be applied (organised) to 
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ensure effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during 
efforts to combat financial crime more effectively. A participant, requesting to 
remain anonymous, provided a schematic drawing of how he/she saw the 
implementation of a Whole-of-Government approach to combat financial crime. 
Figure 6.4 (paragraph 6.7) represents a graphic depiction of a structure for 
combating financial crime according to a Whole-of-Government approach, 
incorporating organisational and institutional components from a participant’s 
viewpoint. It epitomises organising different agencies to conduct Whole-of-
Government work according to a special-purpose agency. Due to the participant’s 
handwriting being identifiable on the draft schematic drawing presented to the 
researcher, the researcher converted it into graphics as presented in figure 6.4 
(interview with Participant P010:2017). 
 
The participant’s view is based on a three-tier level of responsibility, with one 
department, namely the Department of the Treasury, taking the overall political 
responsibility and the other departments sharing functional responsibilities for 
combating financial crime via the agencies reporting to the various political heads. 
The coordination of these functions should be undertaken by a secretariat 
consisting of the relevant directors-general of the relevant departments. The 
above-mentioned concept corresponds to features of the FIOD model shown in 
Figure 5.2 (paragraph 5.14), where in this case the secretariat can be seen to 
fulfil the coordinating and operational function of the FIOD. 
  
An overview of the literature shows that there are several models available for 
organising key investigative agencies responsible for combating financial crime 
to make a Whole-of-Government approach work. The literature further indicates 
that many of the organisational models have already found application in the 
South African context and in the realm of combating financial crime. Many of the 
organisational structures proposed for organising Whole-of-Government work 
also facilitate cooperation and sharing of information between various agencies 
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6.4.7.11 A conceptual Front-line agency model 
The proposal for a conceptual model takes some of its leads from the public 
management principles related to Whole-of-Government examined in this 
research, the expositions from the participants and, in a broad sense, the 
arrangement of the FIOD and the example provided for in the development and 
establishment of a single special-purpose frontier border management authority. 
In the Netherlands, just as in South Africa, the responsibility for combating 
financial crime is distributed among various agencies. Similarly, the responsibility 
for managing the security and safety of South Africa’s borders is also spread 
among several agencies. 
 
Based on the discussion and examples in the literature of an organisational 
structure for a frontier agency to facilitate a “Whole-of–Government” approach, 
the researcher developed a conceptual model for an agency to combat financial 
crime. The example of a special- (single-) purpose frontier agency with the 
objective of combating serious financial crime is depicted in Figures 5.4 
(paragraph 5.12) and 6.4 (paragraph 6.7), representing the contribution of the 
researcher. It contains elements of Whole-of-Government organising, operations 
and institutions, in accordance with Figures 4.2 (paragraph 4.8), 4.3 paragraph 
4.8), 5.2 (paragraph 5.14), and 5.3 (paragraph 5.14), as supported by 
accompanying literature and data from the participants.  
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings made in this study, the following recommendations are 
proposed: 
6.5.1 The concept, nature, characteristics and examples of financial 
crime 
To overcome the problem of the loose and ill-considered use of the term financial 
crime in official communications, it is recommended that communicators do the 
following: 
• Familiarise themselves with the meaning and scope of the phrase 
financial crime 
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• Familiarise themselves with the type of unlawful conduct that falls 
within the category of financial crime 
• Quote the proper examples of crimes and behavioural conduct this 
research has shown to fall within the classification of financial crime 
when officially communicating about financial crime 
• Avoid the interchangeable and analogous use of the terms commercial 
crime, economic crime, white-collar crime and financial crime when 
officially communicating about financial crime 
• To prevent the risk of diverse understandings of the meaning of the 
term financial crime when developing strategies, actions or policies 
that deal with financial crime, developers must ensure that they know 
what it is that they must combat. It is recommended that developers 
familiarise themselves with the meaning of the term financial crime as 
explained in this report 
• It is recommended that the following definition derived from this 
research could aid in understanding the concept financial crime in 
general from a South African perspective: 
 
Financial crime is understood to be a subspecies of the 
category of offences generally referred to as economic 
crime or commercial crime that specifically targets and 
abuses the financial sector, systems and institutions, or 
property belonging to another, in order to gain access or 
control thereof, or to convert it for one’s own personal use 
or benefit, that generally results in a financial loss and is 
non-violent and profit-driven. It may involve fraudulent 
activity, deception, breaches of trust, concealment of the 
truth, often including crimes such as fraud, theft, corruption, 
money-laundering and tax evasion. 
• It is recommended that the following characteristics of financial crime 
be considered for correctly identifying or classifying financial crime: 
o Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation  
o Direct or indirect financial/monetary loss for victim  
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o Attains a direct or indirect financial/monetary 
advantage/gain/benefit 
o It is aimed at illegally obtaining property 
o Focuses on money 
o Non-violent 
o It is a crime aimed at the financial systems of a country  
o The focus is on the criminal economy and business systems  
o Makes use of fraud/misrepresentation  
o The proceeds are invariably concealed/laundered 
• The following offences, as a rule, can be included when providing 
examples of financial crime: 
o Money laundering 
o Corruption 
o Terrorist financing 
o Tax evasion 
o An offence in terms of the Financial Sector Regulation Act (when 
implemented) 
o An offence in terms of the definition of financial crime, as defined 
in section 1 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act (when 
implemented) 
o Unlawful conduct in accordance with a combination of the 
characteristics, aims and definition of financial crime, as outlined 
in this document 
6.5.2 The systematic categorisation of financial crime 
To overcome the omission in the National Crime Statistics of not making provision 
for a category of offences referred to as financial crime, the following 
recommendations are made: 
• The national crime statistics must include a separate category of 
financial crime to provide reliable information in order to guide policy 
development and planning in the criminal justice system. 
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• Reliable financial crime information, together with the parallel evolution 
of an effective communications strategy based on such information, 
can properly guide public opinion in the fight against financial crime. 
 
A meaningful, systematic method of classification of financial crimes in 
accordance with universal behavioural descriptors, irrespective of whether they 
are sourced from the common law or from the statutes (events-based system of 
classification), is proposed to overcome the problem of confusion caused by 
different definitions and concepts to categorise financial crime that are often 
based on strict legal definitions and categorisations of crime. To enhance 
uniformity and international compatibility when referring to financial crime and to 
assist public officials and other users to tailor their responses to combat financial 
crime for the development of policies and strategies in relation thereto it is 
suggested that the proposed events-based system of classification be used. 
6.5.3 Combating of crime 
To avoid terminological confusion regarding the use of the terms crime combating 
and crime prevention it is recommended that the terms be treated as two separate 
concepts, where it is understood that the term prevention of crime is always part 
of the broader concept of crime prevention, while the phrase combating of crime 
can never be part of crime prevention, and combating of crime is an umbrella 
term for all kinds of activities designed to combat crime.  
 
To aid in conceptualising the concept of crime combating and associated 
activities it is recommended that the term combating of crime be understood to 
include the following: 
• Crime prevention 
• Investigation of crime 
• Crime detection 
• Crime intelligence 
 
To keep abreast of the criminal landscape, it is recommended that the conceptual 
definition of investigation of crime be extended to include asset forfeiture, 
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intelligence gathering, disruption of criminal networks and taxing the proceeds of 
crime, as objectives of the criminal investigation process.  
 
To combat crime effectively and achieve the most cost-effective deployment of 
resources during prevention and proactive investigations, it is recommended that 
during the combating of crime: 
• crime intelligence be optimally utilised; 
• awareness be created regarding the value of crime intelligence; 
• capacity be developed to analyse crime intelligence; 
• the role and function of the FIC with regard to financial intelligence 
during the investigation of financial crime be fully appreciated and 
employed; 
• the cooperation between the respective agencies be improved to 
include sharing and development of crime intelligence. 
6.5.4 Combating of financial crime 
To combat financial crime effectively in view of the symbiotic relationship between 
financial crimes in general, corruption, money laundering, interconnectivity with 
tax evasion and financing of other illegal activities such as terrorism, it is 
recommended that government policies, strategies, plans, White Papers, 
legislation and other efforts consider a holistic view of financial crime and to not 
differentiate between specific financial crimes, for example only corruption.   
 
As regards the problem of corruption and money laundering co-occurring and the 
presence of one tending to create and reciprocally reinforce the frequency of the 
other, it is recommended that these crimes should be investigated in a systematic 
and integrated fashion. 
 
Realising that reactive resources will not match the sheer volume and frequency 
of financial crime, it is recommended that a hostile environment be created for 
perpetrators of financial crime by means of more effective crime-combating 
efforts, and that efforts be combined to include Government, business and society 
as a whole. 
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To overcome the perception that there is no concerted effort by the Government 
to accomplish a multidisciplinary and integrated synergy across agency 
boundaries during the combating of financial crime, it is recommended that public 
institutions and forums such as the JCPS, MAWG and ACTT do the following: 
• Be more transparent in revealing what their activities entail with regard 
to improving cooperation between agencies and the integration of 
resources during the combating of financial crime 
• Publish successes and achievements, giving insight regarding the 
level of cooperation and roles of other agencies in achieving 
successes 
• Explain what their objectives are in relation to combating financial 
crime and how they aim to achieve results 
• As opposed to advocating ideas, strategies or plans resulting in 
rhetoric, take active steps to implement such activities and make them 
known publicly 
• Communicate the high-level decisions taken and strategies developed 
to the practitioners on the ground 
6.5.5 Sharing of information 
To overcome and ease the process of complex or lengthy procedures for an 
agency to obtain information from another through the secure legal gateways, it 
is recommended that one piece of legislation provide the legal basis or authority 
for sharing information between the key agencies to combat financial crime and 
to use in criminal proceedings. 
 
To overcome the lack of awareness of the availability of information from another 
agency or other mechanisms for cooperation it is recommended that training 
interventions should include a module regarding the existence of legal gateways 
as indicated in this research, the correct procedure to request information, the 
circumstances under which information can be requested, and under which 
legislative provision it must take place. 
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Where MOUs have not been entered into between respective agencies to provide 
for operational agreements on how to obtain information from another agency or 
to ascertain other mechanisms for cooperation, or there is a lack of specialist 
knowledge that reduces the effectiveness of gateways to information that may 
exist, it is recommended that signing such MOUs should be considered. 
 
Where MOUs have been signed between agencies to facilitate and ease 
operational procedures to obtain information from one another, it is 
recommended that the provisions of the MOUs be sufficiently inculcated upon 
members of agencies to correctly interpret those provisions.  
6.5.6 Inter-agency cooperation 
Given the complexity of financial crime investigations and multi-faceted nature of 
financial crime, it is recommended that the combating of financial crime in all its 
facets not be undertaken by a single agency acting in isolation. 
 
To ensure that the full benefits of inter-agency cooperation are achieved, it is 
recommended that the institutional framework (key agencies) be considered 
when strategies for inter-agency cooperation are developed. It is recommended 
that the sharing of information be considered as a prerequisite for effective inter-
agency cooperation during the combating of financial crime. 
 
It is also recommended that the exchange of information among agencies during 
the combating of financial crime should be contextualised by understanding its 
purpose, as each area or category has different information requirements: 
• The management of financial crime risks relating to information 
sharing by and within those areas affected by financial crime, should 
be examined/understood for the purpose of reducing vulnerability, risk 
exposure, or potential harm that could be associated with the maturing 
of such risk. Government finances, the economic sector and industry, 
and civil society are three key nodal points where financial crime poses 
economic risks over the short, medium and longer terms. 
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• The financial crime threats in their various forms posing a direct threat 
to national security, the well-being, development and upliftment of the 
South African people, the stability of the Republic, the constitutional 
order and state institutions, and the sustainable growth and 
development of the South African economy should be determined. 
• The creation of formal working relationships between Government and 
industry to enable an effective, coordinated and integrated strategic 
approach towards the prevention, combating and investigation of 
serious crimes, including financial crime. The formal arrangements 
can be facilitated by the SAPS as the Government partner. Such 
formal arrangements aim to secure an undertaking by both parties to 
work towards long-term strategic and coordinated mechanisms 
between the Government and industry to combat financial crime. 
 
It is recommended that to enhance inter-agency cooperation, operational models 
have to be developed that make the most efficient use of the legal gateways that 
exist for the sharing of information. It is recommended that the following 
mechanisms be employed to promote an efficient exchange of information and 
inter-agency cooperation, and to avoid duplication: 
• Establish exchange of information systems where the incorporated 
investigative agencies are consistently aware of previous and ongoing 
investigations regarding the same persons or legal entities. 
• Establish policies and procedures that promote the strategic sharing 
of the necessary information within the intra-agency and inter-agency 
institutional framework. 
• Establish processes to resolve inter-agency disputes. 
6.5.7 Whole-of-Government 
To understand the driving force behind advocating a Whole-of-Government 
approach it is recommended that the formation of silos and the risks they present 
related to single-purpose agencies being assigned the responsibility for 
combating financial crime be inculcated upon practitioners. 
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To understand the benefits and operationalisation of a Whole-of-Government 
approach, it is recommended that the meaning of the concept integration be 
impressed upon practitioners as a prerequisite for undertaking Whole-of-
Government work. To successfully operationalise Whole of Government work it 
is recommended that the sense of the concept be inculcated upon practitioners 
before operationalising Whole-of-Government work. 
 
It is recommended that a Whole-of-Government approach be considered for 
implementation where, during the combating of financial crime, a requirement has 
been identified to: 
• eliminate silos; 
• prevent departments from working in isolation from each other; 
• achieve a seamless (integrated) Government approach; 
• avoid having various cross-cutting policies undermining each other; 
• optimise the impact of Government by using all the resources at the 
disposal of the State in an integrated way to deliver specific outcomes; 
• reduce costs and inefficiencies. 
 
It is recommended to ensure that the Whole-of-Government approach is viable, 
to result in inter-agency cooperation and collaboration to combat financial crime 
more effectively, by using one or more of the following organisational models: 
• Task forces 
• Interdepartmental partnerships forming joint teams 
• Cross-departmental partnerships forming agency arrangements 
• Special-purpose agencies forming frontier agencies 
6.5.8 Models for organising Whole-of-Government work 
a. Task Force/Task Team 
It is recommended that a task force or task team, as an organisational model for 
Whole-of-Government work to combat financial crime, be considered where there 
is a requirement to address a specific issue and time is of the essence. This will 
enable highly skilled officials to put their departmental interests aside and focus 
on developing positive outcomes. 
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b. Interdepartmental Joint Teams 
It is recommended that interdepartmental joint teams, as an organisational model 
for Whole-of-Government work to combat financial crime, be considered so that 
officials from two or more agencies work together to deliver shared outcomes in 
a mixed functional organisation where successes can more readily be achieved 
jointly than separately. The officials will continue to be subject to the management 
control of the relevant heads of their respective agencies. 
 
c. Cross-departmental Agency Arrangements 
It is recommended that interdepartmental joint teams, as an organisational model 
for Whole-of-Government work to combat financial crime, be considered, when 
one agency can perform a duty or task on behalf of another agency in cases 
where seamless delivery is required, or the other agency is better equipped and 
staffed with a better skill set. 
 
d. Special-purpose Frontier Agency 
To optimise the legal framework, capacity and skill set to combat financial crime 
it is recommended that the current institutional and organisational frameworks be 
harnessed under the strategic and operational control of a special-purpose 
frontier agency, as referred to in paragraph 5.11 of this research report.  
 
It is recommended that a special-purpose frontier agency as an organisational 
model to combat financial crime be considered where a Whole-of-Government 
approach to a contentious and complex issue is created outside of the normal 
departmental structures, where expertise, impartial advice and programme 
administration are required. 
  
It is further recommended that the conceptual frontier model developed in 
accordance with the information received from the participants and the literature 
and elaborated on in paragraph 5.11 of this research report be considered as a 
viable baseline model for implementation by the authorities in South Africa to 
combat financial crime more effectively. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
It has been almost seven years since a delegation of high-ranking South African 
public officials returned from a Tax and Crime Conference held in Oslo, Norway 
where, among other things, it was concluded that “developing countries can also 
benefit from the Whole-of-Government approach and, in particular, significant 
improvements could be achieved through early detection, effective investigation, 
prosecution and recovery of assets through the use of appropriate tools.” 
However, based on data obtained in this research, it has been found that efforts 
to combat financial crime effectively still suffer from a lack of integration, inter-
agency cooperation, collaboration and sharing of information covering tax, law 
enforcement, anti-money laundering agencies and others, as appropriate.  
 
This study was conducted with the aim of evaluating the prospect of Government 
using a Whole-of-Government approach to enable integration of efforts, inter-
agency cooperation, collaboration, and sharing of information between the key 
investigative agencies responsible for combating financial crime. These efforts 
can be implemented as a model to combat financial crime more effectively. In this 
research project, the researcher conducted a study of the literature, both 
international and national, to gain an understanding of the problem being 
researched. The researcher established the meaning of financial crime as viewed 
from an international as well as national perspective and determined how it could 
be categorised systematically. He reviewed the relevant legislation that informs 
the South African legal framework to combat general crime and financial crime, 
providing the authority and legal mandate to key agencies, establishing the 
institutional and policy frameworks, and allowing for cooperation and sharing of 
information. The researcher further conducted a study of the literature to 
determine what working in accordance with a Whole-of-Government approach 
entailed, and whether it could be implemented to correspond to available models 
that exist internationally. The researcher had to establish the prospect of 
implementing a Whole-of-Government approach against the background of the 
domestic legal, institutional and organisational frameworks, and the possibility of 
the existence of constraints weakening such prospects.   
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Using a qualitative research approach in this study permitted the collection, 
integration and presentation of data from a variety of sources that followed after 
studying the participants in their real-world settings and studying the text in 
documents (document study – p. 51) that provided detailed insight into the 
phenomenon of financial crime and efforts to combat it effectively. Obtaining data 
from more than one source added the methodological benefit of the ability to 
triangulate between the different sources to establish convergence and 
intersection of lines of enquiry or themes. 
  
Data were obtained from participants who are officials attached to the key 
investigative authorities responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
financial crime in accordance with a purposive sample where the participants 
were identified by the respective heads of the departments as knowledgeable 
and experienced enough to be interviewed. Although there are other agencies 
involved in the combating of financial crime, the interviews were focused on the 
agencies mandated to conduct criminal investigation, gather intelligence and 
prosecute financial crime, often seeking cooperation and sharing of information. 
 
The research aim was accomplished by responding to the following research 
questions:  
a. What do the concept, nature and characteristics of financial crime entail?  
b. How can financial crime be categorised systematically (codified) in practical 
terms, using as a reference a descriptor of unlawful conduct?  
c.  What does combating or to combat crime entail within the South African 
legislative, policy and strategic framework? 
d. Which are the key investigative agencies responsible for combating 
financial crime? 
e. What institutional models for ensuring inter-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts for combating financial crime are available, 
considering the legal framework providing for legislative mandates and 
sharing of information?  
f. What does the concept Whole-of-Government entail and how can it be 
applied or adapted for implementation by the Government to serve as a 
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model framework to ensure effective multi-agency cooperation and 
integration of efforts to combat financial crime? 
g. Are models for implementing a Whole-of-Government approach available to 
support Government in carrying out an organisational system, using all its 
key agencies and integrating its efforts to combat financial crime more 
effectively? 
 
Even in today’s terms, the inconsistent and careless use of the term financial 
crime creates confusion for policymakers, practitioners and officials tasked with 
combating financial crime. This confusion is exacerbated by the interchangeable 
use of the terms financial crime, commercial crime and economic crime when the 
intention is to refer to financial crime or vice versa. The conceptualisation, nature 
and characteristics of financial crime identified during this study contribute to an 
understanding of the phenomenon of financial crime from a South African 
perspective. The theoretical findings assisted in developing practical applications. 
The significance of a model to systematically and methodically categorise or 
classify financial crime is that such a method of categorisation avoids issues 
created by legal complexities, resulting in a simplified, applicable classification. 
Such a model cancan be used to set up a register or guide to financial crime that 
can be updated as new instances of unlawful conduct are identified throughout 
the development of the changing criminal landscape. 
 
The discovery in this research of what the concept to combat crime or combating 
of crime and, more explicitly, financial crime entails, provides a lens through 





• prosecution; to combat financial crime, can be viewed panoramically 
(360 degrees) to include sight of: 
o The legal framework 
o The policy framework 
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o The institutional framework 
o The organisational framework. 
 
The realisation achieved through this research of the complex, symbiotic and 
interconnectedness between financial crimes dictates that there should be a 
unified integration of all efforts and existing frameworks that culminates in the 
development of a theory of a Whole-of-Government approach to combat financial 
crime effectively. Based on the information obtained in this research, it is 
determined that inter-agency cooperation and sharing of information between 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime are an antecedent for Whole-
of-Government work and as such presents several institutional models for 
cooperation that could overlap with those presented as models for Whole-of-
Government work. 
 
The understanding of the concept Whole-of-Government gained through this 
study as an approach to public management assisted with the development of a 
model with the potential to organise the available agencies to do the work of 
combating financial crime. It is proposed that using a Whole-of-Government 
approach is a worthwhile approach for Government to consider in order to combat 
financial crime more effectively. 
 
 South Africa already has a robust legal framework and institutional framework to 
combat financial crime. The implementation of a successful Whole-of-
Government approach will most likely depend on the development of a policy 
framework and possible legislation to establish a special-purpose frontier agency 
backed by the political will to implement and make it work. 
 
The researcher is of the view that this study offers an important contribution to 
the understanding, categorisation and combating of financial crime, as well as the 
legal and institutional frameworks for cooperation and exchanging information in 
South Africa. In addition, a conceptual model for implementing a Whole-of-
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6.7 TABLES AND FIGURES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 6 
 
Figure 6.1: Institutional arrangement of key agencies to combat financial 
crime 
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Table 6.1:  Examples of financial crimes in the literature  
Financial crime Frequency 
(%) 
 Financial Crime Frequency 
(%) 
Money laundering 92   Bankruptcy fraud 8 
Insider trading 77   Securities fraud 8 
Fraud 46   Serious fraud 8 
Embezzlement 46   Insurance fraud 8 
Identity fraud 38   Consumer fraud 8 
Tax evasion/fraud 38   Bid-rigging 8 
Stock manipulation 38   Inflated invoices 8 
Bribery and corruption 38   External fraud 8 
Cheque fraud 23   Financial statement fraud 8 
Terrorist financing 23   Accounting fraud 8 
Corporate fraud 15   Theft of cash 8 
Advance-fee fraud 15   Inventory theft 8 
Financial fraud 15   Misappropriation schemes 8 
Mortgage fraud 








15   
Sale of fictitious insurance policies 
8 
Credit card fraud 13   Computer-related crimes 8 
Medical fraud 8   Extortion 8 
Point-of-sale fraud 8   Blackmail 8 
Healthcare fraud 8   Organised crime 8 
Currency fraud 8   Ponzi scheme 8 
Basic company fraud 8   Drug mules 8 
Subsistence claims 8   Bank account fraud 3 
False documentation 8 
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Table 6.2:  Examples of common-law and statutory financial crimes 
presented by the participants  




 Financial Crime 
Frequency 
(%) 
Fraud; 90  Tax evasion  90 
Theft: 50  Money laundering 70 
Tax fraud (evasion) 40  Corruption 60 
Forgery 40  Terror financing 30 
Cheque fraud 20  Racketeering 30 
Plastic fraud 10  Counterfeiting 20 
Investor/investment fraud 10  Transfer pricing 10 
Ponzi schemes 10  Offences involving fraud 10 
Customs fraud 10  Cybercrime 10 
Banking fraud 10  Reckless and fraudulent trading 10 
Advance-fee fraud 10  Share offer without prospectus 10 
Fraud relating to transactions 
between corporate entities. 
10  
False prospectus 10 
Double discounting of 
instalment sales agreements 
10  Deposit-taking without being 
registered 
10 
Manipulation of a computer to 
commit fraud 
10  
Exchange-control regulations 10 
Fraud related to Internet 
transactions 
10  Under-declaration of customs 
value 
10 
Kite-flying 10  Operating an unlicensed medical 
scheme 
10 
Mortgage 10  Failure to report money- 
laundering activity 
10 
Theft by trustees or liquidators 
of assets belonging to an estate 
10  
Identity theft 10 
Embezzlement 10  Securities fraud 10 
Extortion 10  Contraventions of POCA 10 
Cybercrime 10  Contraventions of PRECCA 10 
Uttering 10  Contraventions under the 
Customs and Excise Act  
10 
Corruption 10  Drug trafficking 10 
Counterfeiting 10    
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Table 6.3 Themes presented by participants to explain why they believe 








Mandates and functions are not 
collectively coordinated 
50 
 Intelligence not directed at 
protecting the financial system. 
10 





No common line of sight between 
departments 
10 
They have different views of 
what financial crime entails 
20 
 
Lack of information sharing 10 
Fragmented approach 20  Guarding of own turf 10 
Lack of skills 20 
 Regulators do not enforce and 
monitor offenders 
10 
Lack of qualifications 
10  Regulators do not follow up and 
monitor indicators of crime 
10 
Weak and unstructured private 
sector cooperation 
10 
 Regulators tend to focus on 
licenced individuals and entities 
10 
No – Lack of resources 
10  Agencies do not act in time, 
leaving it to others to do the job 
10 
Lack of knowledge 
10  Crime intelligence fails to identify 
and monitor suspicious individuals 
10 
Dissonance about who 
investigates what 
10  No - High incidence of financial 
crime is testament to 
ineffectiveness  
10 
Loss of focus 
10  Too many perpetrators get off 
scot-free 
10 
Different mandates in SAPS’ 
units responsible for 
investigating financial crime  
10  
Too much time lapse between 
commissioning and conviction. 
10 
Absence of governance 
structure to direct efforts 
10  No - Driving force is greed and 
therefore difficult to combat 
10 
Crime intelligence does not 
direct their efforts 
10  There is an absence of a task force 
concept 
10 
Too much reliance on external 
organisations  
10  There are legislative bottlenecks 
when it comes to information 
10 
Lack of intellect.  10    
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Figure 6.2: Arrangement of agencies according to operational capability  
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Figure 6.3: Formal models and mechanisms focused on improving co-
operation between Government and commerce 
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Figure 6.4: Participant’s view of the application (organising) of a Whole-
of-Government approach  
 







































































































































































































Participant’s explanatory notes (interview with Participant P010:2017): 
1. The structure should be guided by an MOU or TOR, granting them operating space, 
authorisation to share information, methods to collaborate, coordinate, implement and execute. 
2. Coordinated feedback via Directors-General. 
3. Future planning on addressing all challenges identified in addressing financial crimes and any 
other issue on financial crime in executing the whole-of-Government approach. 
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Figure: 6.5: Conceptual model for a Whole-of-Government special-purpose 
frontier agency to combat financial crime 
 
 
(Source: Conceptual model developed by the researcher) 
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ATTACHMENT A 
 
Participant Research Code:   
   
D Lit et Phil RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FORM: 
 
 








SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT 
This interview forms part of a two-phased research project, the first phase being an 
attempt to understand the meaning of financial crime in accordance with systematic 
categorisation, and the next phase to understand the current state of cooperation and 
collaboration across agencies responsible for combating financial crime. As part of the 
second phase, the project evaluates the prospect of the Whole-of-Government 
approach as a possible model for combating financial crime more effectively. 
 
In this research project, the concepts of to combat or the combating of financial crime 
collectively refer to the concepts of prevention, detection, gathering of crime 
intelligence, and investigation of financial crime. 
 
METHODOLOGY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION 
This interview schedule forms part of the data collection techniques used by the 
researcher to obtain answers to address the research questions. The questions in this 
schedule were prepared in advance and relate to the research questions. 
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During the interview, the researcher will: 
• Record your answers on paper 
• Record this interview on a digital audio recording device 
 
Afterwards, your interview with the researcher will be transcribed verbatim, and the 
transcription analysed to interpret the results. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions that this project aims to address are the following: 
1. How is financial crime understood among the participants, how is it described 
in the literature and how can it be categorised, using a systematic approach? 
2. What is the current structural and operational arrangement among government 
agencies to combat financial crime, is the arrangement effective, and are there 
government policies and strategies in place that will guide Government’s response to 
financial crime?  
3. What models are utilised internationally to ensure effective inter-agency 
cooperation and collaboration among government agencies during efforts to combat 
financial crime that can be evaluated for possible implementation in the domestic 
arena? 
4. What is the meaning of the concept Whole-of–Government approach, how is it 
understood, and how can this approach be applied or adapted for implementation by 
Government as a model framework to ensure effective inter-agency cooperation and 
collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime effectively?  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY 
You have been allocated a participant research code. Your identity will be kept strictly 
confidential. The information you provide will be used to answer the research 
questions. Only the results of the research will be made available to the University of 
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SECTION B  
 
1. Biographical Information 
 
1.1 Where do you work? 
 
 
1.2 What is your job title? 
 
 
1.3 What do your duties entail in relation to the combating of financial crime? 
 
 
1.4 Are you currently working for, or have you previously worked for, a Government 
investigative authority/agency involved in the combating of financial crime?  
 
 
1.5. If so, which Government investigative authority (ies) / agency (ies)? 
 
 
1.6 How many years’ experience do you have in any or all of the facets of the 
combating of financial crime? 
 
 
1.7 Did you receive any training or education in any or all of the facets of the 
combating of financial crime at a tertiary institution? 
 
 
1.8 Did you receive any in-service training in any or all of the facets of the 
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SECTION C 
 
2. FINANCIAL CRIME 
 
2.1 Do you think there is a common understanding of the meaning of financial 
crime? Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
2.2 How would you define the term financial crime in your own words? 
 
 
2.3 What do you think are the identifiable characteristics of financial crime? 
 
 
2.4 According to your understanding of the meaning of financial crime, what 
common-law offences according to South African law fall within the category of 
offences referred to as “financial crime”? 
 
 
2.5 According to your understanding of financial crime, what statutory offences fall 
within the category of offences referred to as “financial crime”? 
 
 
3. COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME 
 
3.1 Define the concept combating of crime” or to combat crime in your own words. 
 
 
3.2 Define the concept crime prevention in your own words. 
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3.4 Define the concept crime detection in your own words. 
 
 
3.5 Define the concept crime intelligence in your own words. 
 
 
3.6 Do you think that financial crime is effectively combated in South Africa by the 
agencies responsible for combating financial crime? Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
3.7 How do policies and strategies for combating financial crime or the lack thereof 




3.8 Are you aware of any government agency or body that is developing or 
implementing government policies and strategies to ensure inter-agency coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration to combat financial crime? If so, please provide the 




3.9 Do you think that there is effective inter-agency coordination among 
government agencies in their efforts to combat financial crime? Please substantiate 
your answer.   
 
 
3.10 Do you think that there is effective inter-agency cooperation among government 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime? Please substantiate your answer.   
 
 
3.11 Do you think that there is effective collaboration (sharing of resources) among 
agencies during efforts to combat financial crime? Please substantiate your answer.  
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3.12 Do you think that the sharing of information among government agencies during 
efforts to combat financial crime is effective? Please substantiate your answer.   
 
 
3.13 Are you aware of any constraints of a legal nature that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime? 
Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
3.14 Are you aware of any operational constraints that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime? 
Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
3.15 Are you aware of any constraints of a political nature that hamper inter-agency 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime? 
Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
4. INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
 
4.1 List the government agencies and/or investigative authorities responsible for 
combating financial crime in South Africa. 
 
 
4.2 What is the responsibility of each of the government agencies identified in the 
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4.3 What do you think are the benefits of sharing information among the revenue 
service, law enforcement, anti-money-laundering regulators and other government 
agencies during the combating of financial crime? Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
4.4 In your opinion, what can be done to improve sharing of information among 
government agencies in an effort to combat financial crime more effectively? 
 
 
4.5 What do you think are the benefits of cooperation and collaboration among the 
revenue service, law enforcement, anti-money-laundering regulators and other 




4.6 From your experience and observations, can you describe how the agencies 
responsible for combating financial crime in South Africa are arranged?  
 
 
4.7 Are you aware of any available models that can be applied or modified for 
domestic application to improve sharing of information, coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration among agencies during efforts to combat financial crime more 
effectively? If so, please describe what these models entail. 
 
 
5. THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH  
 
5.1 Section 17B of the South African Police Service Act in relation to the 
establishment and functioning of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation refers 
to an “integrated methodology” and “multidisciplinary approach”. In your own words, 
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5.2 Are you aware of an approach referred to as a Whole-of-Government approach 
that aims for actions to more effectively combat financial crime?  
 
 
5.3 What is your understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach in relation 
to the actions to combat financial crime effectively? 
 
 
5.4 According to your understanding, describe what it means for different agencies 
to work together, across agency boundaries, with the aim of combating financial crime 




5.5 Do you think that a Whole-of-Government approach in the South African 
context is a viable proposition to ensure inter-agency coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration during efforts to combat financial crime more effectively? 
 
 
5.6 How, in your opinion, should a Whole-of-Government approach be applied to 
ensure effective inter-agency coordination, cooperation and collaboration during 
efforts to combat financial crime more effectively?  
 
 
Thank you for your valuable time, participating in the research interview, and for 
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ANNEXURE F 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Affiliation: STUDENT AT UNISA 
 
Researcher: MR ANDRÉ EDUAN BOTHA 
 
Qualifications of Researcher: 
National Diploma, Police Administration (Department of Higher Education, RSA) 
M Tech, Forensic Investigation (UNISA) 
Title of the study: COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME: EVALUATING THE 
PROSPECT OF A “WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT” APPROACH. 
Purpose of the Research:  
In conducting this research, the researcher proposes that the aim of this study is to: 
Evaluate a Whole-of-Government approach as a model framework to combat financial 
crime more effectively whereby policy, legal arrangements, practices or approaches 
to combat financial crime can prospectively be arranged or modelled upon. 
Duration of the Study: 
It is projected that the proposed study, including the year for preparation and 
submission of a research proposal, will take six years.  
Participant’s Role: 
The role of the participant is that of a source of information to provide data through the 
data collection method of interviews between the researcher and the participants, the 
latter answering questions formulated in an interview schedule that is aimed at 
answering the research questions applicable to the proposed study. It is anticipated 
that the duration of the interview will be approximately three hours, but may end sooner 
if the interview has run its course, or by request of the researcher or participant, 
depending on the circumstances. 
Selection of Participants: 
The selection of participants is reliant upon a snowball method of sampling. 
Participants will be selected according to their involvement in government agencies 
concerned with the combating of financial crime, based on their perceived specialist 
knowledge and experience regarding the combating of financial crime. The researcher 
hopes that the heads or managers of investigative agencies involved with the 
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combating of financial crime will point the researcher to participants who, as a result 
of their knowledge, skills and experience regarding financial crime and the combating 
thereof, are likely to be able to assist the researcher in answering the research 
questions. The researcher anticipates that the participants will direct the researcher to 
other candidates who fit the same profile as theirs and who are likely to be able to 
participate in the interviews.  
Risks and Discomfort: 
It is not foreseen that by participating in this research the participants face any specific 
risks. The researcher has obtained permission or is in the process of obtaining 
permission from the heads or delegated officials from investigative agencies to 
conduct interviews with its members. The research, therefore, will be able to speak as 
sanctioned participants. The researcher will adhere to secrecy and confidentiality 
provisions to which the participants may be subject to and will not solicit any such 
related information from them. 
 
The questions formulated in the interview schedule to provide data in answer to the 
research questions are not of a personal nature and should not pose a risk of 
discomfort. During the interviews, the participants may become tired or feel 
uncomfortable, at which point the participant may request a break or request that the 
interview be postponed to a later date or terminated, if so desired. The researcher will 
try to ensure that the participant is comfortable and at ease to mitigate such a risk.  
Adverse Events: 
Not applicable 
Protection of Privacy: 
The identity of participants will be kept strictly confidential. Only the researcher knows 
the personal details of the participant, to whom a research code has been allocated. 
The personal details of the participant remain confidential and are not disclosed. They 
are kept separate from the research results by the researcher. 
Benefits to Participant: 
The researcher hopes that by participating in the study, the participants will experience 
the satisfaction of solving a problem that affects each South African citizen and the 
economy of South Africa., By contributing their skills, knowledge and experience to 
the study, they may also be of benefit to their colleagues and future colleagues by 
enabling them to understand the problems and offering possible solutions. The 
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participants will assist in providing insight into the problem that may stimulate future 
research and thus be of even greater benefit in the future. On a personal level, the 
researcher believes the participants will obtain personal satisfaction once they have 
discussed the issues emanating from the interview schedule with the researcher, 
gaining personal insights that were not evident prior to the interview. 
Benefit to Others: 
The researcher is hopeful that the results of the research will assist the government 
agencies responsible for the combating of financial crime to understand what financial 
crime means in the domestic context. It is furthermore hoped that the findings of this 
research will inform their strategies and plans to combat financial crime more 
effectively.  
Maintaining Confidentiality: 
The participants will be informed that their identity will be kept confidential and will not 
be made known. The participants will be informed that they will be allocated a research 
code.  The information that they provide will be used to answer the research questions. 
Only the results of the research will be made available to UNISA. Their identity will not 
be detectable from the research results. 
Statement regarding Gifts and Compensation / Reimbursements: 
Participation in the research is voluntary and without any compensation, 
reimbursement, remuneration, reward or inducement, whether prior or during the 








Participants are free to contact the researcher by means of the contact details provided 
on this form, at a reasonable hour, in connection with the interview particulars if they 
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Voluntary Participation without Prejudice for Non-participation: 
The participant is under no obligation or duress to participate in this research and does 
so out of his/her own free will, and can withdraw from it at any time prior to or during 
the interview without any risk of prejudice for non-participation or withdrawal. 
Withdrawal from Research: 
The participants will be informed verbally and in writing, as stated above, that they can 
voluntarily withdraw from the study at any point. 
Informed Consent ensures Autonomy: 
A signed informed consent form will be obtained from each participant prior to 
participating in the study. 
Security of Data: 
The data collected digitally during the interview will be stored on an electronic storage 
device that is protected by a password, and that will be kept separate from the 
researcher's research work and stored in a safe. The transcripts will be kept separate 
from the disk in a separate safe. A back-up copy of the electronic data will be kept 
separate from the original. Also password-protected in a different location for safe 
storage. 
Feedback on Findings of Research: 
The findings and recommendations of this research study will be communicated to the 
government agencies whose employees participated in the study. 
Access to Developed Products and Sharing of Benefits derived from Products: 
It is anticipated that the products developed from this research will constitute a 
framework or strategy that can possibly be developed into a policy document or plan 
for implementing a “Whole-of–Government” approach to combat financial crime more 
effectively. It is hoped that investigative authorities may co-opt such a strategy or plan 
for implementation as a policy or policy framework. The findings regarding such a 
framework will be published by UNISA once this research has been finalised, and can 
then be accessed by interested parties. 
Reporting to Ethical Research Committee: 
If required, a report can be made available, if so requested. 
Disclosure of Conflict of Interest: 
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Benefit to Local Community and Society at large: 
Financial crime affects all South Africans and the country as a whole, not only as direct 
victims of crime but also on all socio-economic fronts. Money that could have been 
used for socio-economic or infrastructure development is pillaged through illicit 
financial flows out of reach of the financial system. More effective methods to combat 
financial crime will mean a more stable financial system and ensure that funds 
earmarked for socio-economic and infrastructure development reach the intended 
recipients. Individuals who make use of the banking sector or investments will have 
more security, knowing their investments are safe or used for the purpose intended. 
Adverse Impact on the Community: 
The researcher does not anticipate that the research or its findings will have an 
adverse impact on the community - quite the opposite, as stated above. 
Dissemination of Results: 
As already indicated above, the research results will be communicated, and the 
research results will be available and may be published by UNISA will be available 
from the UNISA library resources.   
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY. 
 
DECLARATION OF INFORMED CONSENT BY PARTICIPANT: 
I, the undersigned (full first names) …………………………………………………… 
(surname)……………………………………………., having been made aware of the 
information provided in this consent form; agree to participate in the research study 
voluntarily, without compensation, and under any no obligation.  
 
Signed at ………………........ on this ………............... day of …………......…… 20….. 
 
Signature: ……………………….. (name in print) ……………………………………. 
Mr André Botha 
PhD student 
UNISA 









UNDERTAKING AND PERSONAL DETAILS OF PARTICIPANT  
 
D Lit et Phil Research Project: 
 
COMBATING FINANCIAL CRIME:  EVALUATING THE PROSPECT OF A 











(This code is cross-referenced to the interview schedule) 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY 
Your identity will be kept strictly confidential. Only the researcher knows the personal 
details of the respondent to whom a research code has been allocated. The personal 
details of the respondent remain confidential and are never disclosed. They are kept 
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2. What are your first names? 
 
 
3. What is your contact telephone number? 
 
 
4. What is your mobile phone number? 
 
 
5. What is your e-mail address? 
 
 
UNDERTAKING BY PARTICIPANT 
 
I, the undersigned …………………………………………………………, voluntary agree 
to participate in this interview. I understand that I will be allocated a unique research 
code and that my identity will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
 
Signature of interviewee ……………………………………………. 
 
 
 Signed on this ……………. day of .......................................... (month)  201.....at 
................................................... (place). at ___________(time) 
 
 
 
